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The conflict between military security and economic security which accompanied the first years of NATO has been much discussed.1 It arose out of the demands of voters in post-war western democracies, many of them with a greatly extended franchise, for personal lifetime economic security. The high unemployment rates and great uncertainties of personal income in the inter-war period were seen by many post-war western European governments as having weakened the fabric of civil society. There was a remarkable readiness, deriving from the desire of restoration regimes to legitimise themselves with electorates which they had largely failed in the inter-war years by satisfying the claims of voters for a larger measure of social security. In some countries-Belgium, France, the United Kingdom —, this was displayed even before the onset of the Cold War reversed the immediate post-war fall in defence spending. The welfare state, as it came to be called, was willingly embraced by politicians whose primary task in their own judgement was to re-establish the nation-states which had collapsed in 1938–40 as the basis of a European order.

It has taken a long time for the mainstream of economic literature to accept that the Bretton Woods Agreements did not establish the working rules of the post-war international monetary system. The conventional periodisation, in which these rules were laid down in 1945, suspended by Britain’s failure to make sterling-dollar convertibility work in 1947, gradually reintroduced between 1949 and 1958, and then fully restored by the general return to dollar convertibility in 1958, seems likely at last to have been put aside. A new schematisation is suggested by McKinnon, in which the monetary system sketched out in the Bretton Woods Agreements had no applicability after 1950.1 What emerged by that year was the fixed-rate dollar system, enduring until 1970. In this new periodisation it is the ‘rules of the game’ which define the systems, a Bretton Woods system which failed to operate successfully between 1945 and 1950, and the subsequent fixed-rate dollar system — a period of relatively stable exchange rates exceeded in length and stability only by the international gold standard.