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All the states involved in the First World War issued massive war loans. These operations, combined with taxes, money creation, and foreign credits, had both economic and political motives. They not only mattered for domestic ends but also had international implications. By focusing on British and French war loans and the way they were campaigned for in both the metropolis and the empire, this chapter stresses the role of transnational practices of observation for financial reforms. While they created new opportunities for mass participation in public finances, war loans also brought about new risks, given that so many people were now involved in the business of funding the state, a matter that would become explosive after 1918. The First World War therefore ushered in a much more unstable world of public debts, while dramatically increasing the power of the state to penetrate civil society and regulate markets.

The contributions gathered in Part I highlight the evolution of the balance of power between European socialists who supported acculturation to the modern state and those who remained irrevocably hostile to this entity as such. Although the latter group was active until the 1970s, socialists increasingly conceived the modern state—which they used to characterize as bourgeois before the First World War—as the most efficient lever to democratise society. From the 1980s to the present, however, a new form of targeted and ambiguous reformism gradually emerged. In the name of a necessary adaptation to globalisation, European socialists consented to economic and financial liberalisation but claimed not to be renouncing to defend (more or less resolutely) the social role of the state. This ideological compromise remained fragile, and was severely damaged by the 2008 financial crisis.

Socialist acculturation to the state implied the acquisition of its codes, functioning and language by the leaders of the different national parties. From the First World War to the late 1990s, socialist-leaning civil servants thus played a prominent role as intermediaries between these organisations and the state apparatus. In the second half of the twentieth century, this increasing overlap was crucial, when socialists were in office, to push through an ambitious programme of economic and social reforms. Over the last two decades, however, ties between socialists and civil servants were increasingly loosening. While discussing the causes of this growing disaffection, Part II addresses the crucial issue now on the table, which is whether or not this situation can be reversed.

How do non-established far-right actors reach visibility in the media? While much research focuses on media visibility of progressive movements and established parties, little is known about the coverage of grassroots far-right mobilization. Inspired by insights from media studies, social movement literature, and scholarship on the far right, the paper suggests that media coverage is a function of the protest strategies of non-established far-right actors. To this end, We use a new dataset measuring political claims made on the websites of CasaPound Italia (CPI) and the Bloc Identitaire (BI), and from newspaper reports in France and Italy. We use logistic regressions to quantify increasing media coverage based on specific characteristics of mobilization (issue ownership, dramatization, confrontation and counter-mobilization). Focusing on two countries with comparable political contexts but major differences in other factors relevant to far-right mobilization (number of migrants, asylum seekers, perceived most important problem, and proximity to elections), we illustrate that news coverage is more likely when CPI and BI mobilize on immigration, engage in street protest, and create public controversy. While broader comparative evidence is needed, the paper offers a novel meso-level perspective on the interplay between far-right mobilization and media attention, and it sets out an innovative method to combine online and offline data for the study of protest in far-right politics.

International audience; To what extent do parity laws in France express the myth of the French exception ?In 2000, France was the first country to adopt mandatory legislation making it a legal requirement for political parties to nominate the same number of women and men as candidates on election lists. French women only obtained the right to vote and to be elected in 1944, and the proportion of male Chairpersons of City Council still stood at 84% in 2018. To understand the specific nature of the French case, this chapter will begin by discussing the influence of the French republican inheritance on the exclusion of women from politics. It shall then examine how the French so-called Parity Laws are an answer to global preoccupations with the under-representation of women in positions of power, taking the national path dependency into account. Finally, It will show how the French implementation of gender-based quotas in politics and economics embodies or goes beyond the assertion according to which “gender-based quotas are in a way a simplistic answer to a highly complex problem, that of changing women’s historical representation. Gender quotas do not break all aspects of male dominance” (Dahlerup, Leyenaar, 2013, 249).

Book abstract: The Ukraine crisis in 2014 took many observers by surprise. Its magnitude and implications necessitate a better understanding of the drivers of Russia's actions in international politics. Russia's Foreign Policy: Ideas, Domestic Politics and External Relations analyses the evolution and main determinants of Russia's foreign policy choices. Its various chapters, written by renowned specialists in the field, shed light on and attempt to explain some of the new trends – including an increasingly nationalistic tone in foreign policy discourse and a heightened level of animosity towards Europe – characterizing Russia's contemporary policy. This study posits that Russia's behaviour is driven above all by objectives and imperatives linked to domestic regime consolidation. That is to say, Russia's foreign policy is the continuation of domestic politics by other means.

This article develops an electoral forecasting model for the extreme-right vote share in France during the 2014 municipal elections. On the basis of data gathered between 1998 and 2014 from a sample of 56 cities where the Front National(FN) has always presented candidates for municipal office, the model anticipated a rise in the FN’s share of the vote during the 2014 municipal elections. Controlling for political context through election type, FN popularity and electoral dynamics in addition to the criminality rate, this article adds to previous extreme-right forecasting models demonstrating that the FN’s vote share is not at all unpredictable even in the case of local elections.

Developments in French Politics 5 provides a systematic assessment of French politics following the 2012 presidential and parliamentary elections. Bringing together an entirely new set of specially-commissioned chapters, its central theme is whether the discourse of reform - initiated by Sarkozy - has been translated into tangible change. (Publisher's abstract) 1. From Sarkozy To Hollande: The New Normal?; Alistair Cole, Sophie Meunier, Vincent Tiberj 2. The French Presidency; Robert Elgie 3. The 'New' French Parliament: Changes And Continuities; Sylvain Brouard, Olivier Costa, Eric Kerrouche 4. Politics And Justice; Yves Surel 5. Local And Regional Governance; Alistair Cole And Romain Pasquier 6. Political Parties: The Ump And The Right; Florence Haegel 7. Political Parties: The Socialists And The Left; Frederic Sawicki 8. The Media; Raymond Kuhn 9. Interests And Collective Action; Arthur Goldhammer 10. Elections In France: Electoral Disorder In A Realignment Era; Florence Gougou, Simon Labouret 11. The Evolution Of Political Attitudes And Policy Preferences In France; James Stimson, Vincent Tiberj, Cyrille Thiebaut 12. France In Crisis? Economic And Welfare Policy Reform; Timothy B. Smith 13. Contested Citizenship In France: The Republican Politics Of Identity And Integration; Patrick Simon 14. France And The European Union; Helen Drake 15. France And The Global Economic Order; Sophie Meunier 16. French Foreign And Security Policy: In Search Of Coherence And Impact; Jolyon Howorth

The chapters presented in this volume have tried to answer to some overarching, basic research questions. How does Europe matter in domestic welfare state reforms? What is the degree of change in the recent evolution of domestic welfare state policies? Which European resources have been used by domestic institutional and social actors in order to support domestic reform processes? Which actors have been using Europe and how?

Since the mid 1990s, European governance has evolved substantially, particularly in the direction of fewer constraints: flexibility, coordination, peer monitoring, and soft law have become fashionable themes. The literature on ‘new modes of governance’ (or NMGs) has flourished alongside these transformations.1 Some authors have referred to a ‘governance turn’ in European studies (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger 2006). The analysis of the nature, significance and impact of this ‘new’ governance has indeed created a scholarly movement in its own right (with its ‘stars’, a specific language, quasi-specialised reviews, a multiplication of large-scale research programs, etc.). NMGs are defined, more or less implicitly, in opposition to the Community method. Despite occasional doubts regarding their legitimacy (Georgakakis and de la Salle 2007) or their effectiveness (Idema and Kelemen 2006), they tend to be viewed as increasingly important in EU policy-making.

This book provides an understanding of how decisions on voting are made within the context of the entire process of electoral decision-making that ultimately leads to the end result of an election. It describes the mechanisms used by the voter to make a choice and attempts to separate the social, political, and psychological factors at play. It also defines structural influences such as the effects of the current political and economic climate on which the dynamics of an electoral victory depend. But, above all, it reconstructs electoral choice within the time frame of the election and offers a study of voting behavior as the electoral decision is being made. This is where the book’s originality and its value lie.

There is no consensus in electoral sociology on the indicators and measurements of cognitive factors that are very often defined by the political awareness of voters (Hacker, 2004). Inspired by the work of George Marcus in particular, part of this type of research focuses on the role played by emotional factors in the determination of electoral choice. Work on the subject, which is on the borderline between analyses of political competence or awareness and political psychology, examines the explicative factors of voting behavior and the cognitive processes that lead people to vote. George Marcus’ work presents itself as an alternative approach to rational choice analyses and draws on the concept of the “affective intelligence” of voters defined as a mixture of reflex, emotional, and rational processes. According to George Marcus, the personality of the candidates as well as the mood and feelings aroused as the candidate becomes more familiar to the voter during the campaign are essential variables in the study of political awareness and opinions. He believes that citizens only manage to become familiar with what they feel to be likable and moving. The 2007 presidential election campaign in France provided a key moment to take these dimensions into account. The personality and image of the main candidates have rarely played such a central role or made it so necessary to take the voters’ “emotional intelligence” into account in explaining how their political opinions are shaped.

One of the essential elements in this election that broke with the past (Perrineau, 2008) and that paved the way to a comfortable victory for Sarkozy in the 2007 presidential election was the surprising erosion of the Le Pen vote. His support decreased from 4,804,713 votes in 2002 to 3,834,530 votes in 2007 representing a loss of 970,183 voters in spite of a strong increase in the number of registered voters on electoral lists (+3,278,145 voters) and the number of people who actually voted (+7,758,509). Le Pen who obtained 16.86% of the votes cast (11.66% of registered voters) on April 21, 2002, scored only 10.44% (8.62% of registered voters) on April 22, 2007 (Evans and Ivaldi, 2007; Fourquet, 2007; Mayer, 2007). The 2007 election was far removed from the electoral “shock” of 2002 when Le Pen eliminated Lionel Jospin and made it through to the second round. The extreme-right had already experienced such an electoral downturn in some European democracies but this usually occurred following a period in power. This was the case for the Freiheitliche Partei Osterreichs (FPO) in Austria and for the Liste Pim Fortuyin (LPF) in the Netherlands. After the exceptional success of the FPO in the 1999 legislative election (26.9% of votes cast, which was as high as the level attained by the right-wing party, the OVP), it entered the government headed by the conservative chancellor Wolfgang Schussel. After several years in government with the conservatives from the OVP, the FPO once again found itself at the level of the 2002 legislative election and then at 11% in the 2006 legislative election. It subsequently rose to 17.5% during the most recent legislative election in 2008 when it once again found a space for itself within the opposition. The situation was the same for the LPF, which obtained 17% of the vote in the 2002 legislative election and became part of a government formed by a union of right-wing parties (with the Christian Democratic Appeal, the CDA, and the People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy, the VVD) headed by Jan Peter Balkenende. Its share of the vote then decreased once more to 5.7% in the 2003 legislative election and then to 0.2% in the 2006 election.

It is frequently claimed that the best electoral terrain for Green parties is to be found in Northern Europe. Germany is presented as the cradle of political ecology for several reasons: the Grunen had their first electoral successes there; this is where anti-nuclear movements succeeded in emerging onto political terrain with the programmed closure of German nuclear centers and finally, ecological civic-mindedness is thought to have a clear impact on the electoral behavior of German voters. In France, on the other hand, a country described as being impregnated with the chronic lack of civic spirit which characterizes the Latin countries, it is widely believed that ecology has not really become part of everyday mentalities. This is presented as the reason why the green party took root there only later and without managing to achieve the same degree of electoral success as it did in Germany. The critical comparison often goes further: the French Verts are said to be ecologists in name only as it is claimed that, in reality, they do not defend environmental values with sufficient fervor due to an overly exclusive attachment to Left and indeed Extreme-Left values. Whether rightly or wrongly, French ecologists are reproached with being more concerned with the traditional issues of the Left-Right struggle (equality of living conditions or refusal of discrimination, for example), than with environmental values. How true are these assertions? Does the history of ecological movements in Europe confirm that France has fallen behind on this issue?

Through the eyes of a young American female radical socialist, living and working in Barcelona during the Catalan Revolution and the Spanish Civil War, the dreams, the nightmares and the realities of European politics in the age of dictatorship are fully brought to life. An autobiographical commentary written on the eve of World War Two.(Editor's presentation)

Cop. 2009

From 1945 to the late 1970s, social policies in France expanded as one of the key features of the Keynesian compromises that underpinned the trente glorieuses. Social spending was perceived as favouring economic growth and employment, social insurance transfers were seen as consolidating social integration and (occupational) solidarity, and welfare-state institutions supported social peace. Since then, all the economic, social and political functions of the social protection systems have been called into question. After a long period of crisis and resistance, French social programmes are being reformed in order to become better adapted to the new economic and social environment. These reforms are supposed to increase the economic and social efficiency of social policies. Whether they are also politically legitimate and socially just remains questionable.

The crisis of representation has been a recurrent theme in recent discussions of the state of the French political system. The rise in voter abstention and the obvious weakening of the link between voters and political parties have led observers to blame Fifth Republic institutions as well as the parties, seen as responsible for not having been able to adapt to citizens’ demands. The French political system, which in the seventies and eighties was a well-oiled machine, is said to have slowly frozen up, putting democracy in France in a critical situation.

International audience; Political parties in Europe face a crisis of legitimacy, which manifests itself through a decline in partisan identification, an increase in electoral volatility and a drop in membership figures. The development of new means of communication has transformed the way political parties relate to their constituents. In recent years political campaigning has become more centralised and more professional. Florence Faucher uses her research into party conferences as a vehicle for examining the changes that parties are undergoing as they provide a microcosm for the study of relationships between party leaders and their followers: it is where policy is decided upon and developed and where support for those plans is initiated.

A broad-ranging assessment of continuities and change in local governance in the western industrialized world providing in-depth assessments by leading experts of a wide range of countries exemplifying between them the whole spectrum of types and models of local government systems and networks. A central focus is on the impact of public management reforms, new forms of community governance and changes in central-local relations. (From the editor)

That advanced post-industrial democracies have been subject to massive social change in the postwar period is a given of the sociological and political science literature (Dalton, Flanagan and Beck, 1984; Franklin, Mackie and Valen, 1992). Indeed, the emphasis that the latter discipline in particular places on the link between social structure and electoral behaviour can obscure the undoubtedly greater importance that such changes have had on the quotidian as well as on mass politics. The fundamental restructuring of Western economies towards service economies, away from traditional industrially oriented infrastructures; the associated expansion of education in secondary and tertiary levels; social mobility among new white-collar classes bridging the traditional opposition of 'lower' and 'middle' class; geographie mobility, as the foci of economie activity have migrated from industrial heartlands to tertiary sector business-parks - these new patterns of sociological strata have engendered large-scale changes in lifestyles which, while not necessarily apparent at the micro-level to the individuals themselves, are nonetheless undeniable at the macro-level. [First paragraph]

Social media like Facebook are harshly criticized for the propagation of health misinformation. Yet, little research has provided in-depth analysis of real-world data to measure the extent to which Internet users engage with it. This article examines 6.5 million interactions generated by 500 posts on an emblematic case of online health misinformation: the Facebook page Santé + Mag, which generates five times more interactions than the combination of the five best-established French media outlets. Based on the literature on cultural evolution, we tested whether the presence of cognitive factors of attraction, that tap into evolved cognitive preferences, such as information related to sexuality, social relations, threat, disgust or negative emotions, could explain the success of Santé + Mag’s posts. Drawing from media studies findings, we hypothesized that their popularity could be driven by Internet users’ desire to interact with their friends and family by sharing phatic posts (i.e. statements with no practical information fulfilling a social function such as “hello” or “sister, I love you”). We found that phatic posts were the strongest predictor of interactions, followed by posts with a positive emotional valence. While 50% of the posts were related to social relations, only 28% consisted of health misinformation. Despite its cognitive appeal, health misinformation was a negative predictor of interactions. Sexual content negatively predicted interactions and other factors of attraction such as disgust, threat or negative emotions did not predict interactions. These results strengthen the idea that Facebook is first and foremost a social network used by people to foster their social relations, not to spread online misinformation. We encourage researchers working on misinformation to conduct finer-grained analysis of online content and to adopt interdisciplinary approach to study the phatic dimension of communication, together with positive content, to better understand the cultural evolution dynamics of social media.

The creation of the Party of European Socialists in November 1992 marked a new stage in the process of cooperation among Socialists of the European Union. In fact, given the stagnation of the previous phase, the PES contributed to reorganizing and heightening cooperation within European Socialism. The PES imposed itself and was gradually recognized as the unchallenged organizational center of coordination among Socialists at the European Union level, bringing a new dynamic to regional Social Democratic “integration.” More homogenous than the Union of Socialist Parties of the European Community (UPSCE), founded in 1974, the PES is today more coherent and better equipped than its traditional partner and adversary, the EPP (European People’s Party), to carry out “effective” actions within the European institutions. The PES’s political influence has grown (especially through the party leaders’ conferences) and its authority has been more clearly asserted and consolidated at the European level.2 Yet, despite its increased strength, the PES, like all pan-European parties, is in reality only a “proto-party,” a term indicative of a restricted partisan profile, even an elliptical one, and clearly incomplete.3 The reinforced PES remains a weak integrative institution.4

In France, as in most Western democracies, the main political change of the 1980s was the emergence of a radical right. For more than ten years, the Front national (FN) of Jean-Marie Le Pen gained at least 10 percent of the valid vote in every national election, with peaks of over 15 percent in the 1995 presidential and 1997 parliamentary elections. [First paragraph]

This article has no abstract.

This article studies the process of climatization of the French military initiated with the 21st Conference of the Parties in 2015 through an analysis of the discourses produced by military actors on climate change. I will argue that there are two ways in which the climatization of the military discourse operates. First, it leads to a reframing of existing security narratives such as migrations or armed conflicts through a climatic lens, which creates a sense of urgency and intensity. Second, the climatization of the military discourse is mediated by a riskification of climate change, through the adoption of a risk-based approach to prevent its security implications. It creates a sense of uncertainty and leads to the climatization of a growing number of security issues such as terrorism or illegal fisheries. Both processes contribute to legitimize military solutions in global climate governance and expand the scope of intervention of the armed forces.

This Special Issue aims to explain the transition from the Cold War US-led sys- tem of exclusive bilateral alliances in East Asia (or “hub-and-spokes” system) into a “networked security architecture”, i.e. a network of interwoven bilateral, minilateral and multilateral defence arrangements between the US and its regional allies and partners, and that also partly includes China. Drawing from the English School of International Relations, it challenges dominant Structural Realist expla- nations which interpret such development as a form of external balancing against a revisionist China. By contrast, this Special Issue submits that China’s selective contestation of the US-led hegemonic order in East Asia has sparked a renegotia- tion of such order among regional powers, which has resulted in the restructur- ing of the underlying alliances and defence partnerships into a networked security architecture. Specifically, regional powers have sought to broaden the composi- tion of the US-led hegemonic order in East Asia—by diversifying the range of defence ties between US allies and partners, but also by seeking to include the PRC in it. Thereby, rather than merely balancing the People’s Republic of China, they have sought to channel the trajectory of China’s rise within this hegemonic order through a mixture of resistance and accommodation. This introductory paper develops the theoretical framework and central argument of the Special Issue.

First published online: February 2020 That the symbolic is an identifiable dimension of contemporary politics is unlikely to be a controversial statement. Yet, political scientists have been wary of drawing attention to the category, if not in denial about its importance for their field of study. The article starts with an overview of the public policy literature and shows how the symbolic dimension is often treated as less "real" and as "mere communication". Despite the growing attention to feedback, narratives and qualitative approaches to the evaluation of policies, the symbolic remains a terrain treaded with care. In the second section, we propose a definition of the symbolic that highlights some of the key aspects that are relevant to political analysis and for the analysis of their role in public policy. In the third section, we advocate taking into account how public policies incorporate and use the symbolic and propose several avenues of research.

Over the last 20 years, the study of economic regulation has attracted growing attention in political research. But what is so political about regulation? And what is “new”in the political analysis of this topic? We argue that the answer to both of these questions lies in the evolution of the conception of regulatory power in political research. To validate this claim, we first review the main developments that followed the introduction of agency-theoretic models in this field. While recognizing their insights, we argue that these contributions rest on a narrow, essentially directive conception of regulatory power. With regard to more recent developments, we then show how a focus on other facets of the politics of regulation has connected it to broader political science questions. This focus significantly improves our understanding of regulation’s influence on economic activities, public policy, and ultimately, on the politics of economic regulation in the broadest sense of the term.

International audience; This chapter starts by briefly reviewing the long legacy of Third Worldism in Italy going back to the interwar period. After World War II the main thrust of anti-colonialism came from the Third World, where the anti-imperialist message gained popularity before gradually spreading to the West. The Soviet Union was often seen by Third Worldists as a deterrent against the colonial powers and at the same time a possible model for modernization. And so the aid policy toward the Third World became a peculiar feature of the Soviet strategy beginning in the second half of the 1950s. In 1959 the Cuban Revolution further confirmed the Communist direction of Third Worldism. Despite this overall picture the historiographical reflection within Italian Marxism on the link between communism, Third Worldism, and the political and social conflict in the 1960s and 1970s seems to have been minimal. The reason for this lies in the fact that the expressions Third World and Third Worldism were born within French sociology and demography of the early 1950s to describe the processes of decolonization and the rise of new nations under way at that time in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. And what was meant by these expressions also regarded very different phenomena: from the question of “non-alignment” with the development strategies of emerging countries, from guerrilla movements, to movements claiming economic rights in more or less institutionalized relations with the international system.

In the early 1990s it was de rigueur to argue that the challenge of competitiveness in an age of ever greater economic interdependence was likely to put pay to the institutional diversity of capitalism itself, certainly in the western world. Globalisation, in other words, was an agent of convergence like no other—driving down taxation, regulation and welfare spending.

This chapter analyses the methodological conditions for applying the notion of field to a specific kind of policy: water policy. It represents one of the few extensions of field theory into public policy outside the work of Bourdieu on housing. In that work, he approaches the policy by separating different levels of decisions and applying his theory to each independently. However, this research on the west of the USA explores the possibility of applying field theory on public policy by integrating all the levels into a common frame of analysis. We present the obstacles encountered in this process and the usefulness of field as an operative notion, rather than a fixed and closed theory.

An expanded definition of diplomatic practice to include “citizen diplomacy” allows scholars to analyze musical performances, when they travel across international borders, as acts of diplomacy. Music can perform diplomatic functions, defined as representation and communication. As a social activity, embedded in a specific socio-political context, music is loaded with symbolic meaning which subsequently is interpreted by the receiving society. The case study shows how performers of Russian music on the stages of two Baltic States (Latvia and Lithuania) take on or are assigned the roles of representatives of Russia. Public media and influential opinion makers take on the task of interpreting the meanings of Russian music in the Baltic public spheres and thus shape the opinions of Baltic populations on Russia. Although the State is not a necessary actor in the practice of musical diplomacy, sometimes, especially when the symbolic value of music is made related to the issues of national security, it intervenes in controlling the meaning of private musical initiatives. Paying close attention to the socio-political contexts in which musical diplomacy occurs may help it to become a useful concept to better explain international relations.

The history of the euro starts with the creation of the European Central Bank (ECB). It is therefore intrinsically related to the Maastricht Treaty which defined the objectives and statutes of the ECB and shaped the institutional architecture of Eurozone economic policies -the dominance of monetary policy over fiscal policies-, the characteristics of the implemented monetary policy -a form of inflation-targeting- and its performances. They are not sufficient though. Objectives and statutes were prepared for a stable environment. The upheaval following the global financial crisis required many changes in the implementation of monetary and fiscal policies which have questioned a possible change of economic paradigm.

Drawing from 55 in-depth interviews with residents of the new-build neighborhoods of Courbevoie and Levallois-Perret (Hauts-de-Seine) carried out in 2004-2008, Bruno Cousin analyze their sense of spatial justice, as well as the arrangements and compromises they display when their residential choices and their attitude towards local integration are challenged. By focusing on a segment of the upper-middle class that chose to live in new, remarkably socially homogeneous neighborhoods this chapter offers an unprecedented insight into the justifications, attempted justifications, and refusals to justify themselves of a population playing an active role in the upkeep and increase of urban segregation. It also shows that the distinction between classical liberalism and neoliberalism is crucial when analyzing precisely the subjective meaning-making and the sense of justice of the denizens of contemporary cities.

If, according to Harold Wilson’s political calculus, ‘a week is a long time in politics’, then 33 years is an eternity. Yet it is now almost exactly a third of a century since the very first edition of Developments in BritishPolitics (henceforth Developments 1) was published. It appeared just before the 1983 general election, though with a hastily revised re-edition published early in 1984 to take account of the re-election of Margaret Thatcher. Much, of course, has changed since then. The task of this concluding chapter is to gauge quite how much – how, if you like, developments in British politics have … developed. In so doing, I return to and draw on the concluding chapter of the original volume, Patrick Dunleavy’s characteristically crisp, lucid and still extremely useful ‘Analysing British Politics’ (1983). My central question is whether and, if so, to what extent, we can still make sense of and analyse British politics today in and through the categories, terms and theoretical perspectives that he set out so clearly a little over three decades ago. To start with, however, it is useful just to remind ourselves a little of the world in 1983. Ronald Reagan was President of the US, and Peter Davidson was Doctor Who. The Cold War was at its height, the Berlin Wall had yet to fall, Gorbachev was not yet general secretary of the Soviet Communist Party and the terms glasnost and perestroika were, as yet, entirely unfamiliar even to Western diplomats.

In recent years British politics has seemed increasingly unpredictable. The Conservative Party's return to single-party government in 2015 surprised commentators and the electorate alike, and Labour's choice of Jeremy Corbyn as its leader marked a striking change in direction for the party. Cuts to public welfare and spending have led to growing dissatisfaction among sections of the public, and the increasing popularity of parties critical of the government's immigration, economic and social policies appears to represent a call for fundamental change in British politics. With a question mark hanging over the country's global standing following the EU referendum, and with further calls for Scottish independence, Britain's immediate future seems uncertain. In the 10th edition of this highly acclaimed text, leading authorities reflect on the latest developments in British politics. Drawing on current research, the chapters provide a state-of-the-art, yet accessible, account of British politics today. All the chapters are newly commissioned for this edition and together they provide a systematic analysis of key trends, issues and debates. Topics covered include the legacy of Cameron's governments, the politics of austerity, immigration, and the question of what, if anything, is distinctively 'British' about the British political system. (Publisher's abstract)

The Obama administration has launched a series of diplomatic, military, and economic initiatives as well as issued a number of public pronouncements that over time have come to shape and define the so-called US "pivot" (or "rebalance") toward the Asia Pacific. After a decade of conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, this policy shift signaled a new direction for US foreign policy in the twenty-first century. [...]

Like most bons mots, relevance is a seemingly unimpeachable virtue, an attribute one would like conferred upon one’s work, and something only others lack. Yet it is not always clear what relevance actually is; nor, relatedly, what might make a work of political analysis irrelevant. In this chapter I reflect on the question of relevance/irrelevance, considering what it might mean for political analysis to be seen or judged relevant — noting, in the process, both that relevance is a property or attribute that can really only be bestowed by others and that it tends to be task or, at least, context-specific. I will consider how a political science more clearly oriented to the attainment of relevance might differ from the one we have today. In the process I consider whether political science requires a paradigm shift in order to enhance its capacity to attain relevance, reflecting on the implied identification by its critics of a ‘crisis of irrelevance’ associated with the old paradigm. I look at how political science might engage better with its current audiences, extend the range of audiences with which it engages and, in the process, change at least some of its content and form. Yet I will suggest that, in the end, this entails no paradigm shift: that little if any contemporary political science is irrelevant — but that most of it could be made both more relevant and relevant to many more.

Published online 9 March 2015 At the beginning of this century, the European Union engaged in a discussion on the necessity to shift to softer modes of governance, less detrimental for state sovereignty, which prompted lively academic debates. But how much has actually changed in the day-to-day practice has not been systematically analysed, and the severe economic and financial crisis experienced by European countries has radically changed the conditions in which EU policies are elaborated. Reviewing recent evidence, this article questions the dichotomy between old and new governance and shows that the crisis has led to a ‘hardening’ of EU regulation in key policy areas, while in others the Commission has proved to be able to use its ‘soft powers’ in ways that buttressed its influence. As a result, the shift to soft governance has not been as radical as one might have thought.

Based upon comparative empirical research, this chapter deals with the transnational mobility and rootedness practices of a segment of the upper middle classes (managers) in four European cities: Paris, Madrid, Milan and Lyon.1 The research follows a micro-level perspective, looking at individual experiences and practices and how they are expressed in interviews. In contrast to other studies on mobility (Elliott and Urry, 2010), this chapter simultaneously deals with the dynamics of mobility and rootedness of managers living in neighbourhoods with different social composition (mixed and homogeneous). We explore how these people combine mobility and deterritorialized practices, together with their embeddedness in their urban context and neighbourhoods. Comparing socially contrasted neighbourhoods allows us to grasp how our interviewees develop different practices in relation to their social context. Our main hypothesis is that this social group is developing ‘partial exit’ strategies, investing resources outside the city and developing transnational networks also to organize and defend its interests at the local level. In socially mixed neighbourhoods, where managers live with less privileged social groups, we expect these managers to put into practice ‘partial exit’ strategies to a larger extent than those managers living in homogeneous neighbourhoods.