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The article discusses attention of the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity to the security and safety implications of gain-of-function research and work of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) on Syria's declarations on chemical weapons.

The author discusses the gain-of-function (GOF) research with potential pandemic pathogens and the Infectious Diseases Society of America (IDSA). He discusses the importance of clinician perspective for risk-benefit assessment (RBA) of GOF research. The author mentioned the recommendations from the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) on the dual use and biosecurity of GOF.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various topics within the issue including National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) criteria's for public health and safety, avian influenza virus to be the most dangerous and the concept of dual-use research of concern (DURC).

The article offers information on the tightening of the global regulations for dual use research. It states that the U.S. National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) has been discussing it and making documents available to the government and public for years regarding the re-use of researches.