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Why has western foreign policy exhibited a record of sustained strategic failure, from Afghanistan to Ukraine? Why is it that despite the intellectual attention devoted to identifying the foundations of good strategy, outcomes remain so poor? This study seeks to bring a process of academic rigour to these questions. It pinpoints an inability to relate to problems proportionately as the major factor that accounts for bad strategic results and the growth of an anti-strategic predilection in policy-making. This lack of proportionality arises largely from a liberal-elite commitment to moral missions that undermine exit plans and bounded objectives. This sets in train an escalatory dynamic that inexorably spirals towards failure. Furthermore, rarely is there any accountability for predictive ineptitude or reckless advocacy, which merely entrenches the propensity towards poor strategic performance. The argument contends that these factors can all be captured within an enduring paradigm of total war, which exerts an overdetermining influence on western policy-making, pushing the formulation of strategy towards abstract goals and the unrestrained application of resources. While there are no easy answers to overcome these deep-seated problems in western strategic formulation, this article suggests that an attempt to move the idea of strategy away from 'problem-solving' to 'problem-framing' can offer the prospect of more considered policy reflection and facilitate a process of learning from mistakes rather than repeating them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Graft- versus-host disease (GVHD) remains a major problem after allogeneic haematopoietic stem cell transplantation, a curative therapy for haematological malignancies. Previous studies have demonstrated a role for the adenosine triphosphate (ATP)-gated P2X7 receptor channel in allogeneic mouse models of GVHD. In this study, injection of human peripheral blood mononuclear cells (PBMCs) into immunodeficient non-obese diabetic-severe combined immunodeficiency-interleukin (NOD-SCID-IL)-2Rγnull (NSG) mice established a humanized mouse model of GVHD. This model was used to study the effect of P2X7 blockade in this disease. From five weeks post-PBMC injection, humanized mice exhibited clinical signs and histopathology characteristic of GVHD. The P2X7 antagonist, Brilliant Blue G (BBG), blocked ATP-induced cation uptake into both murine and human cells in vitro. Injection of BBG (50 mg/kg) into NSG mice did not affect engraftment of human leucocytes (predominantly T cells), or the clinical score and survival of mice. In contrast, BBG injection reduced circulating human interferon (IFN)-γ significantly, which was produced by human CD4+ and CD8+ T cells. BBG also reduced human T cell infiltration and apoptosis in target organs of GVHD. In conclusion, the P2X7 antagonist BBG reduced circulating IFN-γ in a humanized mouse model of GVHD supporting a potential role for P2X7 to alter the pathology of this disease in humans. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the way in which the group calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (Islamic State) manages cultural heritage sites under its control. By drawing on three different cases--Palmyra; Sufi, Shi'a and Sunni heritage sites; and Mosul--it examines the way in which the logic of Islamic State's iconoclasm might also be considered a strategy. To be considered strategic the contention is that three factors need to prevail: the degradation and delegitimization of the existing societal fabric, the removal of all reference to the previous society, and an attempt to reconstruct society in keeping with a new ideological vision. When these three factors are present and interconnected then iconoclasm as a strategy can be said tobe manifest. In the case of Islamic State, this article also seeks to illustrate that its actions may broadly be categorized as either pragmatic or dogmatic, thus creating an inconsistent dichotomy within Islamic State's rhetoric. The article frames such a dichotomy within the context of a strategic narrative both in order to be able to connect pragmatic Islamic State policy to action and to show that when rigid doctrine clashes with the exceptionality of war an irresolvable paradox is created. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background The growing prevalence of chronic conditions in the ageing workforce has been shown to have a negative impact in terms of optimal work performance and quality of life. It is therefore important to understand the factors associated with sickness absence due to health problems. Aims To examine the socio-demographics, health status indicators, barriers to self-care and social support associated with working adults missing work because of chronic conditions. Methods We analysed data from working adults in the USA with one or more chronic conditions who completed the National Council on Aging (NCOA) Chronic Care Survey. Analyses were performed using SPSS version 22; independent sample t-tests and chi-squared tests were used to compare sample characteristics and logistic regression was used to assess factors associated with missed work as a dichotomous outcome variable. Results Among the 250 study subjects, employees who reported poorer general health status [odd ratio (OR) = 1.62, P < 0.05], more physician visits (OR = 1.45, P < 0.01), not having enough money for their health (OR = 3.69, P < 0.01) and a higher reliance on their co-workers (OR = 1.71, P < 0.05) were significantly more likely to report sickness absence due to their chronic conditions. Conclusions To reduce absences among employees with chronic conditions, employers need to understand the importance of factors such as employee income, resources and knowledge of disease self-care. US employers should explore opportunities for employees to offset health care costs, apply appropriate time-flexible work policies and encourage employees' participation in health knowledge enhancing interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twenty-first-century political crises stretching from Europe to the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific have undermined the worldview that governed post-Cold War western thinking about a liberal end of history. This worldview assumed that shared norms and transnational institutions would transform the state based-order. In this context, the use of force is considered appropriate only for humanitarian ends meeting a set of predetermined axioms laid down in chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Yet for any strategy to be effective-in an international order subject to change-a clear political aim is required, which might deviate from the general rule. Preoccupied with universal postulates, legal normativism has lost sight of the particular. The argument put forth in this article is that the failure of contemporary western foreign policy in the twenty-first century to address this limitation or to prioritize political ends has led to strategic confusion from Afghanistan to Syria and Ukraine. In this context, it might be useful to reappraise the utility of abstract rationalist approaches to global governance and return instead to an earlier understanding of statecraft that avoided premature generalizations and treated norms as maxims of prudence rather than axioms requiring universal application. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rhino-poaching crisis in South Africa raises questions about whether it should be tackled through judicial processes or by the application of hard-power methods. The poaching of wildlife has traditionally been met with a harsh response to send a clear message of punitive deterrence. While the reaction of the South African authorities has been no different, the contemporary threat posed by poaching intersects with, and is complicated by, wider concerns such as border security and immigration. In many respects, this has led to what can be termed the 'rhinofication' of South African security. South Africa has a long political tradition that relies on force rather than dialogue, negotiation and reform. Yet, the hard-power response to protect the rhino and other large fauna, though necessary at one level, often runs up against the economic frustrations and temptations of a large, predominantly black, under-class, which for generations has been excluded from wildlife management and conservation by white 'exceptionalism'. Poachers are thus transformed through their counter-cultural actions into what Eric Hobsbawm termed 'social bandits'. While this social chasm lies at the heart of the 'rhino wars', it is clear that in practical terms the lack of a political/poaching settlement in the form of a racially inclusive conservation strategy almost certainly guarantees their continuation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Carl von Clausewitz might seem an unusual thinker to invoke in the name of wildlife protection but his insights into the nature of war provide a unique perspective into an arena that arguably poses more complex moral questions of responsibility to protect than with humans. The increasingly dangerous world of wildlife conservation offers a prism for examining many issues linked to sovereignty, especially in developing countries. This study highlights how the commercial rewards of the wildlife trade have fed into problems surrounding national security such as corruption, sub-state insurgency and state legality. These factors have led to the growing militarization of wildlife protection and, in turn, raise a fundamental question: is it ever right for an outside actor to ignore international convention to save a species from extinction? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent terrorist events in the UK, such as the security alerts at British airports in August 2006 and the London bombings of July 2005 gained extensive media and academic analysis. This study contends, however, that much of the commentary demonstrated a wide degree of failure among government agencies, academic and analytic experts and the wider media, about the nature of the threat and continues to distort comprehension of the extant danger. The principal failure, this argument maintains, was, and continues to be, one of an asymmetry of comprehension that mistakes the still relatively limited means of violent jihadist radicals with limited political ends. The misapprehension often stems from the language that surrounds the idea of ‘terrorism’, which increasingly restricts debate to an intellectually redundant search for the ‘root causes’ that give rise to the politics of com placency. In recent times this outlook has consistently underestimated the level of the threat to the security of the UK. This article argues that a more realistic appreciation of the current security condition requires abandoning the prevailing view that the domestic threat is best prosecuted as a criminal conspiracy. It demands instead a total strategy to deal with a totalizing threat. The empirical evidence demonstrates the existence of a physical threat, not merely the political fear of threat. The implementation of a coherent set of social policies for confronting the threat at home recognizes that securing state borders and maintaining internal stability are the fi rst tasks of government. Fundamentally, this requires a return to an understanding of the Hobbesian conditions for sovereignty, which, despite the delusions of post-Cold War cosmopolitan multiculturalism, never went away. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the paradoxical effects of the 7 July bombings in London was to expose the ambivalence in the British government's attempt to wage war on terror by forcefully prosecuting war against those who resort to jihad abroad, actively participating in coalitions of the willing whether in Afghanistan or Iraq, while affording some of Islamism's key ideologists and strategists a high degree of latitude in the United Kingdom itself. This indicates a number of contradictions in official policy that simultaneously recognizes the globalized threat from violent Islamic militancy while, under the rubric of multiculturalism, tolerating those very strains of Islamist radicalism, some of which draw upon the interdependent and transnational character of conflict, to render the UK vulnerable to those very same violent forces. Consequently, the British authorities displayed a studied indifference towards this developing transnational phenomenon both during the 1990s and in some respects even after the London bombings. To explore the curious character of the government's response to the Islamist threat requires the examination of the emergence of this radical ideological understanding and what it entails as a reaction to modernization and secularism in both thought and practice. The analysis explores how government policies often facilitated the non-negotiable identity politics of those promoting a pure, authentic and regenerated Islamic order both in the UK and abroad. This reflected a profound misunderstanding of the growing source and appeal of radical Islam that can be interpreted as a consequence of the slow-motion collision between modernity in its recent globalized form and an Islamic social character, which renders standard western modernization theory, and indeed, the notion of a ‘social science’ itself, deeply questionable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]