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Background: Knowing risk factors for household transmission of Ebola virus is important to guide preventive measures during Ebola outbreaks.Methods: We enrolled all confirmed persons with Ebola who were the first case in a household, December 2014-April 2015, in Freetown, Sierra Leone, and their household contacts. Cases and contacts were interviewed, contacts followed prospectively through the 21-day incubation period, and secondary cases confirmed by laboratory testing.Results: We enrolled 150 index Ebola cases and 838 contacts; 83 (9.9%) contacts developed Ebola during 21-day follow-up. In multivariable analysis, risk factors for transmission included index case death in the household, Ebola symptoms but no reported fever, age <20 years, more days with wet symptoms; and providing care to the index case (P < .01 for each). Protective factors included avoiding the index case after illness onset and a piped household drinking water source (P < .01 for each).Conclusions: To reduce Ebola transmission, communities should rapidly identify and follow-up all household contacts; isolate those with Ebola symptoms, including those without reported fever; and consider closer monitoring of contacts who provided care to cases. Households could consider efforts to minimize risk by designating one care provider for ill persons with all others avoiding the suspected case. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The first outbreak of Ebola hemorrhagic fever (EHF) due to Bundibugyo ebolavirus occurred in Uganda from August to December 2007. During outbreak response and assessment, we identified 131 EHF cases (44 suspect, 31 probable, and 56 confirmed). Consistent with previous large filovirus outbreaks, a long temporal lag (approximately 3 months) occurred between initial EHF cases and the subsequent identification of Ebola virus and outbreak response, which allowed for prolonged person-to-person transmission of the virus. Although effective control measures for filovirus outbreaks, such as patient isolation and contact tracing, are well established, our observations from the Bundibugyo EHF outbreak demonstrate the need for improved filovirus surveillance, reporting, and diagnostics, in endemic locations in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Data on mortality rates are crucial to guide health interventions in crisis-affected and resource-poor settings. The methods currently available to collect mortality data in such settings feature important methodological limitations. We developed and validated a new method to provide near real-time mortality estimates in such settings.Methods: We selected four study sites: Kabul, Afghanistan; Mae La refugee camp, Thailand; Chiradzulu District, Malawi; and Lugufu and Mtabila refugee camps, Tanzania. We recorded information about all deaths in a 60-day period by asking key community informants and decedents' next of kin to refer interviewers to bereaved households. We used the total number of deaths and population estimates to calculate mortality rates for 60- and 30-day periods. For validation we compared these rates with a best estimate of mortality using capture-recapture analysis with two further independent lists of deaths.Results: The population covered by the new method was 76 ,476 persons in Kabul, 43,794 in Mae La camp, 54,418 in Chiradzulu District and 80,136 in the Tanzania camps. The informant method showed moderate sensitivity (55.0% in Kabul, 64.0% in Mae La, 72.5% in Chiradzulu and 67.7% in Tanzania), but performed better than the active surveillance system in the Tanzania refugee camps.Conclusions: The informant method currently features moderate sensitivity for accurately assessing mortality, but warrants further development, particularly considering its advantages over current options (ease of implementation and analysis and near-real estimates of mortality rates). Strategies should be tested to improve the performance of the informant method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background The UK heroin market is the biggest in Europe and ∼70% of heroin deaths are due to fatal poisoning. Methadone treatment for heroin addiction in the UK, the ‘British system’, is unique as it is largely provided by General Practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Background About 500 drug poisoning deaths involving paracetamol (acetaminophen) occur every year in England and Wales. To reduce the number of deaths, regulations were introduced in 1998 to restrict the sale of paracetamol. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of these regulations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Background Paracetamol poisoning is implicated in about 150–200 poisoning deaths per year in England and Wales. We review previous studies assessing the effectiveness of regulations introduced in 1998 to restrict sales of paracetamol and reduce paracetamol poisoning. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article discusses the authors' comments on the study regarding hospitals which frequently perform hip and knee replacements that achieve better clinical outcomes. They present a comparisons that have been made between doctors and airline pilots and highlight the benefits of standardization within the healthcare setting. In addition, applications of these lessons to public health is offered.

Clinicians frequently use influenza rapid antigen tests for diagnostic testing. We tested nasal wash samples from 1 April to 7 June 2009 from 1538 patients using the QuickVue Influenza A+B (Quidel) rapid influenza antigen test and compared the results with real-time reverse transcription polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) assay (gold standard). The prevalence of 2009 pandemic influenza A (pH1N1) was 1.98%, seasonal influenza type A .87%, and seasonal influenza type B 2.07%. The sensitivity and specificity of the rapid test for pH1N1 was 20% (95% CI, 8–39) and 99% (95% CI, 98–99), for seasonal influenza type A 15% (95% CI, 2–45) and 99% (95% CI, 98–99), and for influenza type B was 31% (95% CI, 9–61) and 99% (95% CI, 98–99.7). Rapid influenza antigen tests were of limited use at a time when the prevalence of pH1N1 and seasonal influenza in the United States was low. Clinicians should instead rely on clinical impression and laboratory diagnosis by rRT-PCR. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Knowledge from early outbreaks is limited regarding the virus detection and illness duration of the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) infections. During the period from April to May 2009 in Texas, we collected serial nasopharyngeal (NP) and stool specimens from 35 participants, testing by real-time reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (rRT-PCR) and culture. The participants were aged 2 months to 71 years; 25 (71%) were under 18. The median duration of measured fever was 3.0 days and of virus detection in NP specimens was 4.2 days; however, few specimens were collected between days 5–9. The duration of virus detection (4.2 days) was similar to the duration of fever (3.5 days) (RR, 1.14; 95% CI, .66–1.95; P = .8), but was shorter than the duration of cough (11.0 days) (RR, .41; 95% CI, .24–.68; P < .001). We detected viral RNA in two participants’ stools. All cultures were negative. This investigation suggests that the duration of virus detection was likely similar to the seasonal influenza virus. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

San Antonio, Texas, was one of the first metropolitan areas where 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus (pH1N1) was detected. Identification of laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 in 2 students led to a preemptive 8-day closure of their high school. We assessed transmission of pH1N1 and changes in adoption of nonpharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) within households of students attending the affected school. Household secondary attack rates were 3.7% overall and 9.1% among those 0–4 years of age. Widespread adoption of NPIs was reported among household members. Respondents who viewed pH1N1 as very serious were more likely to adopt certain NPIs than were respondents who viewed pH1N1 as not very serious. NPIs may complement influenza vaccine prevention programs or be the only line of defense when pandemic vaccine is unavailable. The 2009 pandemic provided a unique opportunity to study NPIs, and these real-world experiences provide much-needed data to inform pandemic response policy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A critical issue during the 2009 influenza A (H1N1) pandemic was determining the appropriate duration of time individuals with influenza-like illness (ILI) should remain isolated to reduce onward transmission while limiting societal disruption. Ideally this is based on knowledge of the relative infectiousness of ill individuals at each point during the course of the infection. Data on 261 clinically apparent pH1N1 infector-infectee pairs in households, from 7 epidemiological studies conducted in the United States early in 2009, were analyzed to estimate the distribution of times from symptom onset in an infector to symptom onset in the household contacts they infect (mean, 2.9 days, not correcting for tertiary transmission). Only 5% of transmission events were estimated to take place >3 days after the onset of clinical symptoms among those ill with pH1N1 virus. These results will inform future recommendations on duration of isolation of individuals with ILI. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A response by Oliver Morgan and James Hebblethwaite to a letter to the editor about their article on the three specific methodological concerns in analysis of waiting time data including self-deferral, case mix and lack of consideration of urgency in the previous issue is presented.