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In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence , John Tillson argues that initiating children into religion is morally wrong. His argument overlaps and intersects at various points with my own argument against confessional religious education in schools. In this brief reply I consider two notable differences between our arguments. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Children, Religion and the Ethics of Influence , John Tillson sets out a clear and convincing case for the view that children ought not to be initiated into religious faith by their parents or others with the relevant 'extra-parental responsibilities'. However, by predicating his thesis on an understanding of illegitimate religious influence that largely equates initiation into faith with the inculcation of a distinctive type of propositional content, I contend that Tillson misses some of the potential harms such initiation may engender. Here I briefly explain why this is a problem before suggesting three ways he might respond to the criticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The indoctrination debates have been a key feature of the philosophy of education over the past 50 years. While it is generally acknowledged that the pejorative associations of indoctrination only emerged over the last 100 years, those normative associations are widely taken to be an essential part of the concept itself as are the positive connotations of education. I explore some of the problems of assuming that the term must refer to something negative and the essentialism that this implies. The attempt to 'transvaluate' indoctrination results in the claim that the concept is virtually indistinguishable from education. Drawing on Ivan Snook's Indoctrination and Education, I examine several candidates for indoctrination to show that the pejorative label is not a good fit. I argue that much of what is framed as indoctrination turns out to be either impossible–implausible or necessary–inevitable; the fact that there is scarcely a gap between these extremes should give us pause to wonder about this term and its relation to education: By providing a term for those influences of which we generally disapprove, does the concept of indoctrination act as a way for educationalists to uphold and protect the normative view of education (that education must aim for something intrinsically worthwhile)? Eds.: This paper forms part of a Special Issue entitled 'Beyond Virtue and Vice: Education for a Darker Age' in which the editors invited authors to engage in exercises of 'transvaluation'. Certain apparently settled educational concepts (from agency and fulfilment to alienation and ignorance) can be reinterpreted and transvaluated (in a Nietzschean vein) such that virtues become vices, and vices, virtues. The editors encouraged authors to employ polemics and some occasional exaggeration to reimagine educational values that are all too readily accepted within contemporary educational discourses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and how does state indoctrination work? Building upon research on motivated reasoning and family socialization, I argue that only those individuals whose parents have connections to political patronage are subject to state indoctrination because their pro-regime biases transmitted from parents induce higher receptivity prior to government messages. Focusing on political education in China, I conduct a quasi-experimental analysis exploiting the sharp variation in textbook content generated by China's most recent curriculum reform. Results based on a national survey show that the new politics textbooks successfully affected only those individuals whose parents had worked for the government. The finding survives extensive robustness checks and falsification tests. I also consider several alternative explanations of the effects: preference falsification, selective attention, parental indoctrination, and educational quality. This paper not only highlights the role of intergenerational transmission in moderating the effectiveness of state indoctrination but also casts doubt on the actual degree to which regimes can change minds by changing educational content. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil-military relations scholarship forecasts that governments fearing coups d'état and facing belligerent external and internal adversaries face a dilemma. Governments can coup-proof to reduce coup risk, but such measures reduce military effectiveness. Conversely, if they eschew coup-proofing to maintain military effectiveness, they risk coups. This paper explains how governments facing coup threats and belligerent adversaries can alleviate this dilemma. It first describes five coup-proofing measures that generally reduce military effectiveness, such as politicized promotion and reduced training, and two other coup-proofing measures that do not reduce effectiveness, bribery and indoctrination. Because leaders can pick and choose which coup-proofing measures to employ, leaders facing coup and belligerent adversary threats can reduce the coup-proofing dilemma by adopting those coup-proofing measures that do not reduce effectiveness and avoiding those measures that reduce effectiveness, within availability and dependence constraints. The paper presents a case study of coup-proofing in Nazi Germany, a deviant case for coup-proofing theory and democratic victory theory because Adolf Hitler avoided being overthrown in a coup and fielded an effective military. The case study demonstrates support for the theory that a leader can simultaneously reduce coup risk and optimize military effectiveness by employing some coup-proofing tactics but not others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My discussion suggests that one of Richard Peters' main contributions to the philosophy of education was in expounding and stressing the need for a particular view of the subject, essentially conceptual analysis. The paper proceeds to defend this view and Peters' specific account of education against the charges that his work relies simply on preferred definitions and that it is unwarrantably prescriptive. The practical value of this kind of philosophy is then further assessed, while in the final section attention is drawn to Peters' commitment to the idea of education being an integrally moral enterprise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article addresses the ongoing debate over which criteria should determine what teachers ought to teach as controversial. I argue that this debate rests on false assumptions. It is a mistake to assume that 1) there should be a context‐transcending criterion, 2) such a criterion can be prescribed a priori and universally, and 3) this criterion can be utilised by teachers by means of deductivism. Instead, I argue in favor of a situationist stance in which the means and ends are both worked out from within the situation. This implies that a theory must begin from a practical starting point. In practice, the situation should be the foremost guide rather than a definite criterion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a reply to Rebecca Taylor's 2017 JOPE article 'Indoctrination and Social Context: A System-based Approach to Identifying the Threat of Indoctrination and the Responsibilities of Educators'. It agrees with her in going beyond the indoctrinatory role of the individual teacher to include that of whole educational systems, but differs in emphasizing indoctrinatory intention rather than outcome; and in allowing the possibility of indoctrination without individual teachers being indoctrinators at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates about indoctrination raise fundamental questions about the ethics of teaching. This paper presents a philosophical analysis of indoctrination, including 1) an account of what indoctrination is and why it is harmful, and 2) a framework for understanding the responsibilities of teachers and other educational actors to avoid its negative outcomes. I respond to prominent outcomes-based accounts of indoctrination, which I argue share two limiting features-a narrow focus on the threat indoctrination poses to knowledge and on the dyadic relationship between indoctrinator and indoctrinated person. I propose a system-based account of indoctrination in which actors with authority contribute to the production or reinforcement of closed-mindedness, which threatens both knowledge and understanding. By taking a system-based approach, my account is better equipped to identify the implications of indoctrination for educational policy and practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose of the Study: Financial fraud is estimated to cost consumers approximately $50 billion annually. To examine how new hires are trained to engage in fraud, this study analyzed a sales training transcript from Alliance for Mature Americans (Alliance). In 1996, Alliance was charged with using deception and misrepresentation to sell more than $200 million worth of living trusts and annuities to 10,000 older adults in California. Design and Methods: Transcribed recordings from a 2-day Alliance sales training seminar were analyzed using NVivo10, coded inductively, and examined to identify emergent themes. Results: Predominant themes were as follows: (a) indoctrination using incentives and neutralization techniques and (b) training on persuasion tactics targeted at older adults. Findings suggest that sales training focuses on establishing the company's legitimacy, normalizing unethical sales practices, and refining trainees' knowledge about how to influence older consumers. Implications: Predatory and fraudulent businesses peddling ill-suited products threaten the economic security of older Americans. Improved insights into sales manipulation strategies can guide the development of protective policies including educational approaches to help older adults detect scams and resist purchasing fraudulent products. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It has been alleged that compatibilists are committed to the view that agents act freely and responsibly even when subject to certain forms of radical manipulation. In this paper I identify and elucidate a form of compatibilist freedom, social autonomy, that is essential to understanding what is wrong with ordinary indoctrination, and argue that it also holds the key to understanding what goes wrong in more fanciful manipulation cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study provides exploratory evidence about how behavioral and neural responses to standard moral dilemmas are influenced by religious belief. Eleven Catholics and 13 Atheists (all female) judged 48 moral dilemmas. Differential neural activity between the two groups was found in precuneus and in prefrontal, frontal and temporal regions. Furthermore, a double dissociation showed that Catholics recruited different areas for deontological (precuneus; temporoparietal junction) and utilitarian moral judgments [dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC); temporal poles], whereas Atheists did not (superior parietal gyrus for both types of judgment). Finally, we tested how both groups responded to personal and impersonal moral dilemmas: Catholics showed enhanced activity in DLPFC and posterior cingulate cortex during utilitarian moral judgments to impersonal moral dilemmas and enhanced responses in anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus during deontological moral judgments to personal moral dilemmas. Our results indicate that moral judgment can be influenced by an acquired set of norms and conventions transmitted through religious indoctrination and practice. Catholic individuals may hold enhanced awareness of the incommensurability between two unequivocal doctrines of the Catholic belief set, triggered explicitly in a moral dilemma: help and care in all circumstances—but thou shalt not kill. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered’ Michael Hand revisits the debate on the right of parents to give their children a religious upbringing in a liberal context. According to him, the logical difficulty lies in the fact that parents cannot both impart religious beliefs and avoid indoctrination. While Peter Gardner and Jim Mackenzie have responded to Hand's paper and raised a number of pertinent issues, what is missing is a fuller treatment of indoctrination and belief inculcation for children. In this paper, I argue that Hand's fallacy lies in his flawed understanding of indoctrination and belief inculcation: the inculcation of non-rational beliefs, far from being indoctrinatory, is in fact necessary for children in the process of growing up. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Hand's recent paper, ‘Religious Upbringing Reconsidered', re-opens a debate that was flourishing over a decade ago in this journal and, long before that, in the works of others. In this response I examine Hand's claims that earlier contributions to the debate passed over the central problem and that he can solve that problem. I endeavour to show that several of Hand's arguments, such as those dealing with indoctrination, as well as his claims may be flawed, that the relevance of his inquiries is open to question, but that his hidden and, apparently, unacknowledged agenda should not remain hidden or passed over. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]