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The European Union (EU) is currently experiencing significant geopolitical shifts and is concerned that its dependence on externally produced or foreign-owned technologies risks its strategic autonomy, with implications for its security and economy. In response, it has placed sovereignty at the forefront of its agenda and at the centre of its relations with the world. Academic literature has so far paid limited attention to understanding the interactions between geopolitics, perceptions of technological dependence, and the impact on policy governance in cybersecurity. Bearing this gap in mind, the article asks how the EU's discourse of sovereignty and reducing external dependencies is shaping its approach to cybersecurity. Applying regulatory mercantilism and policy analysis to three case-studies—focusing on control of semiconductors, data server location, and cybersecurity certification— the article finds that the EU's depiction of its cybersecurity as impacted by dependence on externally manufactured products resulted in the merging of security and economic rationales. This has translated into efforts for greater control, either through promoting production within the European physical space through security-influenced industrial policies or—when this is not possible—by exerting regulatory influence beyond Europe's borders. Where globalization is believed to have failed, regulatory mercantilism becomes more likely as a policy approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this article is to examine the issue of 'lobbying' in the EU legislative process, using an interdisciplinary analysis of the development of copyright laws as a way of explaining why and how some lobbyists are more successful than others in having their preferences taken into account in legislation. As this article will demonstrate, the keys to successful lobbying in this field are information exchange, the ability to frame issues at an early stage in the legislative process (agenda setting) and the political salience of an issue. By assessing not only where legislative initiatives in copyright reform have been successful, such as the passing of the Information Society, Enforcement and Term Extension Directives, but also where legislative initiatives fail, as in the case of ACTA, it will be demonstrated that legislative success is not a simple case of 'big business getting what it wants', but of varying levels of political salience. Where the salience of an issue is low and voters consider that issue comparatively unimportant to other issues, industry representatives are able to effectively frame legislative outcomes. Where salience is high, and an issue important to voters, this ability is substantially reduced. By approaching copyright law development in this way, it is possible to reconceptualise the role of lobbying in the EU legislative process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]