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Throughout Latin American federations, programmatic welfare spending is increasingly nationally oriented and bureaucratically delivered. By explaining the logic and the effects of combining two types of federal spending, discretionary and non-discretionary, this article uncovers an additional driver that contributes to understanding policymaking and its implementation not only in Argentina, but potentially in other robust federal systems such as Brazil, Canada, and the United States. Using original data on federal infrastructure and programmatic social welfare spending for the twenty-four provinces of Argentina between 2003 and 2015, we provide empirical evidence that both forms of spending penalize opposition districts and more populated urban provinces (regardless of partisan affinity), and thus undercut the ability of key governors to become future presidential challengers. This research suggests that presidents of territorially diverse federations with strong governors can utilize the dual-punishment spending strategy to alter the balance of power, reinforcing the dominance of the center. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The theory of congruence in comparative federalism holds that institutional design will, eventually, reflect societal divisions by transferring central powers to new, autonomous entities. While this model helps to understand why many divided societies adopt federalism, it cannot explain why only certain unitary states transform into federal ones while others do not. We use a historical institutionalism approach to identify the critical junctures in the trajectory of two prominent plural polities, Belgium and Lebanon. We suggest that the politicization of identities during initial stages of state-building plays a major role in the transformation of a unitary state into a federation—which occurs in the former but not in the latter of our cases. The current contrast in both consociational democracies is explained here as a legacy of the late nineteenth century, which set in motion decisive logics of public governance that direct institutional dynamics until today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do common-pool problems persist over time in federations? The literature shows that macro institutional, economic, and political incentives facilitate bailouts through intergovernmental transfers and debt management. Little research, however, explores the legislative mechanisms that prevent common-pool problems from being effectively addressed. This article focuses on a most central mechanism: tax lawmaking. We argue that lawmakers, whose careers rest in the hands of provincial constituencies, administer the legislative process to promote bills that protect the federal transfers that finance vertical fiscal imbalances and to amend proposals that seek to change them. Using an expert-coded dataset designed to assess the direction and magnitude of tax policy change, as described by the amendments proposed by legislators to the full set of tax bills proposed to the Argentine Congress since 1983, we document the legislative dynamics underpinning the common-pool problems of decentralized fiscal federal arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Greek and Turkish Cypriot leaders have been negotiating to create a “bi-zonal, bi-communal” federation over a span of thirty-six years, but despite support from the United Nations and other intermediaries, no agreement has yet been reached. This article examines the reasons why the many attempts to negotiate a “federal solution” have failed. Our argument is that dyadic federations have inherent flaws that make them difficult to operate successfully, and even if the two communities could somehow be persuaded to form such a union, it would not be viable as a system of government. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper studies the effects of monetary policy in the presence of debt spillovers within a monetary union. When capital markets are integrated, the fiscal policy of any member country will generally influence equilibrium wages and interest rates across the whole union. We ask whether there exists a monetary policy which can offset these spillovers. Within a general class of monetary policy rules, there does not exist one that completely insulates agents in one region from fiscal policy in the other. These debt spillovers will affect welfare through two channels: intertemporal efficiency and redistribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconceptualizes shared rule and uses novel data to measure it, thus addressing two shortcomings of federal literature. First, while most studies focus on self-rule, one question that is largely neglected is how lower-level governments can influence politics at a higher level in the absence of “second” chambers. The answer is through shared rule. A second shortcoming is that even when addressing this question, scholars concentrate on constitutional-administrative aspects of vertical intergovernmentalism, neglecting more informal, “political” dynamics. Comparing the twenty-six Swiss cantons allows drawing two lessons for federal studies: That shared rule is multifaceted and complex, and that to study informal territorial actors as well as direct political processes is indispensable to understand how power is actually distributed in federal political systems. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Is Spain a federal system? Most experts do not give a straight answer and define the system with adjectives. They tend to underline how it differs from other federations, rather than focusing on what they have in common. This article presents Spain as a fully fledged federation, analyzes the process of political decentralization (1978–2010) to explore the ways it is constitutionally entrenched, and confronts the arguments of its critics. I argue that some of its idiosyncratic institutions are precisely what turn the Estado de las Autonomías into a federal system. A clarification about what makes Spain a federation is needed to prevent future reforms from turning it into what it already is, rather than effectively improving its functioning, and to dissipate the kind of Spanish exceptionalism that makes this case seldom considered in comparative studies. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article undertakes a comparative study of the concept of federal supremacy as it appears in the constitutional texts and judicial doctrine of the United States, Australia, India, Canada, and Germany. It discusses the complex judicial techniques and principles developed in each of these federations, and argues that the approaches based on “conflict” and “field,” respectively, should be distinguished as opposing paradigms of interpretation. The field approach is criticized as being incompatible with a coherent vision of supremacy, and as being itself replete with conceptual problems that are unnecessary to the resolution of cases. It is further suggested that the conflict approach is in itself sufficiently flexible to be adapted to all situations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Under the formula of “one country, two systems,” Hong Kong and Macau were handed over to the People’s Republic of China to become two special administrative regions. Today, China has a total of thirty-three subnational units or constituencies: twenty-two provinces, four municipalities directly under the central government, five national autonomous regions and two special administrative regions. With the creation of special administrative region, the Chinese state has experienced a de facto structural change and, in my view, can no longer be characterized as a unitary state nor a federation. It is more accurate to identify and define China as a “composite state.” The concept of composite state, developed in this article, not only will come to terms theoretically with the newly formed relationship between central and regional/local authorities but will also rationalize how the vertical separation of power is institutionalized, how different degrees and forms of autonomy are designed to accommodate each locality’s needs, and what the salient features of each autonomous regime are. With special reference to the autonomy practiced by Hong Kong today, the article proposes this novel legal and political conception in hopes that it will be able to provide a theoretical paradigm and a sound constitutional framework which can serve as an original approach to such issues as Tibet and Xinjiang, and also to the question of national unity and reunification with Taiwan in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Public opinion is often said to affect the distribution of powers in federal systems, the legitimacy of the orders of government, and system functions. However, there is little comparative empirical and longitudinal research on public attitudes toward federalism. Using several years of surveys conducted in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, we examine public attitudes about the treatment of constituent units, trust in the various orders of government, government value, power distribution, and federal political culture. We find many similarities, as well as significant differences, between public attitudes toward federalism issues in these North American federations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Federations exist to divide power and to promote diversity. Nonetheless, in federations interdependence requires degrees of policy coordination across governments. We examine two means of coordinating policies in the U.S. and Canadian federations: administrative and jurisdictional federalism. The former, with its centralized coordinative mechanisms, is thought to produce more uniform national policy outcomes; the latter, operating in the context of non-hierarchical relationships, greater policy variation. An analysis of cases in three policy areas in both countries indicates that despite contrasting coordinative practices, outcomes in actual policies implemented in the two federations are relatively similar. Hierarchical administrative federalism in the United States does not always produce the degree of coordination one might anticipate while a decentralized non-hierarchical system in Canada can achieve surprising degrees of coordination. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Critics of federalism have long pointed to overlap and duplication as evidence of a system under pressure. This article challenges their critique through an examination of Australia’s environmental assessment and approval regime. It finds that, in their quest to eliminate duplication and overlap, policy makers have imposed artificial divisions on a complex policy domain. By limiting the opportunities for political engagement, they have also surrendered some of the strengths of a federal system of government and removed important failsafe mechanisms which provide valuable insurance against policy failure. While the empirical argument is based on the Australian experience, the analysis has more general implications for federations characterized by concurrency. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

From the late-seventeenth to the late-nineteenth century, Yanktonais played a crucial role in sustaining the Sioux confederation. They served within intertribal forces resisting American encroachment, on diplomatic teams that sought peaceful initiatives, and as cultural mediators within the Sioux confederation. This essay argues that Yanktonais both strengthened internal links within the confederation and helped to establish Sioux significance on the northern plains. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyses the relationship between decentralization and the extent of fiscal discipline in the Swiss cantons between 1984 and 2000. From a theoretical point of view, decentralization and federalism can be associated with both an expansive and a dampening effect on government debt. On the one hand, decentralized structures have been argued to lead to a reduction of debt due to inherent competition between the member states and the multitude of veto positions which restrict public intervention. On the other hand, decentralization has been claimed to contribute to an increase of public debt as it involves expensive functional and organizational duplications as well as cost-intensive, often debt-financed, compromise solutions between a large number of actors that operate in an uncoordinated and contradictory way. Our empirical results show that in periods of prosperous economic development, the architecture of state structure has no impact on debt. However, the degree of decentralization influences debt in economically poor times: In phases of economic recession, administratively decentralized cantons implement a more economical budgetary policy than centralized Swiss member states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines recent and potential reforms in India's fiscal federal system. We summarize key federal institutions in India, including tax and expenditure assignments, and mechanisms for Center-state transfers. We discuss the institutional process by which reforms can and do take place, including the role of academics, political influences, and especially institutions such as the Finance Commission. In contrast to the past, recent commissions have played a greater role in articulating an agenda for fiscal federal reform, which then proceeds through political bargaining. This change has taken place in the context of, and been influenced by, broader economic reform in India. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many studies highlight constitutional asymmetry as a desirable feature of federal systems in multinational countries. This article looks at India which, mainly because of the special provisions for Kashmir in the 1950 constitution and the status of newer small states in the north-east, is generally described as asymmetrically federal, I show that, while India exhibits considerable de facto asymmetry, asymmetry in the constitutional powers granted to individual states has (i) not been important for India's ability to 'hold together' as often assumed and (ii) not entailed special protection of cultural or national minorities. I thus cast doubt on the normative political philosophy, particularly informed by Canadian and Spanish debates, that advances the idea of asymmetrical federalism as a model of governance in potentially divided societies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a connection between a discussion of factions or partial associations in Rousseau's Du Contrat Social and federal representation. The author discusses the use of voting in factions in federations. A discussion of degressive proportionality is provided. The article discusses Rousseau's view of the general will.

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses several articles published within issue on topics related to federalism.

Background. Many of the 1 million Swiss traveling to tropical or subtropical countries book their trip through travel agencies every year. These agencies are thus an important source of information about malaria and other important health risks and little is known about the appropriate health information provided by these. Method. A study was conducted to assess health-related information in members of the Swiss Federation of Travel Agencies in the metropolitan area of Zurich, Switzerland. A covert investigator (F.M.S.) visited these agencies and requested information on a package holiday for 2 or 3 weeks to Kenya. Following an in-person interview, the investigator recorded any health-related information provided on a pretested form. If none was mentioned, the agent was prompted using a standardized procedure. Results. A total of 88 agencies were visited. Spontaneous health advice was given in 44% of all visits. After prompting, 99% of all travel agents mentioned preventive measures against malaria, but only 69% indicated the need for vaccinations against other diseases. Spontaneous advice on malaria risk and vaccinations was better than advice given upon prompting. One fifth of all travel agents neither mentioned malaria prevention measures spontaneously nor recommended seeing a health specialist. Conclusions. Overall, travel medicine knowledge of travel agents in the Zurich area needs improvement as many tended to draw attention to health risks only when prompted. Attitude, personal knowledge, and experience of individual travel agents were key to the health information given. Up-to-date and readily available information on health risks should be provided to travel agencies and structured training given in collaboration with health professionals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Conventional wisdom ascribes to Land parliaments at best a supporting role in German politics and a minor influence on public decision making. Land parliaments are often dismissed as having few substantial legislative or other functions. However, a closer analysis reveals a more complex picture. Even though the legislative function of Land parliaments is limited, these regional bodies of representation are indispensable institutions for the German federal system. This article analyzes the legislative role, the elective function, and the participation of Land parliaments in coalition building as well as developments in the Land party systems. It is shown that in these areas the Land level is more important than is commonly thought. Recent changes indicate that Land parliaments may play an even more pronounced role in the future. The prevailing theoretical approach that sees federalism dominating German consensus democracy thus seems too general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Book Review Identities, Trust, and Cohesion in Federal Systems: Public Perspectives, edited by Jack Jedwab and John Kincaid, Kingston, ON: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2018, 290 pp., $39.95 Paperback Reviewed by Jennifer Wolak University of Colorado at Boulder One indicator of the successful performance of a federalized government is the degree to which people are satisfied with how it works. A. J. Brown and Jacob Deem report that Australians are mostly satisfied with the state of federalism in their country, both in principle and in practice. [Extracted from the article]

Explores the significance of the constitutional order in the U.S. labor history. Ideology of workers during the first century of the new republic; Problems of republicanism; Disengagement of the American Federation of Labor from the tradition of labor republicanism.

Provides an overview of the situation during the eighteenth-century from which the U.S. Constitution came. Reformation of the Articles of Confederation; Draft of state constitutions; Adoption of policies by legislators that were favorable to their interests; Democratization of the state governments; Reaction of policymakers to social change.

Compares the U.S. and Canadian Constitutions as a federal document. Differences and similarities of the federal system between Canada and the U.S.; Features of the federation created by the British North America Act; Influences supporting the process of nation building on Canada and the U.S.; Proportion of total revenues and public expenditures attributable to the national governments of U.S. and Canada.

In a Federal system of government, each unit of government decides independently how much of each type of public good to provide, and what types of taxes, and which tax rates, to use in funding the public goods. In this paper we explore what types of problems can arise from this decentralized form of decision-making. In particular, we describe systematically the types of externalities that one unit of government can create for nonresidents, through both its public goods decisions and its taxation decisions. The paper also explores briefly what the central government might do to lessen the costs of decentralized decision-making. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Both the Amen can and the German federal systems are acting under the impact of increasing globalization and are involved in processes of macro-regional integration. These developments are of vital interest for the constituent members of both federations. In such transformations, the nature of the representation of subnational units is a pivotal element. The crucial point is whether the federation and/or the new transnational regimes provide for the representation of subnational territorial units and give space for their horizontal cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Constitutions alone do not make or break federations. In any event, they are not static, and evolve over time through judicial review and political understandings, even in the absence of constitutional change. Nevertheless, institutions, principles, and procedures for which constitutions provide are significant influences on federations. This article examines some key features of federal constitutional arrangements in different federal systems: the status of the constituent instrument; the division of powers between the orders of government; the scope of economic union; regional disparity; and the relationship of federalism to the rest of the system of government. Today, there is a wide and widening variety of federal structures in systems around the world. Borrowing is tempting, but should be done with care; federalist elements are closely linked with other aspects of a system of government and with the historical, political, and economic setting in which it has been developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores "federalism" as an abstract concept of political theory like liberalism and socialism, and "federation" as a descriptive term connoting a system of government. The term "federative systems" connotes the genus of which federations are a species. "Federalism" as a concept has important implications for comparative studies of federations such as the Untied States, Canada, and India. Canada and India began as quasi-federations and have gradually become federations. They are not based on federalism as a concept. The U.S. Constitution was not only the blueprint for a federation, but was inspired by a political theory we call "federalism," a set of interlocking principles of government very different from the parliamentary tradition that Canada and India inherited from the United Kingdom. If these two countries wish to proceed beyond treating federation as the distribution of power, they will have to reappraise their parliamentary tradition and, in due course, evolve their own concept of federalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interstate tax disharmony arising from the states' attempt to "free-ride" on other states can cause distortions and inequity in a federal system. In this article, an attempt is made to analyze interstate disharmony in the Indian tax system, provide a quantitative measure of disharmony, examine its trend overtime, and compare the degree of disharmony in India with three other important federations. The major conclusions are that (1) India has a higher degree of interstate tax disharmony than Australia, Canada, and the United States; (2) tax disharmony in India has increased over time unlike in the other three federations; and (3) tax disharmony in respect of individual state taxes is higher than the taxes taken in aggregate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research examines the frequency of utilization and the usefulness of interstate compacts as a contemporary instrument of intergovernmental relations. Beginning with a discussion of the legal status of compacts, the author then reviews historic and current scholarship on compacts. Changes over time in the enactment of compacts are observed, together with changes in the types and scope of compacts. The procedures of the State of Maryland are used as a case study in evaluating the benefits of compact membership. In conclusion, the author discusses recent academic interest in this aspect of intergovernmental relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

By dividing political power between the national government and multiple constituent governments, a federal system automatically produces relations among the constituent governments. This article describes six provisions of the U.S. Constitution for handling relations between the states: (1) federal judicial settlement of interstate disputes, (2) cooperative action by states, (3) privileges and immunities within each state for our-of-state citizens of the United States, (4)full faith and credit for the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of each state, (5) interstate rendition, and (6) free interchange of commerce among the states. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes key Clinton administration initiatives in education and the framework that underlies them. It then addresses four aspects of intergovernmental relationships highlighted by current federal policy: an emphasis on policy coherence within and across governments; the emerging importance of "national, "as opposed to federal, policy leadership; the acceptance of the key role of states in education policy; and, perhaps, more stability in the federal system related to the convergence of policy at all levels around results or outcomes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is often claimed that overlapping government activity in Canada's federal system causes significant government inefficiency. The three major studies on the subject have demonstrated the existence of extensive overlap, bur they resort to qualitative arguments and anecdotal evidence to conclude either that overlap causes significant government inefficiency (the traditional provincial position) or that overlap is fairly well managed (the traditional federal position). Thus, the debate about overlap remains essentially a debate about federal and provincial power, nor about efficiency. This is apparently unavoidable, due to the difficulty of measuring the effect of overlap on efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The sharp increase in the number of congressional partial and total preemption statutes and innovative use of preemption powers since 1965 have produced major changes in federal-state relations. The Congress has become a unitary government in several regulatory fields and also finances its policies in other fields in part by imposing burdensome mandates and restraints on state and local governments. Current federalism theories fail 10 account for the changes produced by preemption or to address alternatives to preemption other than conditional grants-in-aid. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 1991, the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) announced that a health-care worker (HCW) had apparently transmitted the virus that causes the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) to patients while providing them routine medical treatment. This article examines the policy choices made based on this case. It begins by reviewing the federal system for making these policies. The conflicting public and professional policy recommendations are then summarized. Next, a frame work for policy choice in a federal system is outlined and federal and state choices are described. The final section suggests some implications of these choices for American federalism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The idea that the president should manage intergovernmental relationships gained credence and became more feasible as the Executive Office of the President developed managerial capacities. Executive-centered intergovernmental management gained considerable support in the Kestnbaumn Commission's deliberations, developed rapidly in response to Great Society coordination problems, and culminated during the Nixon administration. This perspective relies on the use of hierarchical managemnent techniques to produce an orderly. rational federal system. Its decline began during the Carter administration and accelerated during the Reagan years. It is doubtful that this perspective will again be influential, given the erosion of professional support for and waning presidential interest in comprehensive, federal intergovernmental management. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although the Fourteenth Amendment has been the vehicle for a number of transformations in the protection of rights, there has been no consensus on what it means. The amendment is sometimes held to have revolutionized the Constitution, in effect replacing the traditional federal system with a more national system. It is also argued that the amendment essentially reaffirmed the prewar Constitution. The truth appears to lie with neither side: the drafters of the amendment attempted to "complete the Constitution," neither to reform it radically, nor to reaffirm it simply, in doing so, they unwittingly followed in the tracks of the original "father of the Constitution, "James Madison, who believed the original Constitution to be defective in important ways. Proper attention to the context and the structure of the text of the amendment reveals just how the amendment was to "complete the Constitution." So examined, the amendment reveals itself to be a precisely stated, clearly drafted text, containing a number of new constitutional principles. Properly understood, the amendment affords constitutional protection far rights already possessed in some sense, but therefore unprotected in the old Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Like most federal Systems, Nigeria has a revenue distribution system in which the national government shares revenues with state and local governments. Since the early 1970s, the bulk of revenue has been collected by the national government. Much of this revenue has been derived from petroleum taxes and mining rents and royalties. Various proportions of this revenue have then been distributed to state and local governments under a revenue allocation system (RAS) using different formulas. A key problem, however, is that revenue allocations since 1970 have been driven largely by political considerations and by formula factors, such as jurisdictional population and state equality, rather than by factors associated with economic development imperatives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As part of its transition program to civilian federal democracy, the federal military government has constitutionalizeda two-party system along federal lines, provided funding and other facilities to the two parties, and established institutions, such as the National Electoral Commission and the Directorate for Social Mobilisation, to supervise and over see the two-party process. This regimentation is seen as being necessary because Nigeria has not been able to sustain either democracy or a stable party system in the past. The stage has been set, therefore,for the maintenance of a two-party system in the Third Republic, but many problems remain to be resolved before the stable, competitive party system becomes rooted in Nigeria's federal system, societal diversity, and political culture. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The origins of Nigeria's federalism lie not in the pluralities of economic and geographic regions or of ethnic nationalities, but in the plurality of colonial administrative traditions imposed by the British. Different administrative traditions were especially evident in the Northern and Southern Regions of Nigeria. These traditions produced regional rivalry and conflict that were entrenched in the Nigerian polity by the processes of consolidation and nation-building. After independence, this regional rivalry became the basis for triggering the conflicts between economic and ethnic areas present in Nigeria's federal system and for creating more states in attempts to accommodate various group interests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The stock opinion among students of interest groups has, until recently, posited that groups in countries with a federal system of government are less cohesive and more prone to disunity than interest groups in unitary states. This article addresses this relationship between federalism and weak group cohesion in an attempt to explain the contrasting patterns of cohesion in two peak Australian business groups, each a confederation in structure. The literature on federalism and group cohesion gives insufficient attention to the divisive impact of three factors: party government, size and wealth inequalities among a group's constituent units, and a group's decision and payoff rules. The literature also gives insufficient attention to the determinants of group secession. It is the contention of the article that conflicts over the fairness of a federated organization's rules, particularly when the large, wealthy units find themselves outvoted by the small, poor Units, can be sufficient to provoke the aggrieved units to secede. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been a longstanding interest in the relationship between the party system in reflecting regional diversity and maintaining the dispersal of power in federations. Given the relative scarcity of information on this question in the Australian federation, this article examines the extent to which the party systems of the Australian states differ by looking at a number of indicators summarizing patterns of partisan support in elections and legislatures over a period of forty years. Its findings demonstrate persistent differences in the structure and dynamics of the state party systems. In particular, the study shows that, in spite of the dichotomizing tendencies of a parliamentary system, electoral competition in the Australian states is characterized by a strong tendency to dispersed multi-partyism rather than simple bipartyism, although the individual states occupy varying positions within this range. The charring of this partisan diversity is important in questioning some of the presumptions of regional uniformity that have been applied to the study of the Australian federal system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public policy is the overt activity of governing and what governments have as their primary purpose. This is so whether the political system is unitary or federal. There are many more elements that complicate policymaking in a federal system. In particular, constitutional, financial, and political issues intrude because of the necessary interdependence of otherwise independent and autonomous national and subnational components. This article addresses this complexity of joint action through use of the ideas about federalism, the structure of governing institutions, and the processes of policymaking. The extent to which an outcome depends on the mixture of independence and interdependence is conceptualized as degrees of the federal factor. Linking this concept to particular policy arenas may provide a better understanding of federal systems than explanation from centralization or decentralization or dependence or independence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the Australian experience with coordinated government borrowing from federation to the present day. It reveals significant changes in the purposes for which the borrowing arrangements were originally designed and are now used. Largely for this reason, the outward form of the arrangements no longer resembles their actual operation. causing severe accountability problems. Whatever the advantages of coordinated government borrowing for economic management in a federal system, the Australian experience shows that it may have economic disadvantages as well. The time has come, therefore, for the borrowing arrangements to be rethought and revised. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The boundary that separates the Canadian provinces of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia was established in 1784. This article contrasts the political orientations of those who live within a common border region, but on opposite sides of the New Brunswick and Nova Scotia boundary. and concludes that the boundary line has independently had a divisive impact on the area's political culture. Unless this particular provincial boundary is atypical, therefore, the institution of federalism is, in some measure, inherently centrifugal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Articles of Confederation, usually neglected by those studying the American founding, formed an important part of the background to the 1787 Constitution. The Articles functioned as the first national constitution of the United States and, as such, reflected American political theory as it emerged during the Revolution. Equally important, a textual analysis reveals the extent to which the 1787 Constitution was a logical extension of the Articles of Confederation. Most of the Articles were incorporated in the U.S. Constitution, and several key changes found in the later document were present in embryo in the Articles of Confederation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The central argument in this article is that it is wrong to conceive of federalism as simply a degree of decentralization. Decentralization can only be applied meaningfully to federalism in matters that belong to the central government. Even then, unlike unitary decentralization, which is entirely at the discretion of the central government, federal decentralization is both mandatory and guaranteed. Much more than this, however, the key to distinguishing federal systems from nonfederal systems, which also have "degrees of decentralization," lies in the concept of noncentralizarion by which is meant that matters belonging to the states cannot ordinarily be centralized unilaterally. It is this noncentralization, which opposes decentralization (because decentralization presupposes centralization), that makes federalism a highly distinct form of "decentralization." [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Public finance is a crucial issue in any federation. In the system of shared public financing in Germany, no unit of government is fiscally dependent on the other. The federal and Land governments share the personal income tax, the corporation tax, and the value-added sales tax. Because the Bundesrat approves of the shares of these lax yields granted the federal and Land governments, the Länder are deeply involved in the public finance system. Fiscal equalization occurs both vertically and horizontally. The federal government provides the Länder with grants-in-aid, and also shares the financing of a number of "joint tasks." The Lander share their tax yields with their local governments. Fiscal transfers also take place among the richer and poorer Lander and among the municipalities within the boundaries of individual counties. Controversy exists over the shares to be given the respective governments from the value-added tax and over fiscal equalization between the richer (South) and poorer (North) Länder. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]