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Chinese leaders are increasingly mobilizing historical narratives as part of a broader trend that challenges Francis Fukuyama's thesis of the end of history. China's monumental history as an ancient civilization is used to revise the communist party's ideology and to buttress foreign policy ambitions and infrastructural investments—including the 'belt and road initiative' and territorial claims in the South China Sea. This more assertive approach to China's immediate neighbourhood resonates with the official reiteration of imperial tropes and concepts of Confucian philosophy, yet assertions that Beijing wants to reanimate the tribute system remain contested. While using historical narratives to legitimize foreign policy is not new, we are witnessing an unprecedented 'return of history' as a global social force. By revisiting Fukuyama's claims, I develop the notion of 'historical statecraft' and apply it to China's 'belt and road initiative'. The Chinese case is exemplary for the importance of ideational factors in understanding the recent structural changes often described as the weakening of the West. This article examines in what ways China's historical statecraft is challenging western narratives, what controversies emerge as China articulates its identity as a re-emerging ancient Great Power—one which expects global audiences to acknowledge the value of its cultural norms—and whether the Chinese approach to the use of the past for construing alternative political imaginaries contributes to a peaceful reconstruction of global order. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article proposes a Confucian conception of critical thinking by focussing on the notion of judgement. It is argued that the attainment of the Confucian ideal of li (normative behaviours) necessitates and promotes critical thinking in at least two ways. First, the observance of li requires the individual to exercise judgement by applying the generalised knowledge, norms and procedures in dao (Way) to particular action-situations insightfully and flexibly. Secondly, the individual's judgement, to qualify as an instance of li, should be underpinned and motivated by the ethical quality of ren (humanity) that testifies to one's moral character. Two educational implications arising from a Confucian conception of critical thinking are highlighted. First, the Confucian interpretation presented in this essay challenges the perception that critical thinking is absent from or culturally incompatible with Chinese traditions. Secondly, such a conception advocates viewing critical thinking as a form of judgement that is action-oriented, spiritual, ethical and interpersonal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can Confucianism enrich Chinese foreign policy? This article seeks to explore major traditions of Confucian foreign policy in imperial Chinese history and suggest their implications for contemporary Chinese foreign policy. The popular notion of Confucian pacifism is not a credible tradition of Confucian foreign policy, but a modern Chinese myth constructed in the early 20th century. Rather, Confucian foreign policy traditions were characterized by the contrasting ideas of inclusivism and exclusivism, neither of which renounced the use of force as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Both traditions were underpinned by a traditional Chinese theory of human nature. The adoption of inclusivism or exclusivism in foreign policy was a contingent outcome of relational interactions in China's foreign relations. Confucianism's inclusive humanism, reflected in the inclusive tradition, can provide a major intellectual inspiration for contemporary Chinese foreign policy. It can suggest a Confucian grand strategy of inclusive relationalism that significantly broadens the strategic vision of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese foreign policy discourse under President Xi Jinping already contains an important degree of inclusive relationalism. Putting this strategy more into practice will benefit both China and the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can Confucianism enrich Chinese foreign policy? This article seeks to explore major traditions of Confucian foreign policy in imperial Chinese history and suggest their implications for contemporary Chinese foreign policy. The popular notion of Confucian pacifism is not a credible tradition of Confucian foreign policy, but a modern Chinese myth constructed in the early 20th century. Rather, Confucian foreign policy traditions were characterized by the contrasting ideas of inclusivism and exclusivism, neither of which renounced the use of force as a legitimate instrument of foreign policy. Both traditions were underpinned by a traditional Chinese theory of human nature. The adoption of inclusivism or exclusivism in foreign policy was a contingent outcome of relational interactions in China's foreign relations. Confucianism's inclusive humanism, reflected in the inclusive tradition, can provide a major intellectual inspiration for contemporary Chinese foreign policy. It can suggest a Confucian grand strategy of inclusive relationalism that significantly broadens the strategic vision of Chinese foreign policy. Chinese foreign policy discourse under President Xi Jinping already contains an important degree of inclusive relationalism. Putting this strategy more into practice will benefit both China and the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides information on Chinese culture and highlights the role of Confucian beliefs in Chinese society. It mentions that Chinese "Fengshui" started as a practice to control the physical and metaphysical features of the environmental space for human welfare, and eventually became incorporated by professionals such as architects, interior designers, and business consultants. It presents two aspects on universal kingship including the "baoja" or local registration policy, and "Shanhai Jing" or mountain and sea surveys which recognize the existence of other states and communities. Additionally, the article explores how the Opium War fits into the context of these intellectual movements.

Examines the Chinese spiritual ideal of effortless action. Contrast between ocular and action-based metaphors for true knowledge; Perception of wu-wei as an exclusively Daoist ideal for all mainstream Chinese thinkers; Development of pre-Qin Confucian and Daoist thought.