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Social interactions involving coordination between individuals are subject to an "evolutionary trap." Once a suboptimal strategy has evolved, mutants playing an alternative strategy are counterselected because they fail to coordinate with the majority. This creates a detrimental situation from which evolution cannot escape, preventing the evolution of efficient collective behaviors. Here, we study this problem using evolutionary robotics simulations. We first confirm the existence of an evolutionary trap in a simple setting. We then, however, reveal that evolution can solve this problem in a more realistic setting where individuals need to coordinate with one another. In this setting, simulated robots evolve an ability to adapt plastically their behavior to one another, as this improves the efficiency of their interaction. This ability has an unintended evolutionary consequence: a genetic mutation affecting one individual's behavior also indirectly alters their partner's behavior because the two individuals influence one another. As a consequence of this indirect genetic effect, pairs of partners can virtually change strategy together with a single mutation, and the evolutionary barrier between alternative strategies disappears. This finding reveals a general principle that could play a role in nature to smoothen the transition to efficient collective behaviors in all games with multiple equilibriums. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A growing number of experimental and theoretical studies show the importance of partner choice as a mechanism to promote the evolution of cooperation, especially in humans. In this paper, we focus on the question of the precise quantitative level of cooperation that should evolve under this mechanism. When individuals compete to be chosen by others, their level of investment in cooperation evolves towards higher values, a process called competitive altruism, or runaway cooperation. Using a classic adaptive dynamics model, we first show that when the cost of changing partner is low, this runaway process can lead to a profitless escalation of cooperation. In the extreme, when partner choice is entirely frictionless, cooperation even increases up to a level where its cost entirely cancels out its benefit. That is, at evolutionary equilibrium, individuals gain the same payoff than if they had not cooperated at all. Second, importing models from matching theory in economics we, however, show that when individuals can plastically modulate their choosiness in function of their own cooperation level, partner choice stops being a runaway competition to outbid others and becomes a competition to form the most optimal partnerships. In this case, when the cost of changing partner tends towards zero, partner choice leads to the evolution of the socially optimum level of cooperation. This last result could explain the observation that human cooperation seems to be often constrained by considerations of social efficiency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of the hallmarks of human fairness is its insensitivity to power: although strong individuals are often in a position to coerce weak individuals, fairness requires them to share the benefits of cooperation equally. The existence of such egalitarianism is poorly explained by current evolutionary models. We present a model based on cooperation and partner choice that can account for the emergence of a psychological disposition toward fairness, whatever the balance of power between the cooperative partners. We model the evolution of the division of a benefit in an interaction similar to an ultimatum game, in a population made up of individuals of variable strength. The model shows that strong individuals will not receive any advantage from their strength, instead having to share the benefits of cooperation equally with weak individuals at the evolutionary equilibrium, a result that is robust to variations in population size and the proportion of weak individuals. We discuss how this model suggests an explanation for why egalitarian behaviors toward everyone, including the weak, should be more likely to evolve in humans than in any other species. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Human beings universally express a concern for the fairness of social interactions, and it remains an open question that which ultimate factors led to the evolution of this preference. Here, we present a model accounting for the evolution of fairness on the basis of individual selection alone. We consider a simple social interaction based on the Dictator Game. Two individuals, a 'proposer' and a 'responder,' have an opportunity to split a resource. When they have no choice but to interact together, the most powerful (here the proposer) reaps all the profits and fairness cannot evolve. Partner choice is the key lever to overcome this difficulty. Rather than just two individuals, we consider a population composed of two classes of individuals (either proposers or responders), and we allow the responders to choose their partner. In such a 'biological market,' fairness evolves as an 'equilibrium price,' resulting from an ecological equivalent of the law of supply and demand. If a class is disadvantaged by the chosen resource partition (i.e., if it frequently receives less than half of the resource), it is outcompeted by the other one, and automatically becomes rarer. This rarity grants it an advantage on the market, which yields in turn to the evolution of a more favorable partition. Splitting the resource into two identical halves, or more generally in a way that equalizes the payoffs of the two classes, is then the only evolutionarily stable outcome. Beyond human fairness, this mechanism also opens up new ways of explaining the distribution of benefits in many mutualistic interactions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the potential consequences of vaccination on parasite epidemiology and evolution. Our model combines a microscopic (within-host dynamics) and a macroscopic (epidemiological dynamics) description of the interaction between the parasite and its host. This approach allows relevant epidemiological traits such as parasite transmission, parasite virulence, and host recovery to emerge from a mechanistic model of acute infection describing the interaction between the parasite and the host immune system. We model the effect of a vaccine as an activator of immunity enhancing the replication rate of lymphocytes, their initial density at infection's initiation, their efficacy to kill the parasite, or their activation delay after infection. We analyze the evolution of the replication rate of parasites and show that vaccination may promote the evolution of faster replicating and, consequently, more virulent strains. We also show that intermediate vaccination coverage may lead to the coexistence of two different parasite strategies (a low-virulence strain adapted to naive hosts, and a high-virulence strain, more generalist, adapted to both naive and vaccinated hosts). We discuss the consequences of various vaccination strategies under different epidemiological situations using several distinct measures to evaluate the cost induced by the parasite on individuals and entire host populations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we model analytically the evolution of mutation rate in asexual organisms. Three selective forces are present. First, everything else being equal, individuals with higher mutation rate have a larger fitness, thanks to the energy and time saved by not replicating DNA accurately. Second, as a flip side, the genome of these individuals is replicated with errors that may negatively affect fitness. Third, and conversely, replication errors have a potential benefit if beneficial mutations are to be generated. Our model describes the fate of modifiers of mutation rate under the three forces and allows us to predict the long-term evolutionary trajectory of mutation rate. We obtain three major results. First, in asexuals, the needs for both adaptation and genome preservation are not evolutionary forces that can stabilize mutation rate at an intermediate optimum. When adaptation has a significant role, it primarily destabilizes mutation rate and yields the emergence of strong-effect mutators. Second, in contrast to what is usually believed, the appearance of modifiers with large mutation rate is more likely when the fitness cost of each deleterious mutation is weak, because the cost of replication errors is then paid after a delay. Third, in small populations, and even if adaptations are needed, mutation rate is always blocked at the minimum attainable level, because the rate of adaptation is too slow to play a significant role. Only populations whose size is above a critical mass see their mutation rate affected by the need for adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Models of virulence evolution generally consider the outcome of competition between resident and mutant parasite strains at or near endemic equilibrium. Less studied is what happens during the initial phases of invasion and adaptation. Understanding initial adaptive dynamics is particularly important in the context of emerging diseases in wildlife and humans, for which rapid and accurate intervention may be of the essence. To address the question of virulence evolution in emerging diseases, we employ a simple stochastic modeling framework. As is intuitive, the pathogen strains most likely to emerge are those with the highest net reproductive rates (R0). We find, however, that stochastic events shape the properties of emerging pathogens in sometimes unexpected ways. First, the mean virulence of emerging pathogens is expected to be larger in dense host populations and/or when transmission is high, due to less restrictive conditions for the spread of the pathogen. Second, a positive correlation between average virulence and transmissibility emerges due to a combination of drift and selection. We conclude that at least in the initial phases of adaptation, special assumptions about constraints need not be invoked to explain some virulence-transmission correlations and that virulence management practices should consider how residual variation in transmission and virulence can be selected to reduce the prevalence and/or virulence of emerging infectious diseases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]