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Forty-four elementary grade teachers of deaf and hard of hearing students were surveyed about how they taught writing and their beliefs about writing. Beliefs about writing included their self-efficacy to teach writing, attitude toward writing, and epistemological beliefs about writing. These teachers from fifteen different states in the United States slightly agreed that they were efficacious writing teachers and they were slightly positive about their writing. They slightly agreed that learning to write involves effort and process, moderately disagreed that writing development is innate or fixed, slightly disagreed that knowledge about writing is certain, and were equally split about whether writing knowledge comes from authorities and experts. On average, teachers applied the twenty-two instructional writing practices surveyed at least once a month. They reported their students wrote weekly, and their writing was supported through goal setting, feedback, and prewriting activities. Writing instruction mostly focuses on teaching grammar and how to plan compositions. Teacher self-efficacy uniquely and statistically predicted reported teaching practices after attitude toward writing, and epistemological beliefs were first controlled. Recommendations for future research and implications for practice are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemic Permissivists face a special problem about the relationship between our first- and higher-order attitudes. They claim that rationality often permits a range of doxastic responses to the evidence. Given plausible assumptions about the relationship between your first- and higher-order attitudes, I show that you can't be on the edge of the range, so there can't be a range at all. Permissivism, in its traditional form, can't be right. I consider new ways of developing Permissivism to avoid my argument, but they have problems of their own. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article aims to show how intellectualists can resist objections by contesting the idea that practical knowledge is difficult to transmit via testimony. It outlines examples which suggest that the practical knowledge attributed by knowledge-how-to ascriptions is difficult to relay through testimony. The difference between practical knowledge and knowledge-that is explained.

Intelligent activity requires the use of various intellectual skills. While these skills are connected to knowledge, they should not be identified with knowledge. There are realistic examples where the skills in question come apart from knowledge. That is, there are realistic cases of knowledge without skill, and of skill without knowledge. Whether a person is intelligent depends, in part, on whether they have these skills. Whether a particular action is intelligent depends, in part, on whether it was produced by an exercise of skill. These claims promote a picture of intelligence that is in tension with a strongly intellectualist picture, though they are not in tension with a number of prominent claims recently made by intellectualists. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study explores the topics of matter and making in music therapy through embodied reflexive retrospection with six music therapists. The participants were asked to re-enact a hand position from their memory of a significant moment in therapy. In individual research meetings, they shared their thoughts about this moment while the researcher made a body cast of their chosen hand pose. A thematic analysis of the participant narratives, the hand casts, and existing literature was used to generate the following themes: The biographic hand, The body, space, place, and time, The plural hand, Matter of the hand, and The method in hand. The research procedure facilitated an exploration of epistemological, ontological, and phenomenological perspectives in understanding music therapy practitioner experiences. The study highlights the inseparability and multiplicity of matter, making, and narrating music therapy that transcends context or therapeutic approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An essay is presented on Marcel Proust's novel "À la Recherche du temps perdu" which explores knowledge and allows readers to embark on quests by the lead character, the author and the readers themselves. It offers an explanation of the quests and the discoveries that knowledge offers. The importance of a person's suffering in the quest for and achievement of knowledge is discussed. The concept of epistemology is also described.

According to ‘orthodox’ epistemology, it has recently been said, whether or not a true belief amounts to knowledge depends exclusively on truth-related factors: for example, on whether the true belief was formed in a reliable way, or was supported by good evidence, and so on. Jason Stanley refers to this as the ‘intellectualist’ component of orthodox epistemology, and Jeremy Fantl and Matthew McGrath describe it as orthodox epistemology’s commitment to a ‘purely epistemic’ account of knowledge — that is, an account of knowledge where only truth-related factors figure in whether or not a person knows.In the first part of this paper I try to clarify the intellectualist thesis and to distinguish what I take to be its two main strains. In the remainder of the paper I then take a more critical turn and argue that even if, as a matter of fact, traditional epistemology has endorsed intellectualism in both of its strains, this is a mistake on the part of the tradition. At least one way of understanding intellectualism should be rejected and its practicalist counterpart should be accepted instead. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Shackle's work has many connections, to economic, scientific and philosophical ideas and also to the practicalities of economic organization and business management. Uncertainty is not only a pervasive problem, but a necessary condition for human intelligence, initiative and imagination; unpredictability is essential to both scientific progress and entrepreneurship. We create knowledge by making patterns that enable us to impose order and envisage new combinations in an evolutionary process, driven by human purpose, of competing and complementary conjectures, many of which turn out to be false representations. Though academia was Shackle's natural environment, he was always concerned with applicability, and testament to the practical relevance of his ideas is provided by two former senior managers, with particular emphasis on the fundamental and domain-specific issues of what to think about and how to think about it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Debates about the nature of practical knowledge and its relationship with declarative knowledge have, over the last ten years, been lively. Relatively little has, however, been written about the educational implications of these debates, particularly about the educational implications of the two broad families of positions known respectively as 'Intellectualism' and 'Anti-intellectualism'. Neither has much appeared in the literature about what Ryle called 'intelligence epithets' or evaluative elaborations on attributions of know how. Yet the use of intelligence epithets is a central feature of Ryle's account of knowing how and that account cannot be adequately understood without an appreciation of their importance. The paper will offer a qualified defence of anti-intellectualism about practical knowledge, paying particular attention to the importance of intelligence epithets and, second, argue that anti-intellectualism offers the best opportunity for constructing a rationale for vocational and professional education that gives broad forms of agency, autonomous action and the pursuit of excellence their due place in such programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the two approaches to the paradox of knowability or the Church-Fitch argument, including denying that knowledge distributes over conjunction and moving to a typed logic. He argues that neither of the approaches works. He further argues that a Church-Fitch argument can be run with an assumption weaker than distribution of knowledge over conjunction. He adds that a modified Church-Fitch argument can be constructed in a typed logic.

This paper presents a theory of how perception provides a basis for moral knowledge. To do this, the paper sketches a theory of perception, explores the sense in which moral perception may deserve that name, and explains how certain moral properties may be perceptible. It does not presuppose a causal account of moral properties. If, however, they are not causal, how can we perceive, say, injustice? Can it be observable even if injustice is not a causal property? The paper answers these and other questions by developing an account of how moral properties, even if not causal, can figure in perception in a way that grounds moral knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Russell's version of the multiple-relation theory from the Theory of Knowledge manuscript is presented and defended against some objections. A new problem, related to defining truth via correspondence, is reconstructed from Russell's remarks and what we know of Wittgenstein's objection to Russell's theory. In the end, understanding this objection in terms of correspondence helps to link Russell's multiple-relation theory to his later views on propositions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mary knows all there is to know about physics, chemistry and neurophysiology, yet has never experienced colour. Most philosophers think that if Mary learns something genuinely new upon seeing colour for the first time, then physicalism is false. I argue, however, that physicalism is consistent with Mary's acquisition of new information. Indeed, even if she has perfect powers of deduction, and higher-level physical facts are a priori deducible from lower-level ones, Mary may still lack concepts which are required in order to deduce from the lower-level physical facts what it is like to see red. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Central claim is that Hornsby's argument that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge is based upon a false premise. I argue, contra Hornsby, that speakers do not voice their thoughts directly. Rather, our actions of voicing our thoughts are justified by decisions we make (albeit rapidly) about what words to use. Along the way, I raise doubts about other aspects of the thesis that semantic knowledge is practical knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Central claim is that the semantic knowledge exercised by people when they speak is practical knowledge. The relevant idea of practical knowledge is explicated, applied to the case of speaking, and connected with an idea of agents' knowledge. Some defence of the claim is provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My life consists in my being content to accept many things (Wittgenstein On Certainty x344) Two kinds of epistemological sceptical paradox are reviewed and a shared assumption, that warrant to accept a proposition has to be the same thing as having evidence for its truth, is noted. ‘Entitlement’, as used here, denotes a kind of rational warrant that counter-exempli.es that identi.cation. The paper pursues the thought that there are various kinds of entitlement and explores the possibility that the sceptical paradoxes might receive a uniform solution if entitlement can be made to reach sufficiently far. Three kinds of entitlement are characterised and given prima facie support, and a fourth is canvassed. Certain foreseeable limitations of the suggested anti-sceptical strategy are noted. The discussion is grounded, overall, in a conception of the sceptical paradoxes not as directly challenging our having any warrant for large classes of our beliefs but as crises of intellectual conscience for one who wants to claim that we do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to T.M. Scanlon's buck-passing account of value, to be valuable is not to possess intrinsic value as a simple and unanalysable property, but rather to have other properties that provide reasons to take up an attitude in favour of their owner or against it. The 'wrong kind of reasons' objection to this view is that we may have reasons to respond for or against something without this having any bearing on its value. The challenge is to explain why such reasons are of the wrong kind. This is what I set out to do, after illustrating the objection more thoroughly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notion of common knowledge is of interest because it raises problems about the complexity of the cognitive states which one can sensibly attribute to finite self-conscious creatures when they confront one another. Common knowledge is of interest also because we need to invoke it in explaining the rationality of certain actions, namely those co-operative enterprises of which many conventional social practices, including language, seem to be examples. In what follows nothing hangs on the use of the word knowledge in the phrase common knowledge. The account one seeks is to be of a structure which can accommodate the mediaeval "common knowledge" that the Sun circles the Earth. What is primarily at issue is the nature of the propositions people can entertain, the routes of perception and inference by which they might come to have confidence in those propositions and the manner in which theft beliefs contribute to justifying their actions.

The article presents a discussion on the space, color, sense perception and the epistemology of logic. Logical knowledge is about sentences, and it is gained by sense perception. Metaphysical and epistemological commitments seem to determine the course of research in the field of logic as well as its theoretical interpretation. What one takes the objects of logical investigation to be determine one's views on how they are to be known, and one's view of the possible types of knowledge in turn places restrictions on what kinds of things those objects could be.

The article presents a discussion on logic and the Sachverhalte. Those who conceive logic as a science have generally favoured one of the few alternative conceptions as to what the subject-matter of this science ought to be. Concerning this, one conception sees logic as a science of special objects called Sachverhalte or 'states of affairs'. A view of this sort is present in simplified form in the works of Meinong, but it received its definitive formulation in the writings of Adolf Reinach. The laws of logic, according to Reinach, are 'nothing other than general principles expressing relations between states of affairs.'

The article presents the author's views on why logic is a priori. False beliefs are failures to know; however, not every failure to know involves a false belief, and it is illuminating to set the false belief cases in the broader context of failures to know. The essential step is to distinguish two ways in which one may fail to know: failures due to lack, impairment, or misuse of a recognitional ability; and, failures that arise from other sources. There are three cases to distinguish: lack of ability; impaired ability; and improperly used ability.

The article presents information on the relationship between consistency and rationality. The connection between consistency and rationality is not clear, however, it is assumed that rationality, that angelic norm to which all featherless bipeds are presumed to aspire, entails consistency if not logical omniscience. A failure of consistency that did not reflect merely a weakness of logical faculty would be a clear demonstration of irrationality. Nevertheless, only the most extreme philosophers would argue against consistency. Failures of consistency are generally deplored; one is urged to repair such failures. Of course, as weak mortal beings, our failure to achieve consistency may be condoned as regrettable but inevitable. The demand for consistency is appropriate for angels, not men.