Search

The article discusses the European Court of Human Rights case Mortier v. Belgium which relates to assisted dying. Topics discussed include the legal framework for euthanasia in Belgium, a patient's request for assisted dying after suffering from chronic depression, and the compatibility of a permissive framework for assisted dying against rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

According to the Standard View, a doctor who withdraws life-sustaining treatment does not kill the patient but rather allows the patient to die-an important distinction, according to some. I argue that killing (and causing death) can be understood in either of two ways, and given the relevant understanding, the Standard View is insulated from typical criticisms. I conclude by noting several problems for the Standard View that remain to be fully addressed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Our goal in this article is to explicate the way, and the extent to which, euthanasia can be voluntary from both the perspective of the patient and the perspective of the health care providers involved in the patient’s care. More significantly, we aim to challenge the way in which those engaged in ongoing philosophical debates regarding the morality of euthanasia draw distinctions between voluntary, involuntary, and nonvoluntary euthanasia on the grounds that drawing the distinctions in the traditional manner (1) fails to reflect what is important from the patient’s perspective and (2) fails to reflect the significance of health care providers’ interests, including their autonomy and integrity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The author discusses euthanasia in India and the Indian Supreme Court case of Aruna Ramchandra Shanbaug v. Union of India which the court decided on the legality of euthanasia of a person with non-progressive irreversible brain damage. Information is provided on the legal meaning of the word "dead" interpreted by Indian courts.

The article focuses on the speculation that voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are indications of personal autonomy. It argues that the women's experience reveals the uncertainty of choice as the basis of policies that approve such death. It takes into account available empirical evidence in evaluating relative incidence of assisted death in women. It further considers the decision of women for euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide.

This essay rebuts Gary Seay's efforts to show that committing euthanasia need not conflict with a physician's professional duties. First, I try to show how his misunderstanding of the correlativity of rights and duties and his discussion of the foundation of moral rights undermine his case. Second, I show aspects of physicians' professional duties that clash with euthanasia, and that attempts to avoid this clash lead to absurdities. For professional duties are best understood as deriving from professional virtues and the commitments and purposes with which the professional as such ought to act, and there is no plausible way in which her death can be seen as advancing the patient's medical welfare. Third, I argue against Prof. Seay's assumption that apparent conflicts among professional duties must be resolved through "balancing" and argue that, while the physician's duty to extend life is continuous with her duty to protect health, any duty to relieve pain is subordinate to these. Finally, I show that what is morally determinative here, as throughout the moral life, is the agent's intention and that Prof. Seay's implicitly preferred consequentialism threatens not only to distort moral thinking but would altogether undermine the medical (and any other) profession and its internal ethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the role of personhood in end-of-life decision-making and examines the way in which the concept of a person interacts with the notion of a right to die. It claims that the right to die embodies a critical paradox of a personhood and explains the significance of personhood-based account of moral status. Moreover, it emphasizes that personhood is ascribed to beings on the basis of the qualities or characteristics which they possess.

The Roman Catholic theological approach to euthanasia is radically prohibitive. The main theological argument for prohibition is the so-called "stewardship argument": Christians cannot escape accounting to God for stewardship of the bodies given them on contribution presents alternative approach based on European existentialist and philosophical traditions. The suggestion is that exploring the fullness of our relational responsibility is more apt for a pluralist -- and even secular debate on the legitimacy of euthanasia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Proponents of the legalization of assisted suicide often appeal to our supposed right to "die with dignity" to defend their case. I examine and assess different notions of "dignity" that are operating in many arguments for the legalization of assisted suicide, and I find them all to be deficient. I then consider an alternative conception of dignity that is based on Aristotle's conception of the conditions on the best life. I conclude that, while such a conception of dignity fits best with our intuitions about the conditions under which a life has dignity, it supports the legalization of assisted suicide only under very limited circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article "A Comparison of Characteristics of Kevorkian Euthanasia Cases and Physician-Assisted Suicides in Oregon," by L. A. Roscoe, J. A. Malphurs, L. J. Dragovic, and D. Cohen from the August 2001 issue on physician-assisted suicide (PAS), euthanasia, the actions of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, and medical law in Oregon regarding the right to die.

The article offers information on the research conducted on assisted suicide of individuals and mass media worldwide. Researchers found that since suicide is usually the method employed by those individuals who have terminal illness. Moreover, researchers suggested that the media people should carefully broadcast these incident to avoid romanticizing or idealizing suicide as a heroic one.

A letter to the editor is presented in response to the article "A Comparison of Characteristics of Kevorkian Euthanasia Cases and Physician-Assisted Suicides in Oregon by L. A. Roscoe, J. E. Malphurs, L. J. Dragovic, and D. Cohen with a written reply from the authors regarding the characteristics of patients who died with the assistance of Dr. Jack Kevorkian, along with information on the definition of euthanasia, patient consent, laws in Oregon regarding the right to die, and bioethics.