Search

While 'takedowns' are a familiar term in the liability and regulation of online platforms, the opposite act of reuploading legal content after an incorrect takedown, the so-called 'put back', does not receive the same amount of attention. This paper aims to provide an overview of different legal bases of put back claims against platforms in German and European law. Even though the procedural approach to platform governance with its internal complaint-handling systems is one way to mitigate incorrect decisions, the recourse to the courts also needs to be viable. The paper concludes on a positive note showing numerous existing legal bases of put backs, especially in contract law. Nevertheless, the safest way would be the implementation of an explicit legal base for put back claims, for which the paper offers a proposal for discussion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents comments on Florencia Marotta-Wurgler's studies on standard-form contracts on topics including the definition of a standard-form contract, the "informed minority" hypothesis, and consumer protection.

The article presents comments on Florencia Marotta-Wurgler's work on standard-form contracts on topics including an overview of Marotta-Wurgler's work on End User License Agreements (EULAs), regulatory strategies, and the commentators' conclusion.

This article examines the claim that there are two different and often incompatible ‘worlds’ within which contractual relationships can be placed—a real world created by the parties and an artificial world created by contract law and formal contract documents. This distinction, often made by sociolegal scholars, is usually accompanied by the suggestion that legal reasoning might be improved by more attention to the real world of contracting at the expense of the artificial world of documents and classical doctrine. After examining the relationship between trust and contract, the role of legal institutions in supporting agreement-making and the reasons parties might have for formalizing commercial relationships, the article argues that a sharp distinction between the real and paper deal cannot be drawn and that in many commercial agreements these must be understood as integrated phenomena, rather than wholly discrete aspects of contracting behaviour. The article then considers the capacity of contract law to respond to this finding, with particular reference to the law's approach to uncertainty in agreements and the contextual approach to contract interpretation as developed by Lord Hoffmann in Investors Compensation Scheme and subsequent cases. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

With relational contracts, increased uncertainty with no change in factor prices is shown to reduce investment in the long run even if the parties are risk-neutral. This contrasts with models based on the impact of financial risk on the cost of capital and on the option value arising from irreversible investment. For the latter, Bloom et al. (Econometrica , 2018) find that a negative first-moment shock, in addition to increased uncertainty, best matches the data. This paper develops a relational contract model to demonstrate the impact of uncertainty on investment, depending on whether investment is general or specific. It then uses a specification calibrated with parameters from Bloom et al. (Econometrica , 2018) to show that this model can generate effects on productivity and investment of the magnitude of the negative aggregate shock in that paper purely with an increase in uncertainty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pay-as-you-go contracts reduce minimum purchase requirements, which may increase market participation. This paper randomizes the introduction and price(s) of a novel pay-as-you-go contract to the California auto insurance market, where 17% of drivers are uninsured. The pay-as-you-go contract increases take-up by 10.8 p.p. (89%) and days with coverage by 4.6 days over the 3-month experiment (27%). Demand is relatively inelastic, and pay-as-you-go increases insurance coverage in part by relaxing liquidity requirements: most drivers' purchasing behavior is consistent with a cost of credit in excess of payday lending rates, and 19% of drivers have a purchase rejected for insufficient funds. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Blockchain has attracted tremendous attention from both the academia and the capital market. The insertion of data in a blockchain known as anchoring makes data verifiable and independently auditable and has many potential applications. The objective of this paper is to introduce a dynamic cross-chain anchoring framework for snapshotting users' data into multiple public blockchains with the help of smart contracts. This paper starts by proposing the framework and depicting the components and workflow. Second, we design a target chain selection algorithm that combines the states of different blockchains. Using the algorithm, users can dynamically select a suitable public blockchain for anchoring tasks. Third, the virtual chain protocol is presented and achieves data anchoring orderly and integrally. Analyzation and evaluation show that the framework can enhance user experience, robustness and performance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The informativeness principle states that a contract should depend on informative signals. This paper studies how it should do so. Signals indicating that the output distribution has shifted to the left (e.g. weak industry performance) reduce the threshold for the manager to be paid; those indicating that output is a precise measure of effort (e.g. low volatility) decrease high thresholds and increase low thresholds. Surprisingly, "good" signals of performance need not reduce the threshold. Applying our model to performance-based vesting, we show that performance measures should affect the strike price, rather than the number of vesting options, contrary to practice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the (semi)group action of |$\textrm{SL}_{n}({\mathbb R})$| on |${\mathbb P}({\mathbb R}^{n})$|⁠ , a primary example of non-conformal, non-linear, and non-strictly contracting action. We establish variational principles of the affinity exponent for two main examples: the Borel Anosov representations and the Rauzy gasket. In [ 32 ], they obtain a dimension formula for the stationary measures on |${\mathbb P}({\mathbb R}^{3})$|⁠. Combined with our result, it allows us to study the Hausdorff dimension of limit sets of Anosov representations in |$\textrm{SL}_{3}({\mathbb R})$| and the Rauzy gasket. It yields the equality between the Hausdorff dimensions and the affinity exponents in both settings, generalizing the classical Patterson–Sullivan formula. In the appendix, we improve the numerical lower bound of the Hausdorff dimension of Rauzy gasket to |$1.5$|⁠. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we show that incentives to convert temporary contracts into permanent ones might be less effective when the employment protection legislation associated with temporary contracts is lax. Drawing upon rich administrative data and using a difference-in-differences methodology, we estimate that workers at their first work experience hired on more flexible contracts undergo a reduction in the conversion rate to permanent employment of 6.3 percentage points after the implementation of the incentives (and of 3.2 percentage points over a year), compared to peers hired on more rigid contracts. This reduced conversion rate, which results in a 17% wage penalty even 2 years into their professional journey, points to a significant negative impact of flexible temporary jobs on the future prospects of young workers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Low-carbon hydrogen is expected to play a key role in realizing net-zero and sustainable development plans. Nonetheless, there is a gap between the cost of producing low-carbon hydrogen and its potential users' willingness to pay for such hydrogen. To implement support for the development of the industry, we propose using low-carbon hydrogen long-term agreements allocated through auction mechanisms. The objectives are 2-fold: (i) matching supply and demand volumes considering the time horizon and geographical delivery point specification and (ii) allocating the subsidy. This perspective article innovates by proposing a reference price indexed to liquid to natural-gas prices, which is the main product that low-carbon hydrogen aims to substitute. The premium and the production cost are defined through a double-sided auction. This aims to minimize the public policy funds required to incentivize the low-carbon hydrogen market while facilitating long-term agreements and mitigating price risks that may hinder investment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents an introduction to articles published in this issue of the journal "Industrial and Corporate Change."

Relational contracts are typically modeled as being between a principal and an agent, such as a firm owner and a supplier. Yet, in a variety of organizations, relationships are overseen by an intermediary such as a manager. Such arrangements open the door for collusion between the manager and the agent. This paper develops a theory of such managed relational contracts. We show that managed relational contracts differ from principal–agent ones in important ways. First, kickbacks from the agent can help solve the manager's commitment problem. When commitment is difficult, this can result in higher agent effort than the principal could incentivize directly. Second, making relationships more valuable enables more collusion and hence can reduce effort. We also analyze the principal's delegation problem and show that she may or may not benefit from entrusting the relationship to a manager. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As a promising strategy to secure debt financing, firms can use their intellectual property rights (IPR) as collateral. Despite an ongoing shift to a more technology-based economy, the collateralization of IPR is still trailing behind the use of more traditional asset classes. In this paper, we address the challenges and opportunities of using IPR as collateral from a legal and economic angle by also exploring the role of and consequences for IP law. We develop a new taxonomy, i.e., a classification of the key determinants of using IPR as collateral. The taxonomy defines two pillars that govern the use of IPR collateral that distinguish between institutional and economic determinants. The institutional determinants cover contract law, IPR registries, and banking regulations. The economic determinants constitute the influence of IPR characteristics on the trade-off between the economic costs and benefits of collateralizing IPR. We apply the derived taxonomy to the legal and economic status quo in several industrialized economies to identify potential impediments to IPR-backed debt financing. Taken together, our taxonomy can be viewed as providing guidance for future research in the fields of law and economics on IPR as loan collateral for businesses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the presence of career and promotion-based incentives in the context of arm's-length contracting between wineries and independent wine-grape farmers. We hypothesise that long-term contracts represent a stage in a farmer's career after a series of short-term contracts. We develop a conceptual framework to frame the interaction between explicit performance incentives and implicit career incentives arising from the possibility of promotion to a long-term contract, conditional on wineries learning a farmer's potential for superior-quality production. Based on data from Chilean wine-grape farmers, we find evidence suggesting that implicit market-based incentives, usually studied in the context of employment contracts, are also important in arm's-length contracts used in procurement of farm output. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides novel evidence that stronger contract enforcement mitigates holdup in business investment decisions using stark, externally imposed variation in contract enforcement across Native American reservations. My tests focus on the golf course industry. A high degree of sunk costs and long investment horizons in this industry make it naturally subject to the classical holdup problem. I find that state courts, which provide stronger contract enforcement than do tribal courts, lead to at least 27% more golf courses, with greater effects in areas with greater natural amenities. These findings suggest that courts play an important role in facilitating the oft-discussed contractual solutions to the holdup problem. Received November 13, 2017; editorial decision May 31, 2018 by Editor: Uday Rajan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purchase obligations are forward contracts with suppliers and are used more broadly than traded commodity derivatives. This paper is the first to document that these contracts are a risk management tool and have a material impact on corporate hedging activity. Firms that expand their risk management options following the introduction of steel futures contracts substitute financial hedging for purchase obligations. Contracting frictions, such as bargaining power and settlement risk, as well as potential hold-up issues associated with relationship-specific investment, affect the use of purchase obligations in the cross-section, as well as how firms respond to the introduction of steel futures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Empirical evidence suggests that workers care about the mission of their job, in addition to their wage. This paper studies how organizations can choose a mission to attract, incentivize, and screen their workers. We analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent for the development of a project and can influence the agent's marginal return of effort through the choice of project mission. The principal's and the agents' mission preferences are misaligned and the agents vary in the intensity of their mission drive. Our main results highlight that how far the organization chooses to move from its preferred mission depends on the contractual environment in which it operates. Missions will be more agent-preferred in environments in which effort is noncontractible. In environments in which agents' drive is unknown, missions will be less agent-preferred and the organization will find it optimal to offer contract menus that may be implemented via scoring auctions when there are competing agents. Our analysis applies to the design and allocation of aid contracts, research funding, and creative jobs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Large numbers of people remain in paid work after pensionable age, often in bridge jobs or with reduced working hours. Remarkably, knowledge about the quality of these jobs relative to those taken prior to pension eligibility is very limited. In this paper, we examined changes in job quality among workers in their sixties in the context of contemporaneous changes in work intensity and employment characteristics. This study is based on data from the biennial Swedish Longitudinal Occupational Survey of Health (SLOSH, 2006–2018, n = 1890–3013). Job quality outcomes were physical (dangerous, strenuous or unpleasant work) and psychosocial (job strain, effort-reward imbalance, work time control) working conditions and job satisfaction. First difference estimation was used to observe within-individual wave-to-wave changes in job quality over ages 61/62–69/70. Changes in working hours, employment characteristics (shifting to a non-permanent contract, the private sector and self-employment) and health were included as covariates. The typical individual who worked beyond pensionable age experienced statistically significant improvements in job quality. Improvements in psychosocial working conditions and job satisfaction were larger for those who reduced working hours and shifted from permanent to non-permanent contracts, from the public into the private sector and from wage-and-salary to self-employment. Work beyond pensionable age is a distinctive period, characterized by employment that becomes more flexible and rewarding and less stressful. These improvements are a function of older individuals' preferences and ability to work fewer hours and transition to new lines of work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the wake of the Covid-19 pandemic, public private partnerships (PPP) can prove useful to close the healthcare investment gap and accelerate long-term recovery, by matching public and private money. Despite their extensive application in the delivery of major infrastructure projects globally, their performance remains contested. Drawing on a unique set of data of PPP contracts for healthcare investments in Italy, the paper explores the antecedents (namely, policies, institutions, and contracts), that have influenced the capacity of PPP contracts to deliver performance, measured in terms of value for money (VfM), and contract stability. Results show that although explicit policy goals have a clear contribution, VfM can benefit from competent central PPP institutions, which should play a hands-on role in the planning, design, and project management activities. At the same time, centralised PPP units, if not combined with local competent authorities and strong governance mechanisms, may increase the risk of contract renegotiation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The evolving nature of atypical work arrangements is studied. A particular focus is placed on one such form of work relation: zero-hours contracts (ZHCs). The paper uses existing secondary data and new survey data collected for the specific purpose of studying alternative work arrangements to describe the nature of ZHC work in the UK labour market. The interaction with labour market policy is explored, in the context of the 2016 introduction of the UK's National Living Wage. ZHC work is shown to be an important feature of today's work arrangements, and the wage cost shock induced by the new, higher minimum wage resulted in an increased use of ZHCs in the UK social care sector, and in low wage sectors more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Against the backdrop of growing public discourse about the usefulness, legitimacy and effectiveness of the investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) system, this article reviews the participation of African States in international investment arbitration and analyzes some of the cases involving African States in claims initiated under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States (the "ICSID Convention"). Specifically, the article reviews ICSID cases involving African States in which decisions were reached on the merit [i.e. the tribunal determined whether the challenged measure breached any substantive obligation in an international investment agreement (IIA)]. Focus is on cases where claimants alleged violation of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) obligation and cases where expropriation, both direct and indirect were alleged. A review of cases involving African States suggests that there is no African peculiarity or specialty in terms of the awards and analysis of arbitral tribunals. In cases involving African States, ICSID tribunals appear to be guided primarily by the provisions of applicable texts (IIAs, contracts, and legislation) and ICSID case law rather than by the status of a Respondent State as developing or least developed. The paper raises important questions about the development dimension of the ISDS system or the lack thereof, and could contribute to current debates about ISDS reform and the need for sustainable development-oriented reform of IIAs more broadly. The paper also sheds light on the risks that broad and vague provisions in IIAs pose for host States and calls attention to the capacity constraints that limit meaningful IIA reform in Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper extends the transaction cost economics framework to examine the contractual hazards that arise in the course of technological innovation. We identify three main strategic hazards related to future technological opportunities that may develop in business transactions: loss of technological pacing possibilities on the technological frontier, loss of technological control at or behind the frontier, and design omissions. In examining these hazards we focus on the increasingly common phenomenon of vertically integrated firms supplying downstream competitors. We then analyze how constellations of safeguards, particularly relational safeguards, can augment transaction-specific safeguards in many instances to ensure high-powered incentives are maintained. We also consider under what conditions downstream divestiture is a desirable economizing option. Supportive illustrations are drawn from the desktop laser printer and telecommunications industries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can divide-and-rule colonial policy be responsible for contemporary ethnic tension? This paper empirically investigates the role of a divisive and extractive colonial policy on Hutu–Tutsi discord in Rwanda and Burundi. It shows that Hutu with a family history of subjugation to forced labour by Tutsi chiefs are less trusting of Tutsi today and less willing to partner with Tutsi for a cooperative task. This may have implications for agriculture insurance agreements because Hutu are more agrarian and Tutsi are more pastoral. Indeed, Hutu with a forced labour family history make fewer inter-household insurance agreements and are more likely to experience default. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Each alternative for a repair contract implies a specific response time and related cost. The response time is associated with the commitment of repair time, based on the contract. A decision maker chooses the best alternative taking into account the system performance and the cost of the contract. This problem has been analysed through a multicriteria decision model. This decision model supports decision makers in the determination of the best combination of contracting conditions. The decision model proposed allows the decision maker to quantify the consequences of an action taking into account two basic criteria: the cost of the contract and the system performance. Two different decision models have been built to support decision makers. These decision models are based on different multicriteria approaches. The first, reported in a previous paper, is based on the multiattribute utility theory (MAUT). The model presented in this paper is based on the ELECTRE I method combined with utility functions. The paper presents the main theoretical aspects related to both approaches and practical implications related to model building. A numerical application is presented in order to illustrate the use of the decision model. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The EU Digital Content Directive sets out to facilitate the cross-border distribution of digital content and ensure a high level of consumer protection by harmonising certain aspects concerning contracts for the supply of digital content. The Directive acknowledges the variety of licensing agreements involved in the distribution of digital content, such as between the holders of intellectual property rights, intermediaries and end-users. It is recognised that the consumer's use of digital content could be restricted under end-user licensing agreements pursuant to intellectual property rights; at the same time, the Directive is without prejudice to other EU law, including copyright. Rather, under Art. 10, the consumer is entitled to remedies from the trader of digital content for lack of conformity where restrictions resulting from a violation of intellectual property rights prevent or limit the use of the content. As the traders of digital content frequently are not the owners of intellectual property rights but rely themselves on a licence, the question arises as to the potential implications of Art. 10 for digital content markets. This paper discusses two such potential implications. The first is whether the efforts to safeguard reasonable consumer expectations could be undermined by the Directive leaving the arrangements between traders and intellectual property right holders out of scope. The second is whether Art. 10 could reinforce the network effects and dominant position of the established players on the market. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

International conventions establishing uniform law for commercial contracts have become more and more numerous ever since the late nineteenth century. From a functional perspective these instruments are close to international trade law. The paper dwells upon the systematic relationship between uniform commercial law and international trade law, using an actor-based approach: while in international trade law States stake out the playing ground for private cross-border business, the conventions on uniform commercial law are meant to reduce legal uncertainty for private actors and to reduce their hesitations to engage in cross-border trade. Their aptitude for that purpose does not only depend on the quality of the texts and the number of States willing to adhere, but also on their future application, in particular their interpretation, the filling of gaps and their revision and adjustment to changed circumstances. The paper focuses on these issues which are common to uniform law conventions in many fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper aims to contribute to a larger research agenda concerning the possibility of meaningful transatlantic dialogue about private-law reform. Both the European Union and the United States regulate private autonomy extensively. In spite of contextual similarities, however, there are several barriers making dialogue among legal scholars difficult. In particular, the conversation about social justice--by now an important element of private-law reform within the European Union--is less prominent in American contract law scholarship. In U.S. legal academia, social justice is a matter for moral philosophers, development economists, and constitutionalists, and also provides normative frameworks for current property and torts debates, but its impact on contracts scholarship has declined over the past few years, and efficiency discourse has often replaced social justice parlance. Against this background, this paper takes a close look at a recent transatlantic exchange in matters of private-law reform--a Chicago Law School conference on a proposed Common European Sales Law-- and identifies a few counter-intuitive points of convergence between U.S. and European scholarship. Along the way, the paper also highlights structural and discursive incompatibilities, but concludes that the dialogue is, as a whole, valuable and should be kept alive. In designing post-national rules for private autonomy, Europe may draw better lessons from U.S. regulatory experiences if it first deconstructs the wholesale pro-market rhetoric of otherwise relevant literature. When this is done, the payoffs of American commentaries become more appreciable. Taking the lead from some Chicagoan insights, this paper recommends customizing the empirical investigation of EU markets so as to factor socio-economic asymmetries into the equation of private-law reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various articles within the issue on topics regarding impact of changes in education system on attainment of education, account deficits in euro area countries and preferential business agreements between country pairs.

Cloud computing offers an attractive solution to customers keen to acquire computing infrastructure without large up-front investment, particularly in cases where their demand may be variable and unpredictable. But the greater flexibility of a Cloud computing service as compared with a traditional outsourcing contract is balanced by less certainty for the customer in terms of the location of data placed into the cloud and the legal foundations of any contract with the provider. This paper reports on a detailed survey and analysis of the Terms and Conditions offered by cloud computing providers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There has been significant public debate about the susceptibility of research to biases of various kinds. The dialogue has extended to the peer-reviewed literature, scientific conferences, the mass media, government advisory bodies, and beyond. While biases can come from myriad sources, the overwhelming focus of the discussion, to date, has been on industry-funded science. Given the critical role that industry has played and will continue to play in the research process, the International Life Sciences Institute (ILSI) North America Working Group on Guiding Principles has, in this paper, set out proposed conflict-of-interest guidelines, regarding industry funding, for protecting the integrity and credibility of the scientific record, particularly with respect to health, nutrition, and food-safety science. Eight principles are enumerated, specifying ground rules for industry-sponsored research. The paper, which issues a challenge to the broader scientific community to address all bias issues, is only a first step; the document is intended to be dynamic, prompting ongoing discussion and refinement. The Guiding Principles are as follows. In the conduct of public/private research relationships, all relevant parties shall: 1) conduct or sponsor research that is factual, transparent, and designed objectively; according to accepted principles of scientific inquiry, the research design will generate an appropriately phrased hypothesis and the research will answer the appropriate questions, rather than favor a particular outcome; 2) require control of both study design and research itself to remain with scientific investigators; 3) not offer or accept remuneration geared to the outcome of a research project; 4) prior to the commencement of studies, ensure that there is a written agreement that the investigative team has the freedom and obligation to attempt to publish the findings within some specified time-frame; 5) require, in publications and conference presentations, full signed disclosure of all financial interests; 6) not participate in undisclosed paid authorship arrangements in industry-sponsored publications or presentations; 7) guarantee accessibility to all data and control of statistical analysis by investigators and appropriate auditors/reviewers; and 8) require that academic researchers, when they work in contract research organizations (CRO) or act as contract researchers, make clear statements of their affiliation; require that such researchers publish only under the auspices of the CRO. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a university (study 1) and a farm management training centre (study 2), the subjects of the second study most resembling the subjects in the field. The experiment consists of several treatments and each treatment has two different distribution rules, which are varied in a within-subjects manner. After subjects have experienced both, they can vote for one of the two rules: either a differentiated bonus that results in equal payoff for all, or an undifferentiated, equal share of the group bonus. In a between-subjects manner, subjects can vote for a (minimum or average) threshold or are faced with an exogenous threshold. The results indicate that exogenous thresholds perform better, possibly because the focal point they provide facilitates coordination. With regard to the two distribution rules, the results are mixed: in study 1, average contributions and payoffs are higher under the 'equal-payoff' rule, but there is no significant difference between the two in study 2. Overall, our results suggest that environmental payment schemes should consider cost heterogeneity in the design of group contracts, and pay explicit attention to coordination problems too. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although their paper stresses the potential merits of a particular financial innovation--a form of shared-ownership indexed contract--Miles and Pillonca surprisingly neglect the role of differential surges of financial innovation in explaining cross-country differences in house-price inflation. The risk-reducing potential of their favoured instrument deserves further analysis, not least because of the sizeable political risk involved: the experience of several other countries that have used indexed mortgage contracts shows their limited robustness to macroeconomic shocks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to reveal whether fixed-term contracts are the new European inequality and does so in a comparative analysis of two countries typically regarded as eurosclerotic: West Germany and France. We compare the wages, wage growth and labour market outcomes of fixed-term contract workers relative to a matched sample of permanent workers with similar characteristics. Using seven waves of the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) we find evidence of wage penalties, increased exposure to unemployment and repeat spells of fixed-term employment. However, these tendencies vary significantly by country and by gender. The main finding of this paper is the extent to which fixed-term contract employment is of considerable disadvantage for French women. This is important, as previous research on female employment in the UK and in West Germany (Booth et al., 2002; Giesecke and Gross, 2003), two countries with intermittent female employment, did not find evidence of fixed-term worker disadvantage. Our findings, however, suggest that in countries where female employment tends to be full-time and continuous, the introduction of fixed-term contracts challenges the existing gender contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Blockchain technology provides decentralized consensus and potentially enlarges the contracting space through smart contracts. Meanwhile, generating decentralized consensus entails distributing information that necessarily alters the informational environment. We analyze how decentralization relates to consensus quality and how the quintessential features of blockchain remold the landscape of competition. Smart contracts can mitigate informational asymmetry and improve welfare and consumer surplus through enhanced entry and competition, yet distributing information during consensus generation may encourage greater collusion. In general, blockchains sustain market equilibria with a wider range of economic outcomes. We further discuss the implications for antitrust policies targeted at blockchain applications. Received May 31, 2017; editorial decision May 29, 2018 by Editor Itay Goldstein. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies some empirical implications of models with limited risk sharing due to the imperfect enforceability of contracts. We test whether the amount by which public transfers reduce private transfers is affected by features of the economy, such as the variance of income and its persistence. These implications are unique to models with imperfect enforceability. We use data from Mexico collected to evaluate a public transfer programme. It included a randomised component that we exploit as a source of exogenous variation. Our results support the theoretical model in that the crowding out of private transfers is larger in villages where the variance of income is smaller. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper uses the case of contract manufacturing in the electronics industry to illustrate an emergent American model of industrial organization, the modular production network. Lead firms in the modular production network concentrate on the creation, penetration and defense of markets for end products—and increasingly the provision of services to go with them—while manufacturing capacity is shifted out-of-house to globally operating turn-key suppliers. The modular production network relies on codified inter-firm links and the generic manufacturing capacity residing in turn-key suppliers to reduce transaction costs, build large external economies of scale and reduce risk for network actors. I test the modular production network model against some of the key theoretical tools that have been developed to predict and explain industry structure: Joseph Schumpeter's notion of innovation in the giant firm; Alfred Chandler's ideas about economies of speed and the rise of the modern corporation; Oliver Williamson's transaction cost framework; and a range of other production network models that appear in the literature. I argue that the modular production network yields better economic performance in the context of globalization than more spatially and socially embedded network models. I view the emergence of the modular production network as part of a historical process of industrial transformation in which nationally specific models of industrial organization co-evolve in intensifying rounds of competition, diffusion and adaptation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes a framework in which countries over time pollute and invest in green technologies. Without a climate treaty, the countries pollute too much and invest too little, particularly if intellectual property rights are weak. Nevertheless, short-term agreements on emission levels then reduce every country's payoff, since countries invest less when they anticipate future negotiations. If intellectual property rights are weak, the agreement should be tougher and more long-term. Conversely, if the climate agreement happens to be short-term or absent, intellectual property rights should be strengthened or technological licensing subsidized. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Less health finance and the competitive contract culture are leading many health services to adopt quality methods to prove and improve their quality. Health promotion programmes face similar changes, but have not made great use of modern quality management methods. In part this has been because the definitions and approaches to quality have not appeared to be relevant to health promotion. Practitioners need to consider which methods and approaches are most suited to their programmes. This paper shows that many quality ideas and methods are congruent with good practice in health promotion, and may help to implement such practices more widely as well as to develop theory and practice.There is a danger that inappropriate ways of defining, specifying and assuring quality will be imposed on programmes. Practitioners need to consider which methods and approaches are most suited to their programmes. This paper seeks to stimulate debate about the need to prove and improve quality in health promotion, and about how best to do so. It considers definitions of quality, measurement, competing quality paradigms, quality in contracting and concepts of process and system in the context of health promotion programmes. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper explores the extent to which the incompleteness of contracts can be attributed to their formal nature the form, usually written, that contracts are required to take to be enforceable in a court of law by legal prescription, common practice, or simply the contracting parties' will We model the formal nature of state-contingent contracts as the requirement that the mapping from states of the world to the corresponding outcomes must be of an algorithmic nature. It is shown that such algorithmic nature, although by itself is not enough to generate incomplete contracts, when paired with a similar restriction on the contracting parties' selection process yields endogenously incomplete optimal contracts

The paper analyzes the issue of commitment in Grossman and Hart's model of optimal labor contracts under asymmetric information about firm profitability. We extend their framework by allowing employment to vary over time, at equidistant intervals. When both parties can precommit ex ante not to renegotiate the contract, this replicates the Grossman-Hart outcome each subperiod. When precommitment is not possible, information revealed through the contract can create Pareto-improving renegotiation opportunities, and the issue of optimal information revelation arises. The paper analyzes the impact of ex post Pareto-improving renegotiations on the optimal contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This section presents a reply by Dwight M. Jaffee and Thomas Russell to a commentary about their article Imperfect Information, Uncertainty, and Credit Rationing which appeared in the November 1984 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Economics. In responding to the comments by Kerry D. Vandell and James D. Hess, it is useful to make one general point before turning to our specific responses to each of the papers. The general comment concerns a continuing feature or strategy of the credit rationing literature, which Jaffee and Russell share, but which both Vandell and Hess seem to have misunderstood. Turning to specifics, Vandell respecifies and extends the model of Jaffee and Russell and then claims results that differ from Jaffee and Russell, neither is credit rationing necessary in a single contract equilibrium, nor is an unstable equilibrium possible in the multiple-contract case. While we have no quarrel with such a result, it appears irrelevant for our model. In particular, in our model borrowers have differing default propensities known only to themselves, while the lender must act on the aggregate average default propensity. The comment by Hess claims that we confused competitive supply curves with zero profit curves, and that our conclusion of profitable credit rationing in a competitive model is wrong. We strongly deny these claims, but do acknowledge a value in the Hess comment in drawing attention to questions of the definition of competition and equilibrium in a moral hazard, credit rationing model.

Signed information is difficult to manage and this difficulty is even bigger when pieces of signed digital information have to be exchanged in an atomic procedure. Multiparty contract signing is an application of fair exchange of values, where the information to be exchanged are signed versions of a contract. Traditionally, this trust service requires the involvement of a trusted third party (TTP). This is a point of weakness for the generalization of the use of electronic contract signing protocols. Another usual problem for multiparty contract signing is that the protocols for multiparty exchanges are far more complex that those for two-party exchanges. Additionally, it is common that the signers demand protocols that assure the confidentiality of the contract. In this proposal blockchain-based technologies and smart contracts are used to obtain a protocol for electronic contract signing that does not need a TTP in any stage of the procedure. The protocol satisfies the ideal requirements for the contract signing service, even allowing the signature of confidential contracts. Moreover, the proposed solution is far more efficient than previous solutions for fair exchange protocols using blockchain presented up to the date thanks to the use of elliptic curve cryptography. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A buyer wants to purchase an innovative good from a seller. Both parties are risk-neutral, and payments from the buyer to the seller must be non-negative. After the contract is signed, the seller privately observes a signal which may be informative about the seller's costs. We compare two contracting regimes. In the case of specific performance, the courts enforce the contractually specified trade level. In the case of at-will contracting, the seller is free to walk away from the contract after observing the signal. The optimal regime from an economic efficiency point-of-view depends on the informativeness of the signal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study the interaction between the currency choice of private domestic contracts and optimal monetary policy. The optimal currency choice depends on the price risk of each currency, as well as on the covariance of its price and the relative consumption needs of the agents signing the contract. When a larger share of contracts is denominated in local currency, the government can use inflation more effectively to either redistribute resources or reduce default costs, which makes local currency more attractive for private contracts. When governments lack commitment, competitive equilibria can be constrained inefficient, thus providing a reason to regulate the currency choice of private contracts. We show that both the equilibrium use of local currency and the implications for regulation depend on the level of domestic policy risk. Our model can explain the wide use of the US dollar in international trade contracts and the observed hysteresis in dollarization. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several commentators have tried to ground legal prohibitions of kidney sales in some form of Kant's moral arguments against such sales. This paper reconsiders this approach to justifying laws and policies in light of Kant's approach to law in his political philosophy. The author argues that Kant's political philosophy requires that kidney sales be legally permitted, although contracts for such sales must remain unenforceable. The author further argues that Kant's approach to laws, such as those governing kidney distribution, was formed in part by considering and rejecting an assumption frequently employed in the bioethics literature, namely, that legal duties can be grounded directly in moral duties. The author explains some of Kant's reasons for rejecting this assumption and concludes that arguments pertaining to the legality of kidney sales developed on the basis of Kant's moral philosophy should no longer be considered tenable. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In light of inevitable cross-border scenarios in today's highly interconnected financial markets and since financial stability may be put at risk by the rising phenomenon of financial technology (known as fintech), the importance of developing effective ways to regulate fintech across borders cannot be neglected. The financial sector has changed from a traditional one marked by conventional financial intermediation structures towards an increasingly technology-affected one. Not only this change but anticipated developments too require if not extensively reconsidering the design of financial regulation, 1 then at least not turning a blind eye to shaping developments. Whether the numerous recently sprouting bilateral fintech cooperation agreements are adequate transnational regulatory instruments to address fintech effectively across borders is for this paper to elucidate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does an ex-ante contract affect behavior in an ex-post renegotiation game? We address this question in a canonical buyer-seller relationship with renegotiation. Our paper provides causal experimental evidence that an initial contract has a highly significant and economically important impact on renegotiation behavior that goes beyond the effect of contracts on bargaining threat points. We compare situations in which an initial contract is renegotiated to strategically equivalent bargaining situations in which no ex-ante contract was written. The ex-ante contract causes sellers to ask for markups that are 45% lower than in strategically equivalent bargaining situations without an initial contract. Moreover, buyers are more likely to reject given markups in renegotiations than in negotiations. These effects do not depend on whether the contract was written under competitive or monopolistic conditions. Our results provide strong evidence supporting the hypothesis that contracts serve as reference points that shape and coordinate the expectations of the contracting parties. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers whether, and if so, to what extent the employer has an implied duty to provide information and advice to the employee on the existence and extent of their legal and contractual rights and on measures they may need to take to protect the economic interests of the employee. The paper explores the traditional reluctance of the courts to imply such a duty, and argues that this position should be reassessed in the light of the evolution of the duty of mutual trust and confidence. After providing an account of the relevant case law, the paper submits that strong arguments exist in defence of the imposition of a minimum duty of information and advice on the employer, but stresses that the imposition of such a duty in a concrete case must be ‘necessary’ or ‘reasonable’ given the legitimate expectations of the employee and the employer. Moreover, the content and extent of this duty depends on an assessment of those expectations in light of a standard of reasonableness – a standard which must be applied with respect to labour law’s normative functions and foundations. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]