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This chapter discusses the adverse inferences that may be drawn against an accused from: his failure to testify; his failure, when questioned or charged, to mention facts which he could reasonably have been expected to have mentioned at that time and which he later relies on in his defence at trial; his failure or refusal, on arrest, to account for any object, substance, or mark that the police reasonably believe may be attributable to his participation in the commission of an offence; his refusal to consent to the taking of an intimate sample, such as a sample of blood, semen, or urine; and his failure to provide advance disclosure of the defence case, the nature of his defence, or the facts on which he takes issue with the prosecution.

This chapter discusses exceptions to the general rule that there is no requirement for evidence to be corroborated. There are three categories of exception (i) where corroboration is required as a matter of law (speeding, perjury, treason, and attempts to commit these offences) and therefore a conviction cannot be based on uncorroborated evidence; (ii) where neither corroboration in a technical sense nor supportive evidence is required as a matter of law, but the tribunal of fact may need to be warned to exercise caution before acting on the evidence of certain types of witness, if unsupported; (iii) five cases in which corroboration is not required as a matter of law, and there is no obligation to warn the tribunal of fact of the danger of acting on the unsupported or uncorroborated evidence, but there is a special need for caution. The five cases are confessions by mentally handicapped persons, identification evidence, lip-reading evidence, cases of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, and unconvincing hearsay. Identification evidence is dealt with separately in Chapter 10.

This chapter discusses the law on experts and opinion evidence. As a general rule, opinion evidence is inadmissible: a witness may only speak of facts that he personally perceived, not of inferences drawn from those facts. However, there are two exceptions to this general rule: (i) an appropriately qualified expert may state his opinion on a matter calling for the expertise that he possesses; and (ii) a non-expert witness may state his opinion on a matter not calling for any particular expertise as a way of conveying the facts that he personally perceived. Experts may also give evidence of fact based on their expertise. The chapter covers the duties of experts and the rules which apply where parties propose to call expert evidence.

The questioning of witnesses, which generally falls into three stages known as examination-in-chief, cross-examination, and re-examination, is central to the English adversary system of justice. This chapter focuses on the first stage, examination-in-chief. In this stage the party calling a witness, or counsel on his behalf, will seek to elicit evidence that supports his version of the facts in issue. The discussions cover young and vulnerable witnesses; the rule against leading questions and the exceptions to the rule; refreshing the memory in court and out of court; the rule against previous consistent or self-serving statements and the common law exceptions to the rule (complaints in sexual cases, statements admissible to rebut allegations of recent fabrication, statements made on accusation, previous identification, statements admissible as part of the res gestae and statements in documents used to refresh the memory and received in evidence); and unfavourable and hostile witnesses.

This chapter discusses the following: (i) the competence and compellability of witnesses (including the special rules that apply in the case of the accused, the spouse or civil partner of an accused, persons with a disorder or disability of the mind, the Sovereign, diplomats, and bankers); (ii) oaths and affirmations; (iii) the use of live links; (iv) the time at which evidence should be adduced; (v) witnesses in civil cases (including the witnesses to be called and the use of witness statements); (vi) witnesses in criminal cases (including the witnesses to be called, the order of witnesses, evidence-in-chief by video recording and special measures directions for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses); (vii) witness anonymity; and (viii) witness training and familiarization.

Evidence is information by which facts tend to be proved, and the law of evidence is that body of law and discretion regulating the means by which facts may be proved in both courts of law and tribunals and arbitrations in which the strict rules of evidence apply. This introductory chapter discusses truth and the fact-finding process and explains how getting to the truth in court is hampered by practical constraints, the adversarial system, the rules of evidence themselves, and the fact that litigation is a human endeavour that necessarily provides scope for differences of opinion, error, deceit, and lies. The chapter also contains a brief history of the development of the law to date.

This chapter examines the circumstances in which a verdict is admissible in subsequent proceedings as evidence of the facts on which it was based. It analyses the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd, which has been widely criticized, that judgments are not admissible as evidence of the facts on which they are based. Its effect, in both civil and criminal proceedings, has been largely removed by the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, respectively. Concerning civil proceedings, consideration is given to previous convictions generally, previous convictions in defamation proceedings, previous findings of adultery and paternity, previous acquittals, and other previous findings. Concerning criminal proceedings, consideration is given to previous convictions of the accused, previous convictions of persons other than the accused, and previous acquittals.

This chapter considers the risk of mistaken identification, and the law and procedure relating to evidence of visual and voice identification. In respect of evidence of visual identification, the chapter addresses: the Turnbull guidelines, including when a judge should stop a case and the direction to be given to the jury; visual recognition, including recognition by the jury themselves from a film, photograph, or other image; evidence of analysis of films, photographs, or other images; pre-trial procedure, including procedure relating to recognition by a witness from viewing films, photographs, either formally or informally; and admissibility where there have been breaches of pre-trial procedure. In respect of evidence of voice identification, the chapter addresses: pre-trial procedure; voice comparison by the jury with the assistance of experts or lay listeners; and the warning to be given to the jury (essentially an adaption of the Turnbull warning, but with particular focus on the factors which might affect the reliability of voice identification).

This chapter discusses several well-established principles whereby relevant evidence is excluded because of extrinsic considerations which outweigh the value that the evidence would have at trial. Three types of privilege are considered: (i) the privilege against self-incrimination (including statutory withdrawal of the privilege, compatibility with Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the compulsory production of pre-existing documents and materials, and substituted protection); (ii) legal professional privilege, which enables a client to protect the confidentiality of (a) communications between him and his lawyer made for the purpose of obtaining and giving legal advice (known as ‘legal advice privilege’) and (b) communications between him or his lawyer and third parties for the dominant purpose of preparation for pending or contemplated litigation (known as ‘litigation privilege’); and (iii) ‘without prejudice’ privilege, which enables settlement negotiations to be conducted without fear of proposed concessions being used in evidence at trial as admissions.

This chapter first discusses cross-examination, the questioning of a witness immediately after his examination-in-chief by the legal representative of the opponent of the party calling him, or by the opposing party in person, and by the legal representative of any other party to the proceedings or by any other party in person. The object of cross-examination is to elicit evidence which supports the cross-examining party’s version of the facts in issue and to cast doubt upon the witness’s evidence-in-chief. It then turns to re-examination. A witness who has been cross-examined may be re-examined by the party who called him. The object of re-examination is to repair damage that has been done by cross-examination.

This chapter considers the following categories of hearsay: statements in public documents, works of reference, evidence of birth, age, and death, evidence of reputation, statements forming part of the res gestae, and statements which are admissions made by an agent of a defendant. All of these categories were established at common law as exceptions to the rule against hearsay, and all of them have been preserved by statute. The categories relating to age and res gestae have been preserved in criminal but not civil proceedings. All of the other categories have been preserved in both criminal and civil proceedings.

This chapter discusses the circumstances in which relevant evidence can be excluded, as a matter of law or discretion, on the grounds that it was obtained illegally, improperly, or unfairly. The principles for exclusion of evidence are considered, and exclusion in both civil and criminal cases are covered. In respect of civil cases, discretionary exclusion under the civil procedure rules is examined, and in respect of criminal cases, discretionary exclusion at common law and under statute is discussed. The chapter also considers the circumstances in which criminal proceedings should be stayed as an abuse of the court’s process, where a trial would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and bring it into disrepute.

This chapter discusses the following: (i) facts that are open to proof or disproof in English courts of law: facts in issue, relevant facts, and collateral facts; (ii) the varieties of evidence: testimony, hearsay evidence, documentary evidence, real evidence, circumstantial evidence (including motive, plans and preparatory acts, capacity, opportunity, identity, continuance, failure to give evidence or call witnesses, failure to provide samples, lies and standards of comparison), and conclusive evidence; (iii) the concepts of relevance and admissibility; (iv) the weight of evidence; (v) the functions of the judge and jury; (vi) judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence.

This chapter discusses the admissibility of confessions under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (the 1984 Act). It considers how, under s 76(2) of the 1984 Act, confessions may be excluded as a matter of law where obtained by oppression or in consequence of something said or done which was likely to render any such confession unreliable. It also considers the discretion to exclude confessions under s 78(1) of the 1984 Act; the effect of breaches of the Codes of Practice issued under the 1984 Act; the voir dire; statements made in the presence of the accused; and facts discovered in consequence of inadmissible confessions.

This chapter discusses the meaning of hearsay in criminal proceedings and the categories of hearsay admissible by statute in such proceedings. It considers the relationship between the hearsay provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 (the 2003 Act) and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights as it relates to hearsay; the definition of hearsay and its admissibility under the 2003 Act, including admissibility under an inclusionary discretion (section 114(1)(d)); and safeguards including provisions relating to the capability and credibility of absent witnesses, the power to stop a case and the discretion to exclude. Also considered in this chapter are: expert reports; written statements under section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1967; and depositions of children and young persons under section 43 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.

Facts in issue and relevant facts are treated as established by the courts only insofar as they are proved by evidence. This chapter discusses three exceptions to this general rule: (i) some facts may be presumed in a party’s favour in the absence of proof or complete proof, including marriage, legitimacy, death, the regular and proper performance of public or official acts, sanity, and negligence; (ii) a fact will be treated as established where the court takes judicial notice of it either (a) without enquiry, in the case of facts that are beyond serious dispute, notorious or of common knowledge or (b) after enquiry (usually political facts, customs, professional practices, and historical and geographical facts); and (iii) a fact ceases to be in issue when a party has formally admitted it.

This chapter discusses the law on documentary evidence and real evidence. It addresses the following key issues: Where a party to litigation wishes to adduce in evidence a statement contained in a document, (a) should it be open to proof by production of a copy of the document and, if so, (b) in what circumstances and subject to what safeguards? Where a party to litigation wishes to admit a document in evidence, (a) should he be required to establish that it was written, signed, or attested by the person by whom it purports to be written, signed, or attested and, if so, (b) how should these matters be established? When should material objects and other types of real evidence be admissible in evidence and why do they need to be accompanied by oral testimony? When, and subject to what safeguards, should a court inspect a place or object out of court?

This chapter discusses the circumstances in which, in criminal proceedings, evidence of the good character of the accused may be adduced because of its relevance either to a fact in issue or to his credibility. It addresses the following issues: Why should an accused be allowed to call evidence of his previous good character? What is meant by ‘good character?’ Linked to this, where an accused has previous convictions, in what circumstances might it be acceptable for a judge to tell a jury that they should consider the accused as a person of good character? Where an accused has no previous convictions, in what circumstances might it be acceptable for a judge to refuse to tell a jury that they should treat the accused as a person of good character? Other issues discussed include the admissibility of evidence of the good character of prosecution witnesses.

This chapter discusses the following: (i) the competence and compellability of witnesses (including the special rules that apply in the case of the accused, the spouse or civil partner of an accused, persons with a disorder or disability of the mind, the Sovereign, diplomats, and bankers); (ii) oaths and affirmations; (iii) the use of live links; (iv) the time at which evidence should be adduced; (v) witnesses in civil cases (including the witnesses to be called and the use of witness statements); (vi) witnesses in criminal cases (including the witnesses to be called, the order of witnesses, evidence-in-chief by video recording and special measures directions for vulnerable and intimidated witnesses); (vii) witness anonymity; and (viii) witness training and familiarization.

This chapter discusses several well-established principles whereby relevant evidence is excluded because of extrinsic considerations which outweigh the value that the evidence would have at trial. Three types of privilege are considered: (i) the privilege against self-incrimination (including statutory withdrawal of the privilege, compatibility with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the compulsory production of pre-existing documents and materials, and substituted protection); (ii) legal professional privilege, which enables a client to protect the confidentiality of (a) communications between him and his lawyer made for the purpose of obtaining and giving legal advice (known as ‘legal advice privilege’) and (b) communications between him or his lawyer and third parties for the dominant purpose of preparation for pending or contemplated litigation (known as ‘litigation privilege’); and (iii) ‘without prejudice’ privilege, which enables settlement negotiations to be conducted without fear of proposed concessions being used in evidence at trial as admissions.

Under the common law rule against hearsay, any assertion, other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings, was inadmissible if tendered as evidence of the facts asserted. The Civil Evidence Act 1968 constituted a major assault upon the common law rule in civil proceedings by making provisions for the admissibility of both oral and written hearsay subject to certain conditions. In June 1988 the Civil Justice Review recommended an inquiry by a law reform agency into the usefulness of the hearsay rule in civil proceedings and the machinery for rendering it admissible. The subsequent recommendations of the Law Commission were put into effect by the Civil Evidence Act 1995. This chapter discusses the admissibility of hearsay under the Civil Evidence Act 1995; safeguards; proof of statements contained in documents; evidence formerly admissible at common law; and Ogden tables.

The Modern Law of Evidence is a comprehensive analysis of the law of criminal and civil evidence and the theory behind the law. It identifies all the key issues, emphasizes recent developments and insights from the academic literature, and makes suggestions for further reading. The work begins with a definition of evidence and the law of evidence and an outline of its development to date. It then describes and analyses the key concepts, such as the facts open to proof, the forms that evidence can take, relevance, admissibility, weight and discretion, including the discretion to exclude evidence obtained by illegal or unfair means. It then proceeds to cover in a logical sequence all aspects of the subject: the burden and standard of proof, witnesses, examination-in-chief, cross-examination and re-examination, corroboration and care warnings, documentary and real evidence, identification evidence, hearsay, confessions, adverse inferences from an accused’s silence, evidence of good and bad character, opinion evidence, public policy, privilege, judgments as evidence of facts on which they were based, and the proof of facts without evidence.

This chapter discusses the rules governing which party bears the legal and evidential burdens on which facts in issue. These rules can determine the eventual outcome of proceedings; determine which party has the right to begin adducing evidence in court; in what circumstances a defendant, at the end of the case for the prosecution, or claimant, may make a successful submission of no case to answer; and how the trial judge should direct the jury. The chapter begins by defining and distinguishing the legal, evidential, and other burdens, and then considers in detail which burden is borne by each of the parties on the various facts in issue in any given case. The chapter also considers the standard of proof in criminal proceedings where the burden is on the prosecution and on the accused. The standard of proof in civil proceedings is also considered.

This chapter discusses the admissibility of confessions under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (the 1984 Act). It considers how, under s 76(2) of the 1984 Act, confessions may be excluded as a matter of law where obtained by oppression or in consequence of something said or done which was likely to render any such confession unreliable. It also considers the discretion to exclude confessions under s 78(1) of the 1984 Act; the effect of breaches of the Codes of Practice issued under the 1984 Act; the voir dire; statements made in the presence of the accused; and facts discovered in consequence of inadmissible confessions.

This chapter discusses the law on documentary evidence and real evidence. It addresses the following key issues: Where a party to litigation wishes to adduce in evidence a statement contained in a document, (a) should it be open to proof by production of a copy of the document and, if so, (b) in what circumstances and subject to what safeguards? Where a party to litigation wishes to admit a document in evidence, (a) should he be required to establish that it was written, signed, or attested by the person by whom it purports to be written, signed, or attested and, if so, (b) how should these matters be established? When should material objects and other types of real evidence be admissible in evidence and why do they need to be accompanied by oral testimony? When, and subject to what safeguards, should a court inspect a place or object out of court?

This chapter discusses the admissibility of evidence of character. A number of factors govern the admissibility of character evidence, including whether the proceedings are civil or criminal and whether the evidence relates to the character of a party or non-party. It is also necessary to consider the nature of the character evidence in question. It may relate to either good or bad character and, in either event, may constitute evidence of a person’s actual disposition, that is his propensity to act, think, or feel in a given way; or evidence of his reputation, that is his reputed disposition or propensity to act, think, or feel in a given way. Thus, the character of a person may be proved by evidence of general disposition, by evidence of specific examples of his conduct on other occasions (including, in the case of bad conduct, evidence of his previous convictions), or by evidence of his reputation among those to whom he is known. The chapter considers civil cases in which bad character designated ‘similar fact evidence’ has been admitted.

This chapter examines the circumstances in which a judgment in a civil case or a verdict in a criminal case is admissible in subsequent proceedings as evidence of the facts on which it was based. It analyses the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd, which has been widely criticized, that judgments are not admissible as evidence of the facts on which they are based. Its effect, in both civil and criminal proceedings, has been largely removed by the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 respectively. Concerning civil proceedings, consideration is given to previous convictions generally, previous convictions in defamation proceedings, previous findings of adultery and paternity, previous acquittals, and other previous findings. Concerning criminal proceedings, consideration is given to previous convictions of the accused, previous convictions of persons other than the accused, and previous acquittals.

This chapter considers the risk of mistaken identification, and the law and procedure relating to evidence of visual and voice identification. In respect of evidence of visual identification, the chapter addresses: the Turnbull guidelines, including when a judge should stop a case and the direction to be given to the jury; visual recognition, including recognition by the jury themselves from a film, photograph, or other image; evidence of analysis of films, photographs, or other images; pre-trial procedure, including procedure relating to recognition by a witness from viewing films, photographs, either formally or informally; and admissibility where there have been breaches of pre-trial procedure. In respect of evidence of voice identification, the chapter addresses: pre -trial procedure; voice comparison by the jury with the assistance of experts or lay listeners; and the warning to be given to the jury (essentially an adaption of the Turnbull warning, but with particular focus on the factors which might affect the reliability of voice identification).

This chapter begins with an introduction to the statutory framework governing the admissibility of bad character evidence. It goes on to consider the statutory definition of ‘bad character’ and to discuss the admissibility of evidence of bad character in criminal cases under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, namely: the admissibility of the bad character of a person other than the defendant and the requirement of leave; the admissibility of evidence of the bad character of the defendant under various statutory ‘gateways’, including the gateway by which evidence may be admitted if it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution; and safeguards including the discretion to exclude evidence of bad character and the judge’s power to stop a case where the evidence is contaminated. Procedural rules are also considered, as is the defendant’s right to challenge evidence of bad character.

This chapter first discusses cross-examination, the questioning of a witness immediately after his examination-in-chief by the legal representative of the opponent of the party calling him, or by the opposing party in person, and by the legal representative of any other party to the proceedings or by any other party in person. The object of cross-examination is to elicit evidence which supports the cross-examining party’s version of the facts in issue and to cast doubt upon the witness’s evidence-in-chief. It then turns to re-examination. A witness who has been cross-examined may be re-examined by the party who called him. The object of re-examination is to repair damage that has been done by cross-examination.

This chapter discusses the following: (i) facts that are open to proof or disproof in English courts of law: facts in issue, relevant facts, and collateral facts; (ii) the varieties of evidence: testimony, hearsay evidence, documentary evidence, real evidence, circumstantial evidence (including motive, plans and preparatory acts, capacity, opportunity, identity, continuance, failure to give evidence or call witnesses, failure to provide samples, lies and standards of comparison), and conclusive evidence; (iii) the concepts of relevance and admissibility; (iv) the weight of evidence; (v) the functions of the judge and jury; (vi) judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence; and (vii) proof of birth, death, age, convictions, and acquittals.

The public interest in efficient and fair trials may be seen as underlying the rules of disclosure in civil litigation, whereby a litigant is obliged to make pre-trial disclosure of the documents on which he relies and the documents that adversely affect his own case or adversely affect, or support, another party’s case, even though such documents may not be admissible evidence at the trial. There is also a public interest in enabling material to be withheld where its production would harm the nation or the public service. Where these two kinds of public interest clash and the latter prevails over the former, relevant and otherwise admissible evidence is excluded at trial. Such material is said to be withheld by reason of ‘public interest immunity’. This chapter discusses the development of the modern law on public interest immunity; the scope of exclusion on grounds of public policy; and related procedural issues in civil and criminal cases.

Evidence is information by which facts tend to be proved, and the law of evidence is that body of law and discretion regulating the means by which facts may be proved in both courts of law and tribunals and arbitrations in which the strict rules of evidence apply. This introductory chapter discusses truth and the fact-finding process and explains how getting to the truth in court is hampered by practical constraints, the adversarial system, the rules of evidence themselves, and the fact that litigation is a human endeavour that necessarily provides scope for differences of opinion, error, deceit, and lies. The chapter also contains a brief history of the development of the law to date.

Facts in issue and relevant facts are treated as established by the courts only insofar as they are proved by evidence. This chapter discusses three exceptions to this general rule: (i) some facts may be presumed in a party’s favour in the absence of proof or complete proof, including marriage, legitimacy, death, the regular and proper performance of public or official acts, sanity and negligence; (ii) a fact will be treated as established where the court takes judicial notice of it either (a) without enquiry, in the case of facts that are beyond serious dispute, notorious or of common knowledge or (b) after enquiry (usually political facts, customs, professional practices and historical and geographical facts); and (iii) a fact ceases to be in issue when a party has formally admitted it.

This chapter discusses several well-established principles whereby relevant evidence is excluded because of extrinsic considerations which outweigh the value that the evidence would have at trial. Three types of privilege are considered: (i) the privilege against self-incrimination (including statutory withdrawal of the privilege, compatibility with Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the compulsory production of pre-existing documents and materials, and substituted protection); (ii) legal professional privilege, which enables a client to protect the confidentiality of (a) communications between him and his lawyer made for the purpose of obtaining and giving legal advice (known as ‘legal advice privilege’) and (b) communications between him or his lawyer and third parties for the dominant purpose of preparation for pending or contemplated litigation (known as ‘litigation privilege’); and (iii) ‘without prejudice’ privilege, which enables settlement negotiations to be conducted without fear of proposed concessions being used in evidence at trial as admissions.

This chapter examines the circumstances in which a judgment in a civil case or a verdict in a criminal case is admissible in subsequent proceedings as evidence of the facts on which it was based. It analyses the rule in Hollington v Hewthorn & Co Ltd, which has been widely criticized, that judgments are not admissible as evidence of the facts on which they are based. Its effect, in both civil and criminal proceedings, has been largely removed by the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 respectively. Concerning civil proceedings, consideration is given to previous convictions generally, previous convictions in defamation proceedings, previous findings of adultery and paternity, previous acquittals, and other previous findings. Concerning criminal proceedings, consideration is given to previous convictions of the accused, previous convictions of persons other than the accused, and previous acquittals.

This chapter discusses the law on documentary evidence and real evidence. It addresses the following key issues: Where a party to litigation wishes to adduce in evidence a statement contained in a document, (a) should it be open to proof by production of a copy of the document and, if so, (b) in what circumstances and subject to what safeguards? Where a party to litigation wishes to admit a document in evidence, (a) should he be required to establish that it was written, signed, or attested by the person by whom it purports to be written, signed, or attested and, if so, (b) how should these matters be established? When should material objects be admissible in evidence and why do they need to be accompanied by oral testimony? When, and subject to what safeguards, should a court inspect a place or object out of court?

This chapter discusses the following: (i) facts that are open to proof or disproof in English courts of law: facts in issue, relevant facts, and collateral facts; (ii) the varieties of evidence: testimony, hearsay evidence, documentary evidence, real evidence, circumstantial evidence (including motive, plans and preparatory acts, capacity, opportunity, identity, continuance, failure to give evidence or call witnesses, failure to provide samples, lies and standards of comparison), and conclusive evidence; (iii) the concepts of relevance and admissibility; (iv) the weight of evidence; (v) the functions of the judge and jury; (vi) judicial discretion to admit or exclude evidence; and (vii) proof of birth, death, age, convictions, and acquittals.

This chapter considers the following categories of hearsay: statements in public documents, works of reference, evidence of age, evidence of reputation, and statements forming part of the res gestae, statements which are admissions made by an agent of a defendant. All of these categories were established at common law as exceptions to the rule against hearsay, and all of them have been preserved by statute. All of the cases considered, apart from evidence of age and res gestae statements, have been expressly preserved and given statutory force in both criminal proceedings and civil proceedings (by s 7(2) and (3) of the Civil Evidence Act 1995).

This chapter discusses the admissibility of confessions under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (the 1984 Act). It considers how, under s 76(2) of the 1984 Act, confessions may be excluded as a matter of law where it is represented that a confession has been obtained by oppression or in consequence of something said or done which was likely to render it unreliable. It also considers the discretion to exclude confession under s 78(1) of the 1984 Act; the effect of breaches of the Codes of Practice issued under the 1984 Act; the voir dire; statements made in the presence of the accused; and facts discovered in consequence of inadmissible confessions.

Under the common law rule against hearsay, any assertion, other than one made by a person while giving oral evidence in the proceedings, was inadmissible if tendered as evidence of the facts asserted. The Civil Evidence Act 1968 constituted a major assault upon the common law rule in civil proceedings by making provisions for the admissibility of both oral and written hearsay subject to certain conditions. In June 1988 the Civil Justice Review recommended an inquiry by a law reform agency into the usefulness of the hearsay rule in civil proceedings and the machinery for rendering it admissible. The recommendations were put into effect by the Civil Evidence Act 1995. This chapter discusses the admissibility of hearsay under the Civil Evidence Act 1995; safeguards; proof of statements contained in documents; evidence formerly admissible at common law; and Ogden tables.

This chapter discusses the circumstances in which relevant evidence can be excluded, as a matter of law or discretion, on the grounds that it was obtained illegally, improperly, or unfairly. The principles for exclusion of evidence are considered, and exclusion in both civil and criminal cases discussed. In respect of civil cases, discretionary exclusion under the civil procedure rules is discussed. In respect of criminal cases, discretionary exclusion at common law and under statute is discussed. The chapter also considers the circumstances in which criminal proceedings should be stayed as an abuse of the court’s process, where a trial would undermine public confidence in the criminal justice system and bring it into disrepute.

This chapter discusses the rules governing which party bears the legal and evidential burdens on which facts in issue. These rules can determine the eventual outcome of proceedings; determine which party has the right to begin adducing evidence in court; in what circumstances a defendant, at the end of the case for the prosecution, or claimant, may make a successful submission of no case to answer; and how the trial judge should direct the jury. The chapter begins by defining and distinguishing the legal, evidential, and other burdens, and then considers in detail which burden is borne by each of the parties on the various facts in issue in any given case.

Evidence is information by which facts tend to be proved, and the law of evidence is that body of law and discretion regulating the means by which facts may be proved in both courts of law and tribunals and arbitrations in which the strict rules of evidence apply. This introductory chapter discusses truth and the fact-finding process and explains how getting to the truth in court is hampered by practical constraints, the adversarial system, the rules of evidence themselves, and the fact that litigation is a human endeavour that necessarily provides scope for differences of opinion, error, deceit, and lies. The chapter also contains a brief history of the development of the law to date.

This chapter discusses exceptions to the general rule for corroboration of evidence. There are three categories of exception (i) where corroboration is required as a matter of law (speeding, perjury, treasons and attempts to commit these offences) and a conviction cannot be based on uncorroborated evidence; (ii) where neither corroboration in a technical sense nor supportive evidence is required as a matter of law, but the tribunal of fact may need to be warned to exercise caution before acting on the evidence of certain types of witness, if unsupported; (iii) five cases in which corroboration is not required as a matter of law, and there is no obligation to warn the tribunal of fact of the danger of acting on the unsupported or uncorroborated evidence, but there is a special need for caution. The five cases are confessions by mentally handicapped persons, identification evidence, lip-reading evidence, cases of Sudden Infant Death Syndrome, and unconvincing hearsay. Identification evidence is dealt with separately in Chapter 9.

This chapter discusses the admissibility of evidence of bad character in criminal cases under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, namely: the admissibility of the bad character of a person other than the defendant and the requirement of leave; the admissibility of evidence of the bad character of the defendant under various statutory ‘gateways’, including the gateway by which evidence may be admitted if it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution; and safeguards including the discretion to exclude evidence of bad character and the judge’s power to stop a case where the evidence is contaminated. Procedural rules are also considered, as is the defendant’s right to challenge evidence of bad character.

This chapter discusses the adverse inferences that may be drawn against an accused, and why, from: his failure to testify; his failure, when questioned or charged, to mention facts which he could reasonably have been expected to have mentioned at that time and which he later relies on in his defence at trial; his failure or refusal, on arrest, to account for any object, substance or mark that the police reasonably believe may be attributable to his participation in the commission of an offence; his refusal to consent to the taking of an intimate sample, such as a sample of blood, semen, or urine; and his failure to provide advance disclosure of the defence case, the nature of his defence or the facts on which he takes issue with the prosecution.

The public interest in efficient and fair trials may be seen as underlying the rules of disclosure in civil litigation, whereby a litigant is obliged to make pre-trial disclosure of the documents on which he relies and the documents that adversely affect his own case or adversely affect, or support, another party’s case, even though such documents may not be admissible evidence at the trial. There is also a public interest in enabling material to be withheld where its production would harm the nation or the public service. Where these two kinds of public interest clash and the latter prevails over the former, relevant and otherwise admissible evidence is excluded at trial. Such material is said to be withheld by reason of ‘public interest immunity’. This chapter discusses the development of the modern law on public interest immunity; the scope of exclusion on grounds of public policy; and related procedural issues in civil and criminal cases.

This chapter discusses the admissibility of evidence of character. A number of factors govern the admissibility of character evidence, including whether the proceedings are civil or criminal and whether the evidence relates to the character of a party or non-party. It is also necessary to consider the nature of the character evidence in question. It may relate to either good or bad character and, in either event, may constitute evidence of a person’s actual disposition, that is his propensity to act, think, or feel in a given way; or evidence of his reputation, that is his reputed disposition or propensity to act, think, or feel in a given way. Thus, the character of a person may be proved by evidence of general disposition, by evidence of specific examples of his conduct on other occasions (including, in the case of bad conduct, evidence of his previous convictions), or by evidence of his reputation among those to whom he is known.

This chapter discusses the law on experts and opinion evidence. As a general rule, opinion evidence is inadmissible: a witness may only speak of facts that he personally perceived, not of inferences drawn from those facts. However, there are two exceptions to this general rule: (i) an appropriately qualified expert may state his opinion on a matter calling for the expertise that he possesses; and (ii) a non-expert witness may state his opinion on a matter not calling for any particular expertise as a way of conveying the facts that he personally perceived. Experts may also give evidence of fact based on their expertise.