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Quine is renowned for offering a criterion of ontological commitment in terms of the values of bound variables. Simultaneously, however, Quine had a long-standing interest in formal systems that dispense with variables and quantifiers that permit variables to be explained away. The chapter seeks to resolve this often-neglected tension in a way that is sensitive to Quine’s allegiance to first-order logic, but is somewhat relaxed about the connection between semantics (/truth) and ontology.

The chapter argues that so-called semantic and syntactic intuitions, as appealed to as evidence in linguistic theory, are two sides of the same coin. Speaker-hearers do not have direct intuitive access to linguistic facts, but instead have intuitions about what can be said with a sentence; it is the theorist’s task to sieve such coarse-grained reports to discover the contribution of semantic and syntactic principles to the content associated with a sentence. The chapter contends that this conception better accommodates the complexity of linguistic phenomena vis-à-vis intuition. It also shows how the position is defensible against two troubling linguistic phenomena: one where we find interpretation without grammaticality, and another where we find grammaticality without interpretation. Both cases are illusory, at least as so described. In both, grammaticality (syntactic soundness) is aligned with semantic interpretability.

This chapter will spell out the general significance of weather reports and detail some of the so-called ‘weatherman’ thought experiments designed to trigger pragmatist intuitions against the view that meteorological predicates project or lexically encode a locative argument. I shall defend the style of these thought experiments against some objections that rightly point out that the extant experiments do not establish what they purport to do; that is, the thought experiments are perfectly consistent with reading weather reports as essentially locative. Some alternative thought experiments will be presented that evade the complaint. The chapter will also caution against putting too much weight on them.

The chapter seeks to settle on the general syntactic and semantic properties of weather reports. In particular, it is argued that the locative construal of weather reports is adjunctional, that is, the position for a locative phrase is optional and so does not militate for any syntactic or lexical structure when such a position is not overtly occupied. It is also argued that Recanati’s arguments to a similar conclusion can be faulted in ways the strict linguistic argument on offer cannot be. It is concluded, in light of the phenomena discussed, that relevant meteorological predicates are derived from a general principle that raises nominal roots into verbal positions.

Linguistic pragmatism claims that what we literally say goes characteristically beyond what the linguistic properties themselves mandate. In this book, John Collins provides a novel defence of this doctrine, arguing that linguistic meaning alone fails to fix truth conditions. While this position is supported by a range of theorists, Collins shows that it naturally follows from a syntactic thesis concerning the relative sparseness of what language alone can provide to semantic interpretation. Language–and by extension meaning–provides constraints upon what a speaker can literally say, but does not characteristically encode any definite thing to say. Collins then defends this doctrine against a range of alternatives and objections, focusing in particular on an analysis of weather reports: ‘it is raining/snowing/sunny’. Such reporting is mostly location-sensitive in the sense that the utterance is true or not depending upon whether it is raining/snowing/sunny at the location of the utterance, rather than some other location. Collins offers a full analysis of the syntax, semantics, and pragmatics of weather reports, including many novel data. He shows that the constructions lack the linguistic resources to support the common literal locative readings. Other related phenomena are discussed such as the Saxon genitive, colour predication, quantifier domain restriction, and object deletion.

A major strand to the ‘standard view’ is that meteorological predicates must contain a locative position because we can quantify into it. If there were no such position, then the quantifications would be, contrary to fact, illicit. In this chapter I shall reject this line of reasoning. The kind of binding relations into which weather reports may enter do not militate for, let alone entail, the syntactic or lexical occurrence of a locative variable. The quantification at issue is analysed as a free relative construction. It will also be shown how domain restriction fails to have a linguistic licence.

This chapter articulates and defends linguistic pragmatism as a linguistic hypothesis that language alone underdetermines truth conditions (or what is said), and doesn’t even provide a variable licence for the truth conditions of an utterance in a context. Linguistic meaning is characterized, therefore, in terms of constraints upon what can be literally said with a linguistic structure, without the presumption that the linguistic properties of an utterance in a context will determine a content. The hypothesis is explained in terms of the resources language makes available to content, differentiated from related positions, and defended against numerous objections, especially those that argue for an essential role for minimal propositions in accounting for aspects of what is said.

This chapter has three major tasks. Firstly, I show how the conception of linguistic pragmatism on offer squares with certain features of standard truth-conditional approaches to meaning, especially as regards compositionality. Secondly, pace some recent semantic proposals, I argue that the properties of the Saxon genitive (e.g., Sally’s car) and adnominal adjectival attributions (e.g., red pen) are referentially open in the way I argued in the previous chapter. The third task involves sketching the kind of role I take syntax to play in fixing linguistic meaning and how the argument-adjunct distinction operates in regards to my core claims.

A variadic function approach to weather reports and similar constructions is designed to save the spirit, if not the letter, of the ‘standard view’: although the meteorological predicate does not project a locative argument, there is a systematic way of construing the predicate as locatively relational (as having an indefinite argument), and so weather reports pattern with complement deletion verbs. I shall raise some objections to Recanati’s suggestion by showing that putative variadic functions are severely constrained by syntactic conditions, and so the kind of indefinite interpretations variadic functions allow cannot be freely available as an extra-linguistic pragmatic mechanism to coerce the desired reading. If that is right, the ‘standard view’ construals are simply not available, even with the permissibility of variadic functions. The general conclusion will be that the variadic function approach is unduly concessive to the spirit of the ‘standard view’.

Charles Travis seeks to forge a concord between Frege, McDowell, and Chomsky. The three thinkers all profoundly reject empiricism in the guise of rejecting of what Travis calls the Martian Principle. The essence of this principle is that thinking (or a cognitive competence) must be universal in not being due to a ‘special design’ a creature might have such that it exercises its competence in the way it does, as opposed to some other conceivable way. Although uncovering the Martian Principle is a genuine insight, Chomsky’s rejection of it is somewhat different from how Travis presents the case. Travis conceives of linguistic competence as if it were a form of seeing, the structure of an externally orientated sensibility. Once this misconception is rectified, a problem emerges for Travis’s way of putting the rejection of empiricism (on McDowell’s behalf).

The chapter explains the leading ideas of Charles Travis in relation to three main topics and offers first-pass responses to some general objections to Travis’s general philosophical orientation to the topics. Firstly, regarding linguistic meaning, it is argued that occasion-sensitivity poses a novel set of problems for standard construals of truth-conditional semantics. Secondly, regarding the structure of thought, it is explained how much the same issues arise for thought as they do for language. Thirdly, regarding perception, Travis’s distinctive flavour of disjunctivism is explained. The chapter also seeks to situate Travis’s thought in relation to Wittgenstein and more contemporary thinkers such as Jerry Fodor.

Our understanding regarding pain in children has grown significantly in the past few decades; however, we still find reluctance to acknowledge and treat pain in children. Many myths prevail, and coupled with poor understanding, can undermine the effective treatment of pain in children. Understandably many health-care professionals are apprehensive and fearful about working with very sick and dying children; perhaps there is a sense of failure for being unable to ‘cure’. However, as pain is one of the most common symptoms in this group of children, relieving pain and distress can be an extremely rewarding experience. This chapter outlines the background and principles of understanding, evaluating, and treating pain in children with palliative care needs. It offers an overview of current evidence and hopes to support health-care professionals working in this challenging discipline.

The concept of a variable is central to a range of explanations in linguistics and the philosophy of language, especially pertaining to quantification and so-called ‘empty categories’. The notion however, is in need of disambiguation. My aim is to remove the ambiguity by first settling on a formal characterization of a variable and then distinguishing between three grades of variable involvement: variables as theoretical artifacts, as features of semantic representations, or as syntactically realized items. I shall suggest that the first grade is relatively innocent, although unfortunately often wedded to a general antirealism about syntax. The second semantic grade, however, is difficult to evaluate on its own terms. The best case for semantic variables is for the third grade to be vindicated, but the evidence for syntactically realized variables is weak and if the notion of a variable is the formal concept, the position is conceptually problematic. The notion of a linguistic variable therefore remains to be properly explained.