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From an evolutionary perspective, one should be more sensitive when outgroup members attack the ingroup but less so when ingroup or outgroup members fight among themselves. Indeed, previous behavioral and neuroimaging research demonstrated that people show greater sensitivity for the suffering of ingroup compared with outgroup members. However, the question still remains whether this is always the case regardless of who is the agent causing the harm. To examine the role of agency and group membership in perception of harm, 48 participants were scanned while viewing ingroup or outgroup perpetrators intentionally harming ingroup or outgroup members. Behavioral results showed greater moral sensitivity for ingroup versus outgroup victims, but only when the perpetrator was from the outgroup. In support of this finding, fMRI data showed greater activity in left orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) for ingroup victims when they were harmed by outgroup individuals. In addition, effective connectivity analyses documented an increased coupling between left OFC and left amygdala and insula for ingroup harm, when the perpetrator was from the outgroup. Together these results indicate that we are highly sensitive to harm perpetrated by outgroup members and that increased sensitivity for ingroup victims is dependent on who is the agent of the action., (© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

A decisive element of moral cognition is the detection of harm and its assessment as intentional or unintentional. Moral cognition engages brain networks supporting mentalizing, intentionality, empathic concern and evaluation. These networks rely on the amygdala as a critical hub, likely through frontotemporal connections indexing stimulus salience. We assessed inferences about perceived harm using a paradigm validated through functional magnetic resonance imaging, eye-tracking and electroencephalogram recordings. During the task, we measured local field potentials in three patients with depth electrodes (n = 115) placed in the amygdala and in several frontal, temporal, and parietal locations. Direct electrophysiological recordings demonstrate that intentional harm induces early activity in the amygdala (<200 ms), which--in turn--predicts intention attribution. The amygdala was the only site that systematically discriminated between critical conditions and predicted their classification of events as intentional. Moreover, connectivity analysis showed that intentional harm induced stronger frontotemporal information sharing at early stages. Results support the 'many roads' view of the amygdala and highlight its role in the rapid encoding of intention and salience--critical components of mentalizing and moral evaluation., (© The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Guarantors of Brain. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Impaired cognitive empathy (ie, understanding the emotional experiences of others) is associated with poor social functioning in schizophrenia. However, it is unclear whether the neural activity underlying cognitive empathy relates to social functioning. This study examined the neural activation supporting cognitive empathy performance and whether empathy-related activation during correctly performed trials was associated with self-reported cognitive empathy and measures of social functioning. Thirty schizophrenia outpatients and 24 controls completed a cognitive empathy paradigm during functional magnetic resonance imaging. Neural activity corresponding to correct judgments about the expected emotional expression in a social interaction was compared in schizophrenia subjects relative to control subjects. Participants also completed a self-report measure of empathy and 2 social functioning measures (social competence and social attainment). Schizophrenia subjects demonstrated significantly lower accuracy in task performance and were characterized by hypoactivation in empathy-related frontal, temporal, and parietal regions as well as hyperactivation in occipital regions compared with control subjects during accurate cognitive empathy trials. A cluster with peak activation in the supplementary motor area (SMA) extending to the anterior midcingulate cortex (aMCC) correlated with social competence and social attainment in schizophrenia subjects but not controls. These results suggest that neural correlates of cognitive empathy may be promising targets for interventions aiming to improve social functioning and that brain activation in the SMA/aMCC region could be used as a biomarker for monitoring treatment response., (© The Author 2014. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Maryland Psychiatric Research Center. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Background: Pediatric obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) is associated with neurocognitive deficits. However, the neural substrates underlying such deficits remain unknown., Methods: To examine executive control and emotional processing in OSA, 10 children age 7 to 11 y with polysomnographically diagnosed OSA and 7 age- and sex-matched controls underwent a color-word Stroop task and an empathy task consisting of dynamic visual scenarios depicting interpersonal harm or neutral actions in a magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scanner. Functional MRI data were processed using MATLAB 7.12 with SPM8 for region of interest (ROI) analyses, and a general linear model was used with regressors for each trial type in each task., Results: For the Stroop task, accuracy was similar in the two groups, with no differences in the effect of incongruency on success rates. OSA showed greater neural activity than controls in eight ROI clusters for incongruent versus congruent trials (P < 0.001). Within the a priori ROIs, the anterior cingulate cortex was significantly different between groups (P < 0.05). For perceiving harm versus neutral actions, ROI analysis revealed a significant correlation between apnea-hypopnea index and left amygdala activity in harm versus neutral actions (r = -0.71, P < 0.05)., Conclusions: These results provide the first functional MRI evidence that cognitive and empathetic processing is influenced by obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) in children. Children with OSA show greater neural recruitment of regions implicated in cognitive control, conflict monitoring, and attentional allocation in order to perform at the same level as children without OSA. When viewing empathy-eliciting scenarios, the severity of OSA predicted less sensitivity to harm in the left amygdala.

Whether emotion is a source of moral judgments remains controversial. This study combined neurophysiological measures, including functional magnetic resonance imaging, eye-tracking, and pupillary response with behavioral measures assessing affective and moral judgments across age. One hundred and twenty-six participants aged between 4 and 37 years viewed scenarios depicting intentional versus accidental actions that caused harm/damage to people and objects. Morally, salient scenarios evoked stronger empathic sadness in young participants and were associated with enhanced activity in the amygdala, insula, and temporal poles. While intentional harm was evaluated as equally wrong across all participants, ratings of deserved punishments and malevolent intent gradually became more differentiated with age. Furthermore, age-related increase in activity was detected in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in response to intentional harm to people, as well as increased functional connectivity between this region and the amygdala. Our study provides evidence that moral reasoning involves a complex integration between affective and cognitive processes that gradually changes with age and can be viewed in dynamic transaction across the course of ontogenesis. The findings support the view that negative emotion alerts the individual to the moral salience of a situation by bringing discomfort and thus can serve as an antecedent to moral judgment.

Recent neuroimaging findings suggest a role of the extrastriate body area (EBA) in self/other distinction and in the perception of pain and emotions in others. The present functional magnetic resonance imaging study investigated whether EBA is modulated by the perception of pain in others. Participants were scanned during 2 consecutive sessions: 1) a localizer task precisely identifying EBA in each individual and 2) event-related trials in which participants watched pictures of pain (needle injections into human hands) inflicted in others or control stimuli showing hands in no pain. The perception of pain recruited large parts of the so-called pain matrix, documenting shared neural representations between the perception of pain in self and other. Both the needle injections and the control stimuli consistently activated bilateral EBA, replicating involvement of this area in the perception of body parts. However, activation during the perception of painful stimuli was not different from signal changes during perception of the control stimuli. This suggests that EBA is not specifically involved in empathy for pain.

Because awareness of emotional states in the self is a prerequisite to recognizing such states in others, alexithymia (ALEX), difficulty in identifying and expressing one's own emotional states, should involve impairment in empathy. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we compared an ALEX group (n = 16) and a non-alexithymia (non-ALEX) group (n = 14) for their regional hemodynamic responses to the visual perception of pictures depicting human hands and feet in painful situations. Subjective pain ratings of the pictures and empathy-related psychological scores were also compared between the 2 groups. The ALEX group showed less cerebral activation in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), the dorsal pons, the cerebellum, and the left caudal anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) within the pain matrix. The ALEX group showed greater activation in the right insula and inferior frontal gyrus. Furthermore, alexithymic participants scored lower on the pain ratings and on the scores related to mature empathy. In conclusion, the hypofunction in the DLPFC, brain stem, cerebellum, and ACC and the lower pain-rating and empathy-related scores in ALEX are related to cognitive impairments, particularly executive and regulatory aspects, of emotional processing and support the importance of self-awareness in empathy.

It is not known whether the mirror-neuron system is modulated by motivation, such as hunger. In this study, 2 groups of healthy participants underwent 2 functional magnetic resonance imaging scanning sessions separated by 1.5 h interval. During each session, participants were presented with video clips of another person grasping objects or grasping food. The first session was conducted after participants from group 1 had fasted. Then these participants were allowed to eat and were scanned again. Participants from group 2 had a meal before the first session. Food-related stimuli elicited specific hemodynamic response in the parahippocampal gyrus, orbitofrontal cortex, and amygdala, when participants were in a hungry state as compared with a satiated state. In addition, regions that belong to the mirror-neuron system, including the inferior frontal gyrus, and the posterior parietal cortex showed greater response when participants were hungry. Increased activity was also detected in the extrastriate body area. A positive correlation was observed between the self-report ratings of hunger and the hemodynamic activity in the inferior frontal gyrus as well as in the amygdala. Our results suggest that motivation to eat modulates the neural activity in the mirror-neuron system, facilitating the preparation or the intention to act.

Contingencies between objects and people can be mechanical or intentional-social in nature. In this fMRI study we used simplified stimuli to investigate brain regions involved in the detection of mechanical and intentional contingencies. Using a factorial design we manipulated the 'animacy' and 'contingency' of stimulus movement, and the subject's attention to the contingencies. The detection of mechanical contingency between shapes whose movement was inanimate engaged the middle temporal gyrus and right intraparietal sulcus. The detection of intentional contingency between shapes whose movement was animate activated superior parietal networks bilaterally. These activations were unaffected by attention to contingency. Additional regions, the right middle frontal gyrus and left superior temporal sulcus, became activated by the animate-contingent stimuli when subjects specifically attended to the contingent nature of the stimuli. Our results help to clarify neural networks previously associated with 'theory of mind' and agency detection. In particular, the results suggest that low-level perception of agency in terms of objects reacting to other objects at a distance is processed by parietal networks. In contrast, the activation of brain regions traditionally associated with theory of mind tasks appears to require attention to be directed towards agency and contingency.

PET was used to explore the neural network involved in the perception of meaningless action. In two conditions, subjects observed learned and unknown meaningless actions without any purpose. In two other conditions, subjects observed the same type of stimuli for later imitation. The control condition, which consisted of the presention of stationary hands, served as a baseline. Unsurprisingly, a common network that forms part of the dorsal pathway was engaged in all conditions when compared with stationary hands, and this was interpreted as being devoted to the analysis of hand movements. One of the most striking results of the present study was that some brain areas were strongly modulated by the learning level, independent of the subject's intention. Two different effects were observed: a reduced activity in posterior regions within the common network, which correlated with specific increases in the frontopolar area 10 and in the angular gyrus during the perception of learned meaningless actions compared with the perception of unknown actions. Finally, the major effect of the subject's intention to imitate was a strong increase in the dorsal pathway extending to the lateral premotor cortex and to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, which reflects the information processing needed for prospective action. Overall, our results provide evidence for both an effect of the visuomotor learning level and of the subject's intention on the neural network involved during the perception of human meaningless actions.

PET was used to map brain regions that are associated with the observation of meaningful and meaningless hand actions. Subjects were scanned under four conditions which consisted of visually presented actions. In each of the four experimental conditions, they were instructed to watch the actions with one of two aims: to be able to recognize or to imitate them later. We found that differences in the meaning of the action, irrespective of the strategy used during observation, lead to different patterns of brain activity and clear left/right asymmetries. Meaningful actions strongly engaged the left hemisphere in frontal and temporal regions while meaningless actions involved mainly the right occipitoparietal pathway. Observing with the intent to recognize activated memory-encoding structures. In contrast, observation with the intent to imitate was associated with activation in the regions involved in the planning and in the generation of actions. Thus, the pattern of brain activation during observation of actions is dependent both on the nature of the required executive processing and the type of the extrinsic properties of the action presented.

The purpose of this study was to identify the functional anatomy of the mechanisms involved in visually guided prehension and in object recognition in humans. The cerebral blood flow of seven subjects was investigated by positron emission tomography. Three conditions were performed using the same set of stimuli. In the 'grasping' condition, subjects were instructed to accurately grasp the objects. In the 'matching' condition, subjects were requested to compare the shape of the presented object with that of the previous one. In the 'pointing' condition (control), subjects pointed towards the objects. The comparison between grasping and pointing showed a regional cerebral blood flow (rCBF) increase in the anterior part of the inferior parietal cortex and part of the posterior parietal cortex. The comparison between grasping and matching showed an rCBF increase in the cerebellum, the left frontal cortex around the central sulcus, the mesial frontal cortex and the left inferior parietal cortex. Finally, the comparison between matching and pointing showed an rCBF increase in the right temporal cortex and the right posterior parietal cortex. Thus object-oriented action and object recognition activate a common posterior parietal area, suggesting that some kind of within-object spatial analysis was processed by this area whatever the goal of the task.