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The law governing marriage in South Africa is in transition. There are currently two proposals to reform the proprietary consequences of marriages in South Africa, namely a Marriage Bill [B43-2023], and a South African Law Reform Commission Discussion Paper to review aspects of matrimonial property law. This article assesses the effectiveness of the proposed reform in addressing the current regulatory challenges related to the proprietary consequences of customary marriages. It argues that the piecemeal jurisprudential development of the law has not been effectively reconciled, and this must be addressed in any future reform. However, the Marriage Bill proposed by the Department of Home Affairs is not an answer. The Bill ignores customary notions of property and creates several conceptual difficulties such as potentially leaving customary law marriages without a matrimonial proprietary regime. The South African Law Reform's Discussion Paper, which reviews aspects of matrimonial property law, holds great promise because it proposes a change in the default matrimonial proprietary system and the exclusion of family property from the marital estate. The proposals must be reconciled and informed by living customary law practices to deliver the much-anticipated law reform.

In King v De Jager 2021 5 BCLR 449 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that a clause in a private will that unfairly discriminated against beneficiaries based on gender was unlawful and unenforceable. This note considers the implications of the judgment for religion-based discrimination in wills, and in particular wills that incorporate the gender-discriminatory Islamic system of inheritance. After explaining the Constitutional Court judgment, the note argues that the Court was well within its powers to consider the enforceability of discrimination in the private sphere. More importantly, we argue that the case rings a bell of caution regarding gender-discriminatory provisions in private wills. Gender-based discrimination in Islamic inheritance law perpetuates disadvantage against a historically disadvantaged group, and the courts and legislature have been emphatic in their stance against gender discrimination in inheritance. The note thus argues that a testator's religious beliefs are not enough to tip the scales and render gender discrimination justifiable. We urge individuals who want to dispose of their assets following their religious beliefs to seek estate planning advice, cognisant of the potential impact of King v De Jager CC

The South African Law Reform Commission is currently canvassing views on a potential single marriage statute that would reconcile the several enactments currently regulating marriage in South Africa. This comment considers the implications of the proposed Bill for the regulation of customary marriages. It argues that the definition of a marriage / life partnership may be under-inclusive and must be expanded to included polygamous – rather than polygynous – relationships without a religious or cultural basis and life partnerships where the partners are not cohabitants. Furthermore, while the Bill is commended for requiring a husband to obtain the consent of existing wives before he enters into a further customary marriage, the Bill must give meaning to the notion of consent. Finally, the Bill must address existing issues within the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 which have invalidated a range of customary marriages too often at the expense of women.

In 2016 the Eastern Cape Local Division in Mthata heard a claim by Mrs Winnie Madikezela-Mandela that, amongst other things, her customary marriage to former President Nelson Mandela continued to exist until his death, despite the dissolution of their civil marriage. Not long thereafter, in 2017, former President Jacob Zuma's daughter made headlines by claiming half of her soon-to-be-ex-husband's multimillion-rand estate despite the couple’s having entered into a valid ante-nuptial contract. The claim was that her preceding customary marriage had not been accompanied by an ante-nuptial contract, and therefore the marriage was in community of property. These high-profile cases raise the fundamental legal question: what effect does a civil marriage between parties have on the parties' customary marriage to each other? Historically the subsequent civil marriage terminated the customary marriage, as such marriages were not legally recognised in South Africa. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 allows for such dual marriages without specifying the consequences thereof. Most commentators have interpreted the provisions to perpetuate the historical position; the civil marriage terminates the customary marriage. While this appears distasteful, the rationale is legal certainty and accords with the recommendations of the South African Law Commission. Furthermore, alternative customary dispute resolution mechanisms are still available to the parties, who are unlikely to suffer prejudice under the interpretation. In addition, given the social reality in which dual marriages are conducted and how they are perceived by parties, parties should be allowed to conclude an ante-nuptial contract after their customary marriage but before their civil marriage to regulate the proprietary consequences of their marriage.

In pluralistic legal systems, the regulation of non-state law through statute carries the risks associated with codification; namely the ossification and distortion of law. This article examines the effects of statutory regulation on unwritten systems of law in the South African legal context. It argues that the constitutional recognition of customary law in South Africa has forced the state to legislate in this arena, the most notable enactments being the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Law of Succession and Regulation of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009. The enactments' attempt to align customary law with constitutional values have imported significant portions of the common law to regulate the customary law of marriage and succession. This has resulted in a distortion of customary law to reflect common law values and rules. Furthermore, it is argued that significant lacunae in the enactments have necessitated litigation and resulted in the judiciary playing a significant role in shaping customary law. Finally, despite the incorporation of living customary law into the enactments, the implementation thereof by courts and in practice has – and perhaps inevitably so – ossified and distorted portions of the law. Nonetheless, the article argues that legislation is critical to regulate customary law. It advocates that the shortcomings identified in the article are addressed to ensure a more accurate portrayal of customary law in legislation and the successful implementation thereof.

A headscarf, a simple piece of cloth that covers the head, is a controversial garment that carries various connotations and meanings. While it may be accepted as just another item of clothing when worn by non-Muslim women, it is often the subject of much controversy when worn by Muslim women. In recent years the headscarf has been described as a symbol of Islam's oppression of women and simultaneously of terrorism. As the debate regarding the acceptability of the headscarf in the modern world continues, an increasing number of states have legislated to ban the wearing of the headscarf. This article critically examines the reasons underlying these bans and argues that these prohibitions are not justified. It does this by first analysing the place of the headscarf in Islam, its religious basis and its significance to Muslim women. It argues that the headscarf is more than just a mere religious symbol and that Muslim women wear the headscarf as a matter of religious obligation. The headscarf is considered to be an important religious practice protected by the right to freedom of religion. Thereafter the article examines legislative bans on the headscarf in France, Turkey and Switzerland in order to identify the most popular justifications advanced by states and courts for banning the headscarf. It critically evaluates the justifications for protecting secularism, preventing coercion, promoting equality and curbing religious extremism, and disputes that the reasons put forward by states and accepted by courts justify banning the headscarf. It thereafter explores how South African courts would respond to a headscarf ban and argues that schools and employers should accommodate the headscarf. While Muslim women may not have an absolute right to wear the headscarf, there has thus far been no justifiable reason for banning the headscarf.