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A recent judgment of the SCA in Capitec Bank Holdings v Coral Lagoon Investments suggested that the parol evidence rule is likely to become a residual rule of little practical importance in view of the expansive approach to interpretation flowing from the judgment in Endumeni and applied by the Constitutional Court in University of Johannesburg v Auckland Park Theological Seminary. The article analyses the court's concern in the light of the two judgments and suggests that it is misplaced. The parol evidence rule is still of full force and effect and evidence inadmissible under the rule is not admissible as context in interpreting contracts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper my thought experiment leads me to posit that South Africa's environmental governance often results in what I term "hollow environmentalism". This term describes the inevitable long-term outcome of promulgating laws and policies that are idealistic and seem symbolic and that at times fail to achieve their intended objectives or environmental promise. On a narrower scale, hollow environmentalism can also manifest when such symbolic environmental laws and policies lead to judicial decisions that lack substantive ecological justifications, perhaps even resembling symbolic judgments. I substantiate this argument through four key considerations. I commence with a reality check on environmental governance, emphasising that the state is not a neutral actor, necessitating closer scrutiny of state decisions. This leads me to the conclusion that governance stands at a critical juncture. I argue that the symbolic nature of our environmental laws, broadly speaking, often makes it challenging for the state to fully meet the lofty ideals it presents, thereby also complicating court decisions in these matters. Next, I align my thoughts with recent literature on adjudication in the context of the climate crisis. This literature stresses the need for courts to be bold and innovative in their judicial roles, given the precarious nature of stabilising environmental disputes. In the penultimate section I bring the discussion to a close by suggesting two interconnected possibilities to address hollowness in the face of climate change: "sunsetting" and "substitution". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Daniels v Scribante (hereafter the Daniels case) the Constitutional Court had to decide whether: (a) the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) afforded Ms Daniels the right to make improvements to her dwelling; (b) if consent from the person in charge, Mr Scribante, was a requirement for Ms Daniels to make such improvements; and (c) if consent was not a requirement, if Ms Daniels could effect improvements to the total disregard of Mr Scribante. The judgment in Daniels is important not only because it paved the way for Ms Daniels to effect improvements on her existing dwelling without the consent of Mr Scribante, but also because it showed that under section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) on the application of the Bill of Rights Mr Scribante owed a positive obligation to Ms Daniels to ensure that she lived in conditions that afforded her human dignity. In Daniels the Constitutional Court indicated that private landowners were enjoined by section 25(6) of the Constitution through ESTA to accommodate ESTA occupiers on their land. According to the Constitutional Court in Daniels, the nature of the obligation imposed by section 25(6) of the Constitution was both negative and positive, and in this particular case it rested on Mr Scribante. Against this background, this case note provides at the outset the salient facts and judgment of the Daniels case. This is followed by an analysis aimed at critiquing the judgment in Daniels pertaining to what is expected of private landowners in the new constitutional dispensation. It is concluded that more may be required from the private landowner – a positive duty – to ensure that ESTA occupiers enjoy fundamental rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 30P of the Pension Funds Act 24 of 1956 (hereafter PFA) is an important procedural tool that allows those dissatisfied with the Pension Funds Adjudicator's determinations to apply to the High Court for such determinations to be set aside. This article discusses this section and demonstrates that neither the legislature nor the courts have provided clarity on whether what is intended by this section is an appeal, a review or a reconsideration of determinations of the Pension Funds Adjudicator. It also illustrates the confusion that has been created by the courts with the High Court referring to this procedure as sui generis and the Supreme Court of Appeal, without referring to previous High Court decisions, referring to this procedure as an appeal in the wide sense. In this article a reflection on whether these two formulations are synonymous or if there is a need to settle for only one of them will be made. Furthermore, a call for judicial reconsideration of the applicability of the Plascon-Evan Rule in section 30P applications will be made in this article. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In its judgment in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission 2022 2 BCLR 129 (CC), the Constitutional Court declared section 10(1) of the Equality Act unconstitutional and invalid to the narrow extent that section 10(1)(a) refers to the intention to be "hurtful". The prohibition on hate speech passed constitutional muster in all other respects. In addition, the court purposively interpreted aspects of the application of section 10(1) so as to limit its impact on the right to freedom of expression. This contribution firstly welcomes the court's reliance on the transformative goals of the Constitution and the Equality Act as its primary framework in interpreting section 10(1). The severance of section 10(1)(a) and the conjunctive reading of sections 10(1)(b) and (c) ("be harmful or to incite harm" and ʺpromote or propagate hatred" respectively) also seem sensible considering the court's broad definition of "harm". The article further emphasises that the terms of section 10 call for a proper consideration of context. In this regard, the court rightly considered the extreme homophobia in the society addressed by Mr Qwelane, the particular vulnerability of the target group and the real threat of devastating imminent consequences to conclude that Qwelane's words were clearly intended to "incite harm" and "propagate hatred". Yet the court's view that the speaker's subjective intention is irrelevant in performing the requisite objective reasonableness assessment from the ambit of section 10(1) is arguably less judicious, as is the categorical exclusion of expression in private. Ultimately, the objective case-by-case reasonableness inquiry under section 10(1) should be whether a reasonable person in the speaker's position should have refrained from making the impugned harmful discriminatory utterances. This inquiry involves a determination of wrongfulness based on the constitutional duty not to discriminate unfairly. It invokes all the aspects of the Equality Act's definition of discrimination as well as all the elements of fairness analysis set out in section 14 of the Equality Act. Factors to be considered include the value of the particular expression, and the extent of the (potential) harm to individual members of a protected group and to society as a whole, as well as justification considerations such as the respondent's legitimate and bona fide exercise of the right to freedom of expression and to privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This case note analyses an appeal decision (Khoin v Jenkins in Re: Observatory Civic Association v Trustees for the Time Being of the Liesbeek Leisure Properties Trust [2023] 1 All SA 110 (WCC)) handed down in 2022 by the Western Cape High Court, its purpose being to identify the strengths and weaknesses of the decision and to comment on possible future developments. The text of the judgment is interpreted in the light of judicial precedent, literature and domestic (South African) and international law. One of the key findings is that "intangible heritage" is an integral part of both domestic and international law, and the Khoin-case gives judicial recognition to the concept as a part of South African heritage law. One of the main criticisms levelled against the judgment is that it does not adhere to judicial precedent in failing to find that the right to consultation of First Nations Peoples before administrative action is taken that allegedly violates their constitutional rights to intangible heritage is sufficient to satisfy the test for the existence of a prima facie right for the purposes of obtaining an interim interdict. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The judgment in Trustees for the Time Being of the Groundwork Trust v Minister of Environmental Affairs rests on a finding that the right in section 24 of the Constitution consists of two separate rights in subsections (a) and (b), and that the right in section 24(a) is immediately realisable. I argue in this article that this approach is incorrect and that a logical and contextual interpretation of section 24 cannot justify the conclusion that the court reached. I argue that section 24(b) is a qualifying "internal modifier" to section 24(a), and that, in practical terms and due to the modifier in section 24(b), in many situations section 24 would have to be regarded as implementable over time, and not immediately. Such implementation would have to be reasonable. The article also considers the use of the National Environmental Management: Air Quality Act to address the unacceptable level of air pollution in the area known as the Highveld Priority Area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Land and land rights remain a contested issue in South Africa. Grobler v Phillips centered on the eviction of an 86-year-old woman, Mrs Phillips, and her disabled son from property she had lived on since she was 11 years old. After a fourteen-year court battle the Constitutional Court granted an eviction order against Mrs Phillips. This case note consists of a discussion of the judgments of the Magistrate's Court, High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court. It is found that the Constitutional Court erred in its decision as it applied a formalistic approach, disregarded the narrative of the occupier and did not sufficiently challenge the current neo-liberal regime in which property rights operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 28 June 2022 the apex or Constitutional Court (CC) handed down a much-awaited judgment which impacts upon Muslim marriages concluded purely in terms of Islamic law in South Africa. Does the judgment mean that such Muslim marriages are now fully recognised for all purposes in the South African legal context? The simple answer is "no". The rationale for this conclusion is to be found in the two-pronged judgment. The first part of the judgment is wholly suspended and will only and automatically come into effect if remedial legislation is not enacted in 24 months. The second part of the judgment pertains to an interim order which takes effect immediately and applies retrospectively to all Muslim marriages that subsisted on 15 December 2014 (when the case was first launched by the Women's Legal Centre in the Western Cape High Court) and to Muslim marriages which, although terminated before that date, were still subject to ongoing legal proceedings at that date. While the case note briefly refers to the first part of the judgment, the main purpose of this case note is to highlight some of the practical problems that could be encountered by couples when effect is given to the orders pertaining to the interim relief granted in terms of the second part of the judgment. The problem areas are highlighted by looking at the CC judgment in the light of three fictitious scenarios. The case note provides a few critical comments on the judgment and ends with a few concluding remarks. Past experience leads us to expect that tangible progress will take place only by 2024, a date which coincides with South Africa's next presidential election. Until then the non-recognition of Muslim marriages will continue to prove burdensome to Muslim women and children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The National Prosecuting Authority is vested with the power, as dominus litus, to institute and discontinue charges whereas high courts are empowered to order a permanent stay of the prosecution prohibiting the continuation of the trial. However, such an order is considered to be a "drastic remedy" and is not empowered in terms of statute such as the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 but rather vested in the right of an accused to have their trial begin and conclude without unreasonable delay under section 35(3)(d) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. A permanent stay of the prosecution is an order made on a case-by-case basis, balancing various factors such as the prejudice faced by the accused, systemic factors as well as the reason for the delay. The ultimate question however remains whether the lapse of time in a particular case is unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Appeal in Rodrigues v The National Director of Public Prosecutions had to evaluate whether the 47-year-delay and eventual prosecution between the death of anti-apartheid activist, Ahmed Timol, was unreasonable. Both the majority and minority of the Supreme Court of Appeal, although for different reasons, concluded that the delay was not unreasonable. This contribution discusses the recent judgment in Rodrigues v The National Director of Public Prosecutions against the backdrop of the principles relating to permanent stays as established by South African courts. Both the majority and minority judgments are discussed and evaluated to discern important themes and considerations. It is argued that the judgment is a strong reminder of the significance of the right to a speedy trial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Section 9 of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 provides for the forfeiture of patrimonial benefits when a decree of divorce is granted on the ground of the irretrievable breakdown of a marriage. This case note discusses the possibility of an order for forfeiture of patrimonial benefits when a marriage dissolves after death under certain circumstances. It follows on the Supreme Court of Appeal decision in Monyepao v Ledwaba (1368/18) [2020] ZASCA 54 (27 May 2020). The respondent, the estranged first surviving spouse, and the deceased were married in terms of customary law in 2007. In 2008 the deceased left the matrimonial home. In 2009 the respondent entered into a civil marriage with another person. In 2010 the deceased also entered into a customary marriage with the appellant, the second surviving spouse. In 2012 the deceased died. Following his death, both the appellant and the respondent, as surviving spouses, were appointed co-executors of the deceased estate. The appellant sought an order directing the Master to withdraw the appointment as co-executor of the first surviving spouse on the ground that she had renounced her earlier customary marriage to the deceased when she entered into a civil marriage with another person. Alternatively, she sought an order in terms of section 9 of the Divorce Act that the first surviving spouse forfeit patrimonial benefits in favour of the deceased estate. The High Court, Polokwane granted the order. However, on appeal the full bench, Polokwane overturned the decision of the court a quo. The appellant took the decision of the full bench on appeal to the SCA. The SCA dismissed her appeal and upheld the decision of the full bench on the ground that a forfeiture order can be made only during divorce proceedings and it may be brought only by a party to the marriage and not by a third party. This note turns on this aspect of the decision. It will be argued that a forfeiture order should be available when a marriage is dissolved through death. It will also argue that a second spouse is a party to a customary marriage. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The appraisal right in terms of section 164 of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 has been applicable to fundamental transactions undertaken by companies for a number of years. The first two aims of this article are first to provide an overview of the appraisal right, and second to revisit certain concerns that were raised about the determination of fair value by the courts where a shareholder makes an application to court for a determination of fair value. It is suggested that this should not present a major problem in practice, considering that existing practice in takeover laws requires the valuation of shares by an independent expert when a company undertakes an affected transaction. In the main, the requirements for fundamental transactions overlap with those for affected transactions. The requirements for affected transactions adequately deal with the determination of fair value. The third aim is to provide an overview of how companies attempt to limit the effect of the appraisal right on fundamental transactions using various terms and conditions precedents, and the fourth is to discuss developments in case law on the appraisal right remedy. It is concluded that the decisions of the courts on its application will assist companies in structuring fundamental transactions and shareholders in exercising the appraisal right. Finally, the article suggests reasons for including certain subsections in the appraisal right remedy, for instance, the power of the courts to award costs in certain respects and a requirement that extends the time periods within which a shareholder may make a demand where the company fails to comply with specific requirements. It is suggested that this enhances the ability of shareholders to exercise the appraisal right. The article also provides concluding remarks advising companies and shareholders. In the case of companies, it concludes, for instance, that due diligence in identifying the risk that certain shareholders may raise appraisal rights is required before initiating a transaction that may be subject to appraisal rights. Failure to do so may be costly to the company. And, in the case of shareholders, failure to adhere to the required procedures may result in loss of their appraisal right remedy, or loss of the right to approach the courts for an appropriate relief under the appraisal right remedy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In King v De Jager 2021 5 BCLR 449 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that a clause in a private will that unfairly discriminated against beneficiaries based on gender was unlawful and unenforceable. This note considers the implications of the judgment for religion-based discrimination in wills, and in particular wills that incorporate the genderdiscriminatory Islamic system of inheritance. After explaining the Constitutional Court judgment, the note argues that the Court was well within its powers to consider the enforceability of discrimination in the private sphere. More importantly, we argue that the case rings a bell of caution regarding genderdiscriminatory provisions in private wills. Gender-based discrimination in Islamic inheritance law perpetuates disadvantage against a historically disadvantaged group, and the courts and legislature have been emphatic in their stance against gender discrimination in inheritance. The note thus argues that a testator's religious beliefs are not enough to tip the scales and render gender discrimination justifiable. We urge individuals who want to dispose of their assets following their religious beliefs to seek estate planning advice, cognisant of the potential impact of King v De Jager CC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unlike in the constitutions of other African countries such as Botswana and Lesotho, where the relationship between the High Court and courts martial is stipulated, the Ugandan Constitution 1995 (the Constitution) does not deal with this relationship. The Constitution is also silent on the question of whether courts martial have jurisdiction over civilians. The Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces Act (the UPDF Act) creates different types of courts martial with varying jurisdictions (section 197). The Act also provides (section 119) for the circumstance in which the General Court Martial has jurisdiction over civilians and appeals against the decisions of the General Court Martial lie to the Court Martial Appeal Court, which is the final appellate court except in cases where the offender is sentenced to death or life imprisonment. According to Regulation 20(2) of the UPDF (Court Martial Appeal Court) Regulations, in case an offender is sentenced to death or life imprisonment and his/her sentence is upheld by the Court Martial Appeal Court, he/she has a right to appeal to the Court of Appeal. Since 2003, Ugandan courts have grappled with the issues of whether courts martial are courts of judicature within the meaning of article 129(1) of the Constitution or organs of the UPDF and, therefore, part of the Executive under article 210 of the Constitution and whether courts martial have jurisdiction over civilians. Judges of the Supreme Court Constitutional Court and Court of Appeal have often disagreed on these issues. In this article the author relies on the drafting history of Articles 129 and 210 to argue that courts have erred by holding that courts martial are not courts of judicature under article 129(d) of the Constitution; and that courts martial are subordinate to the High Court. The author also relies on the drafting history of the Constitution and on international human rights law to argue that courts martial in Uganda should not have jurisdiction over civilians because they lack the necessary independence and impartiality and were established for the single purpose of enforcing military discipline. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe recently handed down a judgment on the determination of whether the law that governs testamentary dispositions of estates binds a testator to bequeath his or her share of property to the surviving spouse. This was an appeal case against the judgment of the High Court which had held that a testator is bound to leave his or her property to the surviving spouse. Albeit the fact that section 5(1) of the Wills Act establishes the doctrine of freedom of testation, section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act prohibits a testator to execute a will that disinherits a surviving spouse. The provision has been interpreted inconsistently by the High Court for the past years. One category of judgments held that a testator could disinherit a surviving spouse based on freedom of testation and that the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act are not applicable to testamentary dispositions. In contrast, the other set of dissenting judgments held that a will that disinherited a surviving spouse was invalid. Further, the courts held that the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act, in particular section 3A which grants a surviving spouse the right to inherit the matrimonial home applies to testate succession. In overturning the High Court decision, the Supreme Court authoritatively held that section 5(3)(a) of the Wills Act could not be interpreted to mean that a surviving spouse cannot be disinherited in a will. The Court based its decision on the doctrine of freedom of testation entrenched in the Wills Act and the Constitution. The Supreme Court also conclusively held that the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act are not applicable to testamentary dispositions. In arguing her case in the Supreme Court, the surviving spouse among other arguments contended that section 26 of the Constitution of Zimbabwe provides for equality of rights of spouses and the protection of children and spouses upon the dissolution of marriage through death or divorce. The Supreme Court disapproved the previous High Court decisions which held that a will that disinherited a surviving spouse was invalid as it contravenes section 26 of the Constitution. The Court held that section 26 of the Zimbabwean Constitution is not directly enforceable, does not bestow rights on individuals and does not prohibit the disinheritance of a surviving spouse. The Court held that the provisions of section 26 are found under the National Objectives which are intended to guide the state in the formulation of laws relating to dissolution of marriage through death. In this article, I argue that the Supreme Court decisively answered the discordant questions on whether a surviving spouse can be disinherited through a will and whether the provisions of the Deceased Estates Succession Act apply to testamentary dispositions. However, the Court missed an opportunity to develop the Zimbabwean jurisprudence on the enforcement of National Objectives, in particular section 26 of the Constitution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution is an investigation into the role of implicit (as opposed to explicit) biases in judicial rulings by examining the judgment of Chetty J in Mbena v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 4 All SA 361 (ECP). Implicit bias refers to prejudice on a visceral level, namely unconscious bias, of which the bearer, to wit the judicial officer, is unaware. I suggest that exploring implicit bias in judicial rulings in the context of South Africa's harsh stigmatising shaming culture driven by incarceration as its dominant sentencing regime, will introduce a valuable window in identifying, as well as possibly illuminating and eliminating, unjustified and harmful biases. In this contribution I specifically focus on the generalised bias against ex-offenders in South Africa's harsh stigmatising shaming culture (which I distinguish from integrative shaming cultures found in Japan, China and many African societies) which attitude perpetuates the marginalisation, stigmatisation and discrimination of offenders which exceed their courtsanctioned punishment. I attempt to outline the reasons as to why the isolation and elimination of social biases of this nature are important since, in the view of many criminologists but particularly John Braithwaite, stigma is counter-productive and criminogenic as it leads to enhanced recidivism rates. To this end, I analyse the salient features of the case within a broad social context (including a consideration of phenomena such as the prison-industrial complex on South African soil) which exceeds a narrow legal framework. My roadmap for the paper encompasses a consideration of the salient, albeit disputed, facts of the case with a view towards an alternative, if plausible reading based on the probabilities of the two sets of conflicting facts presented by the opposing parties. I highlight the significance of the judgment before recommendations for improved public policy formulation are proffered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the need to mitigate the damage done to children by chronic conflict between co-parents after divorce or family breakdown, the process of parenting coordination has been embraced by South African courts. In terms of the process, a parenting coordinator will first attempt to facilitate resolution of the parenting disputes by agreement of the parties, but if this attempt fails, the parenting coordinator has the power to make directives regarding the disputes which are binding on the parties until a competent court directs otherwise or the parties jointly agree otherwise. Although parenting coordination has flourished over the past decade, there still seems to be uncertainty and a lack of uniformity about various aspects regarding the process and the role and functions of a parenting coordinator. First of all, South Africa has the Guidelines on the Practice of Parenting Coordination (SA Guidelines), drafted by a task team of the National Accreditation Board for Family Mediators (NABFAM) to provide guidance for parenting coordinators concerning minimum qualifications, ethical obligations and conduct, practice and procedure, and children's participation in the process. In addition, the South African Law Reform Commission published the draft Family Dispute Resolution Bill, 2020, which deals with the process of parenting coordination in Chapter 7. Very importantly, there are also various court decisions dealing with parenting coordination in South Africa, which provide some guidance. However, the SA Guidelines, the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Bill and the court decisions are not always aligned and provide different answers to important underlying theoretical questions about various issues, such as the circumstances under which a parenting coordinator should be appointed; the issues that could be dealt with by a parenting coordinator; whom to appoint as a parenting coordinator; the approach to be followed in the parenting coordination process; the inclusion of children in the parenting coordination process; the nature of the parenting coordination process; confidentiality in the process; and a parenting coordinator's relationship with the court and the parties' legal representatives. A lack of consensus regarding these issues has given rise to diverse practices among professionals and confusion for all involved in the parenting coordination process. This article therefore endeavours to provide more clarity and certainty on these issues, taking international best practice into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In December 2021 the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in Bwanya v Master of the High Court, Cape Town. The court ruled that survivors of life-partnerships "in which the partners undertook reciprocal duties of support" would be entitled to claim benefits under the Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act (the MSSA) and the Intestate Succession Act (the ISA). This case note focusses on the phrase "in which the partners undertook reciprocal duties of support." It examines the jurisprudential development of the phrase through the case law. It considers whether reliance on the phrase is likely to present an obstacle to potential claimants or whether the phrase can be interpreted in a way that broadens the protection provided by the MSSA and ISA so as to ensure that all vulnerable partners can be protected. The note suggests that the optimal way in which to interpret the requirement that the life-partners had undertaken reciprocal duties of support would be to focus on the claimant's needs and financial dependence and to assess how the law can provide protection and redress to those who have incurred relationshipinduced dependence because of the particular form and nature of the reciprocal support provided in the intimate relationship. Previous court judgments have noted the typically gendered nature of the contributions made by family members. The law must ensure that it furthers the constitutional goal of achieving substantive equality between men and women, while also acknowledging and responding to the intersectional forms that discrimination and disadvantage assumes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In United Democratic Movement v Speaker of the National Assembly 2017 5 SA 300 (CC), the Constitutional Court set out certain factors that the Speaker of the National Assembly must consider when deciding the manner in which voting in a motion of no confidence proceeding must be conducted. These factors would ostensibly also be relevant when the Speaker's decision as to the proper voting procedure is reviewed in future. This note considers the law governing the review of the Speaker's decisions and finds that although the Speaker's decision is reviewable in South African law, after the UDM decision there is still uncertainty as to whether the Speaker's decision can be reviewed only on the basis of legality or whether it constitutes administrative action reviewable in terms of PAJA. Furthermore, the Court's exposition of certain factors against which the Speaker's decision can now be reviewed creates uncertainty as to whether the review in terms of legality is a basic rationality review as is generally the case or a stricter form of review closer to review that is possible under PAJA. The argument is that the potential of reviewing the Speaker's decision on the basis of a number of factors that in totality appears to set out a test that is stricter than a basic rationality test may hold severe implications for the separation of powers doctrine, as it now appears that the Court is increasing its supervisory jurisdiction in a manner that is not fully substantiated. Although the Court, or courts in general, has the power to review the exercise of public power in a system of constitutional supremacy, it should consider the impact that its judgments may have on co-equal branches of government, as a failure to do so may negatively impact on the relationship between the different branches of government and dilute the already frayed separation of powers doctrine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2019 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission ruled that section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Equality Act) 4 of 2000, otherwise known as the "hate speech" prohibition, was unconstitutional. The court said it was vague, overbroad and therefore unjustifiably infringing the right to freedom of expression. This contribution argues that every person's duty to respect others is central to the hate speech prohibition, and should therefore also be a central consideration in its interpretation. Related duties are those of the state to enact legislation and of courts to interpret and apply the law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. References to relevant case law in various legal contexts provide the framework within which legal duties are examined in the context of unfair discrimination and, in particular, hate speech in terms of section 10(1) of the Equality Act. The constitutional obligations of the state, the courts and private persons to promote respect for the dignity of others are examined. The state's specific obligation in terms of section 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 to enact legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination on the grounds listed in section 9(3) is reiterated. Finally, these duties are related to the section 10(1) prohibition in the Equality Act. Refuting the Supreme Court of Appeal's ruling in Qwelane, the reasonableness standard is applied to conclude that the prohibition gives due effect to the duties of the state and every person, and that the courts are duty-bound to interpret it accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The judiciary-exclusive role to allow or deny the commencement or continuation of contemporary derivative litigation is one of the critical aspects of such proceedings. Before the 2006 codification, derivative actions were brought under the common law as exceptions to the rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 67 ER 189. However, after realising intolerable deficiencies in the common law, the United Kingdom Law Commission (the Law Commission) recommended that there should be a new derivative procedure that met modern demands. This resulted in a statutory derivative remedy which can be activated in terms of Chapter 1 of Part 11 of the Companies Act, 2006 (United Kingdom). The effectiveness of legislative regulatory devices generally, and commercial law-related ones in particular, may to a greater extent depend on judicial interpretation and application. A conservative and literal interpretive approach that is purpose-neutral will significantly undermine the prospect of the current derivative remedy regime’s achieving the intended policy objectives. To that end, this contribution examines several court decisions handed down after the enactment of the 2006 Act and spanning over a period of approximately ten years. Ultimately, it will be considered whether the leave requirement in English derivative litigation is proving to be an invaluable and indispensable procedural prerequisite or an implausible barrier to honest litigants. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Big Catch Fishing Tackle Proprietary Limited v Kemp (17281/18) 2019 ZAWCHC 20 (5 March 2019) the Western Cape Division, Cape Town had to determine whether a former director of a company continued to owe fiduciary duties to the company after he had resigned, and if so, whether he could temporarily be interdicted from competing with the company until the main action was heard in court. The court dismissed the company's application for an interim interdict. This article critically analyses the judgment in regard to the post-resignation fiduciary duties of directors. The judgment is noteworthy as it sheds light on the post-resignation fiduciary duties of directors – an area of law which is still developing in South African law. This article contends that the court incorrectly conflated the legal principles relating to the appropriation of corporate opportunities with the misuse of confidential information. It is further argued that courts should not lay down a closed list of instances when directors' fiduciary duties will continue post-resignation, as the court attempted to do in this case. It is suggested that courts should adopt a flexible and pragmatic approach in determining when a director's fiduciary duties will survive after his or her resignation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although South African courts have handed down progressive judgments concerning the right to access to adequate housing, they have failed failed to do so from a feminist point of view. The trajectory of housing jurisprudence emanated from a sequence of evictions that occurred in Cape Town and the Johannesburg inner city. This article provides an analysis of four pertinent cases, namely Grootboom, Olivia Road, Blue Moonlight and Dladla. A gendered perspective was absent from the arguments before the court and from the court's interrogation and analysis of matters that came before it. This failure was a shortcoming, given the harsh lived realities that affect women who experience eviction based on their race, gender and class. It is against the backdrop of the failures of Constitutional Court cases that lawyers use feminist litigation approaches and courts in housing adjudication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27 October 2020, the Constitutional Court handed down judgment in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aveng Trident Steel (A Division of Aveng Africa (Pty) Ltd) 2021 42 ILJ 67 (CC). Following the judgment, it is now commonplace that the amendment to section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not preclude an employer from dismissing employees for a permissible reason, such as its operational requirements, should they refuse to accept a demand. The court confirmed that in cases such as this where they are faced with two opposing reasons for the dismissal, an impermissible reason on the one hand and a permissible reason on the other, an enquiry must be conducted into what the true reason for the dismissal is. However, the approach to be followed in conducting this enquiry caused dissent. Half of the judges were of the view that the correct approach is to follow the causation test set out in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1999 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC), while the other half disavowed reliance on the causation test. Instead, they opted to support the enquiry conducted in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd 2003 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). This case note seeks to establish which approach should be followed in determining the true reason for an alleged section 187(1)(c) automatically unfair dismissal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focusses on an Australian piece of legislation and interesting case law, as well as on how the Federal Court of Australia has applied Australia's Corporations Act, 2001 to characterise a person as a de facto director - that is, as a professed director whose appointment as such was defective. In this regard, the decisions of that Court will, as envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 constitute persuasive authority. The Australian decision to be discussed in this article is significant in that the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not contain substantively similar provisions to those of Australia's Corporations Act 2001. For example, section 66(7) of South Africa's Companies Act, 2008 contains the phrase "entitled to serve" as a director. This article explains the legal implications relevant to that expression, including whether it imposes a statutory condition precedent. This article also considers the validity of decisions taken by a person who is not "entitled to serve" as a director. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pre-trial publicity regarding a pending criminal case, which publicity may be in the form of media coverage of the case or a prior decision given in parallel judicial proceedings arising from substantially the same facts as the criminal matter, may be adverse to an accused. Such media publicity or findings contained in the parallel judicial decision may implicate the accused in the commission of the crime on which he or she is to stand trial. The publicity may, for example, suggest that the accused is "guilty" of the crime charged, or that the accused is of bad character having had the propensity to commit the crime. Conversely, pre-trial publicity may portray the accused as innocent of any criminal wrongdoing. In other words, pre-trial publicity may prejudge the issues that are to be adjudicated on at trial. A central question that may arise in these instances is whether there is a real and substantial risk that such publicity would materially affect or prejudice the impartial adjudication of the criminal case; that is to say, whether the publicity is likely to have a biasing effect on the trial court in the adjudication process or the outcome of the trial, thereby imperilling the constitutional right to a fair trial. Another key consideration, in respect of which there is scant literature and caselaw, is the question of the impact which adverse pre-trial publicity may have on the prosecutor in instituting and conducting a prosecution. Being unduly influenced by such publicity, a prosecutor may impinge upon the accused's right to a fair trial. There is also a dearth of authority on how the prosecutor is to function in the face of pre-trial publicity which may be prejudicial to the accused. This article seeks to explore these aspects vis-à-vis the prosecutor. It is posited that in an adversarial criminal justice system the same level of impartiality required of the presiding judicial officer is not required of the prosecutor, and that prosecutorial bias towards the guilt of an accused is inevitable where the prosecutor decides to institute a prosecution after studying the police case docket. Thus, exposure of the prosecutor to virulent pre-trial publicity would not be inimical to the fair disposition of the accused's trial provided that the prosecutor conducts the trial fairly and without undue prejudice to the accused and is dedicated to assisting the court in arriving at the truth. Moreover, additional knowledge and understanding of a case which a prosecutor gains from an extraneous source does not amount to bias or prejudice. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institution of traditional leadership has from time immemorial been central to traditional authority in the system of customary law. After the dawn of democracy in 1994, the role was fundamentally entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The entrenchment would seem to entail the development of a new set of norms and a new ethos in customary law in line with the ideals of the new democracy, and the modification of certain aspects of the system. Of great significance for the transformation of the system is the promotion of the right to gender equality with reference to women's succession to the throne. Various commentators argue for this as an attempt to transform the culture of domination entrenched in a patriarchal system that always undermined the rights of women. Against this background, this article undertakes a comparative analysis of the recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mphephu v Mphephu-Ramabulana 2019 7 BCLR 862 (SCA) and Ludidi v Ludidi 2018 4 All SA 1 (SCA) to determine whether the succession of women to the throne is evidence of the desired transformation of the institution of traditional leadership. The article argues that these judgments have initiated a transformation which has the potential to destroy the identity of the institution of traditional leadership by paving the way for the nomination of women to occupy not just any leadership position in the chieftaincy but the throne itself. It also argues that the interpretation of the right to gender equality through the lens of common law instead of in its own context, which has a communal focus, compromises the transformative or developmental agenda of the institution of traditional leadership as envisaged in the Constitution. The discussion is limited to succession to the "throne" and is not applicable to other leadership positions such as occur in matrilineal systems, or regency and other such traditional leadership roles. This is also not a comparative study that considers other jurisdictions, is further limited to the concept of "gender discrimination", and does not deal with the other technicalities that were raised in these cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article assesses South African Broadcasting Corporation v Democratic Alliance 2016 2 SA 522 (SCA) and Economic Freedom Fighters v Speaker of the National Assembly 2016 3 SA 580 (CC) and to a lesser extent the state of capture judgments. All of these deal with whether the findings and remedial action of the Public Protector (PP) are binding in certain circumstances. The judgments significantly change the impact and effect of findings made by the Office of the Public Protector (OPP) and have important consequences and lessons for other Chapter 9 institutions. It is apparent from these judgments that there was a concerted attempt to undermine the OPP by systematically disrespecting and not implementing the remedial action. It is argued in the article that egregious violations by public officials contributed to the courts' rulings that the findings of the PP may be binding. The article also explicitly records the unlawful conduct of public officials and the resultant cost and consequence in the hope that conduct of this nature is not repeated. It also specifically notes that the major findings in the Nkandla, SABC and State of Capture reports have withstood judicial scrutiny. Regrettably, this exalted standard has not always been replicated in the reports of the present PP. Finally, the article submits, on the basis of these judgments that the findings of the South African Human Rights Commission should in certain circumstances be binding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Violent crimes in South Africa are often accompanied by the possession or use of semi-automatic firearms. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the CLA) provides for the imposition of minimum sentences for certain firearms-related offences. The question whether the minimum sentencing regime actually applies to the offence of the unlawful possession of a semi-automatic firearm has led to a number of conflicting judicial decisions by different High Courts. This note discusses the statutory interpretation challenges the courts had to grapple with regarding the interplay between the CLA and South Africa's successive pieces of firearms legislation. The Supreme Court of Appeal ultimately found that the offence of the unlawful possession of a semi-automatic firearm must indeed be met with the prescribed minimum sentence. The recent sentencing practices of South African courts in respect of the unlawful possession of semi-automatic firearms within the framework of the CLA are analysed. From the investigation it is evident that courts are more likely to impose the minimum sentence in cases where the accused is also convicted of other serious offences such as murder and robbery. In such cases little attention is given to the firearm-related offences as the courts are more concerned with the cumulative effect of the sentences imposed on different counts. In cases where the accused is convicted of the stand-alone offence of the unlawful possession of a semiautomatic firearm, the courts are nevertheless taking an increasingly unsympathetic stance towards offenders, and terms of imprisonment in the range of 7 to 10 years are commonly imposed. In addition to the accused's personal circumstances, one of the most important factors in deciding on an appropriate sentence is the explanation of how the unlawful possession came about. It seems that the judicial sentiment increasingly does not support the view that the possession of an unlicensed firearm should be treated as serious only if the weapon has been used for the commission of a serious crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In late 2016, the Constitutional Court delivered judgment in a case, Wickham v Magistrate, Stellenbosch 2017 1 BCLR 121 (CC), involving Wayne Anthony Wickham (an aggrieved father and applicant in this case), who appealed against the decision of the Magistrate's Court in which he was denied the opportunity to hand up a victim impact statement. The thrust of his application was that his rights, as a victim of the crime in which his son was negligently killed by the fourth respondent, had been violated, and that this raised an arguable point of law of general public importance. The respondents, however, argued that the applicant lacked standing as the dominus litis in culpable homicide cases is the public prosecutor, and not the relatives of the deceased, or the victim. The case turned on whether the exercise of discretion by the Magistrate in denying Wickham the right to be heard was performed correctly; and whether a nonparty to criminal proceedings could make an application for the review of the Magistrate's conduct. The article seeks to interrogate the rights of victims in criminal proceedings and aptly poses the following question: Do victims of crimes have a locus standi to be part of criminal proceedings?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The (sometimes fragile) balance between South Africa's constitutional obligations to protect and promote human rights in the international arena and the realities of political practice is the focus of this paper. The Constitution provides for solid dualist mechanisms and procedures for parliamentary oversight of the executive's conduct in the governance of international relations, including the conclusion of treaties. There is, however, a congenital constitutional flaw in the oversight instrumentation of the Constitution: the president is endowed with practically unfettered control over cabinet, and through the cabinet and the parliamentary caucus, he has indirect but firm control over parliament. Consequently, parliamentary oversight of international relations is severely challenged, effectively leaving it to the minority parties, civil society and the courts. This paper assesses the effectiveness of the protection of international human rights in South Africa by constitutional means. It begins by setting out the constitutional foundations that were designed to provide the desired protection and the place of international law in the South African legal order. This is followed by a description of the impact of political reality on the implementation of the constitutional oversight mechanisms. Due to the justiciability of government conduct under the Constitution, parliamentary oversight of executive conduct in the international sphere has largely taken the form of judicial review. In this, the courts have performed very well. This emerges from a concise overview of some key cases in which the courts developed sound principles and delivered strong judgments about the government's failures to maintain the required constitutional standards in its international relations. The cases show a sensitivity on the part of the courts to avoid judicial overreach, while taking up the responsibility to uphold constitutionalism. While the courts' stabilising interventions must be applauded, the executive tendency to flout its constitutional responsibilities remains a cause for concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The debt review procedure in terms of the National Credit Act 34 of 2005 is functioning relatively well and benefits both consumers and credit providers. This is despite its somewhat scarce procedural prescriptions, which result in difficulties from time to time. In this respect, a recent procedural challenge has appeared, namely that of consumers who voluntary enter the debt procedure, but who later want to withdraw therefrom - thus, before the procedure has reached its ordinary conclusion, on the basis that their financial situation has improved to the extent that they are no longer over-indebted. The fact that the National Credit Act does not provide for such an exit has led to procedural uncertainty and diverging court decisions. In this article, the relevant legislative provisions (or lack thereof), court and National Consumer Tribunal judgements, regulations, forms, guidelines and explanatory notes are considered to determine whether it is competent for consumers to withdraw from the debt review procedure before it has reached its normal conclusion. Not only provisions in the National Credit Act are considered, but also general civil procedure to contemplate all possibilities in searching for an answer to this procedural difficulty. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution deals with the question of whether a judgment from a mainstream court dealing with customary law can be regarded as authority and thus as a recording of a customary rule or rules. When a mainstream court develops customary law to promote constitutional values or strikes customary law down for want of constitutionality, it creates new rules which are written down but which can easily be changed when society brings it to court and convinces the court that the rule needs to be changed. It is my contention that case law is a binding source of law, including customary law, which must be followed until such time that it is either absorbed into legislation or amended by a subsequent decision in terms of the principle of stare decisis. It gives us some measure of assurance as to the law to be followed. The high number of customary law disputes taken to a court of law is confirmation that traditional communities are embracing the power of the courts to settle their disputes. The judgments of these courts inevitably become the origins of customary rules that they develop and can thus be regarded as piecemeal recording of (living) customary law. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the dominant approaches to statutory interpretation through a historical lens. It argues that for most of South Africa's history the methods of interpretation were twisted in order to give effect to the intentions of the legislature. This approach to interpretation has now been discarded into the waste bin of history, and intentionalism has been replaced with contextualism. Or so we are told. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) has been hailed as the new, settled approach to interpretation, with the Constitutional Court endorsing Endumeni on numerous occasions. But it appears from both the judgments of the Constitutional Court and those of other Courts that intentionalism is not yet dead. This paper argues that the reason for this is because Endumeni has not provided clarity to the process of interpretation that it proclaims to do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special edition consists of a selection of contributions delivered during a conference "Towards an integrated approach to the interpretation of legal documents: contracts, wills and statutes", hosted by the University of the Western Cape, on 23 March 2018. The aim of the conference was to take stock of the state of legal interpretation in South Africa five years after the watershed judgment in Joint Natal Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality. The papers in the special edition provide clarifications, contestations and applications of the Edumeni approach to the interpretation of legal documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to critically analyse the requirements of the duty imposed on directors to act for a proper purpose as provided in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act (Companies Act 71 of 2008) whenever they distribute company money and/or property. This analysis is conducted with the obligations imposed under sections 4 and 46 of the 2008 Act in mind. The purpose is not to question the inclusion of this duty in the 2008 Act. It is simply to question whether the common law interpretation of the duty still suffices in the face of section 76(3) of the 2008 Act, which seems to suggest that a different standard of judgment must be used. The argument that is made here is that the use of common law principles in interpreting proper purpose is well and good when the actions of directors are challenged based on the common law, but, where this duty has been incorporated into statutory law the interpretation of the duty in the context of the wording of the statute should be paramount. In addition, when interpreting any provision of the Act, consideration of the objects of the statute becomes inevitable. The interpretation of the duty cannot, in the face of the changes brought about by the statute, remain stagnant as a result of reliance on common law standards of judgment. The wording of the provision in question and the purpose of the statute cannot and must not be ignored; they must be given effect. A comparative approach will be adopted, using legislation and case law from Australia and Canada. The selection of these particular jurisdictions is based solely on the fact that like South Africa, their legal heritage is based on English common law, and a comparison of the three jurisdictions therefore makes sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa has developed domestic legislation governing all surrogacy matters within the country. These provisions are contained in Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. In Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 2014 2 All SA 312 (GNP), the commissioning parents did not adhere to the requirement provided by Chapter 19. The parties to the (initially informal) surrogacy agreement authorised the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother prior to the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement by the court. In considering the best interest of the resultant child, the High Court decided to ratify the inadequate surrogate motherhood agreement. This discussion aims to establish whether the court's judgement in Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement was in accordance with the provisions of current legislation and case law. It furthermore aims to answer two primary questions: firstly, whether adjudicators should make use of the best interest of the child when ratifying inadequate surrogate motherhood agreements; and secondly, in what manner the court should go about implementing the best interest of the child when validating inadequate surrogate motherhood agreements. It is submitted that courts should refrain from applying the best interest of the child as a constitutional right in inadequate surrogacy matters where the child is yet to be born alive, in accordance with the Digesta Texts. Parties to the invalid agreement should rather be instructed to make use of a section 22 parental responsibilities and rights agreement, a section 28 termination agreement, or adoption as provided for by chapter 15 of the Children's Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part I of this two-part article argued that post-constitutional developments of the right to support have excluded the largest and most vulnerable sector of South African women - African women in invalid customary marriages and in intimate partnerships which do not resemble monogamous Western nuclear households. Part II explores the avenues to develop customary and common law to extend rights to support to these women. It argues that the current position discriminates against poor, rural African women on multiple intersecting grounds, which creates a duty for courts to develop the current legal rules. Customary law affords scope for development in relation to women in invalid customary marriages. Common law rights to support can be extended either ex contractu or ex lege. Because contractual support rights are of limited use to poor women, the legacy of the majority judgments in Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (Volks) must be confronted to strengthen the legal basis for an automatic duty of support to all women in unmarried intimate relationships. The argument in Volks that, women choose to forego legal rights by not getting married is criticised. The minority judgment in Laubscher v Duplan 2017 2 SA 264 (CC) does, however, create potential for overturning this reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution considers the Constitutional Court of South Africa's judgments regarding aspects of sentencing. It starts with an overview of relevant judgments, before attending in more detail to judgments on the minimum sentences legislation and on sentencing when it affects children. On this foundation, the article then discusses the human rights that are affected by the imposition of sentences on offenders, before attempting to identify what the next instalment of Constitutional Court judgments might bring to the sentencing table. This article offers a collection and collation of judgments that share one common element, namely that they have something to say about an aspect of sentencing. The value of such an approach is that it provides the first step to answering the following question: The Constitutional Court has been active for 20 years; what do we learn about sentencing from its judgments during this time?. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the creation of the Constitutional Court in 1994 in South Africa and its judgments from 1995 to 2012. Topics mentioned include the different reasons the Court rejected some of the cases during that time and invalidated others, its direct access, and the several applications for leave to appeal against judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal and other different courts.

The article discusses the KwaZulu Natal High Court's decision in the case of Scoin Trading (Pty) Ltd v. Bernstein., which examines the contractual relations regarding the breach in the form of mora debitoris by a deceased person. It mentions the argument of the respondent claming that the deceased was not at fault in failing to pay the balance amount due to his untimely demise and hence was not be liable for mora interest. It also mentions the judgment where in the granting for the capital sum was amended and claim for interest was dismissed.

The article discusses the North Gauteng High Court's decision in the case of Christian Roberts v. Minister of Social Development, which was a constitutional challenge to section 10 of the Social Assistance Act 13 of 2004 and the relevant regulations regarding the age for accessing an old age grant at 60 for women and 65 for men. It mentions the judgment where in the High Court punished the applicants with a costs order. It also discusses the review of this decision regarding its implication in constitutional law and for public interest litigation.

The article discusses the South Africa Constitutional Court's decision in the case of Maccsand (Pty) Ltd v. City of Cape Town, in order to interdict and restrain the mining activities of the company until the authorizations in terms of the Land Use Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985 (LUPO). It states the argument of the of the company and the Western Cape Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning against the implication of LUPO to the land used for mining as it regulates a municipal functional area. It mentions the judgment where in an owner of land can decide whether his land can be used for the mining purpose or not, if it is not zoned for such purposes.

The previous Westminster criminal justice system entailed a different kind of separation of powers insofar as it concerns the role of state prosecutors. In the Westminster system prosecutors are part of the executive branch, whereas they were a split-off from the judiciary in constitutional states and function like a de facto second organ of the third branch of state power. Currently executive interference in state prosecutions often leads to pre-trial inequality. A further difficulty arises from the unconsidered manner in which the former royal prerogative of pardoning was retained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It used to be a royal veto of judicial sentences in the constitutional monarchy of the former Westminster model. Although the corresponding veto of parliamentary legislation by the head of state did not survive into modern times, the pardoning power has not been discontinued. Section 84(2)(j) thus causes an irreconcilable conflict with section 165(5) of the Constitution which guarantees the legally binding force of judicial decisions. It undermines the rule of law and leads to post-trial inequality in the execution of sentences. The parole system, which dates back to 1959, likewise allows the executive to overrule judicial sentences and is in conflict with section 165(5). The perpetuation of the status quo in criminal justice is in effect leading to a re-Westminstering of the constitutional state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 defines administrative action as "any decision [of a specified kind]" taken by specified persons or entities. The Act goes on to define decision as "any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be", including certain specified categories of decision. The decision in Bhugwan v JSE Ltd 2010 3 SA 335 (GSJ) highlights the distinction between a "decision", as so defined (which may be amenable to judicial review in terms of the Act) and an inchoate decision (that is not amenable to such review).. The judgment in this case is, to date, the only judicial authority in South Africa on this critical threshold requirement to be established by any applicant for judicial review in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the judgment in the case of Kylie v CCMA and considers its implications for the future of labor litigation in South Africa. It argues that the approach adopted by the court in deciding the case is unsupportive of legality, indicating that the court was not interested in the public policy issues. It contends that the judgment will have far-reaching implications for the conduct of cases in the CCMA in general. It notes that the judgment has triggered a new approach to constitutional labour interpretation.

The article analyzes the facts and decision in Naidoo v ABSA Bank case in South Africa. It shows that the court in Naidoo correctly stated that section 130(3) does not extend the ambit of section 129. It points out that an over-indebted consumer may have the financial potential to overcome his or her debt if assisted by debt restructuring, a ruling of reckless credit, and the credit provider. It suggests not forcing a debtor to lose his or her assets and subjecting to the social stigma of being an insolvent.

The article presents an analysis on the judgment of the case Wells v Atoll Media Pty. Ltd. in South Africa. It argues that the judge repeatedly qualified his judgment with reference to the context of the case mean that such an interpretation would be exaggerated. It contends that the user can still justify the unauthorized use of a particular person's attributes on the basis of public interest. It points out that the law in the country leads the way when it comes to the protection of an individual against the unauthorized use of his or her attributes.

The article summarizes the South African Law Commission's (SALC) report on the constitutionality of section 12 of the Divorce Act which highlights reasons why this section could not pass constitutional scrutiny in South Africa. It highlights the facts of the High Court in M v Johncom Media Ltd.; Johncom Media Ltd. v M case which was confirmed by the Constitutional Court (CC) in Johncom Media Investments Ltd. v M. It focuses on the quo's judgment, the CC's judgment and a criticism of the CC's judgment.

The article analyzes the nature and functioning of a player's contract in South Africa. It indicates how the characteristics of sui generis is applied to such contracts in case of Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund. It discusses the effect on the high court decision Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe. It suggests how similar cases is dealt by courts in future. It investigates the suitability of the contractual remedy of performance to a player's breach of contract in the country.