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In this paper my thought experiment leads me to posit that South Africa's environmental governance often results in what I term "hollow environmentalism". This term describes the inevitable long-term outcome of promulgating laws and policies that are idealistic and seem symbolic and that at times fail to achieve their intended objectives or environmental promise. On a narrower scale, hollow environmentalism can also manifest when such symbolic environmental laws and policies lead to judicial decisions that lack substantive ecological justifications, perhaps even resembling symbolic judgments. I substantiate this argument through four key considerations. I commence with a reality check on environmental governance, emphasising that the state is not a neutral actor, necessitating closer scrutiny of state decisions. This leads me to the conclusion that governance stands at a critical juncture. I argue that the symbolic nature of our environmental laws, broadly speaking, often makes it challenging for the state to fully meet the lofty ideals it presents, thereby also complicating court decisions in these matters. Next, I align my thoughts with recent literature on adjudication in the context of the climate crisis. This literature stresses the need for courts to be bold and innovative in their judicial roles, given the precarious nature of stabilising environmental disputes. In the penultimate section I bring the discussion to a close by suggesting two interconnected possibilities to address hollowness in the face of climate change: "sunsetting" and "substitution". [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In Daniels v Scribante (hereafter the Daniels case) the Constitutional Court had to decide whether: (a) the Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 (ESTA) afforded Ms Daniels the right to make improvements to her dwelling; (b) if consent from the person in charge, Mr Scribante, was a requirement for Ms Daniels to make such improvements; and (c) if consent was not a requirement, if Ms Daniels could effect improvements to the total disregard of Mr Scribante. The judgment in Daniels is important not only because it paved the way for Ms Daniels to effect improvements on her existing dwelling without the consent of Mr Scribante, but also because it showed that under section 8(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) on the application of the Bill of Rights Mr Scribante owed a positive obligation to Ms Daniels to ensure that she lived in conditions that afforded her human dignity. In Daniels the Constitutional Court indicated that private landowners were enjoined by section 25(6) of the Constitution through ESTA to accommodate ESTA occupiers on their land. According to the Constitutional Court in Daniels, the nature of the obligation imposed by section 25(6) of the Constitution was both negative and positive, and in this particular case it rested on Mr Scribante. Against this background, this case note provides at the outset the salient facts and judgment of the Daniels case. This is followed by an analysis aimed at critiquing the judgment in Daniels pertaining to what is expected of private landowners in the new constitutional dispensation. It is concluded that more may be required from the private landowner – a positive duty – to ensure that ESTA occupiers enjoy fundamental rights. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Land and land rights remain a contested issue in South Africa. Grobler v Phillips centered on the eviction of an 86-year-old woman, Mrs Phillips, and her disabled son from property she had lived on since she was 11 years old. After a fourteen-year court battle the Constitutional Court granted an eviction order against Mrs Phillips. This case note consists of a discussion of the judgments of the Magistrate's Court, High Court, Supreme Court of Appeal and Constitutional Court. It is found that the Constitutional Court erred in its decision as it applied a formalistic approach, disregarded the narrative of the occupier and did not sufficiently challenge the current neo-liberal regime in which property rights operate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 28 June 2022 the apex or Constitutional Court (CC) handed down a much-awaited judgment which impacts upon Muslim marriages concluded purely in terms of Islamic law in South Africa. Does the judgment mean that such Muslim marriages are now fully recognised for all purposes in the South African legal context? The simple answer is "no". The rationale for this conclusion is to be found in the two-pronged judgment. The first part of the judgment is wholly suspended and will only and automatically come into effect if remedial legislation is not enacted in 24 months. The second part of the judgment pertains to an interim order which takes effect immediately and applies retrospectively to all Muslim marriages that subsisted on 15 December 2014 (when the case was first launched by the Women's Legal Centre in the Western Cape High Court) and to Muslim marriages which, although terminated before that date, were still subject to ongoing legal proceedings at that date. While the case note briefly refers to the first part of the judgment, the main purpose of this case note is to highlight some of the practical problems that could be encountered by couples when effect is given to the orders pertaining to the interim relief granted in terms of the second part of the judgment. The problem areas are highlighted by looking at the CC judgment in the light of three fictitious scenarios. The case note provides a few critical comments on the judgment and ends with a few concluding remarks. Past experience leads us to expect that tangible progress will take place only by 2024, a date which coincides with South Africa's next presidential election. Until then the non-recognition of Muslim marriages will continue to prove burdensome to Muslim women and children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution is an investigation into the role of implicit (as opposed to explicit) biases in judicial rulings by examining the judgment of Chetty J in Mbena v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services 2015 4 All SA 361 (ECP). Implicit bias refers to prejudice on a visceral level, namely unconscious bias, of which the bearer, to wit the judicial officer, is unaware. I suggest that exploring implicit bias in judicial rulings in the context of South Africa's harsh stigmatising shaming culture driven by incarceration as its dominant sentencing regime, will introduce a valuable window in identifying, as well as possibly illuminating and eliminating, unjustified and harmful biases. In this contribution I specifically focus on the generalised bias against ex-offenders in South Africa's harsh stigmatising shaming culture (which I distinguish from integrative shaming cultures found in Japan, China and many African societies) which attitude perpetuates the marginalisation, stigmatisation and discrimination of offenders which exceed their courtsanctioned punishment. I attempt to outline the reasons as to why the isolation and elimination of social biases of this nature are important since, in the view of many criminologists but particularly John Braithwaite, stigma is counter-productive and criminogenic as it leads to enhanced recidivism rates. To this end, I analyse the salient features of the case within a broad social context (including a consideration of phenomena such as the prison-industrial complex on South African soil) which exceeds a narrow legal framework. My roadmap for the paper encompasses a consideration of the salient, albeit disputed, facts of the case with a view towards an alternative, if plausible reading based on the probabilities of the two sets of conflicting facts presented by the opposing parties. I highlight the significance of the judgment before recommendations for improved public policy formulation are proffered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Because of the need to mitigate the damage done to children by chronic conflict between co-parents after divorce or family breakdown, the process of parenting coordination has been embraced by South African courts. In terms of the process, a parenting coordinator will first attempt to facilitate resolution of the parenting disputes by agreement of the parties, but if this attempt fails, the parenting coordinator has the power to make directives regarding the disputes which are binding on the parties until a competent court directs otherwise or the parties jointly agree otherwise. Although parenting coordination has flourished over the past decade, there still seems to be uncertainty and a lack of uniformity about various aspects regarding the process and the role and functions of a parenting coordinator. First of all, South Africa has the Guidelines on the Practice of Parenting Coordination (SA Guidelines), drafted by a task team of the National Accreditation Board for Family Mediators (NABFAM) to provide guidance for parenting coordinators concerning minimum qualifications, ethical obligations and conduct, practice and procedure, and children's participation in the process. In addition, the South African Law Reform Commission published the draft Family Dispute Resolution Bill, 2020, which deals with the process of parenting coordination in Chapter 7. Very importantly, there are also various court decisions dealing with parenting coordination in South Africa, which provide some guidance. However, the SA Guidelines, the provisions of Chapter 7 of the Bill and the court decisions are not always aligned and provide different answers to important underlying theoretical questions about various issues, such as the circumstances under which a parenting coordinator should be appointed; the issues that could be dealt with by a parenting coordinator; whom to appoint as a parenting coordinator; the approach to be followed in the parenting coordination process; the inclusion of children in the parenting coordination process; the nature of the parenting coordination process; confidentiality in the process; and a parenting coordinator's relationship with the court and the parties' legal representatives. A lack of consensus regarding these issues has given rise to diverse practices among professionals and confusion for all involved in the parenting coordination process. This article therefore endeavours to provide more clarity and certainty on these issues, taking international best practice into account. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In November 2019 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission ruled that section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Equality Act) 4 of 2000, otherwise known as the "hate speech" prohibition, was unconstitutional. The court said it was vague, overbroad and therefore unjustifiably infringing the right to freedom of expression. This contribution argues that every person's duty to respect others is central to the hate speech prohibition, and should therefore also be a central consideration in its interpretation. Related duties are those of the state to enact legislation and of courts to interpret and apply the law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. References to relevant case law in various legal contexts provide the framework within which legal duties are examined in the context of unfair discrimination and, in particular, hate speech in terms of section 10(1) of the Equality Act. The constitutional obligations of the state, the courts and private persons to promote respect for the dignity of others are examined. The state's specific obligation in terms of section 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 to enact legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination on the grounds listed in section 9(3) is reiterated. Finally, these duties are related to the section 10(1) prohibition in the Equality Act. Refuting the Supreme Court of Appeal's ruling in Qwelane, the reasonableness standard is applied to conclude that the prohibition gives due effect to the duties of the state and every person, and that the courts are duty-bound to interpret it accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Although South African courts have handed down progressive judgments concerning the right to access to adequate housing, they have failed failed to do so from a feminist point of view. The trajectory of housing jurisprudence emanated from a sequence of evictions that occurred in Cape Town and the Johannesburg inner city. This article provides an analysis of four pertinent cases, namely Grootboom, Olivia Road, Blue Moonlight and Dladla. A gendered perspective was absent from the arguments before the court and from the court's interrogation and analysis of matters that came before it. This failure was a shortcoming, given the harsh lived realities that affect women who experience eviction based on their race, gender and class. It is against the backdrop of the failures of Constitutional Court cases that lawyers use feminist litigation approaches and courts in housing adjudication. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 27 October 2020, the Constitutional Court handed down judgment in National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa v Aveng Trident Steel (A Division of Aveng Africa (Pty) Ltd) 2021 42 ILJ 67 (CC). Following the judgment, it is now commonplace that the amendment to section 187(1)(c) of the Labour Relations Act, 1995 does not preclude an employer from dismissing employees for a permissible reason, such as its operational requirements, should they refuse to accept a demand. The court confirmed that in cases such as this where they are faced with two opposing reasons for the dismissal, an impermissible reason on the one hand and a permissible reason on the other, an enquiry must be conducted into what the true reason for the dismissal is. However, the approach to be followed in conducting this enquiry caused dissent. Half of the judges were of the view that the correct approach is to follow the causation test set out in SA Chemical Workers Union v Afrox Ltd 1999 20 ILJ 1718 (LAC), while the other half disavowed reliance on the causation test. Instead, they opted to support the enquiry conducted in Chemical Workers Industrial Union v Algorax (Pty) Ltd 2003 24 ILJ 1917 (LAC). This case note seeks to establish which approach should be followed in determining the true reason for an alleged section 187(1)(c) automatically unfair dismissal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focusses on an Australian piece of legislation and interesting case law, as well as on how the Federal Court of Australia has applied Australia's Corporations Act, 2001 to characterise a person as a de facto director - that is, as a professed director whose appointment as such was defective. In this regard, the decisions of that Court will, as envisaged in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 constitute persuasive authority. The Australian decision to be discussed in this article is significant in that the South African Companies Act 71 of 2008 does not contain substantively similar provisions to those of Australia's Corporations Act 2001. For example, section 66(7) of South Africa's Companies Act, 2008 contains the phrase "entitled to serve" as a director. This article explains the legal implications relevant to that expression, including whether it imposes a statutory condition precedent. This article also considers the validity of decisions taken by a person who is not "entitled to serve" as a director. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The institution of traditional leadership has from time immemorial been central to traditional authority in the system of customary law. After the dawn of democracy in 1994, the role was fundamentally entrenched in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The entrenchment would seem to entail the development of a new set of norms and a new ethos in customary law in line with the ideals of the new democracy, and the modification of certain aspects of the system. Of great significance for the transformation of the system is the promotion of the right to gender equality with reference to women's succession to the throne. Various commentators argue for this as an attempt to transform the culture of domination entrenched in a patriarchal system that always undermined the rights of women. Against this background, this article undertakes a comparative analysis of the recent judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Mphephu v Mphephu-Ramabulana 2019 7 BCLR 862 (SCA) and Ludidi v Ludidi 2018 4 All SA 1 (SCA) to determine whether the succession of women to the throne is evidence of the desired transformation of the institution of traditional leadership. The article argues that these judgments have initiated a transformation which has the potential to destroy the identity of the institution of traditional leadership by paving the way for the nomination of women to occupy not just any leadership position in the chieftaincy but the throne itself. It also argues that the interpretation of the right to gender equality through the lens of common law instead of in its own context, which has a communal focus, compromises the transformative or developmental agenda of the institution of traditional leadership as envisaged in the Constitution. The discussion is limited to succession to the "throne" and is not applicable to other leadership positions such as occur in matrilineal systems, or regency and other such traditional leadership roles. This is also not a comparative study that considers other jurisdictions, is further limited to the concept of "gender discrimination", and does not deal with the other technicalities that were raised in these cases. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Violent crimes in South Africa are often accompanied by the possession or use of semi-automatic firearms. The Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 (the CLA) provides for the imposition of minimum sentences for certain firearms-related offences. The question whether the minimum sentencing regime actually applies to the offence of the unlawful possession of a semi-automatic firearm has led to a number of conflicting judicial decisions by different High Courts. This note discusses the statutory interpretation challenges the courts had to grapple with regarding the interplay between the CLA and South Africa's successive pieces of firearms legislation. The Supreme Court of Appeal ultimately found that the offence of the unlawful possession of a semi-automatic firearm must indeed be met with the prescribed minimum sentence. The recent sentencing practices of South African courts in respect of the unlawful possession of semi-automatic firearms within the framework of the CLA are analysed. From the investigation it is evident that courts are more likely to impose the minimum sentence in cases where the accused is also convicted of other serious offences such as murder and robbery. In such cases little attention is given to the firearm-related offences as the courts are more concerned with the cumulative effect of the sentences imposed on different counts. In cases where the accused is convicted of the stand-alone offence of the unlawful possession of a semiautomatic firearm, the courts are nevertheless taking an increasingly unsympathetic stance towards offenders, and terms of imprisonment in the range of 7 to 10 years are commonly imposed. In addition to the accused's personal circumstances, one of the most important factors in deciding on an appropriate sentence is the explanation of how the unlawful possession came about. It seems that the judicial sentiment increasingly does not support the view that the possession of an unlicensed firearm should be treated as serious only if the weapon has been used for the commission of a serious crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The (sometimes fragile) balance between South Africa's constitutional obligations to protect and promote human rights in the international arena and the realities of political practice is the focus of this paper. The Constitution provides for solid dualist mechanisms and procedures for parliamentary oversight of the executive's conduct in the governance of international relations, including the conclusion of treaties. There is, however, a congenital constitutional flaw in the oversight instrumentation of the Constitution: the president is endowed with practically unfettered control over cabinet, and through the cabinet and the parliamentary caucus, he has indirect but firm control over parliament. Consequently, parliamentary oversight of international relations is severely challenged, effectively leaving it to the minority parties, civil society and the courts. This paper assesses the effectiveness of the protection of international human rights in South Africa by constitutional means. It begins by setting out the constitutional foundations that were designed to provide the desired protection and the place of international law in the South African legal order. This is followed by a description of the impact of political reality on the implementation of the constitutional oversight mechanisms. Due to the justiciability of government conduct under the Constitution, parliamentary oversight of executive conduct in the international sphere has largely taken the form of judicial review. In this, the courts have performed very well. This emerges from a concise overview of some key cases in which the courts developed sound principles and delivered strong judgments about the government's failures to maintain the required constitutional standards in its international relations. The cases show a sensitivity on the part of the courts to avoid judicial overreach, while taking up the responsibility to uphold constitutionalism. While the courts' stabilising interventions must be applauded, the executive tendency to flout its constitutional responsibilities remains a cause for concern. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyses the dominant approaches to statutory interpretation through a historical lens. It argues that for most of South Africa's history the methods of interpretation were twisted in order to give effect to the intentions of the legislature. This approach to interpretation has now been discarded into the waste bin of history, and intentionalism has been replaced with contextualism. Or so we are told. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 4 SA 593 (SCA) has been hailed as the new, settled approach to interpretation, with the Constitutional Court endorsing Endumeni on numerous occasions. But it appears from both the judgments of the Constitutional Court and those of other Courts that intentionalism is not yet dead. This paper argues that the reason for this is because Endumeni has not provided clarity to the process of interpretation that it proclaims to do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This special edition consists of a selection of contributions delivered during a conference "Towards an integrated approach to the interpretation of legal documents: contracts, wills and statutes", hosted by the University of the Western Cape, on 23 March 2018. The aim of the conference was to take stock of the state of legal interpretation in South Africa five years after the watershed judgment in Joint Natal Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality. The papers in the special edition provide clarifications, contestations and applications of the Edumeni approach to the interpretation of legal documents. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to critically analyse the requirements of the duty imposed on directors to act for a proper purpose as provided in section 76(3)(a) of the 2008 Act (Companies Act 71 of 2008) whenever they distribute company money and/or property. This analysis is conducted with the obligations imposed under sections 4 and 46 of the 2008 Act in mind. The purpose is not to question the inclusion of this duty in the 2008 Act. It is simply to question whether the common law interpretation of the duty still suffices in the face of section 76(3) of the 2008 Act, which seems to suggest that a different standard of judgment must be used. The argument that is made here is that the use of common law principles in interpreting proper purpose is well and good when the actions of directors are challenged based on the common law, but, where this duty has been incorporated into statutory law the interpretation of the duty in the context of the wording of the statute should be paramount. In addition, when interpreting any provision of the Act, consideration of the objects of the statute becomes inevitable. The interpretation of the duty cannot, in the face of the changes brought about by the statute, remain stagnant as a result of reliance on common law standards of judgment. The wording of the provision in question and the purpose of the statute cannot and must not be ignored; they must be given effect. A comparative approach will be adopted, using legislation and case law from Australia and Canada. The selection of these particular jurisdictions is based solely on the fact that like South Africa, their legal heritage is based on English common law, and a comparison of the three jurisdictions therefore makes sense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

South Africa has developed domestic legislation governing all surrogacy matters within the country. These provisions are contained in Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. In Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement 2014 2 All SA 312 (GNP), the commissioning parents did not adhere to the requirement provided by Chapter 19. The parties to the (initially informal) surrogacy agreement authorised the artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother prior to the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood agreement by the court. In considering the best interest of the resultant child, the High Court decided to ratify the inadequate surrogate motherhood agreement. This discussion aims to establish whether the court's judgement in Ex parte MS; In re: Confirmation of Surrogate Motherhood Agreement was in accordance with the provisions of current legislation and case law. It furthermore aims to answer two primary questions: firstly, whether adjudicators should make use of the best interest of the child when ratifying inadequate surrogate motherhood agreements; and secondly, in what manner the court should go about implementing the best interest of the child when validating inadequate surrogate motherhood agreements. It is submitted that courts should refrain from applying the best interest of the child as a constitutional right in inadequate surrogacy matters where the child is yet to be born alive, in accordance with the Digesta Texts. Parties to the invalid agreement should rather be instructed to make use of a section 22 parental responsibilities and rights agreement, a section 28 termination agreement, or adoption as provided for by chapter 15 of the Children's Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part I of this two-part article argued that post-constitutional developments of the right to support have excluded the largest and most vulnerable sector of South African women - African women in invalid customary marriages and in intimate partnerships which do not resemble monogamous Western nuclear households. Part II explores the avenues to develop customary and common law to extend rights to support to these women. It argues that the current position discriminates against poor, rural African women on multiple intersecting grounds, which creates a duty for courts to develop the current legal rules. Customary law affords scope for development in relation to women in invalid customary marriages. Common law rights to support can be extended either ex contractu or ex lege. Because contractual support rights are of limited use to poor women, the legacy of the majority judgments in Volks v Robinson 2005 5 BCLR 446 (CC) (Volks) must be confronted to strengthen the legal basis for an automatic duty of support to all women in unmarried intimate relationships. The argument in Volks that, women choose to forego legal rights by not getting married is criticised. The minority judgment in Laubscher v Duplan 2017 2 SA 264 (CC) does, however, create potential for overturning this reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the creation of the Constitutional Court in 1994 in South Africa and its judgments from 1995 to 2012. Topics mentioned include the different reasons the Court rejected some of the cases during that time and invalidated others, its direct access, and the several applications for leave to appeal against judgments of the Supreme Court of Appeal and other different courts.

The article discusses the KwaZulu Natal High Court's decision in the case of Scoin Trading (Pty) Ltd v. Bernstein., which examines the contractual relations regarding the breach in the form of mora debitoris by a deceased person. It mentions the argument of the respondent claming that the deceased was not at fault in failing to pay the balance amount due to his untimely demise and hence was not be liable for mora interest. It also mentions the judgment where in the granting for the capital sum was amended and claim for interest was dismissed.

The previous Westminster criminal justice system entailed a different kind of separation of powers insofar as it concerns the role of state prosecutors. In the Westminster system prosecutors are part of the executive branch, whereas they were a split-off from the judiciary in constitutional states and function like a de facto second organ of the third branch of state power. Currently executive interference in state prosecutions often leads to pre-trial inequality. A further difficulty arises from the unconsidered manner in which the former royal prerogative of pardoning was retained in the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. It used to be a royal veto of judicial sentences in the constitutional monarchy of the former Westminster model. Although the corresponding veto of parliamentary legislation by the head of state did not survive into modern times, the pardoning power has not been discontinued. Section 84(2)(j) thus causes an irreconcilable conflict with section 165(5) of the Constitution which guarantees the legally binding force of judicial decisions. It undermines the rule of law and leads to post-trial inequality in the execution of sentences. The parole system, which dates back to 1959, likewise allows the executive to overrule judicial sentences and is in conflict with section 165(5). The perpetuation of the status quo in criminal justice is in effect leading to a re-Westminstering of the constitutional state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 defines administrative action as "any decision [of a specified kind]" taken by specified persons or entities. The Act goes on to define decision as "any decision of an administrative nature made, proposed to be made, or required to be made, as the case may be", including certain specified categories of decision. The decision in Bhugwan v JSE Ltd 2010 3 SA 335 (GSJ) highlights the distinction between a "decision", as so defined (which may be amenable to judicial review in terms of the Act) and an inchoate decision (that is not amenable to such review).. The judgment in this case is, to date, the only judicial authority in South Africa on this critical threshold requirement to be established by any applicant for judicial review in terms of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the judgment in the case of Kylie v CCMA and considers its implications for the future of labor litigation in South Africa. It argues that the approach adopted by the court in deciding the case is unsupportive of legality, indicating that the court was not interested in the public policy issues. It contends that the judgment will have far-reaching implications for the conduct of cases in the CCMA in general. It notes that the judgment has triggered a new approach to constitutional labour interpretation.

The article analyzes the facts and decision in Naidoo v ABSA Bank case in South Africa. It shows that the court in Naidoo correctly stated that section 130(3) does not extend the ambit of section 129. It points out that an over-indebted consumer may have the financial potential to overcome his or her debt if assisted by debt restructuring, a ruling of reckless credit, and the credit provider. It suggests not forcing a debtor to lose his or her assets and subjecting to the social stigma of being an insolvent.

The article presents an analysis on the judgment of the case Wells v Atoll Media Pty. Ltd. in South Africa. It argues that the judge repeatedly qualified his judgment with reference to the context of the case mean that such an interpretation would be exaggerated. It contends that the user can still justify the unauthorized use of a particular person's attributes on the basis of public interest. It points out that the law in the country leads the way when it comes to the protection of an individual against the unauthorized use of his or her attributes.

The article summarizes the South African Law Commission's (SALC) report on the constitutionality of section 12 of the Divorce Act which highlights reasons why this section could not pass constitutional scrutiny in South Africa. It highlights the facts of the High Court in M v Johncom Media Ltd.; Johncom Media Ltd. v M case which was confirmed by the Constitutional Court (CC) in Johncom Media Investments Ltd. v M. It focuses on the quo's judgment, the CC's judgment and a criticism of the CC's judgment.

The article analyzes the nature and functioning of a player's contract in South Africa. It indicates how the characteristics of sui generis is applied to such contracts in case of Santos Professional Football Club (Pty) Ltd v Igesund. It discusses the effect on the high court decision Vrystaat Cheetahs (Edms) Beperk v Mapoe. It suggests how similar cases is dealt by courts in future. It investigates the suitability of the contractual remedy of performance to a player's breach of contract in the country.

The article provides a brief overview and features analysis on the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, which was adopted in South Africa on December 1, 2006 as a response to the decision of the Constitutional Court in Minister of Home Affairs v Fourie in which declared insufficient recognition of same-sex relationships as unconstitutional. It states that the Court cautioned the Parliament to be sensitive in developing a remedy that allows formalisation of same-sex relationships and would not produce forms of marginalisation. Accordingly, the Parliament made a separate institution for the same-sex partners that raised questions on the quality of legal protection to same-sex partners. It comments that making the act as separate institution shows a real and powerful inequality.