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On 28 June 2022 the apex or Constitutional Court (CC) handed down a much-awaited judgment which impacts upon Muslim marriages concluded purely in terms of Islamic law in South Africa. Does the judgment mean that such Muslim marriages are now fully recognised for all purposes in the South African legal context? The simple answer is "no". The rationale for this conclusion is to be found in the two-pronged judgment. The first part of the judgment is wholly suspended and will only and automatically come into effect if remedial legislation is not enacted in 24 months. The second part of the judgment pertains to an interim order which takes effect immediately and applies retrospectively to all Muslim marriages that subsisted on 15 December 2014 (when the case was first launched by the Women's Legal Centre in the Western Cape High Court) and to Muslim marriages which, although terminated before that date, were still subject to ongoing legal proceedings at that date. While the case note briefly refers to the first part of the judgment, the main purpose of this case note is to highlight some of the practical problems that could be encountered by couples when effect is given to the orders pertaining to the interim relief granted in terms of the second part of the judgment. The problem areas are highlighted by looking at the CC judgment in the light of three fictitious scenarios. The case note provides a few critical comments on the judgment and ends with a few concluding remarks. Past experience leads us to expect that tangible progress will take place only by 2024, a date which coincides with South Africa's next presidential election. Until then the non-recognition of Muslim marriages will continue to prove burdensome to Muslim women and children. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In King v De Jager 2021 5 BCLR 449 (CC), the Constitutional Court held that a clause in a private will that unfairly discriminated against beneficiaries based on gender was unlawful and unenforceable. This note considers the implications of the judgment for religion-based discrimination in wills, and in particular wills that incorporate the genderdiscriminatory Islamic system of inheritance. After explaining the Constitutional Court judgment, the note argues that the Court was well within its powers to consider the enforceability of discrimination in the private sphere. More importantly, we argue that the case rings a bell of caution regarding genderdiscriminatory provisions in private wills. Gender-based discrimination in Islamic inheritance law perpetuates disadvantage against a historically disadvantaged group, and the courts and legislature have been emphatic in their stance against gender discrimination in inheritance. The note thus argues that a testator's religious beliefs are not enough to tip the scales and render gender discrimination justifiable. We urge individuals who want to dispose of their assets following their religious beliefs to seek estate planning advice, cognisant of the potential impact of King v De Jager CC. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]