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Social learning-learning from others-is the basis for behavioural traditions. Different social learning strategies (SLS), where individuals biasedly learn behaviours based on their content or who demonstrates them, may increase an individual's fitness and generate behavioural traditions. While SLS have been mostly studied in isolation, their interaction and the interplay between individual and social learning is less understood. We performed a field-based open diffusion experiment in a wild primate. We provided two groups of vervet monkeys with a novel food, unshelled peanuts, and documented how three different peanut opening techniques spread within the groups. We analysed data using hierarchical Bayesian dynamic learning models that explore the integration of multiple SLS with individual learning. We (1) report evidence of social learning compared to strictly individual learning, (2) show that vervets preferentially socially learn the technique that yields the highest observed payoff and (3) also bias attention toward individuals of higher rank. This shows that behavioural preferences can arise when individuals integrate social information about the efficiency of a behaviour alongside cues related to the rank of a demonstrator. When these preferences converge to the same behaviour in a group, they may result in stable behavioural traditions.

Human-induced rapid environmental change (HIREC) has recently led to alterations in the fitness and behavior of many organisms. Game theory is an important tool of behavioral ecology for analyzing evolutionary situations involving multiple individuals. However, game theory bypasses the details by which behavioral phenotypes are determined, taking the functional perspective straight from expected payoffs to predicted frequencies of behaviors. In contrast with optimization approaches, we identify that to use existing game theoretic models to predict HIREC effects, additional mechanistic details (or assumptions) will often be required. We illustrate this in relation to the hawk-dove game by showing that three different mechanisms, each of which support the same ESS prior to HIREC (fixed polymorphism, probabilistic choice, or cue dependency), can have a substantial effect on behavior (and success) following HIREC. Surprisingly, an increase in the value of resources can lead to a reduction in payoffs (and vice versa), both in the immediate- and long-term following HIREC. An increase in expected costs also increases expected payoffs. Along with these counter-intuitive findings, this work shows that simply understanding the behavioral payoffs of existing games is insufficient to make predictions about the effects of HIREC.