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The paper demonstrates why the transition process is taking more time than predicted and why many countries are still far away from the projected goal: a developed market economy. Analyzing the causes and re-examining the endogenous character of the transition progress, the authors conclude that the majority of reforms were implemented at a pace conditional on the initial, pre-transition conditions. The results obtained show a significant impact on the economic and institutional heritage of a country, which lasts much longer than was predicted on the eve of the reform process: initial conditions strongly and significantly affect the speed of transition throughout the entire observed period (1989-2007). They also affect the performance of a country: in the first years the transition progress may affect growth in a positive way, but later it becomes insignificant. This can explain some growth peculiarities previously remarked when transition countries were analyzed by means of long-run growth models. Using Barro and Levine-Renelt models the authors show that despite somewhat better results for the second decade of transition many peculiar patterns remain, which could temporarily block poorer transition economies in their attempts to catch up and cause unnecessary losses since transition policies were not properly adjusted to the initial conditions.

All forecasts for transition countries - the 29 EBRD countries of operation - since mid-2008 have been repeatedly downgraded. The latest forecasts (May 2009) envisage an average income decline of 5 per cent in 2009 and only a small recovery of 1.4 per cent in 2010; performance is very diverse. In general, transition countries faced two shocks: a sudden stop and reversal of capital inflows, and an exports collapse due to the global slump. More specific factors include: 1) Home made sub-primes (domestic loans to households, enterprises and governments originally denominated in foreign currency); 2) External imbalances; 3) Worsening terms of trade for primary products exporters; 4) Fall or reversal of FDI and portfolio investment inflows; 5) Funds withdrawal by foreign banks; 6) External demand reduction; 7) Differences in initial positions and policy response. Earlier membership of the Euro by the new member states through a relaxation of Maastricht rules might have been beneficial, but the current crisis is no time for changing or bending rules. By comparison with the transition recession of the 1990s, the current recession is much smaller and shorter, it benefits from more generous assistance from the international community, and from the more enlightened fiscal and monetary policies now uncharacteristically recommended by International Financial Organizations.