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The incorporation of increasing returns and imperfect competition into applied general-equilibrium (AGE) models, beginning with Harris (1984), led to much larger welfare effects from changes such as trade liberalization. But the imperfect competition side of these IO developments has often failed to incorporate meaningful strategic behavior, largely ruling out firm-level productivity and scale effects. I show here that the incorporation of theory-based endogenous markups into AGE models is not difficult in spite of the added simultaneity of the system. I first derive the optimal markup equations for Nash Cournot and Nash Bertrand competition in a CES environment with free entry and exit. Then I code a simple numerical model using non-linear complementarity. Three alternatives are considered: large-group monopolistic competition (LGMC), small-group Cournot (SGC) and small-group Bertrand (SGB). Growth in the economy is the experiment used to compare these specifications. While the overall effects of growth on welfare are qualitatively similar, the gains to initially small economies are much larger under either small-group assumption relative to LGMC, but diminish relative to LGMC as economies grow large. Secondly I show how the contributions of variety (entry), firm scale (productivity), and markups (distortions) to welfare changes differ substantially among the three alternatives.

We develop a dynamic general equilibrium framework with firm heterogeneity and monopsonistic labour markets, for quantification of the impact of trade and FDI liberalisation episodes. Firms make standard extensive margin investment choices into exporting and multinational statuses. The labour market features upward-sloping supply curves and love of variety in employment. These features interact with the variable-fixed cost tradeoff of outward activity. We calibrate the model to U.S. data and study the effect of reductions in tariffs and outward FDI taxes in both bilateral and unilateral contexts, examining steady state and transitional effects. We compare the predictions of this model with a more standard version with perfectly competitive labour markets. Our headline finding is that the model with labour market power gives substantially different quantitative estimates to the perfectly competitive version. For instance, a bilateral trade liberalisation gives welfare gains that are over 10 times larger in the presence of monopsony power. Significant quantitative differences persist with a variety of robustness exercises.

We develop a dynamic model of inventory investment and trade to examine how firms adjust to changes in international trade costs when facing a risk of stockouts due to demand uncertainty and order lead times for imports. We study two strategies firms may use to avoid stockouts, namely holding inventories of imports, and engaging in dual sourcing. Both strategies are shown to magnify the protective effects of trade costs. Using transaction-level data for a U.S. steel wholesaler experiencing an episode of Section-201 tariffs, we find strong evidence consistent with this magnification effect. Higher tariffs are shown to significantly reduce both the inventory-sales and the import-sales ratios, as the firm adjusts its stockout avoidance strategies.

This paper develops an empirical model of consumer taste in twenty-nine Belgium food industries for the period from 1998-2005 to generate a "taste distance" measure of over 1,800 firm-product exports to 53 country destinations. We estimate consumer taste using a control function approach and perform a decomposition of export revenues of firm-products to establish the importance of representative consumer taste relative to quality and marginal cost in export success. We find substantial taste heterogeneity in food exports across destination countries. Overall, in the large majority of food exports, consumer taste is an important and separate demand determinant to explain export revenues. Depending on the product, taste for a product explains between 4-30% of export revenues. Thus, any taste shock due to events such as pandemics or climate change, may induce substantial changes in export profitability of firms.

This paper analyzes the impact of financial development on export concentration. I incorporate credit constraints into a trade model with heterogeneous exporters and endogenous quality choice. The model predicts that financial development increases innovation activity and export shares of larger firms. In contrast, a model variant in which exporters have to finance production costs instead of investments suggests a negative impact of financial development on export concentration as smaller firms benefit more from relaxing credit constraints. These opposing predictions are tested using export data for 70 countries over the period 1997-2014 and exploiting variation in external finance dependence across sectors. I find strong support for the predictions of the investment model that higher financial development increases export concentration among top firms, especially in sectors with high external finance dependence and large scope for quality differentiation. This effect is also present within firms: financial development induces exporters to skew their sales towards the top performing products. I finally show in a counterfactual analysis that financial frictions are quantitatively important to explain the variation in the skewness of exports across countries and sectors.

We present a unified dynamic framework to study the interconnections between international trade and business cycle models. We prove an aggregate equivalence between a competitive, representative firm model that has aggregate production externalities and dynamic trade models that feature monopolistic competition, endogenous entry, and heterogeneous firms. The production externalities in the representative firm model have to be introduced in the intermediate and final good sectors so that the model is isomorphic to dynamic trade models that embody love-of-variety and selection effects. In a quantitative exercise with multiple shocks, we show that to improve the fit of the dynamic trade models with the data, the most important ingredient is negative capital externality in the intermediate good sector. We conclude that this presents a puzzle for the literature as standard dynamic trade models provide micro-foundations for positive capital externality.

This paper investigates the effects of mergers on the product mix of multiproduct firms. Thus, we open the black box of post-merger efficiency improvements to reveal a new margin of adjustment along the product dimension. We analyze horizontal mergers in a theoretical model where oligopolistic firms employ a flexible manufacturing technology and allocate assets between differentiated varieties. After a merger, acquirers drop products from their consolidated domestic product portfolio and reallocate assets towards core varieties. We further demonstrate that such merger-induced efficiency gains imply greater activity in foreign markets. Using detailed Danish register data, we document novel facts regarding mergers and multiproduct firms and find empirical evidence strongly supporting the model's predictions. Our results show that the number of domestic products of the post-merger acquirer falls relative to the sum of the premerger acquirer and target, that skewness of domestic sales rises towards core products, and that export activity increases.

Customs data reveal heterogeneity and granularity of relationships among buyers and sellers. A key insight is how more exports to a destination break down into more firms selling there and more buyers per exporter. We develop a quantitative general equilibrium model of firm-to-firm matching that builds on this insight to separate the roles of iceberg costs and matching frictions in gravity. In the cross section, we find matching frictions as important as iceberg costs in impeding trade, and more sensitive to distance. Because domestic and imported intermediates compete directly with labor in performing production tasks, our model also fits the heterogeneity of labor shares across French producers. Applying the framework to the 2004 expansion of the European Union, reduced iceberg costs and reduced matching frictions contributed equally to the increase in French exports to the new members. While workers benefited overall, those competing most directly with imports gained less, even losing in some countries entering the EU.

This paper studies the market and welfare effects of income heterogeneity in monopolistically competitive product markets in the context of nonhomothetic preferences. In a closed economy, where richer individuals' expenditures are less sensitive to price change compared to poorer ones', a mean-preserving contraction of income distribution entices firms to charge higher markups, reduce output, and fosters creation of new varieties. General equilibrium effects have a negative impact on poorer individuals and, in specific circumstances, on the whole population. In an open economy with free trade, lower income inequality in one country creates price divergence between trading countries. Lower inequality not only further decreases trade volumes and values but also creates a general equilibrium effect that may negatively affect poor individuals. Finally, general equilibrium effects are shown to be quantitatively nonnegligible.

This paper scrutinizes the effects of the European Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market on platform competition in media markets. Platforms that are Online Content-Sharing Service Providers must have a license agreement with collective management organizations that control the content platform users may (or must not) upload to the platform. The paper shows that the new directive may imply market concentration and an aggregate welfare loss. The reason is that only users of the large platform will be allowed to upload content if the content asset controlled by a collective management organization is sufficiently valuable and if network effects are strong.

Following the trade collapse in 2009, Globalization has recovered but the growth rate slowed down compared to the preceding period of Hyper Globalization. The persistence of this slowdown is remarkable. We argue that increased awareness of firms for the costs of involvement in global supply chains can explain the recent developments in trade flows. We formalize the existence, length, and consequences of changes in fragmentation cost along global supply chains. From a theoretical point of view, the model endogenizes production fragmentation, allowing for multiple production stages in multiple countries, while remaining tractable. From an empirical point of view, the model explains both, the period of Hyper Globalization and the subsequent Slowbalization in terms of changing fragmentation costs along global supply chains. The model is also consistent with developments regarding labor market polarization associated with modern globalization: the labor market position of medium-skilled workers in advanced countries has deteriorated relative to high- and low- skilled workers, which can be understood by changing global supply chains. Our model implies, however, that even with zero fragmentation costs the demand for certain occupations does not fall to zero for any country.

How does import protection affect export performance? In trade models with scale economies, import liberalization can reduce industry-level exports by cutting domestic production. We show that this export destruction mechanism reduced US export growth following the permanent normalization of trade relations with China (PNTR). But there was also an offsetting boost to exports from lower input costs. We use our empirical results to calibrate the strength of scale economies in a quantitative trade model. Counterfactual analysis implies that while PNTR increased aggregate US exports relative to GDP, exports declined in the most exposed industries because of the export destruction effect. On aggregate, the US and China both gain from PNTR, but the gains are larger for China.

This paper develops a novel theory of capital mis-allocation within firms that stems from managers’ empire building and informational frictions within the organization. Introducing an internal capital market into a two-factor model of multi-segment firms, we show that international competition imposes discipline on managers and reduces capital mis-allocation across divisions, thereby lowering the conglomerate discount. The theory can explain why exporters exhibit a lower conglomerate discount than non-exporters (a new fact we establish). Testing the model’s predictions with data on US companies, results suggest that Chinese import competition significantly reduces managers' over-reporting of costs and improves the allocation of capital within firms.

International trade is dominated by a small number of very large firms. Models of trade with heterogeneous firms have been developed to study the causes and consequences of this observation. The canonical model of trade with heterogeneous firms shows that trade leads to between-firm reallocations and selection: it shifts employment towards firms with the best attributes and forces marginal firms to exit. The model also illustrates the role of heterogeneity, and its various sources, in explaining the volume of trade and the firm-level margins of adjustment. Consistent with the model, the empirical literature has documented that exporting is a rare activity, that exporting firms are larger and more productive than other firms, and that trade liberalization reallocates market shares towards the best-performing firms in various countries. Studies using transaction-level data have unveiled additional salient features of trade flows. First, sales by foreign firms are very heterogeneous and highly concentrated. Second, both the extensive margin (number of exporting firms) and the intensive margin (average export per firm) are important in explaining the level of exports and its changes over time. More heterogeneity in sales across firms is associated with a higher volume of trade along both margins. Third, increased foreign competition reallocates market shares towards top firms and hence can increase concentration from any country of origin. Numerous extensions of the benchmark model have been proposed to study other important aspects, such as the relevance of multi-product and multinational firms, the import behavior of firms, and the extent to which heterogeneity is endogenous to firms. choices, but some open challenges still remain.

Recent disruptions to global value chains (GVCs) have raised an important question: Can decoupling from GVCs increase a country’s welfare by reducing its exposure to foreign supply shocks? We use a quantitative trade model to simulate GVCs decoupling, defined as increased barriers to global input trade. After decoupling, the repercussions of foreign supply shocks are reduced on average, but some countries experience magnified effects. Across various scenarios, welfare losses from decoupling far exceed any benefits from lower shock exposure. In the U.S., a repatriation of GVCs would reduce national welfare by 2.2% but barely change U.S. exposure to foreign shocks.

NGO campaigns against firms with value chains involving production in developing and emerging economies are a salient feature of economic globalization. What determines the patterns of the internationalization of NGO campaigns? Stylized facts obtained from recently available data containing 102 532 campaigns by 4 343 NGOs targeting 11 429 firms from 145 countries guide our theoretical analysis. We propose a model of global sourcing and international trade in which heterogeneous NGOs campaign against heterogeneous firms in response to infringements along their international value chains. We find that campaigns are determined by a triadic gravity equation, i.e. bilateral trade costs between the country of the NGO, the country of the firm and the sourcing country affect campaigns. Most notably, the latter implies that by advancing the internationalization of production, falling trade costs boost the internationalization of NGO campaigns. We use our data to estimate the NGO level triadic gravity equation implied by our model and find strong support for our predictions.

We explore the possibility of achieving a cooperative outcome when governments act non-cooperatively in a strategic environmental policy model where emission permit markets are linked. We introduce a specific distribution scheme of the permit revenues between the exporting countries so as to sustain the cooperative outcome as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Participation in the scheme is endogenized and we show that it constitutes a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as long as the countries are not too asymmetric. Our results are robust once we allow for multiple pollutants, different modes of competition and market power in the permits market.

This paper examines the effects of a unilateral reform of the redistribution policy in an economy open to international trade. We set up a general equilibrium trade model with heterogeneous agents allowing for country asymmetries. We show that under international trade compared to autarky, a unilateral tax increase leads to a less pronounced decline in aggregate real income in the reforming country, while income inequality is reduced to a larger extent for sufficiently small initial tax rates. We highlight as a key mechanism a tax-induced reduction in the market size of the reforming country relative to its trading partner, resulting in a firm selection effect towards exporting. From the perspective of a non-reforming trading partner, the unilateral redistribution policy reform resembles a unilateral increase in trade costs leading to a deterioration of terms-of-trade and a decline in both aggregate real income and inequality.

This paper uses the quantitative spatial model with heterogeneous locations linked by costly goods trade, migration and commuting developed in Monte et al. (2018) to address the workings of local labor markets in Germany. One key contribution concerns the analysis of the role of the expenditure share of housing in the economy. We provide arguments that, in accordance with Rognlie (2015), for an economy-wide quantitative exercise, this share should be chosen lower than stipulated in much of the extant research. Our analyses show that the local general equilibrium employment and resident elasticities with respect to local productivity shocks are significantly higher with a lower housing share. Moreover, simple ex-ante observable commuting measures have very little predictive power for these general equilibrium elasticities when the housing share is small. The size of the housing share turns out to play no crucial role for two further results, however. First, employment and resident elasticities are very heterogeneous across German local labor markets, irrespective of the housing share. Second, the housing share has only little influence on the welfare effects and location patterns of counterfactual commuting cost reductions.

Service inputs are a key component of the costs of exporting, and contribute to explain the process of internationalization of firms. A new dataset on the participation of French firms in global value chains reveals that firms with longer export experience in a market are more likely to source service inputs from there. We rationalize this fact in a model where firms are initially uncertain about how successful they are as exporters, but learn their export profitability as they keep selling abroad. Because offshoring requires larger sunk costs than domestic sourcing, some firms decide to offshore only when they become sufficiently confident about their export prospects, i.e., once they acquire enough export experience. More export experience in a foreign destination also induces firms to offshore within the boundaries of the firm rather than at arm’s length. The model further implies that firms are more likely to offshore when frictions in the provision of services between the domestic and the foreign market are greater. In turn, offshoring firms sell greater volumes, display less volatility, and are less likely to exit foreign markets. Exploiting our novel dataset, we provide strong empirical support for each of these predictions.

The recent literature on firm-to-firm trade has documented salient empirical regularities of the buyer-seller network. We propose a simplistic re-interpretation of the classical Krugman (1980) model that accounts for surprisingly many of the empirical regularities. This re-interpretation relies on randomized bundling of Krugman-varieties into heterogeneous firms, economically neutral ‘sales units’ that import foreign varieties but belong to local firms, and a statistical reporting threshold that applies to firm-to-firm transactions. We argue that our model provides an important benchmark for the assessment of theoretical models that aim to identify the determinants of firm-to-firm networks.

This paper shows how gains from trade are conditioned by love of variety, defined as the extent to which an additional product variety generates benefits in either final or intermediate consumption. We develop a multi-country, multi-sector gravity trade model where love of variety is parameterized separately from product substitutability using a generalized CES demand function, and show analytically how gains from trade depend on love of variety through different channels that we identify and interpret. In this context, except for very specific parameterizations, gains from trade differ between a heterogeneous- and a homogeneous-firm model. Counterfactual simulations based on a calibrated version of this model show that, all other things being equal, the assessed gains from trade commonly vary by a proportion of one to three depending on the value of the love-of-variety elasticity, in a way that differs significantly across countries. Trade war simulations also point to the strong sensitivity of the assessed impacts. We conclude that love of variety is a key determinant of the gains from trade, an aspect that has so far been overlooked for the sake of convenience in the modeling framework and due to lack of empirical estimates.

Recent trade agreements have shifted their focus to non-tariff barriers such as regulations and product standards, which have been traditionally treated as pure domestic policies. The imposition of such standards reallocates production from small to large, high quality firms. We model regulations as a fixed cost that any firm selling to an economy must pay, consistent with stylized facts that we present. The fixed cost improves allocative efficiency, by reallocating production towards high-quality firms, who under-produce in the market allocation. Furthermore, the fixed cost generates a positive externality on the rest of the world as it induces entry of high-quality firms, but unilateral regulation lowers the terms of trade of the imposing country. The result justifies international cooperation based on the fact that such cooperation can improve welfare, rather than preventing negative consequences of tariff wars. We estimate our model and apply its gravity formulation to quantify the welfare consequences of imposing the optimal regulation, the extent of the positive externalities across countries, and the effects of cooperation.

Firms are under increasing pressure to meet stakeholders' demand for Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) along their global value chains. We study the incentives for and investments in CSR at different stages of the production process. We analyze a model of sequential production with incomplete contracts where CSR by independent suppliers differentiates the final product in the eyes of caring consumers. The model predicts an increasing CSR profile for suppliers along the value chain: from upstream suppliers with low CSR to downstream suppliers with higher CSR. We confirm this prediction using Indian firm-level data. We compute a firm's value chain position combining product-level information in our data with the World Input-Output Database. We find that more downstream firms have higher CSR expenditures as measured by a combination of staff welfare spending and social community spending.

Larger Indian firms selling inputs to other firms tend to have more customers, tend to be used more intensively by their customers, and tend to have larger customers. Motivated by these regularities, I propose a novel empirical model of trade featuring endogenous formation of input-output linkages between spatially distant firms. The empirical model consists of (a) a theoretical framework that accommodates first order features of firm-to-firm network data, (b) a maximum likelihood framework for structural estimation that is uninhibited by the scale of data, and (c) a procedure for counterfactual analysis that speaks to the effects of micro- and macroshocks to the spatial network economy. In the model, firms with low production costs end up larger because they find more customers, are used more intensively by their customers and in turn their customers lower production costs and end up larger themselves. The model is estimated using novel micro-data on firm-to-firm sales between Indian firms. The estimated model implies that a 10% decline in inter-state border frictions in India leads to welfare gains ranging between 1% and 8% across districts. Moreover, over half of the variation in changes in firms’ sales to other firms can be explained by endogenous changes in the network structure.

This paper examines the impact of the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic on China’s trade. Using quarterly transaction-level trade data of all Chinese firms, we find that firms in regions with local transmission of SARS experienced lower import and export growth at both the intensive and extensive margins, compared to those in the unaffected regions. The affected firms’ trade growth remained lower two years after SARS. Products that are more capital-intensive, skill-intensive, upstream in the supply chains, and differentiated experienced a smaller export decline but a stronger recovery. Small exporters were more likely to exit, slowing down trade recovery.

This paper develops a two-country model of intraindustry trade with trade costs, which can be reduced by public investment in an international infrastructure capital, the stock of which accumulates over time. Depending on the trade costs and international distribution of manufac-turing firms, equilibrium patterns of trade are determined, and national welfare in each country is affected by these trade patterns. Taking the relationship between trade costs and national welfare into consideration, the governments carry out a dynamic game of public investment. We show that the dynamic equilibrium of the policy game may exhibit history dependency; if the initial stock of international infrastructure is smaller (larger) than a certain level, the infrastructure stock decreases (increases) over time, and the world economy will end up in autarky (two-way free trade) in the long-run. We also show that international cooperation is beneficial in the sense that it may enable the world economy to escape from a “low development trap.”

In early 2020, the disease Covid-19 caused a drastic lockdown of the Chinese economy. We use a quantitative trade model with input-output linkages to gauge the effects of this adverse supply shock in China on the global economy through international trade and global value chains (GVCs). We find moderate welfare losses in most countries outside of China, while a few countries even gain from the shock due to trade diversion. As a key methodological contribution, we quantify the role of GVCs (in contrast to final goods trade) in transmitting the shock. In a hypothetical world without GVCs, the welfare loss due to the Covid-19 shock in China is reduced by 40% in the median country. In several other countries, the effects are magnified or reversed for several countries. Had the U.S. unilaterally repatriated GVCs, the country would have incurred a substantial welfare loss while its exposure to the shock would have barely changed.

In a three-country model of endogenous trade agreements, we study the implications of the Most Favored Nation Clause (MFN) when countries are free to form discriminatory preferential trade agreements (PTAs). While PTA members discriminate against non-member countries, MFN requires non-members to treat PTA members in a non-discriminatory fashion. We show that MFN reduces the potency of a country's optimal tariffs and therefore its incentive for unilaterally opting out of trade liberalization. Thus, MFN can be a catalyst for trade liberalization. However, when PTAs take the form of customs unions, the efficiency case for MFN as well as its pro-liberalization effect is weaker since one country finds itself deliberately excluded by member countries as opposed to staying out voluntarily.

We compare trade liberalization under Cournot and Bertrand competition in reciprocal markets. In both cases, the critical level of trade costs below which the possibility of trade affects the domestic firm’s behavior is the same; trade liberalization increases trade volume monotonically; and welfare is U-shaped under reasonable conditions. However, welfare is typically greater under Bertrand competition; for higher trade costs the volume of trade is greater under Cournot competition, implying a “van-der-Rohe Region” in parameter space; and, for even higher trade costs, there exists a “Nimzowitsch Region”, where welfare is higher under Bertrand competition even though no trade takes place.

We extend structural gravity models of bilateral trade flows to oligopolistic competition. We show that conventional gravity estimates do not only reflect trade costs but also market power. Our simple estimation procedure generalizes the standard gravity model and disentangles exogenous trade frictions and endogenous market power distortions. We use our estimated model to counterfactually increase trade costs by abolishing the European Single Market. We find that domestic firms' markups in EU member countries increase by 2 to 6 percent. Importantly, welfare effects of trade liberalization are much more pronounced due to the change in competition among domestic and foreign firms.

This paper challenges the common assumption of market segmentation in international trade. To analyze export entry and pricing decisions of firms in integrated vs. segmented markets, we develop a novel tractable approach based on stochastic export costs that allows us to compare firm-level and aggregate outcomes under arbitrary market interdependence. We find that allowing for potential re-exporting arbitrage between countries imposes constraints on export prices of firms and has first-order implications for trade and welfare.

We study how domestic content requirements in Free Trade Areas (FTAs) affect market power and market structure in concentrated intermediate goods markets. We show that content requirements increase oligopolistic markups beyond the level that would obtain under an equivalent import tariff, and we document patterns in Canadian export data and US producer price data that align with the model’s predictions: producers of intermediate goods charge comparatively higher prices when the associated final goods producers are more constrained by FTA origin requirements and by Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs for both intermediate and final non-FTA goods.

We study the international protection of consumer data in a model where data usage benefits firms at the expense of their customers. We show that a multinational firm does not balance this trade-off efficiently if its data usage lacks (full) transparency or if consumers’ privacy preference differs across countries. Unilateral data regulation by each country addresses the moral-hazard problem associated with opacity, but may nevertheless reduce global welfare due to cross-country externalities that distort output and data usage. The regulations may also cause excessive investment in data localization, even though localization mitigates the externalities. Our findings highlight the need for international coordination - though not necessarily uniformity - on regulations about data usage and protection.

We consider an international cartel whose members interact repeatedly in their own as well as in third-country segmented markets. Cartel discipline-an inverse measure of the degree of competition between firms-is endogenously determined by the cartel's incentive compatibility constraint (ICC), which links strategically markets that are seemingly unrelated. Owing to this linkage, trade cost reductions induce cartel members to adjust their sales, not only due to direct effects, but also due to spillover effects related to cartel discipline. We apply these ideas to preferential trade agreements (PTAs) and show that the indirect effects can give rise to trade diversion. We also characterize the welfare effects of preferential tariff cuts for all countries under various circumstances regarding the determination of external PTA trade policy. A persistent finding is that, in the absence of appropriate regulation, preferential trade liberalization can be welfare-reducing even when external policy is jointly optimal.

High-performance firms typically have two features in common: i) they produce in more than one country and ii) they produce more than one product. In this paper, we analyze the internationalization strategies of multi-product firms at the product-level. We find that the most productive firms sell core varieties via foreign direct investment (FDI) and export products with intermediate productivity. Shocks to trade costs and technology affect the endogenous decision to export or produce abroad at the product-level and, in turn, the relative productivity between parents and affiliates.

This paper analyzes how exporters are affected by corporate tax reforms in destination markets. We introduce tax policy in a trade model of multi-product firms and show that producers face tougher competition in export markets with lower corporate tax rates. This competitive effect induces firms to reduce the number of exported products and to skew their export sales towards the better performing varieties. We estimate the effects of corporate taxes on trade dynamics by exploiting policy reforms in 45 destination countries of exports during the period 2005-2012. Our results provide strong support for competitive effects of corporate taxation.

This paper analyzes the effects of credit frictions in a trade model where heterogeneous firms select both into exporting and into two types of external finance. In our framework, small producers face stronger credit frictions, pay a higher borrowing rate and rely on bank finance, whereas large firms have access to cheaper bond finance. We show that an increase in credit frictions induces firms to select into bank finance, which attenuates the negative implications on product variety and welfare. In the open economy, the presence of effective financial intermediation increases the welfare gains from trade. In a counterfactual analysis, we exploit that our framework nests a model with credit frictions and one type of finance as a special case, and we show that endogenous selection into external finance is an important channel of adjustment.

We consider an economic geography setting in which firms are free to choose one of the following organizational types: (i) integrated firms, which perform all their activities at the same location, (ii) horizontal firms, which operate several plants producing the same good at different locations, and (iii) vertical firms, which perform distinct activities at separated locations. We show that there exists a unique organizational equilibrium, which typically involves the coexistence of various organizational forms. We also give necessary and sufficient conditions for the three types of firms to coexist within the same region and show that transportation and communication costs have opposite effects on firms’ organizational choices. This suggests that, depending on its nature, the supply of a new transportation infrastructure may lead to contrasted locational patterns.

Trade credit is the most important form of short-term finance for U.S. firms. In 2017, non-financial firms had about $3 trillion in trade credit outstanding equaling 20 percent of U.S. GDP. Why do sellers lend to their buyers in the presence of a well-developed financial sector? This paper proposes an explanation for the puzzling dominance of trade credit: When sellers charge markups over production costs and financial intermediation is costly, then buyer-seller pairs can save on their overall financing costs by utilizing trade credit. We derive a model of trade credit and markups that captures this mechanism. In the model, the larger is the markup and the larger is the difference between the borrowing and the deposit rate, the more attractive is trade credit. The model also implies that trade credit use increases with repeated interactions and that this effect is stronger for complex products. Using Chilean data at the firm-level to estimate markups and at the trade-transaction level to analyze payment choices, we find strong support for the model.

We show that multilateral tariff binding liberalization substantially impacts the nature and extent of Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) formation. First, it shapes the nature of forces constraining expansion of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). The constraining force is a free riding incentive of FTA non-members under relatively high bindings but an exclusion incentive of FTA members under relatively low bindings. Second, multilateral tariff binding liberalization shapes the role played by PTAs in the attainment of global free trade. Initially, tariff binding liberalization leads to Custom Union (CU) formation in equilibrium but in a way that undermines the pursuit of global free trade. However, further tariff binding liberalization leads to FTA formation in equilibrium and in a way that facilitates the attainment of global free trade. Our theoretical analysis also has implications regarding recent empirical discussions over the relative merits of FTAs versus CUs.

We investigate theoretically and empirically the role of wholesalers in mediating the productivity effects of trade liberalization. Intermediaries provide indirect access to foreign produced inputs. The productivity effects of input tariff cuts on firms that do not directly import therefore depends on the extent that wholesalers are a feature of input supply within an industry. Using firm level data from China, we document that wholesalers play no such role for direct importers. However, other firms experience productivity gains from reducing input tariffs if trade intermediation of foreign inputs within their sector is high. They suffer efficiency losses otherwise.

We provide an overview and synthesis of recent work on models of monopolistic competition with heterogeneous firms in international trade, paying particular attention to competition effects, pass-through, selection effects, and linking distributions of firm characteristics and outcomes. A recurring theme is that CES preferences are extremely convenient for deriving analytic results, but also extremely restrictive in their theoretical and empirical implications. We introduce the class of "constant-response demand functions" to describe some related families of demand functions that provide a unifying principle for much recent work that explores alternatives to CES demands.

We describe a model of trade with input based product differentiation and non-proportional trade costs that is capable of predicting a positive correlation between firms’ export intensity, the price of their exports, and the wages they pay to their workers. These correlations arise in the model solely from comparative input scarcity and independently of any productivity differentials: in equilibrium, firms that employ workers with comparatively scarcer skills, other things equal, export a larger proportion of their output, pay higher wages and charge higher prices.

This paper introduces a framework to study the impact of trade liberalization on wage inequality and welfare in the presence of monopsonistic labor markets. The interaction of firm heterogeneity in productivity with idiosyncratic preferences of workers for working at different firms generates between-firm wage inequality for workers with identical skills. The degree of monopsony power is captured by the elasticity of firm-level labor supply, with a lower elasticity implying more wage-setting power by the firm. With more productive firms paying higher wages, monopsony power dampens the impact of firm heterogeneity on the allocation of market shares and allows lower productivity firms to survive. In a closed economy this increases inequality, but in an open economy high levels of monopsony power inhibit exporting, which may reduce inequality by compressing wages on the right side of the distribution. Nevertheless, inequality in the open economy is always higher than in autarky. Monopsony power reduces social welfare (for empirically plausible values of the labor supply elasticity) and the gains from trade.

We use transaction-level US import data to compare firms from virtually all countries in the world competing in a single destination market. Guided by a simple theoretical framework, we decompose countries. market shares into the contribution of the number of firm-products, their average attributes (quality and efficiency) and heterogeneity around the mean. To further explore the role of exceptional firms, we also develop a novel decomposition that separates the contribution of heterogeneity from that of granularity. Our results show that the number of firm- products explains half of the variation in sales, while the remaining part is equally accounted for by average attributes and their dispersion. Quality is the main driver of firm heterogeneity. While individual firms matter, we find that heterogeneity is more important than granularity for explaining sales. We then study how the distribution of firm-level characteristics varies across countries, and we explore some of its determinants. Countries with a larger market size tend to be characterized by a more dispersed distribution of firms’ sales, especially due to heterogeneity in quality. These countries also tend to be more likely to host superstar firms, although this is not the only source of higher heterogeneity.

This paper documents the importance of consumer taste in trade flows using Belgian firm-product customs data by destination. We identify consumer taste through the use of a control function approach and estimate it jointly with other demand parameters using a very flexible demand specification. Consumer taste is identified for every trade ow. The results show that taste decreases in distance but this relationship is not monotonic. The contribution of consumer taste to actual export revenue ranges between 1-31% depending on the product category in the food industry. Overall, the demand shifters, taste and product quality explain twice as much of the variation in export revenues than cost.

Over the last 20 years the trade literature repeatedly documented the trade-reducing effects of inter- and intra-national borders. Thereby, the puzzling size and persistence of observed border effects from the beginning raised doubts on the role of underlying political borders. However, when observed border effects are not caused by political trade barriers, why should their spatial dimension then inevitably coincide with the geography of present or past political borders? This paper identifies a "border effect" in the absence of a border. Thereby, the finding that trade between East- and West-Japan is 23.1% - 51.3% lower than trade within both country parts, is established in the absence of an obvious east-west division due to historical borders, cultural differences or past civil wars. From a rich set of explanatory variables post-war agglomeration processes, reflected by the contemporaneous structure of Japan's business and social networks, rather than cultural differences, shaped by long-lasting historical shocks, are identified as an explanation for the east-west bias in intra-Japanese trade.

This paper discusses how international trade is organized from export to trans-boundary transport to import. All evidence suggests that the transport sector is independent, may exercise market power and features strong economies of scale. We develop a model of a transport industry that operates under imperfect competition and economies of scale and two generic trade models in which export and import activities are either organized at arm’s length or in a vertical partnership. Using a large dataset of maritime transport costs, tariffs and export prices, we test the model predictions and find that economies of scale beat market power: a decline in the tariff implies a decline in freight rates. Furthermore, our results are consistent only with international trade being organized in vertical partnerships because a tariff increase does not lead to a decrease in export prices.

Combining administrative data on German workers with commercial data on German firms, we find evidence for a distance effect on the multinational wage premium: Foreign multinationals pay lower wages than German multinationals if the ultimate owner is located in close proximity to Germany, whereas the opposite is true if the ultimate owner is located further away. In addition to this so far unexplored effect, our results confirm previous evidence that on average foreign multinationals and domestic multinationals pay wages of similar size, with both types of firms paying a premium relative to other local firms. To provide a rationale for this pattern, we develop a theoretical model in which wages are firm-specific and firms can serve the foreign market via exporting or via FDI. In case of FDI, they face uncertainty about the wages to be paid abroad, and due to this uncertainty, firms that pay high wages at home are more likely to seek foreign investment. In the model, the observed distance effect on the multinational wage premium occurs since the alternative of exporting is less attractive for distant locations, and firms are therefore more willing to accept higher wages for foreign production in locations that are further away from their headquarters.