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I present a theory about the institutional determinants of democratic performance. Parliamentary systems and party list proportional representation are more conducive to a strong party system with competitive, programmatic and institutionalized political parties, and consequently to a better democratic quality. To show this, I take a closer look at a subset of post-Communist polities, those with a majority Orthodox population, thus controlling for the effect of culture or religion. When we look at the relationship between economic development (another important explanatory variable) and democracy, we see that in this group the relationship is actually negative. I offer an institutional explanation for this paradox: less economically developed Orthodox polities have made better institutional choices than more economically developed Orthodox polities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the inclusion in governance of ethnic minority or integral nationalist parties in seven post-communist states, 1990-2004; and the frequency, costs/benefits, stability and electoral success of such coalitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The analysis of political competition as one-dimensional (left-versus-right) is widespread. This single dimension is a useful shortcut for a number of positions on a variety of issues and policies. Nonetheless, political conflict is often multi-dimensional. Using a single dimension for describing political competition in such circumstances is inappropriate. I present a simple model with two dimensions and three actors (constituencies) with preferences over policies associated with each of the two dimensions. I use this model to analyze the most recent presidential elections in three European countries: France, Romania, and Ukraine. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In 2008, Romania changed its electoral system from PR to single ballot mixed. A major reason behind this reform was to strengthen the ties between the candidates and their constituents, and our goal is to test whether this has happened. To this end, we analyze aggregate electoral returns from Romania's 3,000 localities, and rely on the notion of 'uniform partisan swing,' which states that the level of local support for a given party in an election is an excellent predictor of its level of support in the same locality or region in the next election. We expect that the change of the electoral system will lead to a decrease in ideological voting and a larger impact of the qualities of individual candidates. We test this by comparing the correlation between support for a given party at the locality level in the 2000 and 2004 parliamentary elections with the correlation between support for the same party in the 2004 and 2008 elections. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I use survey data to map the constituents of two extreme right-wing parties, the French National Front and the Greater Romania Party, in a two-dimensional policy space. The presence of these constituents has similar consequences for political competition in the two polities, making their politics two-dimensional. On the one hand, we have moderate left and moderate right constituencies, divided primarily by "Old Politics" economic conflicts. On the other hand, we have "New Politics" conflicts, dividing the authoritarian and xenophobic constituents of extreme right -wing parties from all other constituencies. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]