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I explore the dynamics of bargaining in the EU.x000d.through examining the factors that lead member states to shift away from their initial policy positions during the course of negotiations. I examine the extent to which the member states move away from their initial policy positions, and the reasons as to why they do so. . One of the main findings of my analysis is that the member states with more coalition potential tend to hold on to their initial positions and compromise to a lesser extent during the negotiations. Moreover, the type of voting rule used has a great influence on member states’ decision to change their bargaining positions or not. The type of voting rule also influences the extent to which they will benefit from doing so. I find that under unanimity member states switch positions considerably less often but are able to use their increased negotiation power to extract better outcomes as a result of switching. On the other hand, position-switching decreases member states' success under qualified majority voting. These arguments and findings provide a fascinating exploration into previously unexamined dynamics in legislative bargaining in general, and EU negotiations in particular. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper I examine the factors that lead bargaining parties to change their positions during policy negotiations. I empirically examine position-switching by member states during bargaining in the EU. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper seeks to explain budgetary allocation in the EU. I specifically illustrate the role of two key institutional factors: voting and proposal rights of the member states in determining the amount of funding they receive from the EU. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]