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Many Latin Americanist scholars have described large scale protests, in which indigenous people have been noticeably present, as part of the larger phenomena of indigenous social movements which started in the late 1960s and have grown in prominence with governmental attempts to adopt new liberal economic reforms (Brysk 2000, Lucero 2008, Postero and Zamosc 2004, Yasher 1998, Van Cott 2003). However, while many of the protests described by these authors did have a large number of indigenous participants and were organized by self-proclaimed indigenous organizations, these organizations chose to frame their struggles against neo-liberal economics in two different and sometimes contradictory ways. For example, The Confederation of Nationalities of Ecuador (CONAIE), began as an indigenous organization dedicated to protecting indigenous culture, and first gained national prominence by protesting for cultural rights, such as the right to bilingual education. However, when the President entered into serious negotiations with the IMF in 1999, CONAIE once again took to the street, but this time the organization's platform held no mention of cultural rights. Instead of being framed as a protest for indigenous rights, the CONAIE framed the 1999/2000 protests as struggles for the rights of workers against neoliberal economic reforms imposed by the working class. The framing of the protests as a protest for workers' rights is particularly striking given the history of racism and discrimination that indigenous peoples have historically suffered at the hands of the working mestizo class. On the other hand, AIDESEP, a regional indigenous rights organization in the Peruvian Amazon, has continued to emphasize indigenous cultural rights even in the face of neoliberal economic land reforms. This paper will therefore look at case studies from Ecuador and Peru to determine why some indigenous organizations framed protests against the adoption of neoliberal economic reforms in terms of workers' rights, while others were framed in terms of indigenous cultural and land rights. In the end I find that the Peruvian organizations had weaker domestic networks than the Ecuadorian movements, and therefore relied heavily on the internationally salient frames of indigenous rights and environmental protection, while the Ecuadorian organization CONAIE was free to adopt more nationally salient frames. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article explores the conditions that enable an insurgent organization to consolidate in a region and to fragment sovereignty, with reference to the experience of Peru from 1980 through 1996. In the analysis, four explanations are considered: relative deprivation, availability of financing, counterinsurgent capabilities, and political pluralism. The analysis suggests three conclusions. First, rebels are unlikely to consolidate in areas where counterinsurgent forces are strong. Second, insurgents are also unlikely to control regions where the level of political pluralism is high. Third, rebels are likely to consolidate in regions where counterinsurgent forces are weak and the level of political pluralism is low. These conclusions have two implications. First, neither relative deprivation nor access to financing is a useful tool for anticipating the consolidation of insurgents. Second, the much discussed "greed versus grievances" debate is not relevant for explaining why rebels control some parts of a country but not others.

What are the reasons for the participation of indigenous groups in the class based Maoist insurgencies? What are its consequences? Have ethnic participation fuelled the growth of the communist insurgencies after the end of Cold War? This paper explores the questions by looking at three well known Maoist insurgencies in Nepal, Peru, and India that began during democracies with significant participation of the indigenous groups. Peru's insurgency terminated despite reaching a significant height, the Nepali insurgents joined the government, and India's insurgency did not grow as much as in Peru and India but has persisted since the 1960s. The paper analyzes the attitudes and policies of the state and insurgents toward the indigenous groups and the affect of indigenous participation, or the lack of it, on the varied trajectories of the insurgencies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on the impact of local civil society organizations on the trajectory of social conflicts under conditions of weak rule of law. Both civil society and rule of law have been presented as potentially key elements for improving governance and facilitating democratic consolidation. However, there is little empirical research on how the two interact in scenarios that are very different from those of the affluent liberal-democratic countries in which the concepts were developed. The case of Peru offers a valuable opportunity for evaluating this relationship, as accounts of 173 social conflicts collected by the Peruvian Ombudsman over the last three years shed light on both the shortcomings of the rule of law and the type of actors involved in articulating popular discontent. The paper finds that the presence of civil society organizations increases the likelihood that complainants will attempt to use legal mechanisms and peaceful demonstrations. However, it also argues that due to the weakness of the rule of law, legal mechanisms usually prove ineffective. For this reason, the presence of civil society organizations is insufficient to curb the recurrent use of violence to solve disputes. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Explanations for voter decision-making during the process of party-system collapse in Peru (during the1980s) and Venezuela (during the 1980s and 1990s) raise two major questions about party organizationaldynamics. Why did traditional parties fail to shift their ideological appeals in such a way as to end apattern of ideological under-representation that drove voters to embrace outsider parties? Why weremany of the traditional parties in Peru and Venezuela unable to prevent corruption perceptions fromeroding party identification?This paper uses evidence from a new survey of local political party leaders in Argentina, Peru,and Venezuela to argue that the answers to these two questions lie in patterns of party organization.Electorally suboptimal ideological positioning can be explained by the relatively high intra-party powerof often ideologically extremist local leaders in the collapsed parties. Differences in the vulnerability ofparties' identifiers to corruption concerns, in turn, are explained by whether the party channels patronageprimarily through the state apparatus or through the party organization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brazil (1964-1985) and Peru (1992-2000) maintained a uniqueness in Latin America in terms of the structuring of authoritarian regimes which allowed the presence of formal institutions of democracy (political parties, legislative, electoral system), however The process of finalizing the authoritarian differed in that the processes that defined the nature of the political transition, were characterized by the extensive and predictable political transition in Brazil, in contrast to the swift and precipitous political transition in Peru. .x000d..x000d.In that sense, this essay aims to contribute to the understanding of the role that developed the legislative institution in the process of political transition in Peru (1995 - 2001) and in the political transition in Brazil (1974 - 1990), from where a comparative analysis highlights the influence of political institutions, placing greater emphasis on the centrality with which the legislature, in a joint, tensions, progress, and restrictions under the rules of authoritarianism preserved, contributed to defining the nature of the transition and in the process of democratic consolidation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scholars of civil-military relations believe that the presence of domestic security threats increases the role of the military in politics. However, observational data show that domestic security threats do not always increase the political involvement of the armed forces. And when they do, the effects vary across time and space. What are the causes of this variation? Why do similar levels and types of internal security threats have divergent effects on the nature of civilian control over the militaries?In order to provide an answer to my research question, I conduct a comparative case study by focusing on counterinsurgency policy making in Turkey and Peru, which have fought against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Shining Path (SL) insurgents, respectively, from the 1980s onwards. I choose Turkey and Peru as my cases because these two countries witnessed varying degrees of civilian control over the armed forces throughout their long-lasting counterinsurgency campaigns. Thus, their experiences allow me to explore the causes of this variation under comparable degrees of threat perception. With this project, I intend to show that structural variables, such as the presence or degree of threat, are not sufficient to explain the military's role in politics. Instead, I discuss how military's organizational interests about political involvement are combined with the extent of civilian capacity and account for the changing nature of civilian control over the military in counterinsurgency policy making. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2006 Peruvian election was another illustration of the weakness of the country's party system. Nevertheless, the comeback of the traditional parties, which had begun in 2001, continued in 2006. In particular, widespread fear of the anti-system candidate, Ollanta Humala, enabled Alan Garcia to reclaim the presidency despite memories of his disastrous first administration. Garcia did a masterful job of staking out the center ground in the runoff, moving somewhat to the left on domestic issues while using polemical exchanges with Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez to appeal to conservative voters. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]