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The article explores the conditions that enable an insurgent organization to consolidate in a region and to fragment sovereignty, with reference to the experience of Peru from 1980 through 1996. In the analysis, four explanations are considered: relative deprivation, availability of financing, counterinsurgent capabilities, and political pluralism. The analysis suggests three conclusions. First, rebels are unlikely to consolidate in areas where counterinsurgent forces are strong. Second, insurgents are also unlikely to control regions where the level of political pluralism is high. Third, rebels are likely to consolidate in regions where counterinsurgent forces are weak and the level of political pluralism is low. These conclusions have two implications. First, neither relative deprivation nor access to financing is a useful tool for anticipating the consolidation of insurgents. Second, the much discussed "greed versus grievances" debate is not relevant for explaining why rebels control some parts of a country but not others.

What are the reasons for the participation of indigenous groups in the class based Maoist insurgencies? What are its consequences? Have ethnic participation fuelled the growth of the communist insurgencies after the end of Cold War? This paper explores the questions by looking at three well known Maoist insurgencies in Nepal, Peru, and India that began during democracies with significant participation of the indigenous groups. Peru's insurgency terminated despite reaching a significant height, the Nepali insurgents joined the government, and India's insurgency did not grow as much as in Peru and India but has persisted since the 1960s. The paper analyzes the attitudes and policies of the state and insurgents toward the indigenous groups and the affect of indigenous participation, or the lack of it, on the varied trajectories of the insurgencies. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most scholars of civil-military relations believe that the presence of domestic security threats increases the role of the military in politics. However, observational data show that domestic security threats do not always increase the political involvement of the armed forces. And when they do, the effects vary across time and space. What are the causes of this variation? Why do similar levels and types of internal security threats have divergent effects on the nature of civilian control over the militaries?In order to provide an answer to my research question, I conduct a comparative case study by focusing on counterinsurgency policy making in Turkey and Peru, which have fought against Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Shining Path (SL) insurgents, respectively, from the 1980s onwards. I choose Turkey and Peru as my cases because these two countries witnessed varying degrees of civilian control over the armed forces throughout their long-lasting counterinsurgency campaigns. Thus, their experiences allow me to explore the causes of this variation under comparable degrees of threat perception. With this project, I intend to show that structural variables, such as the presence or degree of threat, are not sufficient to explain the military's role in politics. Instead, I discuss how military's organizational interests about political involvement are combined with the extent of civilian capacity and account for the changing nature of civilian control over the military in counterinsurgency policy making. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]