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This paper posits that contrary to modernization theory, economic progress does not lead to democratization, rather it leads to a process of de-democratization. A Latin American case study is used demomstrating this thesis. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a theory of the political calculus behind macroeconomic policymaking in a financially globalized world. It seeks to explain a fascinating puzzle: why has much of Latin America's left maintained a commitment to macroeconomic orthodoxy? Employing elections as my unit of analysis, I challenge the conventional claim the chief executives engineer an economic boom to win elections. Rather, I argue that in a financially globalized world, politicians face greater policymaking constraints that stem from their exposure to international debt markets and an increasingly sophisticated electorate. They often prefer to use macroeconomic discipline to signal their competence to both investors and the electorate, particularly in light of past hyperinflation and debt crises. Ironically, politicians who presumably face fewer institutional checks and balances, constrain their own executive power to demonstrate macroeconomic policy accountability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper presents evidence that protest drives democracy, confirming the supply and demand theory of democratization while calling the dominant modernization approach into question. Modernization theory has remained the centerpiece of comparative research on democratization over the previous decade, amassing an impressive body of empirical research linking democracy to economic development. Drawing from an established cultural tradition in comparative politics, this paper challenges the dominant modernization approach and advances a theory that does not rely upon economic development to explain democratization. The supply and demand theory of democratization posits that the institutional supply of democracy flows naturally from the societal demand for democratization. Accordingly, countries cannot simply buy democracy with economic development, but rather, democracy must be actively pursued at the societal level. Using protest as an indicator of societal demand for democracy, cross-national evidence from Latin America confirms the new theory, providing robust evidence that societal demand drives democratization in the third wave. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin America is experiencing a significant period of economic growth. Annual economic growth has exceeded 3 percent for six consecutive years. In some countries, the growth exceeded 5 percent. Although incomes remain largely stagnant, unemployment is falling, and poverty levels, while still high, are declining. Data show that public opinion is aware of this growth, and that subjective assessments of the economy are gradually changing for the better. But the public remain quite unhappy with their political institutions. Support for democracy is not increasing, and trust in political institutions remains quite low. This paper seeks to explore this combination of growing economies and persistent negative attitudes towards the political system. Why does trust in political institutions remain low in a context of economy growth? Is it that the benefits of this growth have not yet percolated to the majority of the population? Or is it that trust in institutions is driven by new, emerging issues not directly related to the economy? Data for this paper come from three waves of surveys conducted by The AmericasBarometer, and directed by the Latin American Public Opinion Project of Vanderbilt University. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper examines some neo-institutionalist conceptions about economic and institutional development, comparing it with developmental paradigms of the past, and analyzes its implications for political reform programs in Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Budget politics are now at the center of political life in Latin America. With the end of hyperinflation and the implementation of reforms, the bottom line has acquired renewed importance. Furthermore, as economic growth has resumed in the region, government revenues have reached new highs. Budget politics in Latin America are generally thought to favor presidents, relegating legislatures as secondary players with reactive powers. The budgetary powers of Latin American presidents and legislatures, however, vary significantly. In Brazil, the legislature can make very limited changes to the president’s budget proposal. In Mexico, by contrast, the Lower House has final authority over the budget and presidential opposition to legislative revisions to the budget proposal has been rare and contested. This paper focuses on two political traits shared by Mexico and Brazil: multi-party legislatures with no single party majority, and federalism. Specifically, we argue that the electoral connection between deputies and governors helps define the president’s grip on the nation’s purse-strings, and explains divergent budgetary politics of the two countries. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Latin American democracies are often referred to as superpresidential systems. Executives dominate the political arena and legislatures are historically weak and unable to act as a consistent check on the executive. In this paper, I argue that unconstrained executives are detrimental to economic growth. I make a contribution to a developing literature in the area of political institutions and economic. Contrary to expectation, I find that less constrained executives are good for the economy; whereas, more constrained executives are not. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China is a case of the successful use FDI to spur economic growth. However, its relative success is balanced by the general failure of liberalization and FDI in much of Latin America. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay considers the obstacles facing the currently developing nations, specifically in Latin America. The growth and strength of multi-national corporations (MNCs) is considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This work examines the causes of corruption in eighteen Latin American countries from 1994 to 2005. With Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index as the dependent variable, this study utilizes a pooled cross-sectional times series design to link corruption levels with a number of explanatory variables. There is evidence that economic development, inequality, trade, structural reforms, democracy, federal structure, and ethno-linguistic fractionalization have significant effects on corruption. However, resource exports, age of democracy, and public sector size do not appear to affect corruption levels. This investigation draws on previous research on corruption but differs substantively through having an exclusively Latin American focus and drawing on data from the most recent time period. Methodologically, this study differs from previous works through its use of a time series design and multiple random imputation of some missing data points. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]