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We argue that the compensatory features found in Mixed Member Proportional electoral system and its analogues (such as those found in Hungary and Italy, until recently) provide incentives for strategic voting that has not received much scholarly attention: away from large parties in favor of small parties. This exists because the compensatory mechanisms cause list votes for larger parties come to be "wasted" if the party outperforms a minimum threshold in the nominal tier and the provisions for "overhang" seats in the MMP electoral system rewards a party that does well on the nominal tier for performing poorly on the list tier. The tendency, we suggest, is reinforced as the electoral environment becomes more fragmented. We uncover evidence from German Bundestag elections in the 1994-2005 period that suggests that this phenomenon is indeed known to the German voters and parties and that a nontrivial amount of strategic voting along the lines we propose does indeed take place. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]