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This paper suggests that economic theory should be modified to accommodate the realities of regulation of the electricity sector. Electricity has at least three characteristics that set it apart: it cannot be stored, demands on the system must be consistently balanced with supply, and it is - in the modern world - a necessary infrastructure for many other activities. However, economists managing regulation do not always adjust economic theory to the sectors realities. This paper addresses two problems not sufficiently addressed by the economists driving the liberalizing of the electricity sector in Europe. One is a "compliance assumpiton" in which agencies assumed changing law on the book will be enough to change reality. That is analyzed in the context of preventing incumbents and new entrants from undermining competition by sabotaging consumer transfer. The other is an "efficiency assumption" - assuming efficinecy gains are always positive - analyzed in relation to potential tensions between economic efficiency and security of supply protected through redundancy. The paper draws on the experience of the UK, France and Sweden to suggest possible ways of coping with these two problems, and concludes that they can and should be anticipated by economists and prepared for. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper will examine whether Actor-Network Theory (ANT) has the potential to be a useful tool for empirical socio-legal research. ANT was developed in Science and Technology Studies; however, its interest in understanding the relations between heterogeneous entities - paying attention to the role non-humans and technology play in society and focusing on the relations and interactions between actors - has wider applications, and it has been suggested that ANT may be used constructively in Socio-Legal Studies (Cloatre, 2008, Cowan and Carr, 2008). Here ANT will be deployed in a study of the evolution of divided regulatory responsibility for conventional tobacco products and for Nicotine Replacement Therapies (NRTs) in the UK, particularly how NRTs came to be regulated as pharmaceuticals. This paper focuses on the regulatory decisions taken in the UK in respect of the first NRT: a nicotine-containing gum developed in Sweden. This gum, as Nicorette, became available in the United Kingdom in 1980 as a prescription only medicine under the 1968 Medicines Act. It is proposed that utilising ANT to explore the development of nicotine gum and the regulatory decisions taken about it in the UK, will place these decisions into the wider context of ideas about tobacco control and addiction, and help to better understand how different substances such as tobacco, nicotine and nicotine gum were conceptualised, leading to very different systems of regulation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As many studies have shown, regulation is only as effective as its implementation in real life. One aspect of reorganization of the electricity and telecommunications sectors in the last two decades has been the attempt to create competition in these areas. However, opportunities for competition are meaningless without creation of competition "on the ground", consumers actually choosing between providers and being able to transfer, and there are powerful interests opposed to that. The former incumbent has an incentive to make the process of transferring away from it as cumbersome and inefficient as possible, keeping its customers hostage. On the other hand, competitors have an incentive to engage in aggressive, often questionable selling practices that may deprive consumers of choice, a practice of "taking hostages". Yet economic and political studies focus on the struggle to create opportunities for competition, competition "on the books", without looking at the implementation of such policy in practice, "in action". Drawing on research in three countries, the UK, France and Sweden, this paper asks how regulators handle these issues and achieve industry compliance. The paper concludes that the regulators expected competition to be achieved naturally from liberalization. Faced with industry intransigency, agencies initially did not consider enforcement actions, preferring persuasion and bargaining. Even when those strategies failed, regulators did not resort to coercive measures. Only public pressure and criticism resulted in enforcement action, showing the importance of giving voice to actors other than industry in these areas, moving from unidirectional to multidirectional accountability. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper discusses the way regulatory decisions are made in a highly technical area, and discusses the accountability in the process, focusing on the distinction between a consultation process and the actual ability to participate and influence it, drawing on Bronwen Morgan's work on social citizenship and regulatory justification. It addresses the regulators' ways of dealing with different participants and those participants' ability to meaningfully contribute to the dialogue. The empirical data is drawn from the setting of network prices: interconnection prices in telecommunications, distribution and transmission in electricity, in three countries, the United Kingdom, France and Sweden. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]