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The problematic issues related to the legislator’s priority task of regulating changes in the property status of a legal entity in the course of its reorganisation are outlined, which ensures the organisational and legal transformation of the organisation through effective redistribution of resources and enhancing the modernisation of the country’s economic stability as a whole. The current state of the legal doctrine of understanding reorganisation as a legal phenomenon has no common denominator. It is studied as a method of termination of a legal entity; a method of emergence and/or termination of a legal entity(ies); a special procedure for the transfer of rights and obligations; a type of universal succession; a legal remedy; the procedural aspect of reorganisation actions is studied, pointing to the process, composition or set of legal facts, or it is proposed to abandon attempts to define the category of “reorganisation” altogether. Based on the analysis of the legal doctrine and current legislation, the conclusion that reorganisation is a special mechanism of transformation of a legal entity, which is manifested in a complex legal structure aimed at achieving a positive economic effect or bringing it into compliance with current legislation, resulting in termination and/or establishment of a new legal entity(ies) with the transfer to it of the property (or part thereof) of the legal entity being reorganised by way of legal succession, has been made. The opinion that an unambiguous statement that reorganisation is a form of either creation or termination of a legal entity is erroneous has been presented. This conclusion is based on the fact that current legislation enshrines different denominators for certain types of reorganisation – termination/establishment, but the relevant legal phenomenon should be studied comprehensively (as a whole). In this case, one section of such a legal structure will indicate the creation and the other one will indicate the termination of a legal entity, which is manifested within the reorganisation procedure of one organisation.

Based on the analysis of Ukrainian legislation and legal doctrine, the article examines the legal regime of a share in the authorised capital of a limited liability company. The necessity of considering a share in the authorized capital in two senses is substantiated: economic and legal. According to the first meaning, such a share expresses a part of the value of the company’s property and gives a person the opportunity to dispose of the company's capital (assets). However, from a legal point of view, there is an insurmountable obstacle to this understanding – the status of a limited liability company as an independent participant in civil relations, which owns such property, and property separation is one of the features that characterises it. The opinion that a share in the authorised capital of a limited liability company does not coincide with the concepts of “corporate rights” or “property rights” is supported, it is an independent tradable object, but with a specific legal regime, in particular, it cannot be the object of other limited property rights, but it is such a share (and not corporate rights) that can be the object of property rights. It has been proved that: 1) the legal nature of a share should be characterised through the legal nature of the powers of a limited liability company participant; 2) such powers constitute a single and indivisible set of corporate rights which are recognised as a separate category of rights, along with obligatory and property rights; 3) the legal nature of corporate rights is of a comprehensive nature, which primarily consists of a combination of the principles of absoluteness and relativity; 4) the definition of a share only through the shareholder's rights is not justified, since the shareholder's rights are inextricably linked to his/her obligations; 5) a share as an object of civil rights is “other property”, not “property rights”.

Foreign and domestic legislation and legal doctrine regarding the right to be forgotten, establishing its features, in particular in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war, are analyzed. It is noted that recently in the international legal field there is a mention of the existence of a new category for legal scholars - the right to be forgotten. The definition of the right to be forgotten is disclosed and it is established that, in a broad sense, the right means that a certain person after a certain period of time can turn to the media to remove previously disseminated information about him, which is not currently of a certain public interest, but at the request of the person should not to exist in public space. In a narrow sense, the right to be forgotten preserves the personal identity of the relevant person in its subjective aspect, which is related to honor, objectivity and reputation, that is, it prevents the person from being reminded of certain information related to him and causing him certain negative consequences in society. The importance of ensuring a balance between freedom of speech, expression of views, freedom of the press and the right to be forgotten is established. The need to maintain a balance of private and public interests in the context of the right to be forgotten is considered. It is noted that the Court of the European Union recognized the possibility of a person acquiring the right to be forgotten only when there is no interest in information about a specific person in the public space, and also when such a person does not play a special, significant and important social role. It is emphasized that the right to be forgotten is different from the protection of the right to privacy and its realization does not entail the manifestation of measures of civil liability. The impossibility of applying the right to be forgotten in the context of the Russian-Ukrainian war is analyzed. Emphasis is placed on the fact that persons who are somehow involved in armed aggression cannot expect that their name will be “whitened” in the future. It is noted that international companies have set a new standard of business behavior regarding geopolitical events in the future with their decisions. It has been established that companies must cease cooperation with the russia or persons related to it. It was emphasized that transnational corporations, by exiting the russian market, exert a significant influence on the lack of financing of the military machine, preserving their good name. It was concluded that there is another side of the medal of the right to be forgotten, when certain information, despite its resonance, must be forgotten so that the victim can live on and count on an objective attitude towards himself. It is proposed to develop relevant provisions on the regulation of the unimpeded exercise of the right to be forgotten by persons who suffered from the war, despite the fact that their cases were high-profile and of great public interest, because a person has the right not to be associated with such situations.

The current law enforcement practice shows that a single criterion (“membership in a legal entity”) is not sufficient to qualify the existence of corporate relations in a legal entity. The reason for this is that the fact of membership does not always give rise to legal, but mainly civil law consequences that directly arise from the membership relationship to involve a person in it. Therefore, the concept of membership does not have the necessary civil law content, is not the only feature of a corporation (in the sense of a company) in civil law, and cannot be considered the only qualifying feature of corporate relations. It has been proved that the categories of “participation”, “membership” and “cooperation” are not synonymous with basic civil law concepts which indicate an independent feature of a separate group of relations specifically and independently regulated by civil law. These categories should be considered a characteristic of an entity's belonging to a certain community, which does not mean that it has all the features of a corporation as a legal entity. The article argues that the characteristic features which establish the specifics of a corporate organisation within the structure of a legal entity are: 1) division of the authorised capital into shares (stocks), which are recognised as a form of fixation of corporate rights and obligations; 2) existence of relations of participation in the management of such an organisation. The essence of participation in the management of a corporation and membership in it is actually the same thing. The main criterion for a corporation is whether there is participation (membership), and, as a result, whether those who created it (participants, shareholders, members) participate in the management of the legal entity. The authorised capital is important only as an indicator for determining the management procedure i.e. how many votes a participant (shareholder, member) has.

The current state of legal doctrine and court practice on the issues of authority abuse as a ground for liability of bodies and persons performing the functions of business entities has been analysed. Since a business entity forms its own will and implements it through its bodies and persons performing the functions of its agencies, the relevant persons must adhere to the powers defined by law and the charter. If they act beyond their own powers, the will of such a legal entity is distorted and their own will, the will of individuals, takes place. The practice of bringing to justice members of bodies and persons performing the functions of business entities has now been established where such a legal entity is held administratively liable for an administrative offence committed by its authorised person. An example of this is cases involving liability for violations of the requirements of the legislation on the provision and disclosure of information in financial services markets. In general, it should be taken into account that the performance of a specific individual on behalf of a business entity in civil turnover does not change the independent nature of the will, behaviour and responsibility of such a legal entity for its actions in civil relations. It has been argued that, based on the general tenets of civil law, abuse of authority as a ground for liability of bodies and persons performing the functions of business entities has its own specifics of application. This is due not only to the actions (inaction) of such persons, but also to the counterparty’s (third party’s) awareness of the fact that the representatives of such a company act within the scope of their powers. It has been proved that the fact that a body and/or a person performing the functions of a business entity’s body committed unlawful, unfair actions or abused its authority is not the only and sufficient ground for invalidating transactions (agreements) concluded by this body on behalf of a legal entity with third parties. There is a need to prove that the counterparty knew (should have known) that the authority to represent the rights and interests of the business entity was limited by its body or a person performing the functions of such a body.

The article is devoted to the study and comparison of the teachings of Roman lawyers regarding the emergence and understanding of the essence of a legal entity as a certain organization of people, as well as providing arguments “for” and “against” its existence as an independent participant in private relations. Attention is drawn to the fact that the current state of the development of civilist thought regarding the development of the category “legal entity” by Roman lawyers indicates the existence of three approaches: 1) Roman lawyers developed and used a legal structure that was different from the citizens of Rome and could participate in the civil turnover of that time; 2) the category of legal entity was not known to Roman lawyers, but the main features characterised to its modern understanding (legal capacity, property separation, the possibility to participate in legal proceedings, etc.) were developed precisely in Ancient Rome; 3) for the jurisprudence of the Roman period, the category “legal entity” or its individual characteristics were not known in the sense that are now attached to the content of the relevant characteristics, but the use of individual constructions, such as “universitas”, “corpus”, “collegia”, “sodalitia”, etc., was intended to show that in private relations, property can exist without being tied to a Roman citizen as a subject of rights. The analysis of the civil law doctrine of Roman law regarding the doctrine of a legal entity in the context of comparison with the modern understanding of the essence of such a participant in civil relations led to the conclusion that although Roman lawyers did not develop the concept of a legal entity, they proposed its main practical manifestation: the concept of legal capacity, which does not depend on an individual, the concept of legal capacity and the main types of legal entities that were further developed in European jurisprudence (corporations and institutions). The merit of Roman law is the substantiation of the legal way by which a variety of social entities could be introduced into civil turnover. It is emphasized that although the concept of “legal entity” was not defined by the Roman ancient lawyers, and its essence was not directly studied by them, the idea of expanding the circle of subjects of private law at the expense of special organizations, unions of citizens belongs to the Roman private law. It can be assumed that the very concept of “legal entity” at this stage of historical development was not formed from the point of view of substantive law, but was formed only as a social category, but not as a legal one.

On the basis of the conducted analysis, it has been concluded that the responsibility of the officials of entrepreneurial companies in modern law is studied in the context of corporate governance as one of the elements of the management and control system of companies and one of the means of ensuring their responsible management. At the same time, the issue of clear delimitation of powers between the bodies of an entrepreneurial company is closely related to the issue of liability of their officials to the company itself, since their liability always arises as a result of violation of the duties assigned to a particular body (to one or another official). It is the specific definition of the rights and obligations of persons performing the functions of the bodies of a business company, and their activities on behalf of the company in good faith and reasonably and without exceeding their powers that forms the basis for the stability of property and non-property corporate relations within the corporate governance of a business company. The essence of risky actions as grounds for bringing to responsibility of officials of an entrepreneurial company has been clarified. It has been concluded that, given the essence of the risky activities of an entrepreneurial company aimed at making a profit and its further distribution among the participants, the actions (inaction) of the participants of relations within the relevant legal entity contain risks of both economic and legal content. Such risks should be classified into justified and unjustified, which are associated with the further possibility of bringing to justice the persons guilty of causing damage to the participant of corporate legal relations. It has been emphasized that it is the justified nature of entrepreneurial risk in the actions of persons performing the functions of the bodies of an entrepreneurial company, and their reasonable, conscientious, with due care and prudence activity, as well as taking all measures for the proper performance of duties and prevention of adverse legal consequences for the company, allows o talk about their release from liability for damages. It has been noted that the legal mechanism of civil liability of officials to the business company for actions that are risky and may cause damage to the company needs to be improved in domestic law.

Doctrinal approaches to understanding the place and role of the sign of property separation of an entrepreneurial company in the context of the main provisions of the theory of fiction and the theory of reality of a legal entity as a participant in civil circulation are analyzed. It was concluded that the existence of a significant number of scientific approaches that reveal the essence of individual features of an entrepreneurial company as a legal entity only contribute to the further development of doctries about the legal nature of this legal phenomenon and outline not only the general model of a legal entity, but also its varieties with additional features highlighted. Such a variety is a business partnership, which, as a type of phenomenon in relation to a generic (legal entity), has its own characteristics that do not replace (fully correspond to) the general characteristics of a legal entity. One of these features is property separation, which is recognized as mandatory both by the supporters of the theory of fiction and the supporters of the theory of the real existence of a legal entity as a participant in civil circulation. It is noted that the feature of property separation is the main one for a legal entity, as it allows to ensure the guarantees of its creditors, to limit the possibility of abuse by the participants (founders) of such an organization, who could use the construction of a legal entity for the purpose of evading responsibility. However, this sign is not the only one. The approach based on which the theory of fiction most accurately reveals the property separation feature and its place in the system of features of a legal entity is substantiated, defining it as one of the two key essentially forming features of a legal entity.

An analysis of the Ukrainian legislation, as well as doctrinal approaches to understanding the guilt of a legal entity as a participant in civil relations, was carried out. It was concluded that the issue of the possibility of guilt in a legal entity within the limits of civil liability is determined by several factors of both an objective and subjective nature, namely: a) various mechanisms of forming the will of participants in civil legal relations; b) lack of understanding of the manifestation of the legal entity's own guilt as an independent participant in civil relations, or the guilt of members of its bodies, participants or employees; c) the absence of a direct indication in the current Civil Code of Ukraine on the existence of guilt in a legal entity, since the code (Article 96) contains a norm only about its responsibility. Some questions remain unresolved: 1) does the category “guilt of a legal entity” exist at all; 2) if there is a legal entity's guilt, so which of the recognized doctrines should be applied - the doctrine of mental conditioning of the offender's behavior or the doctrine of objectively possible care and prudence in the behavior of a participant in a civil legal relationship. Guilt as a basis for civil liability is taken into account in civil legal relations only between natural persons. There is no separate type of guilt of a legal entity, and any failure by it to fulfill its obligations is caused by the actions of its bodies, participants, and team. This subjective factor is not and cannot be taken into account when imposing civil liability on a legal entity.

Specific issues of the correlation of mandatory nature and discretionary nature of shareholders legal relations’ regulation have been researched. Based on the analysis of the legislation of Ukraine and other countries, the author has paid attention to the fact that priority should be given to their imperative provision in the framework of shareholders legal relations. The conclusion of a shareholders’ agreement is an example of applying the principle of discretionary nature, when the shareholders of one company independently choose the particular model of behavior for the implementation of their corporate rights. Such rights, in their opinion, are the most effective for corporate interests’ settlement. However, while implementing this principle, it is necessary to observe the limits set by mandatory corporate norms. Shareholders’ agreement under national law is secondary in regard to the charter of a joint-stock company within the limits of mandatory-discretionary regulation of shareholders relations. Such an agreement as a form of manifestation of the discretionary regulation of shareholders relations cannot regulate those social relations that are mandatory regulated by the current legislation. It must comply with the requirements of the legislation, as well as with the by-laws adopted for their itemization.