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In this article, we present two accounts of intersubjectivity in Jaspers and Husserl, respectively. We argue that both can be brought together for a more satisfying account of empathy and communication in the context of psychiatric praxis. But while we restrict ourselves for the most part to this praxis, we also indicate the larger agenda that drives Jaspers and Husserl, despite all disagreement. Here we spell out, in particular, how a phenomenologically inspired account of empathy and intersubjectivity can have larger ramifications for a theory of social life and interaction. Finally, we argue for a 'relaxed' view concerning the relation between pure and applied phenomenology, such that both can mutually benefit from one another. © 2013 S. Karger AG, Basel [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper Karl Jaspers' writings on psychotherapy and the psychiatric practice will be profoundly investigated and a meticulous reconstruction of the development of his understandings in the course of his oeuvre will be presented. This reconstruction allows for arguing that Jaspers displays a methodologically critical attitude towards medicine as a 'science of actions' and that he did refrain from developing an existential psychotherapy for methodological and existential reasons. Nonetheless and aside from Jaspers' abstention, some of his concepts from existential philosophy, like 'Grenzsituation' (border-situation, limit-situation) or 'Gehäuse' (shell, housings), can be extraordinarily fruitful in psychotherapy and in the psychiatric practice because it requires a change of attitude in order to bring these concepts into play. This different attitude could be called the attitude of the fellow sufferer, or, more neutral, the attitude of the fellow human being. © 2013 S. Karger AG, Basel [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We offer here a framework for the understanding of being in recovery from schizophrenia as an interpersonal process. We draw upon in-depth phenomenological descriptions of the fundamental changes taking place in an individual's mental life when they are suffering from schizophrenia. There is a loss of commonsensical habituality and interpersonal capabilities, usually most prominently expressed as an impaired intersubjective resonance. People with schizophrenia cannot as easily automatically and coherently display their own emotion via their facial expressions or perceive those of others, as do 'normal' people. This implies that interpersonal resonance between interacting individuals is not automatic, as is often taken for granted. The need to actively rebuild interpersonal resonance also holds true for the interacting 'normal' person, but would be an unfamiliar and unexpected task. These difficulties in empathizing provoke a mismatch in interpersonal resonance, often leading to the intuition that the person having schizophrenia lacks (explicit) self-awareness. We conclude that there is a mismatch in the form and scope of the social cover extended to the social role opportunities available in trans-Atlantic cultural settings for people with schizophrenia. Typically, these social roles imply that people with schizophrenia are unaware of themselves; however, while they often lack insight or may not consider their symptoms as signs of a mental disorder, they are usually not 'confused' or 'distracted' in the sense of no longer being aware of themselves. We discuss various options for adequate social cover achievable for people with schizophrenia, demonstrating their impact on the recovery process. Copyright © 2012 S. Karger AG, Basel [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]