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Introduction: Abnormal self-experiences are a common feature of major depression despite their absence from current diagnostic manuals. Current diagnostic criteria leave us with an impoverished conception of depressive disorders, and they fail to exploit the diverse experiential alterations that might be useful for understanding and diagnosing patients, and last but not least for explaining the aetiology of these disorders. Although some phenomenological descriptions of abnormal self-experiences in major depression are available, further research is needed to validate these through detailed clinical interviews. Methods: To characterize these phenomena in more detail and to verify and consolidate previous accounts, we conducted a qualitative study using the Consensual Qualitative Research method. Results: Our findings identified three categories of abnormal self-experiences: (1) impossibility to project oneself forward, (2) not recognizing one’s self, and (3) losing control on one’s self. Conclusion: Before delving into these results, we briefly described how the self is conceptualized in phenomenological psychopathology and explored in the literature on the self-experience in major depression. After discussing our results in the light of recent and contemporary phenomenological literature, we suggest that the inability to recognize otherness as part of oneself – which is the core of depressive experiences – ends in specific symptoms of depersonalization that differ from schizophrenic ones. We conclude that the self-experience, and in particular narrative identity, is central to the development and maintenance of depression. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The aim of the study was to provide a qualitative analysis of anomalous bodily experiences (ABEs) of persons affected by feeding and eating disorders (FEDs). In particular, this study aimed to refine the description of bodily experiences in persons with FEDs so as to improve their treatment. Sampling and Methods: This is a naturalistic explorative study on a group of 29 patients affected by FED in psychotherapeutic treatment and 12 healthy controls. We asked the participants to write a letter on the way they experience their body. Later, we analysed their letters by means of consensual qualitative research. Results: All patients (29) reported at least 1 ABE. The main categories identified are (1) body-obstacle (the body interposes between the person and the world); (2) body-tyrant (the body imposes itself on the will of the person); (3) body-hyper-visible (the body is experienced as an exposed object); (4) body-geometric (the body is experienced or associated with a geometric form); and (5) body-numerical (the body is defined by numbers). All these categories are present in the clinical group, and they are absent in the control group. Conclusion: To grasp the experiential nuances of ABEs is relevant to understand the disorder of embodied self-hood and personal identity in these patients and thus to refine clinical treatment. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Depressive disorders, despite being classified as mood or affective disorders, are known to include disturbances in the experience of body, space, time, and intersubjectivity. However, current diagnostic manuals largely ignore these aspects of depressive experience. In this article, we use phenomenological accounts of embodiment as a theoretical foundation for a qualitative study of abnormal body phenomena (ABP) in depressive disorders. Methods: 550 patients affected by schizophrenic and affective disorders were interviewed in a clinical setting. Interviews sought to uncover the qualitative features of experiences through self-descriptions. Clinical files were subsequently digitized and re-examined using consensual qualitative research. Results: Ninety-nine out of 100 patients with MDD reported at least one ABP. From cross-analysis of the MDD sample, we obtained 4 general categories of ABP, 3 of which had additional subcategories. The 4 categories include slowed embodied temporality (N = 90), anomalous vital rhythms (N = 82), worries about one's body (N = 22), and body deformation (N = 47). Conclusions: The results provide empirical evidence in support of theoretical discussions of embodiment in MDD found in the work of classical and contemporary phenomenologists. The findings also provide nuanced insight into the experience of persons living with MDD. Some categories of ABP, like slowed embodied temporality, can help to finely characterize psychomotor retardation or the so-called "medically unexplained symptoms" (MUS). This fine-tuned characterization can help to connect MUS to neuropsychological and neurobiological (e.g., alterations of interoceptive processes linked to anomalies of the brain resting-state hypothesis) and inflammatory (e.g., studies linking environmental stressors, inflammation mediators, and neurovegetative and affective symptoms) models of MDD. Our results can also support a pathogenic model of MDD, which posits, on the phenomenal level, ABP as the point of departure for the development of secondary symptoms including cognitive elaborations of these, namely, delusions about the body. Moreover, some of the categories, when contrasted with phenomenological qualitative studies of other disorders, provide conceptual resources of differential diagnosis and of identifying a "depressive core syndrome." For example, findings within category 4, deformation of the body, provide resources for using ABP to distinguish between MDD and schizophrenia. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Schizophrenia patients frequently display an array of abnormal bodily phenomena (ABPs). There is literature to suggest that the presence of ABPs may be representative of a fundamental disruption of the embodied and prereflexive state of selfhood and hence be relevant for the development of schizophrenia spectrum disorders. ABPs have been considered as trait features of vulnerability to psychosis and may have value as potential markers for early detection, target symptoms for prevention and predictors of clinical outcomes. This longitudinal cohort study aimed to explore: (1) the prevalence of ABPs in first episode psychosis, (2) their longitudinal stability, (3) how ABPs compare with data from patients with enduring psychosis, and (4) how aspects of disorders of self-experience (DSEs) and ABPs and the corresponding instruments relate to each other. Sixteen patients were recruited from an early intervention in psychosis service. They were assessed with a series of structured and semi-structured interviews at point of entry, after 6 months and 12 months of follow-up. A variety of ABPs and DSEs were displayed in all study subjects, associated with high levels of core psychotic symptoms and reduced with treatment over time. Compared with findings of both acute and chronic schizophrenia patients, the prevalence of ABPs seems to be representative of severity and acuteness of the illness. Two factors were identified with stable trait characteristics and might be of predictive value for the course of the illness. Further studies with bigger samples are needed to further test the value of ABPs as early markers of detection and predictors of clinical course. The association between DSEs and ABPs warrants further investigation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In a recent book Cristopher Bollas, one of the greatest contemporary psychoanalysts, tells about how he began to bring together phenomenology and psychoanalysis in the clinical setting at the beginning of his career. Working with psychotic patients, he realized that it was first necessary to "absorb" their view of reality before being able to reflect on the mad scenarios of psychosis. In what world did they live? How did they perceive it? Only by "mirroring" this back to the patients was it possible to offer them the experience of being in front of someone trying to understand their world view. Today, phenomenology has been spreading over psychoanalysis more than one can think it did in the past. The aim of this paper is to review and discuss the most relevant theoretical-clinical areas characterizing contemporary psychoanalysis in which phenomenology can claim a legitimate (or still illegitimate for someone) position. The main areas that will be discussed are: (a) the larger relational system or field in which human experience is continually shaped, i.e., the intersubjective matrix in which we are embedded; (b) the capacity to think about the "what" of the patients' experience, rather than the "why" (especially with the most severely disturbed ones); and (c) the crisis of the primacy of interpretation in the analytical technique. Obviously, this review does not have the ambition to be exhaustive. Rather, it just wants to (re)open the discussion on a still controversial but very current topic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Phenomenological psychopathology, through theoretical and idiographic studies, conceptualizes major depressive disorder (MDD) as a disorder of time experience. Investigations on abnormal time experience (ATE) in MDD adopting methodologies requested by the standards of empirical sciences are still lacking. Our study aimed to provide a qualitative analysis, on an empirical ground and on a large scale, of narratives of temporal experiences of persons affected by MDD. Methods: We interviewed 550 consecutive patients affected by affective and schizophrenic disorders. Clinical files were analysed by means of consensual qualitative research. Results: Out of 100 MDD patients, 96 reported at least 1 ATE. The principal categories of ATE are vital retardation- the experience of a stagnation of endogenous vital processes (37 patients), the experience of present and future dominated by the past (29 patients) and the experience of the slackening of the flow of time (25 patients). A comparison with ATE in schizophrenia patients showed that in MDD, unlike in schizophrenia, there is no disarticulation of time experience (disorder of temporal synthesis ) but rather a disorder of conation or inhibition of becoming. Limitations: The interview style was not meant to make a quantitative assessment ("false negatives" cannot be excluded). Conclusions: Our findings confirm the relevance of distinctive features of ATE in MDD, support the hypothesis of an intrinsic disordered temporal structure in depressive symptoms and may have direct implications in clinical practice, especially in relation to differential diagnosis, setting the boundaries between "true" and milder forms of depression and neurobiological research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we discuss the philosophical and psychopathological background of Domain 3, Other persons, of the Examination of Anomalous World Experiences (EAWE). The EAWE interview aims to describe the manifold phenomena of the schizophrenic lifeworld in all of their concrete and distinctive features, thus complementing a more abstract, symptom-focused approach. Domain 3, Other persons, focuses specifically on subjectively experienced interpersonal disturbances that may be especially common in schizophrenia. The aim of this domain, as with the rest of the EAWE, is to provide clinicians and researchers with a systematic orientation toward, or knowledge of, patients' experiences, so that the experiential universe of schizophrenia can be clarified in terms of the particular feel, meaning, and value it has for the patient. To help provide a context for EAWE Domain 3, Other persons, we propose a definition of "intersubjectivity" (IS) and "dissociality." The former is the ability to understand other persons, that is, the basis of our capacity to experience people and social situations as meaningful. IS relies both on perceptive-intuitive as well as cognitive-computational resources. Dissociality addresses the core psychopathological nucleus characterizing the quality of abnormal IS in persons with schizophrenia and covers several dimensions, including disturbances of both perceptive-intuitive and cognitive-computational capacities. The most typical perceptive-intuitive abnormality is hypoattunement, that is, the lack of interpersonal resonance and difficulties in grasping or immediately understanding others' mental states. The most characteristic cognitive-computational anomaly is social hyperreflexivity, especially an algorithmic conception of sociality (an observational/ ethological attitude aimed to develop an explicit, often rule- based personal method for participating in social transactions). Other anomalous interpersonal experiences, such as emotional and behavioral responses to others, are also discussed in relation to this core of dissociality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]