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T HE JAPANESE STUDENT is at once the hope and the concern of post-war Japan. It is from his class that the nation must eventually draw its leadership in the political, economic and moral reconstruction of the country. But it is also his generation that has been subjected to an ideological indoctrination beside which Hitler's education for death is at best a crude imitation. The contrast between the two systems reveals the hemispheric gulf which separates Prussian from Japanese mentality. The Nazi soldier has been taught primarily the material aspects of power. The modern samurai of Japan, while not ignoring material strength in the form of twentieth-century weapons, has made spiritual training the most vital part of his indoctrination. Neither system has produced the superman. In the case of the Japanese warrior, however, most of his education has emphasized ritual and dogma at the expense of independent reasoning, with the result that he finds it virtually impossible to escape by any rational process from the convictions to which his training has bound him. On the battlefield this makes the Japanese soldier the more formidable foe. When forced into a hopeless situation, as at Attu, New Guinea or Tarawa, the Japanese have fought virtually to the last man. The German has also proved himself a brave, tough fighter, but in Russia, Tunisia and Italy, when driven into a corner, German forces have surrendered in droves. The Japanese system, however, has produced one serious weakness. Lacking reason and initiative, adverse circumstances have often thrown the Japanese soldier into abject confusion where he takes his own life rather than sell it at the highest possible price. But far more often he fights to the bitter end and exacts the maximum toll. It takes more than ordinary military training to produce the Japanese soldier we know today. His fanatical courage and fortitude are the

The origin of Japan's interests in Manchuria may be regarded as the base-point from which during the past half century a variety of economic, political and territorial ambitions has radiated, enveloping today virtually all of Eastern Asia and leading directly to war with the United States and Great Britain. In the historical development of this vast program of overseas expansion, paramount attention is usually centered on the vigorous activity which characterized Japanese relations with the ancient kingdom of Korea during the second half of the nineteenth century. This movement played a vital part in shaping Japanese imperialism, but it is significant to recall that Japan's first bid for an actual territorial position on the continent was not concerned with Korea. The fiction of Korean independence was supported by Japanese statesmen until 1910, when Korea was finally annexed to Japan. On the other hand, Japanese territorial ambitions on the mainland were positively revealed fifteen years earlier by the Treaty of Shimonoseki of 1895 by which Japan appropriated the Liaotung Peninsula of Manchuria as one of the spoils of the Sino-Japanese War. Economic and political factors determined this demand for territory, and were in turn the progenitor of the vast program of continental expansion which has since been the basis of Japanese policy.

O F ALL the Axis powers, Japan will unquestionably present the most difficult problem when the time comes for the postwar reorganization of our defeated enemies. The hard fact which we must recognize as we fight to defeat Japan and which we must hold foremost in mind after victory is won is that we have no really liberal allies within the fabric of Japanese life toward whom we can appeal now through propaganda or with whom we can work later for the establishment of a democratic, liberal Japan. No policy toward Japan, now or later, can safely assume that the Japanese militarists have seized power and eradicated Japanese liberalism and that the primary remedy for this situation is simply a matter of defeating the militarists and restoring the "liberals." The militarists of Japan are merely one by-product of a military tradition that has profoundly affected all classes in Japanese society. Throughout the history of modern Japan the political groups we have been pleased to call the Japanese liberals have offered little or no opposition to the basic national policy of conquest and expansion which on December 7, 1941, finally brought Japan into war with the United States. On this fundamental issue, the liberals have been in truth the full-time allies of the Japanese militarists. The liberal myth in Japan arose from the paradoxical fact that until very recently the Japanese liberals displayed what we would call a liberal attitude, but only on certain questions of a strictly domestic nature, such as universal manhood suffrage, over which there was a distinct conflict with the militarists and their bureau cratic cohorts. The major triumph of the Japanese militarists was not the ficticious seizure of power or the alleged suppression of liberalism Rather, it was their success in associating the universal admiration of the people for the modern samurai who have extended overseas

are the same as in the earlier paper. A differential parameter of the form 4 is a function which is unaltered by any transformation of the group, and which may involve the following quantities: a) The coefficients a,, and their derivatives of various orders with respect to the variables x; b) certain arbitrary functions U(xl, , xn), numerically unchanged by the group (2), and the various derivatives of these functions with respect to the variables x; c) if the variables x are not all independent, the derivatives of those which are dependent with respect to those which are independent. If the differential parameter does not contain the functions U, or their derivatives, or the derivatives of the x's, it will be called a differential invacriant (Gaussian invariant). If the differential paranmeter does not contain the derivatives of the x's it will be called a differential parameter qf the first type (Beltramian invariant).