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This essay examines an epistemological thread that runs through Michael W. Clune's A Defense of Judgment. The first half raises worries about Humean judgment, ultimately doubting whether it can vindicate all it has been asked to. The second half argues that expertise can be grounded in fully tacit knowledge, though that fact inevitably—and rightly—introduces outsider skepticism. The explicitness of that tacit knowledge is not a requirement of expertise as such, but rather a contingent feature of the requirements of academic life. But this, among other things, may be what makes literary education a worthy pursuit. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article analyzes how the philosopher Alain Badiou describes a process invented by Lacan, la passe , the pass—a procedure for deciding whether or not to admit to his student analysands about to complete their analysis. By deconstructing Badiou's text, the author shows how the philosopher ascribes a sacramental presupposition to the pass, understood as a Catholic sacrament or mystical mystery. The author criticises a kind of dogmatic worship of psychoanalysis into which many philosophers fall, and shows how this uncritical belief in the sacramental effectiveness of psychoanalysis—and the cult of Freud's work as a Revelation—fails to help psychoanalysis to improve in any way, but rather shuts it down in a narcissistic self-satisfaction. Instead, psychoanalysis lives of its own deconstruction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The relationship between philosophy and bioethics remains a matter of perennial debate, but there does appear to be a consensus on one issue: whatever bioethics might want to borrow from philosophical ethics, it won't be normative theories. This essay argues that theories can have an important role to play in bioethics, though it might not be the one traditionally assumed by philosophers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Most medical learned societies have endorsed both "equivalence" between all forms of withholding or withdrawing treatment and the "discontinuity" between euthanasia and practices to withhold or withdraw treatment. While the latter are morally acceptable insofar as they consist in letting the patient die, the former constitutes an illegitimate act of actively interfering with a patient's life. The moral distinction between killing and letting die has been hotly debated both conceptually and empirically, most notably by experimental philosophers, with inconclusive results. This article employs a "revisionary" intuititionist perspective to discuss the results of a clinical ethics study about intensivists' perceptions of withhold or withdraw decisions. The results show that practitioners' moral experience is at odds with both the discontinuity and equivalence theses. This outcome allows us to revisit certain concepts, such as intention and causal relationship, that are prominent in the conceptual debate. Intensivists also regard end-of-life decisions as being on a scale from least to most active, and whether they regard active forms of end-of-life decisions as ethically acceptable depends on the overarching professional values they endorse: the patient's best chances of survival, or the patient's quality of life. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

"The Philosophers and the Bible: The Debate on Sacred Scripture in Early Modern Thought" is a book edited by Antonella Del Prete, Anna Lisa Schino, and Pina Totaro. It originated from an international conference held in Rome and Viterbo in 2019 and offers a comprehensive exploration of the relationship between philosophers and the Bible during the early modern period. The book challenges the traditional division between philosophy and theology, highlighting the significant influence of Scripture on Western thought. It covers a range of philosophers, including Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke, Pascal, and Newton, and adopts an interdisciplinary approach to the subject. The book is structured into five parts, each focusing on different aspects of the debates surrounding the interpretation and significance of the Bible. [Extracted from the article]

This article delves into the philosophical understanding of madness, examining the perspectives of various philosophers including Locke, Kant, Wigan, and Heinroth. The author proposes a more nuanced view of mental health, highlighting the concepts of sanity, madness, and idiocy as interconnected rather than as a simple absence of reason. They argue that madness should be seen as a distortion or alteration of reason, rather than a complete lack thereof. The article emphasizes the importance of recognizing and empathizing with individuals experiencing mental health conditions, and suggests that a positive perspective on madness can be achieved by moving beyond explanations based on deficiency or weakness. Additionally, the text analyzes a fragment from Kant's Anthropology, focusing on the concept of madness and its different forms. The author explores the idea of "deranged reason" as a distinct type of madness, and discusses the need to consider diverse perspectives and embodiments of reason. They also highlight the limitations of psychologizing philosophy within the field of psychiatry, and propose a historical-philosophical approach as an alternative philosophy of psychiatry that can empower individuals with personal experiences of madness. [Extracted from the article]

Philosopher Peter Sloterdijk's popularity among the German New Right is attributable to the fact that his perspective is identifiably conservative while eschewing rote traditionalism and anti-intellectual sloganeering. Sloterdijk portrays his critics as disingenuous or hysterical, but by harnessing the trappings of counterculture to undermine the perceived hegemony of liberal values, Sloterdijk's self-identified "left-conservatism" serves as both a model for the New Right and a gateway to their ideas for a mainstream audience. This paper explores why the primary concern of Sloterdijk's critics is the disinhibiting effect of his interventions on hierarchical instincts constrained by modest progress toward egalitarianism and inclusivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article discusses Kafkaesque cinema as a response to historical conditions of post-fascism through the close-reading of three films: Chris Marker's La Jetée (1962), Béla Tarr's Werckmeister harmóniák (Werckmeister Harmonies , 2000), and Christian Petzold's Transit (2018). Important interlocutors are the Hungarian philosopher Gáspár Miklós Tamás and the Italian historian Enzo Traverso; both understand post-fascism as a historical condition that perpetuates fascism's hostility to the Enlightenment, but which, however, permeates even mainstream politics. Drawing on their work, the article shows how the films' Kafkaesque aesthetic and themes invite us to consider the link between post-fascism and the defeat of the radicalized Enlightenment thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we criticize what we dub the "pruning view" of self-constitution, championed widely by philosophers, mainly though not exclusively in the Kantian tradition, and instead defend an alternative view inspired by psychoanalysis. We argue that normative assessment comes much too early on the pruning view, so early that it interferes with achieving deeper self-understanding that can produce lasting change. On the proposal we advocate, self-constitution must begin with a non-moralizing attempt to truly understand why one has undesirable and unwanted propensities. We call this the "understanding first" principle. Only after deeper self-understanding has been achieved are attempts to liberate oneself from unwanted elements likely to succeed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In his Pragmatism lectures, William James argued that philosophers' temperaments partially determine the theories that they find satisfying, and that their influence explains persistent disagreement within the history of philosophy. Crucially, James was not only making a descriptive claim, but also a normative one: temperaments, he thought, could play a legitimate epistemic role in our philosophical inquiries. This paper aims to evaluate and defend this normative claim. There are three problems for James's view: (1) that allowing temperaments to play a role within inquiry replaces philosophical disagreement with psychological difference; (2) that including temperaments would allow arbitrary elements to influence the outcome of inquiry; and (3) that such a view assumes an implausible metaphysical picture. Through clarifying the nature of temperaments, and what counts as a satisfactory philosophical theory on a pragmatist account, this paper presents an interpretation of James's metaphilosophical claims that can provide satisfactory responses to these problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Diodorus Cronus reportedly denied that there are truths about present kinēsis (change or movement) but affirmed that there are truths about past kinēsis. Although scholars have argued that Diodorus's atomism about bodies, place, and time supports his rejection of present spatial movement of simple bodies, I argue that Diodorus rejected a broader range of present changes, including qualitative and existential change. I also argue that Diodorus rejected these three sorts of change not only for simples but also for complexes. Furthermore, philosophers since antiquity have claimed that denying truths about present change is incompatible with accepting truths about past change, since each past truth about change corresponds to some present truth about change. I argue that this objection can be overcome. I conclude that Diodorus's arguments against present change are both broader and more successful than is usually maintained. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When we were working with this patient, whom we named Damien, we were working in a psychiatric clinic where patients are hospitalized for several months or even years. Binswanger ran a sanatorium in Switzerland (the Bellevue Clinic) and took in patients suffering from this type of psychological pathology. The aim of the article was to present how the encounter in psychodrama can act, how it is constitutive of the self for a psychotic patient, and how it is essential to relaunch a blocked existence. [Extracted from the article]

Here, Sabrina Ebbersmeyer draws on various historical evidence, including Elisabeth's correspondence with Constantijn Huygens, to support this interpretation of Elisabeth as a philosopher and polymath. The first section, on Elisabeth's intellectual context, begins in chapter 2 with a reconstruction of Elisabeth's academic and political training at Prinsenhof in Leiden. This chapter inverts the focus of the other essays, using Elisabeth to better understand Descartes. [Extracted from the article]

This essay examines Toni Morrison as a political theorist whose novel Paradise (1997) reconstructs the English social contract tradition. I show how Morrison conceptualizes "unmotivated respect"—an attitude of deep admiration for others without reason or motive—as an alternative to contractual agreements. Building on this ground, I establish a framework for what I call the "Fugitive Covenant," which works to restore the rights of personhood to those whom normative social contract theory excludes. Ultimately, I demonstrate how the Fugitive Covenant complicates and extends the pathbreaking critiques of social contractarianism advanced by political theorist Carole Pateman and philosopher Charles Mills. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Emmanuel Levinas and Theodor Adorno are both post-Shoah philosophers who experienced refugeedom. In different contexts, both discuss the question of a linkage between language and soil, and ultimately show that the distinction between the native and the foreign is untenable. I suggest that Levinas's evocation of linguistic soil illustrates his understanding of Jewishness as defined by a ceding of ground, thus showing that Levinas's thought relies on a conception of ground in order to then reject it. Adorno, in evoking a "language without soil," argues for a conception of language that rejects organicism, seeing both loanwords and Jews as examples of difference without foreignness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Kant, however, drew a radical distinction between human and divine knowledge, which Hegel rejected. To be clear, Heidegger's critique of the metaphysical forgetting of being, predicated on the sharp distinction between I essentia i and I existentia i , is not a defense of any notion of "pure" or "absolute" I that- i being, abstracted from all "what" content, as if we might somehow intuit or cognize the simple fact I that i something exists. Half a century ago, the word "existentialism" referred to an intellectual trend that crossed genre boundaries as it crossed national borders, finding expression in not just philosophy and psychology but also literature, art and popular culture. 3 On one reading of Kant, things in themselves coincide with God's concepts, in which case Kant's idealism might be closer to Hegel's after all. [Extracted from the article]

This article argues for an interpretation of doctrine 7 of universal faith in Spinoza's Theological-Political Treatise —that God pardons the sins of those who repent—that renders it true in the terms set by Spinoza's Ethics. Though categorized in the Ethics as a vice, repentance nevertheless has a positive political function as the lesser of two evils, supplanting the greater evils of unrepentant pride and shamelessness. The philosopher can understand God's pardon as the natural advantage conferred by repentance itself insofar as it supplants those greater evils. This pardon arises through the laws of Nature (God's mercy and grace), which are equally responsible for that very repentance. The philosophical truth of the doctrines of universal faith ensures that freedom of philosophizing can be granted without harm to the peace or piety of the Republic and cannot be denied without destroying the same. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nevertheless, Buffier's formulation of self-consciousness - in experiential, empirical terms - as first principle is, as Rouquayrol argues, just as deeply indebted to scholastic arguments as it is to Descartes and Locke; furthermore, it is foundational, both to Buffier's "psychologie rationnelle" and to Buffier's notion of common sense (32-42). In these works, Buffier was prescient in selectively adopting perspectives from Descartes, Malebranche, and Locke, evincing thereby his avid interest and participation in early Enlightenment discussions. This, Rouquayrol contends, renders Buffier's empiricism somewhat distinct from the concern of Locke (28-29). [Extracted from the article]

Philosophers of literature have neglected the short story. I argue that this neglect is unwarranted. The short story raises interesting philosophical questions that deserve attention. If philosophers only ever focused on one form of narrative prose—the novel—they would end up with a distorted picture of literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pedro Erber and Facundo Vega speak with Marcia Sá Cavalcante Schuback about Heidegger's influence on philosophy in Brazil and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bruno Bosteels speaks about the influence of Heidegger's thought on his monograph Philosophies of Defeat: The Jargon of Finitude and his work overall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nicolette Bragg asks Grant Farred about the legacy of his text Martin Heidegger Saved My Life and what it means to think. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ian Moore speaks with Peg Birmingham about the intellectual and personal relationship between Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, and more. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Pedro Erber discusses with Naoki Sakai the history of Heidegger's influence on philosophy in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Cristina Crichton speaks with Ramón Rodríguez about ethics in Heidegger (Studies) and Heidegger's influence on his own work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Calvin Warren talks about Heidegger's influence on Afropessimism, and about the philosophical significance of the Harlem Renaissance. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Niki Young speaks with Graham Harman about his Object-Oriented Philosophy in relation to his understanding of Heidegger's tool-analysis, and more. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For this special issue, consisting entirely of interviews and conversations, we invited scholars whose paths have crossed Heidegger's legacies in various ways to reflect on the endurance and resonances, on the contemporaneity and possible futures of Heidegger's project in today's philosophical and political panorama. As editors, we conducted some of the interviews, individually or together. Other pieces were commissioned, some of them constituting the outcome of conversations between thinkers deeply familiar with each other's work, as student and mentor or as partners in longstanding dialogue. Some of the authors included in this issue nurture a strong sense of indebtedness to Heidegger's work, some take significant distance from his legacy, while others stand in explicit opposition to the Heideggerian project and its afterlives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Michael Marder and Giovanbattista Tusa discuss the "today" and "tonight" in Heidegger's thinking and beyond. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In one of his last interviews before his passing, Jean-Luc Nancy talks about his own engagement with and eventual departure from Heidegger's work. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Francesco Vitale discusses with Rodolphe Gasché the history of Heidegger reception in France and Germany, and more. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Tatjana Noemi Tömmel and Florian Grosser speak with Peter Trawny, the philosopher whose editions and interpretations of Martin Heidegger's work have strongly and lastingly shaped the view of Heidegger's thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Early modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Spinoza, appeal to a theory of modes in their metaphysics. Recent commentators have argued that such a theory of modes has Francesco Suárez as its primary source. In this paper, I explore one explicit source for Suárez's view: Durand of St.-Pourçain, an early fourteenth-century philosopher. My aim will be mainly expository: I will put forward Durand's theory of modes, thus correcting the persistent belief that there was no well-defined theory of modes prior to Suárez. First, I will sketch out the historical and theological context in which Durand developed his theory, briefly canvassing some of the items that he treats as modes as well. Second, I will go over the distinctive features that Durand thinks modes have. Finally, I will close with some reflection on why we should countenance modes in our ontology. Along the way, I will correct a few misconceptions about Durand's theory of modes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I advance our knowledge about women's contributions to nineteenth-century British philosophy by setting out the views of mind of Frances Power Cobbe, Constance Naden, and the theosophists Helena Blavatsky and Annie Besant. Cobbe espoused dualism, Naden materialism, and Blavatsky and Besant a form of panpsychism. Each woman's view was bound up with her position on religion and immortality, and each has problems as well as interesting features and understandable intellectual motivations. My aim is to help to restore these women to the historical record by reconstructing their views of the mind clearly and by exploring the relations between them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Philosophers have become accustomed to being queried as to the value of their discipline. Hume, too, grappled with these questions. In a collection of four essays, entitled "The Epicurean," "The Stoic," "The Platonist," and "The Sceptic," Hume discusses the nature of happiness. "The Sceptic" closes by downplaying the value of philosophy, in particular its ability to meaningfully contribute to human happiness. Which of these four characters, if any, speaks for Hume? In this paper, I clarify the issue by comparing the four essays with Hume's Enquiries , and I find that his position is best expressed by the Stoic, as he contradicts the other three interlocutors on aspects of their primary theses—he disagrees with the conceptions of the happy life espoused by the Platonist and Epicurean, and he disagrees with the Sceptic and the Epicurean regarding the changeability of human nature. For Hume, the happy life is the virtuous and industrious one, and philosophy helps us to achieve this ideal by molding our passions and temperament. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I "a real living form is the natural result of the [...] adventure of his spirit into the unknown" i - Georgia O'Keeffe[1] Freud begins "Creative Writers and Day-Dreaming" by wondering "from what sources that strange being, the creative writer, draws his material, and how he manages to make such an impression on us." Freud did not venture into an analysis of I how i creative writers transfer their daydreams into the written word or I how i artists begin the physical process of making a work of art but, for artists themselves, the use of a medium stands at the centre point of the creative process. From my artist interviews, and from my own experience, I have learned that as soon as artists start working with their medium, they are likely to be disappointed. At this final stage of showing a work in a particular space, the artist's focus is on the potential experience of the audience and how best to enable the viewer to feel something of the artist's own absorption in the work. [Extracted from the article]

I defend an account of Moore's conception of Common Sense—as it figures in "A Defence of Common Sense"—according to which it is based in a vision of the community of human beings as bound and unified by a settled common understanding of the meaning of our words and statements. This, for Moore, is our inalienable starting point in philosophy. When Moore invokes Common Sense against idealist (and skeptical) philosophers, he is reminding them that they too are bound by this common understanding, which cannot just be left behind as they confusedly believe. On Moore's conception, Common Sense becomes nothing other than the affirmation that there is such a common understanding—that there is Common Sense—which yields a specific body of Common Sense knowledge. This yields a more principled account of Common Sense than a mere tallying of what contingently happens to be believed (or known) by all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anderson takes little note of the fact that whether Hume accepts any such principle, and what he means by it if he does, is a matter of controversy among Hume scholars, or that even if he does accept it, he almost certainly means something different by it than does Kant. Abraham Anderson's I Kant, Hume, and the Interruption of Dogmatic Slumbers i is a book with an ambitious, although well-circumscribed, goal - to settle once and for all what precisely it is in Hume that awoke Kant from his dogmatic slumbers - and an audacious conclusion - that both Hume and Kant are concerned primarily, if not exclusively, with rational theology. Most strikingly, despite much of the book being dedicated to defending his interpretation of Hume, Anderson does very little to engage with Hume scholarship, especially that which opposes his interpretation, and his engagement with Kant scholarship is similarly selective. [Extracted from the article]

Edited by Gjesdal and Nassar, it contains new translations, nearly all by Anna Ezekiel, of texts by historical German-speaking women philosophers. Such courses typically cover Fichte, Hegel, Marx, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Husserl, and Heidegger. [Extracted from the article]

The article focuses on consciousness which address another unknowable phenomenon of nature that many philosophers and scientists continue to declare too wonderful for them. It mentions problem of privacy to scholarly attention and Samuel Johnson famously dismissed the idealist suggestion that the external world is nothing. It also mentions Ludwig Wittgenstein, acknowledging the logic of privacy conceded in the "Philosophical Investigations" and how William James sums up the uncomfortable truth about how completely consciousness sets us apart as individuals.

The article focuses on kama muta, a Sanskrit term for the social emotion that people might feel when they fall in love or when a cat curls up on their lap and science may study the neurobiology and psychological characteristics of kama muta, and people may experience. It mentions people may not go through life worrying much about the privacy of their conscious experience as explaining whether people share similar conscious experiences is, as the philosophers say on explanation of consciousness. It also mentions how social lenses determine what knowledge might be produced but also how they can promote ignorance.

The article offers information on the works of the English poet, literary critic and philosopher, Samuel Taylor Coleridge. It discusses the romanticism in the poetry on eighteen century, along with poetry collection of the Coleridge. It mentions the English poet, William Lisle Bowles suggestions on the desultoriness of the Coleridge.

The article offers information on the English poet, literary critic and philosopher, Samuel Taylor Coleridge's poetry collection "Sibylline Leaves." It discusses the preparation of the "Wallensteins Tod" manuscript, for Coleridge by Friedrich Schiller, along with mentions the Canadian academic and a leading authority on the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Kathleen Coburn's characterization of this fragment in the poems.

The article discusses socratic project is founded on the fallibility of those reputed to be wise, and the necessity of examining their wisdom. Topics discussed include philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy's convictions regarding the labor theory of value, German Romanticism into contemporary theory, and Nancy's minor mistranslation of Plato's Greek, which renders it more consistent with philosopher Martin Heidegger's contrariety but less consistent with Diotima's diagnosis.

Plato lends expression to an Axial Age understanding of transcendence: a philosopher, if virtuous, can be released from bodily and temporal existence. Virginia Woolf lends expression to a Romantic or Modernist understanding of transcendence: an artist, if gifted, can be released from the cramped condition of ordinary existence. In this essay, borrowing a concept from Charles Taylor, I argue that Plato and Woolf show us what an immanent transcendence involves: the reach of a soul transformed by an ideal or a vision it lives by. In Plato, in Woolf, what is at stake is poise, openness of mind, largeness of perspective. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Camus is defined by many as an absurdist philosopher of revolt. The Plague, however, shows him working rigorously through a well-known division between ancient (Aristotelian) and modern (Kantian) ethics concerning the relation of reason, feeling, and happiness. Kant and Aristotle would agree, however, in their judgment of many characters and actions in The Plague : the novel provides realistic insights into a philosophical agreement between these supposed oppositions. In particular, both philosophers would agree concerning the relative goodness and relative happiness of Joseph Grand and Raymond Rambert. The illustration of this agreement proves Camus is valorizing a traditional ethic. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]