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Recent research with college undergraduate mock jurors suggests that how psychopathic they perceive a criminal defendant to be is a powerful predictor of whether they will support a death verdict in simulated capital murder trials. Perceived affective and interpersonal traits of psychopathy are especially predictive of support for capital punishment, with perceived remorselessness explaining a disproportionate amount of variance in these attitudes. The present study attempted to extend these findings with a more representative sample of community members called for jury duty (N = 304). Jurors reviewed a case vignette based on an actual capital murder trial, provided sentencing verdicts, and rated the defendant on several characteristics historically associated with the construct of psychopathy. Consistent with prior findings, remorselessness predicted death verdicts, as did the affective and interpersonal features of psychopathy - though the latter effect was more pronounced among jurors who were Caucasian and/or who described their political beliefs as moderate rather than conservative or liberal. Results are discussed in terms of the potentially stigmatizing effects of psychopathy evidence in capital cases., (Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Despite mixed empirical evidence regarding the ability of the Psychopathy Checklist - Revised (PCL-R) to predict violence among incarcerated inmates, it continues to be used to address such questions, even in the context of capital cases. The purpose of this study was to examine if the PCL-R has a prejudicial effect on mock jury members during the sentencing phase of a capital murder trial. Results indicated that participants were more likely to sentence the defendant to death when the defendant exhibited a high likelihood to commit future violence, whether or not the diagnostic label "psychopath" was present. Interestingly, when asked to rate the defendant's likelihood for future violence and murder, the defendant who was a high risk for future violence and not labeled a psychopath received the highest rating. These results suggest an absence of juror bias as it pertains to the label "psychopath" when sentencing a defendant in a capital murder case., (Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

There has been little consideration, in either the caselaw or the scholarly literature, of the potential impact of neuroimaging on cases assessing whether a seriously mentally disabled death row defendant is competent to be executed. The Supreme Court's 2007 decision in Panetti v. Quarterman significantly expanded its jurisprudence by ruling that such a defendant had a constitutional right to make a showing that his mental illness "obstruct[ed] a rational understanding of the State's reason for his execution." This article considers the impact of neuroimaging testimony on post-Panetti competency determination hearings, and looks at multiple questions of admissibility of evidence, adequacy of counsel, availability of expert assistance, juror attitudes, trial tactics, and application of the Daubert doctrine, and also considers the implications of the lesser-known Panetti holding (that enhances the role of expert witnesses in all competency-to-be-executed inquiries). It warns that the power of the testimony in question has the capacity to inappropriately affect fact-finders in ways that may lead "to outcomes that are both factually and legally inaccurate and constitutionally flawed.", (Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

In Panetti v. Quarterman, three professional associations advocated commutation of capital sentences for offenders who are incompetent to face execution. Some judicial opinions deny that convicted offenders have any protected interest in avoiding a legally imposed sentence, and other opinions have found that the Eighth Amendment requires treatment for prisoners with serious mental health needs. This article examines some circumstances in which health care providers in the context of criminal punishment encounter apparent conflicts among the treatment interests of the individuals, the comprehensive interests of these individuals, legally protected interests, and the public interest. This analysis pursues clarification of these interests and of potential tensions among legal and professional obligations of health care providers. This article does not provide comprehensive resolution of this tension. Rather, it is intended to promote rigorous ongoing inquiry by clarifying the relevant interests at stake and the responsibilities of various participants in the complex interaction of health care and corrections., ((c) 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

The purpose of this study was to investigate the role of death qualification in venirepersons' evaluations of expert scientific testimony in capital trials. 200 venirepersons from the 12th Judicial Circuit in Bradenton, FL completed a booklet that contained the following: one question that measured their attitudes toward the death penalty; one question that categorized their death-qualification status; the Need for Cognition (NFC) scale (Cacioppo, Petty & Kao, 1984); a summary of the guilt phase of a capital case (which included the cross-examination of the state's expert witness); verdict preference; five questions concerning participants' evaluations of the expert's testimony; the penalty phase of a capital case; sentence preference; and standard demographic questions. Results indicated that death-qualified venirepersons were more likely to demonstrate a low need for cognition and view ambiguous expert scientific testimony as valid, important in their decision-making processes, unbiased, and of high quality. Finally, death-qualified participants were more conviction- and death- prone than their excludable counterparts. Surprisingly, death-qualified and excludable jurors did not differ with respect to whether or not they felt that the expert followed correct procedures. Legal implications and applications are discussed., (2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd)

In Atkins v. Virginia 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment prohibits executing offenders who are mentally retarded. Rather than adopting a uniform definition of mental retardation, the court charged each state with defining mental retardation in a manner that enforces the constitutional restriction. An unanswered question is how states define mental retardation after Atkins, which has implications for capital defendants and forensic evaluators who conduct capital mitigation evaluations. This project identified the statutory definitions of mental retardation in each state, and grouped the definitions based on consistency with accepted clinical criteria for mental retardation. Results show that definitions of mental retardation vary considerably by state. The large majority of states, both overall and specifically among death penalty states, use criteria for mental retardation that are not entirely consistent with accepted clinical standards. As such, it is not clear whether the majority of states are effectuating the intent of Atkins. The implications of these findings for both policy and practice are discussed., (Copyright (c) 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Recent cases raise a series of questions regarding the involuntary administration of treatment intended to restore or maintain competence to proceed in the criminal process. As is often the case, these matters take on a special urgency in the context of capital punishment. The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the relevant interests that courts should consider in deciding whether to order the involuntary administration of treatment to restore or maintain competence converge to a greater degree than one might initially expect. When the applicable conception of medical interests is appropriately defined and the state's interest in protecting the integrity of the process is given appropriate weight, the legally protected state and individual interests converge to a substantial degree. Protecting both sets of interests may require a variety of procedures designed to avoid misguided interventions with the potential to undermine both sets of interests. Finally, this analysis provides an approach that allows the courts to grant appropriate weight to the professional ethics of those who perform evaluations and deliver treatment in these contexts., (Copyright (c) 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

This study examines whether public opinion parallels recent judicial and statutory changes limiting the applicability of capital sentences to offenders younger than 18 years old. Two hundred and thirty-five undergraduate students were administered a vignette of a capital case and asked to render a sentence of death or life in prison without parole. Results revealed that age of the defendant was not a significant predictor of sentence type; participants sentenced 16- and 17-year-old defendants similarly to 18- and 25-year-old defendants. Therefore, public opinion appears inconsistent with legal and legislative changes to abandon the practice of executing juveniles. Findings also suggested that perceived level of the defendant's responsibility and general opinion about capital sentences significantly predicted sentence type; perceptions of greater responsibility were associated with an increased likelihood of a death sentence. However, participants did not perceive differences in responsibility between juvenile and adult defendants. In addition, participants were more comfortable sentencing defendants to death compared with life in prison., (Copyright (c) 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Little empirical research has addressed the effects of psychological or psychosocial evidence on sentencing decisions. The present study found that death-qualified mock jurors were more likely to sentence a defendant to death without mitigating evidence than in a case with mitigating evidence present. Mock jurors were less likely to assign a death sentence in cases that contained one of the following types of mitigating evidence: The defendant was (i) diagnosed with schizophrenia, not medicated, and suffered from severe delusions and hallucinations, (ii) drug addicted and high at the time of the murder, (iii) diagnosed as borderline mentally retarded during childhood, or (iv) severely physically and verbally abused by his parents during childhood., (Copyright 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Past research examining the effects of actuarial and clinical expert testimony on defendants' dangerousness in Texas death penalty sentencing has found that jurors are more influenced by less scientific pure clinical expert testimony and less influenced by more scientific actuarial expert testimony (Krauss & Lee, 2003; Krauss & Sales, 2001). By applying cognitive-experiential self-theory (CEST) to juror decision-making, the present study was undertaken in an attempt to offer a theoretical rationale for these findings. Based on past CEST research, 163 mock jurors were either directed into a rational mode or experiential mode of processing. Consistent with CEST and inconsistent with previous research using the same stimulus materials, results demonstrate that jurors in a rational mode of processing more heavily weighted actuarial expert testimony in their dangerousness assessments, while those jurors in the experiential condition were more influenced by clinical expert testimony. The policy implications of these findings are discussed., (Copyright 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

We articulate an interpretation of mens rea that is broader than the traditional special sense but narrower than the traditional general sense. Mens rea in this intermediate sense addresses the guilty mind required by the sentencing criteria for specific criminal sentences for particular offenses. We advance an analytic structure for the integration of legal and empirical inquiry regarding standards of culpability that establish eligibility for capital punishment under contemporary United States legal doctrine. This structure addresses legal standards of culpability directly as well as indirectly in the form of evolving standards of decency. The general form of this analysis should be applicable more generally to sentencing provisions that address culpability as a sentencing consideration for other criminal sentences., (Copyright 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

The issue of whether mental health professionals should be involved in conducting evaluations of competency for execution is a topic that has elicited controversy and heated debate. This article picks up at a point beyond the controversy and addresses issues of professionalism and the objective assessment of competency for execution. Specifically, this article identifies professional standards for conducting competence for execution (CFE) evaluations, describes current practices in this area, and provides an interview checklist that can be used as an evaluation guide by involved professionals., (Copyright 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

This article supports the position that the 1989 United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) articulates a prohibition of capital punishment of juveniles that now must be considered a norm of jus cogens. The article provides statistics and trends regarding juveniles who commit capital crimes and describes how the U.S. justice system handles such juveniles, including Eighth Amendment analyses of juvenile executions under the U.S. Constitution. The article also discusses community consensus regarding evolving standards of decency, describes international law on the capital punishment of juveniles, and outlines worldwide trends in juvenile executions. It then defines and describes the concepts of customary international law and jus cogens, applying these concepts to the problem of the execution of juveniles in the United States. The article concludes by suggesting that there is a moral imperative for universal prohibition of juvenile capital punishment and by speculating about the domestic effects of applying such a jus cogens norm in the United States., (Copyright 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Mental health evaluations at capital sentencing represent a complex and specialized arena of practice. The moral culpability focus of capital sentencing is distinct from guilt-phase considerations of criminal responsibility, and has a specialized literature. Capital violence risk assessment is uniquely oriented to a prison context, relying on past adjustment to incarceration, as well as group statistical data specific to capital offenders and other inmate groups. Personality testing is a more complex consideration in capital sentencing evaluations. The implications of interviewing the defendant, as well as the parameters and documentation of an interview, make full disclosure and informed consent of particular importance. Defense- and prosecution-retained experts are subject to specific ethical vulnerabilities. These are examined in this paper through the lens of current professional standards., (Copyright 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.)

Prediction of violence in capital sentencing has been controversial. In the absence of a scientific basis for risk assessment, mental health professionals offering opinions in the capital sentencing context are prone to errors. Actuarial or group statistical data, known as base rates, have proven far superior to other methods for reducing predictive errors in many contexts, including risk assessment. Actuarial follow-up data on violent recidivism of capital murderers in prison and post release have been compiled and analyzed to demonstrate available base rates for use by mental health experts conducting risk assessments pertaining to capital sentencing. This paper also reviews various methods for individualizing the application of base rates to specific cases.