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Various imperfections of the hardware in quantum key distribution (QKD) lead to discrepancies between the theory and real-world devices. An eavesdropper can use these discrepancies to compromise the QKD security, thus legitimate sides need to estimate the influence of imperfections to prevent the loss of security. Here we investigate explicit eavesdropping attacks on passive side channels of the light source for a BB84 decoy states QKD protocol. We consider an optimal phase-covariant cloning attack, followed by unambiguous state discrimination and a joint measurement. Our calculations provide a hint that for state-of-the-art light sources the inherent presence of passive side channels still allows the protocol to be secure, albeit with the reduced secret key rates.

Passive generation of quantum states in quantum key distribution (QKD) is an elegant solution to utilise an internal source of quantum randomness of the transmitter’s scheme. It can be profitable, for example, in setups running at high repetition rates. However, the original analysis of passive protocol doesn’t consider real-life effects of a laser source, therefore possibly breaches the unconditional security of the scheme. Here we take into account the influence of various laser imperfections and make a refined comparison between active and passive setups. We show that the new bound on the secret key rate of the passive protocol stays similar to the one of an active scheme, thus proving passive generation to be a practical means of constructing QKD systems.

We generalize BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) to the scenario where the receiver adopts a heralded quantum memory (QM). With the heralded QM, the valid dark count rate of the receiver’s single photon detectors can be mitigated obviously, which will lower the quantum bit error rate, and thus improve the performance of decoy-state BB84 QKD systems in long distance range. Simulation results show that, with practical experimental system parameters, decoy-state BB84 QKD with QM can exhibit performance comparable to that of without QM in short distance range, and exhibit performance better than that without QM in long distance range.

To increase the security and efficiency of information transmission, the technology of Quantum Key Distribution is developed. A simulation of secure key rate of BB84 protocol is done to give a visualized comparison of efficiency of the protocol using different light sources and detectors. The simulation shows that the Poisson light source is less efficient than single photon source and the secure key rate of using continuous variable detectors is lower than using discrete variable detectors.

The current study introduces a hardware-implemented PRINCE block cipher within Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) determined by the quantum cryptography protocol (BB84). Most security-related software applications of cryptographic algorithms tend to be rather slow and of no efficiency. So as to present a solution to this issue, a new hardware architecture is suggested for speeding up the execution of the PRINCE algorithm and increasing its flexibility, yet with more security. Concurrent computing designs allow an encryption block data of 64 bits during a single clock cycle, resulting in the reduction of hardware area and the production of a higher throughput and relatively lower latency. Higher speed processing and lower power consumption are other features that have been observed. This could be achieved by means of implementing the encrypting, decrypting and quantum key schedule using little hardware sources, followed by the development of a sufficient hardware architecture model for the PRINCE algorithm through very high speed integrated circuit hardware description language (VHDL). The synthetization of this VHDL design is eventually performed in FPGA boards. As for the present study, two FPGA boards have been employed, namely Virtex-4 and Kintex-7. The resulting data indicates the throughput and efficiency values to be (2.029 Gbps) and (1.9 Mbps/slice) for Virtex-4, and (3.931 Gbps) and (7.290 Mbps/slice) for Kintex-7, all respectively.

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communication based on fundamental laws of physics, though practical realizations of QKD may have loopholes and side channels, thus their security can be compromised. We analyze the intercept-resend attack on the BB84 decoy-state protocol under the presence of a passive side channel of the light source. We derive an upper bound for the secret key rate and show that it does not significantly deviate from the ideal side-channel-free case.

Considering the rapid development of quantum technology, it has become inevitable to use this technology to develop an ultimately secured key exchange system. Quantum key distribution (QKD) technology has become more sophisticated, is expected to provide secure key distribution mechanism for the actual information security systems. The unique advantage of quantum cryptography is precisely its ability to guarantee absolute security. Previous works have demonstrated unconditional security of the ideal BB84 QKD system. However, on a typical QKD system, many practical situations often cannot satisfy the requirements of the ideal condition. This problem causes some security issues for practical QKD system. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze the security of QKD system under practical conditions, and identify the security implications on the practical physical systems and equipment, in order to find a method that guarantees the security of QKD system. The security of QKD system based on BB84 involves many aspects; this paper mainly focuses on how to resolve security issues that may exist, especially in the BB84 protocol post-processing. We introduce ways to tackle these issues and make vital key information leakage very small. Their impact on the security of entire QKD system is analyzed, and the interaction and security optimization between the various parts is researched. Finally, the thesis briefly introduces five sub-modules of post-processing of QKD system: the base comparison, error estimation, information correction, data check and privacy amplification; the existent security factors of each module is given, for error estimation and information correction is provided the secure model with those issues. Thus, the security model of post-processing is further optimized.

The Quantum Key Distribution protocol can encode a single quantum state and implements an information-theoretically secure key distribution protocol in communication. In the actual QKD experimental system, there are usually two encoding methods which are phase encoding and polarization encoding. Ma et al.[Phase-Matching Quantum Key Distribution, Phys. Rev. X., 2018, 8(3)] proposed the phase-matching QKD protocol, which has high transmission and it is an extension of the measurement device independent QKD. This paper successfully gives the polarization scheme of this PM-QKD protocol, the bases in the polarization scheme are arbitrary, and eliminates detector side channel attacks. Furthermore, we give the security analysis and simulation results of the polarization scheme, and compare it with the BB84 protocol. The simulation results show that our protocol is superior to the BB84 protocol in terms of transmission distance under the fixed key rate.

In this paper, we show that a (2, 3) discrete variable threshold quantum secret sharing scheme of secure direct communication can be achieved based on recurrence using the same devices as in BB84. The scheme is devised by first placing the shares of smaller secret pieces into the shares of the largest secret piece, converting the shares of the largest secret piece into corresponding quantum state sequences, inserting nonorthogonal state particles into the quantum state sequences with the purpose of detecting eavesdropping, and finally sending the new quantum state sequences to the three participants respectively. Consequently, every particle can on average carry up to 1.5-bit messages due to the use of recurrence. The control codes are randomly prepared using the way to generate fountain codes with pre-shared source codes between Alice and Bob, making three participants can detect eavesdropping by themselves without sending classical messages to Alice. Due to the flexible encoding, our scheme is also dynamic, which means that it allows the participants to join and leave freely.

We propose a new counterfactual quantum cryptography protocol concerning about distributing a deterministic key. By adding a controlled blocking operation module to the original protocol [T.G. Noh, Phys. Rev. Lett. 103 (2009) 230501], the correlation between the polarizations of the two parties, Alice and Bob, is extended, therefore, one can distribute both deterministic keys and random ones using our protocol. We have also given a simple proof of the security of our protocol using the technique we ever applied to the original protocol. Most importantly, our analysis produces a bound tighter than the existing ones.

It is established that a single quantum cryptography protocol usually cooperates with other cryptographic systems, such as an authentication system, in the real world. However, few protocols have been proposed on how to combine two or more quantum protocols. To fill this gap, we propose a composed quantum protocol, containing both quantum identity authentication and quantum key distribution, using squeezed states. Hence, not only the identity can be verified, but also a new private key can be generated by our new protocol. We also analyze the security under an optimal attack, and the efficiency, which is defined by the threshold of the tolerant error rate, using Gaussian error function.

Decoy state method quantum key distribution (QKD) is one of the promising practical solutions for BB84 QKD with coherent light pulses. The number of data-set size in practical QKD protocol is always finite, which will cause statistical fluctuations. In this paper, we apply absolutely statistical fluctuation to amend the yield and error rate of the quantum state. The relationship between exchanged number of quantum signals and key generation rate is analyzed in our simulation, which offers a useful reference for experiment.

This paper presents a simple way for an eavesdropper to eavesdrop freely the secret message in the experimental realization of quantum communication protocol proposed by Beige et al (2002 Acta Phys. Pol. A 101 357). Moreover, it introduces an efficient quantum secure communication protocol based on a publicly known key with decoy photons and two biased bases by modifying the original protocol. The total efficiency of this new protocol is double that of the original one. With a low noise quantum channel, this protocol can be used for transmitting a secret message. At present, this protocol is good for generating a private key efficiently.

The quantum key distribution protocol BB84 combined with the repetition protocol for error correction is analysed from the point of view of its security against individual eavesdropping relying on quantum memory. It is shown that the mere knowledge of the error-correcting protocol changes the optimal attack and provides the eavesdropper with additional information on the distributed key.

Realistic experimental apparatus of quantum cryptography are imperfect, which may be utilized by a potential eavesdropper to eavesdrop on the communication. We show that quantum communication may be improved with quantum teleportation and entanglement swapping, which is robustly secure against the most general Trojan horse attacks. Our scheme is not an improvement of the communication apparatus, but the improvement of quantum communication protocol itself. We show that our modified schemes may be implemented with current technology.

We present a scheme for quantum privacy amplification (QPA) for a sequence of single qubits. The QPA procedure uses a unitary operation with two controlled-not gates and a Hadamard gate. Every two qubits are performed with the unitary gate operation, and a measurement is made on one photon and the other one is retained. The retained qubit carries the state information of the discarded one. In this way, the information leakage is reduced. The procedure can be performed repeatedly so that the information leakage is reduced to any arbitrarily low level. With this QPA scheme, the quantum secure direct communication with single qubits can be implemented with arbitrarily high security. We also exploit this scheme to do privacy amplification on the single qubits in quantum information sharing for long-distance communication with quantum repeaters.

Using the generalized Bell states and quantum gates, we introduce a quantum encryption scheme of d-level states (qudits). The scheme can detect and correct arbitrary transmission errors using only local operations and classical communications between the communicators. In addition, the entanglement key used to encrypt can be recycled. The protocol is informationally secure, because the output state is a totally mixed one for every input state ρ.

The decoy-state method is a useful method in resisting the attacks on quantum key distribution. However, how to choose the intensities of decoy states and the ratio of the decoy states and the signal state is still an open question. We present a simple formula to analyse the problem. We also give a simple method to derive the bounds of the necessary counting rates and quantum bit error rates for BB84 and SARG04; the latter was previously proposed by Scarani et al. [Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 (2004) 057901] We then propose a multi-signal-state method which employs different coherent states either as the decoy state or as the signal state to carry out quantum key distribution. We find our protocol more efficient and feasible.

Traditional methods of cryptographic key distribution rest on judgments about an attacker. With the advent of quantum key distribution (QKD) came proofs of security for the mathematical models that define the protocols BB84 and B92; however, applying such proofs to actual transmitting and receiving devices has been questioned. Proofs of QKD security are propositions about models written in the mathematical language of quantum mechanics, and the issue is the linking of such models to actual devices in an experiment on security. To explore this issue, we adapt Wittgenstein’s method of language games to view quantum language in its application to experimental activity involving transmitting and receiving devices. We sketch concepts with which to think about models in relation to experiments, without assuming the experiments accord with any model; included is a concept of one quantum mechanical model enveloping another. For any model that agrees with given experimental results and implies the security of a key, there is an enveloping model that agrees with the same results while denying that security. As a result there is a gap between equations and the behaviour recorded from devices in an experiment, a gap bridged only by resort to something beyond the reach of logic and measured data, well named by the word guesswork. While this recognition of guesswork encourages eavesdropping, a related recognition of guesswork in the design of feedback loops can help a transmitter and receiver to reduce their vulnerability to eavesdropping.

In the paper by Gleim et al (2016 Opt. Express 24 2619), it was declared that the system of quantum cryptography, exploiting quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol BB84 with the additional reference state and encoding in a sub-carrier, is able to distribute secret keys at a distance of 210 km. The following shows that a simple attack realized with a beam splitter results in a loss of privacy of the keys over substantially smaller distances. It turns out that the actual length of the secret key transmission for the QKD system encoding in the sub-carrier frequency is ten times less than that declared in Gleim et al (2016 Opt. Express 24 2619). Therefore it is impossible to safely use the keys when distributed at a larger length of the communication channel than shown below. The maximum communication distance does not exceed 22 km, even in the most optimistic scenario.

A new quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) protocol is proposed by using decoherence free subspace (DFS) to avoid insecurity of the present QSDC protocols in a quantum noise channel. This protocol makes it easily for Bob and Alice to find eavesdropping in channel because the collective dephasing noise disappears in DFS. The probability of successful attack by Eve in this protocol is smaller than in BB84 protocol. Thus this protocol realizes secure QSDC and is feasible with present-day technology.

Quantum cryptography is a new way to distribute keys, which can detect any eavesdropping. Quantum cryptography using single particle or weak light pulse has been discussed in some early papers, but it is difficult to transmit such single particle or weak light pulse. We propose a scheme of quantum key distribution using coherent state ||α and ||α + Δα. We also discuss its feasibility and security, and give an experimental realization of this scheme.

We show a deterministic secure direct communication protocol using single qubit in mixed state. The security of this protocol is based on the security proof of BB84 protocol. It can be realized with current technologies.

In this letter we present estimates for the distance of secret key transmission through free space for three different protocols of quantum key distribution: for BB84 and phase time-coding protocols in the case of a strictly single-photon source, and for the relativistic quantum key distribution protocol in the case of faint laser pulses.

We propose a novel strategy named basis-splitting scheme to split the intercepted quanta into several portions based on different bases, for eavesdropping in the process of quantum cryptography. Compared with intercept-resend strategy, our simulation results of the basis-splitting scheme under the non-ideal condition show a greater performance, especially with the increase of the length of shifted bits. Consequently our scheme can aid eavesdropper to gather much more useful information.

In our modern era of telecommunications and the Internet, information has become a valuable commodity. Sometimes it must therefore be protected against theft - in this case, loss of secret information to an eavesdropper. Most of today's transactions are protected using encryption unproven to be secure against a computational attack by a classical computer and, in fact, the standardly used encryption algorithms are provably vulnerable to the mind-boggling parallelism of a quantum computer, should one ever be physically realized. Enter quantum cryptography. Underlying nearly all forms of encryption is the necessity for a truly secret key, a random string of zeros and ones; the basic notion of quantum cryptography is to employ single photon transmissions (or the closest attainable approximation to these) to distribute the random key material, while removing the threat of an undetected eavesdropper. Now, nearly twenty years since the seminal quantum cryptography paper by Bennett and Brassard (Bennett C H and Brassard G 1984 Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. on Computers, Systems, and Signal Processing (Bangalore) (New York: IEEE) pp 175-9), we take a look at several state-of-the-art implementations, and glimpse how future quantum cryptosystems might look. We start with papers from three of the world's leading experimental quantum cryptography efforts: Stucki et al and Bethune and Risk describe working systems for quantum key distribution (QKD) over telecommunications fibres (at 1550 nanometres and 1300 nanometres, respectively). The former's achievement of quantum key exchange over 67 kilometres of optical fibre is a world record, as is the experimental demonstration by Hughes et al of daylight free-space QKD over a 10 km atmospheric range. Next, Lutkenhaus and Jahma explore the possible vulnerabilities of such systems (which employ attenuated laser pulses instead of actual single photon states) to conceivable future eavesdropping technologies. Enzer et al have implemented a totally new protocol, using polarization-entangled photons, which in some circumstances can tolerate higher error rates than the traditional one of Bennett and Brassard; moreover, the use of entanglement provides a means of `automatic source verification'. Finally, looking to the future, Elliott gives a provocative view of how these technologies may be merged into network operation, and Shapiro describes a method to combine a novel source of entangled photons with a means to transfer the photons' quantum state to trapped-atom quantum memories. If realized, these systems could presage the world's first quantum network. Focus on Quantum Cryptography Contents Quantum key distribution over 67 km with a plug&play system D Stucki, N Gisin, O Guinnard, G Ribordy and H Zbinden Autocompensating quantum cryptography Donald S Bethune and William P Risk Practical free-space quantum key distribution over 10 km in daylight and at night Richard J Hughes, Jane E Nordholt, Derek Derkacs and Charles G Peterson Quantum key distribution with realistic states: photon-number statistics in the photon-number splitting attack Norbert Lutkenhaus and Mika Jahma Entangled-photon six-state quantum cryptography Daphna G Enzer, Phillip G Hadley, Richard J Hughes, Charles G Peterson and Paul G Kwiat Building the quantum network Chip Elliott Architectures for long-distance quantum teleportation Jeffrey H Shapiro Ground to satellite secure key exchange using quantum cryptography J G Rarity, P R Tapster, P M Gorman and P Knight Method for decoupling error correction from privacy amplification Hoi-Kwong Lo Paul G Kwiat University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA

We present a full quantum network scheme using a modified BB84 protocol. Unlike other quantum network schemes, it allows quantum keys to be distributed between two arbitrary users with the help of an intermediary detecting user. Moreover, it has good expansibility and prevents all potential attacks using loopholes in a detector, so it is more practical to apply. Because the fiber birefringence effects are automatically compensated, the scheme is distinctly stable in principle and in experiment. The simple components for every user make our scheme easier for many applications. The experimental results demonstrate the stability and feasibility of this scheme.

In the original BB84 quantum key distribution protocol, the states are prepared and measured randomly, which lose the unmatched detection results. To improve the sifting efficiency, biased bases selection BB84 protocol is proposed. Meanwhile, a practical quantum key distribution protocol can only transmit a finite number of signals, resulting in keys of finite length. The previous techniques for finite-key analysis focus mainly on the statistical fluctuations of the error rates and yields of the qubits. However, the prior choice probabilities of the two bases also have fluctuations by taking into account the finite-size effect. In this paper, we discuss the security of biased decoy state BB84 protocol with finite resources by considering all of the statistical fluctuations. The results can be directly used in the experimental realizations.

Although some ideal quantum key distribution protocols have been proved to be secure, there have been some demonstrations that practical quantum key distribution implementations were hacked due to some real-life imperfections. Among these attacks, detector side channel attacks may be the most serious. Recently, a measurement device independent quantum key distribution protocol [Phys. Rev. Lett. 108 (2012) 130503] was proposed and all detector side channel attacks are removed in this scheme. Here a new security proof based on quantum information theory is given. The eavesdropper's information of the sifted key bits is bounded. Then with this bound, the final secure key bit rate can be obtained.

SARG04 uses the same quantum states and the same measurement bases with BB84 protocol, but SARG04 can generate secret keys from two-photon pulses when BB84 cannot. We report the implementation of BB84 and SARG04 protocols using a polarization-encoded weak coherent pulse with an optical fiber quantum channel. We have experimentally investigated the secret key rate of BB84 and SARG04 protocols, and BB84 gave a higher secret key rate than SARG04.

We devise a new quantum key distribution scheme that is more efficient than the BB84 protocol. By pre-announcing basis, Alice and Bob are more likely to use the same basis to prepare and measure the qubits, thus achieves a higher efficiency. The error analysis is revised and its security against any eavesdropping is proven briefly. Furthermore we show that, compared with the LCA scheme, our modification can be applied in more quantum channels.

The disturbance effect of a depolarizing channel on the security of the quantum key distribution of the four state BB84 protocol with multiple sequentiel intercept and resend attacks of many eavesdroppers, has been studied. The quantum bit error rate and the mutual information are computed for arbitray number of attacks.

Quantum key distribution based on encoding in three dimensional systems in the presence of several eavesdroppers is proposed. This extends the BB84 protocol in the presence of many eavesdroppers where two-level quantum systems (qubits) are replaced by three-level systems (qutrits). We discuss the scenarios involving two, three and four complementary bases. We derive the explicit form of Alice and Bob mutual information and the information gained by each eavesdropper. In particular, we show that, in the presence of only one eavesdropper, the protocol involving four bases is safer than the other ones. However, for two eavesdroppers, the security is strongly dependent on the attack probabilities. The effect of a large number of eavesdroppers is also investigated.

The most severe problem of a two-way "plug-and-play" (p& p) quantum key distribution system is that the source can be controlled by the eavesdropper. This kind of source is defined as an "untrusted source". This paper discusses the effects of the fluctuation of internal transmittance on the final key generation rate and the transmission distance. The security of the standard BB84 protocol, one-decoy state protocol, and weak+vacuum decoy state protocol, with untrusted sources and the fluctuation of internal transmittance are studied. It is shown that the one-decoy state is sensitive to the statistical fluctuation but weak+vacuum decoy state is only slightly affected by the fluctuation. It is also shown that both the maximum secure transmission distance and final key generation rate are reduced when Alice's laboratory transmittance fluctuation is considered.

We propose an implementation of quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol using magnon-photon interactions in dielectric waveguides. Starting from the Hamiltonian of spin wave-optical interactions in a symmetric dielectric waveguide, we derive the single-photon transformations that allow us to define two non-orthogonal basis sets, which are isomorphic to polarization basis of single-photon. Implementation of the BB84 and B92 protocols is then straightforward. The principal advantage of our scheme is the higher quantum bit error rate (QBER) (37.5%) compared to polarization-coded scheme (25%) for simple intercept/resend attack. This considerably relaxes the specifications of optical components. Finally, we consider the effect of low conversion efficiency on QBER.

We propose an efficient phase-encoding quantum secret key generation scheme with heralded narrow-band single photons. The key information is carried by the phase modulation directly on the single-photon temporal waveform without using any passive beam splitters or optical switches. We show that, when the technique is applied to the conventional fiber-based phase-encoding BB84 and differential phase shift (DPS) quantum key distribution schemes, the key generation efficiencies can be improved by a factor of 2 and 3, respectively. For N(>3)-period DPS systems, the key generation efficiency can be improved by a factor of N. The technique is suitable for quantum memory-based long-distance fiber communication system., 5 pages, 5 figures

Security and anonymity are essential to E-payment systems. However, existing E-payment systems will easily be broken into soon with the emergence of quantum computers. In this paper, we propose an E-payment system based on quantum group signature. In contrast to classical E-payment systems, our quantum E-payment system can protect not only the users' anonymity but also the inner structure of customer groups. Because of adopting the two techniques of quantum key distribution, a one-time pad and quantum group signature, unconditional security of our E-payment system is guaranteed.

We propose a scheme for quantum key distribution, in which single photons are encoded with polarization states and then divided and delayed to encode phase differences between two sequential pulses. In an example, the BB84 and DPS (differential phase shift) protocols are combined to achieve single-photon two-qubit quantum key distribution. This scheme can increase the key generation efficiency up to 7/6, higher than that of the conventional single-photon one-qubit quantum key distribution scheme.

A novel approach to quantum cryptography to be called NQKD, networking quantum key distribution, has been developed for secure quantum communication schemes on the basis of the complementary relations of entanglement Greenberger–Horne–Zeilinger (GHZ) triplet states. One scheme distributes the private key among legal participants in a probabilistic manner, while another transmits the deterministic message with some certainty. Some decoy photons are employed for preventing a potential eavesdropper from attacking quantum channels. The present schemes are efficient as there exists an elegant method for key distributions. The security of the proposed schemes is exactly guaranteed by the entanglement of the GHZ quantum system, which is illustrated in security analysis.

In the original BB84 protocol by Bennett and Brassard, an eavesdropper is detected because his attempts to intercept information result in a quantum bit error rate (QBER) of at least 25%. Here we design an alternative quantum key distribution protocol, where Alice and Bob use two mutually unbiased bases with one of them encoding a "0" and the other one encoding a "1." The security of the scheme is due to a minimum index transmission error rate (ITER) introduced by an eavesdropper which increases significantly for higher-dimensional photon states. This allows for more noise in the transmission line, thereby increasing the possible distance between Alice and Bob without the need for intermediate nodes., 17 pages, 3 figures, 4 tables, discussion of QBER added

Photon number resolving detectors can enhance the performance of many practical quantum cryptographic setups. In this paper, we employ a simple method to estimate the statistics provided by such a photon number resolving detector using only a threshold detector together with a variable attenuator. This idea is similar in spirit to that of the decoy state technique, and is specially suited for those scenarios where only a few parameters of the photon number statistics of the incoming signals have to be estimated. As an illustration of the potential applicability of the method in quantum communication protocols, we use it to prove security of an entanglement based quantum key distribution scheme with an untrusted source without the need of a squash model and by solely using this extra idea. In this sense, this detector decoy method can be seen as a different conceptual approach to adapt a single photon security proof to its physical, full optical implementation. We show that in this scenario the legitimate users can now even discard the double click events from the raw key data without compromising the security of the scheme, and we present simulations on the performance of the BB84 and the 6-state quantum key distribution protocols., 27 pages, 7 figures

Quantum key distribution with single photons from a telecommunication-wavelength quantum dot source is performed over a standard optical fibre link. The source was operated at a temperature of 70 K and gave g(2)(0)~0.166 with an efficiency of 5% after coupling into the single-mode fibre. Correlation results are quoted without subtraction of detector dark counts and g(2)(0) as low as 0.1 was measured, at reduced efficiency. This source enabled a proof-of-principle demonstration of quantum key distribution over 35 km of fibre using the BB84 protocol and phase encoding.

On the basis of the modified four-coherent-state post-selection quantum key distribution protocol (Namiki and Hirano 2006 Preprint quant-ph/0608144v1), two 1-out-of-2 quantum oblivious transfer (QOT21) protocols are proposed. The first proposed protocol (called the receiver-based QOT21 protocol) requires the coherent states to be prepared by the receiver, whereas the second protocol (called the sender-based QOT21 protocol) allows the coherent states to be generated by the sender. The main advantages of the proposed protocols are that (i) no quantum bit commitment schemes and the assumption of quantum memory are needed; (ii) less communication cost between participants is required, i.e. the receiver-based QOT21 protocol requires only one quantum communication and one classical communication and the sender-based QOT21 protocol requires only one quantum communication between participants during protocol execution; and (iii) the utilization of quantum states is very efficient, wherein the receiver-based and the sender-based QOT21 protocols use only two coherent pulses and one coherent pulse respectively for sending the sender's two messages.