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When a ruler of the former ?Christian Republic? went to war, he had to inform his Christian enemy about the fact itself (declaration of war) and would give to him and to other Christian rulers reasons for this serious step (legitimisation of war). This concept was not Christian in its origin, but in the theological theory of Just War it became basic for the order among Christian states. Later it again transcended religious restrictions and became basic for warfare until today.It was, however, not the mere fact of secularisation that made the theory of Just War open for the future international order. Legitimisations of War changed substantially with the revolutions in communications since the 15th Century. The ?personal? declaration of war became less important, the legitimisation by war manifestos became crucial, i.e. official pamphlets that were written or drafted by rulers or high-ranked politicians. Manifestos were directed towards an international public. Their intention might have been in particular to convince other rulers, people of political influence, subjects that were affected by the war etc., but they argued that the reasons given for war in the individual case would be acceptable for the whole Christendom or even for all civilized societies and the whole ?world?. Thus they mirror the existing ideas of an international system and its values, as legitimisations of war make sense only if the author expects that there will be readers who can follow his argument. In the context of the project?s main subject and different panels it is e.g. most significant when Queen Anne of Great Britain in 1702 declared war on France for the ?liberty and balance of Europe?. This was the first time that a monarch used the idea of balance of power in a war legitimisation which shows that at that time it was a political standard that was acceptable to the European public.In my paper I would like to analyse main ideas of an international order given in war legitimisations from 16th to 18th Century. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers the impact of Europe on the internal cohesion of the major British political parties, through its capacity to affect their issue profiles. It recounts the irruption of the European issue onto the agenda of British politics at various times in the recent history of the country, noting how this is reflected in the manifesto statements of the major parties. More particularly, it focuses on the impact of Europe on the attitudinal cohesion of the parties, making use of cluster analysis of survey data of parliamentarians in order to show how the parties - and especially the Conservatives - seem to have absorbed this issue and thus staved off the threat of internal fragmentation. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the 1970s, Henry Kissinger lamented: ?When I want to call Europe, I cannot find a phone number.? Since then the institutional momentum of the European Union (EU) has increased considerably. One of the goals is to create a continuous and stable Common Foreign and Security Policy of the member states. Yet, the foreign policies of the three major states within this Union ? Germany, France, and Great Britain ? often continue to diverge. In this paper I argue with Douglas North that international institutions such as the EU are ?shared mental models? and despite being objective physical facts, they are ?cognitive entities that do not exist apart from actors? ideas about how the world works.? More specifically, I argue that the conditions for convergence or divergence and the viability of the EU?s desired Common Foreign and Security Policy are located in the belief systems of national leaders. Common perceptions of a security externality and common prescriptions towards it are a necessary condition for convergence. The sufficient condition, however, is the translation of these beliefs into similar strategic orientations. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution seeks to explain why a country commits itself to fix its exchange rate, and why, at a certain point, the credibility of this commitment may fade triggering the rational expectations of the financial markets to re-orient towards a realignment of the exchange rate, eventually producing speculative attacks.Thus, the following research question will be addressed:Why does a government decide to commit itself to fixed exchange rates? On what is the credibility of this commitment based? Why and when do the markets decide to bet on the lack of credibility of a similar commitment? In this work it is argued that the markets, in deciding whether to attack a currency peg or not, evaluate a wide range of factors, including socio-political and structural ones. In particular, the credibility of an exchange rate agreement, and, therefore, markets’ expectations about devaluation, are crucially depending on the behaviour and interests of socio-economic actors and interests groups. The main hypothesis to be tested is that an exchange rate peg credibility and resilience to a speculative attack increases, when it receives support from socio-economic groups. Secondly, this effect is greater when the support comes from groups to whom the government can be considered more sensitive. In particular, this research investigates the cases of Italy and UK permanence within the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European Monetary System (EMS) between its establishment in 1978 and its end in December 1998 just before the entry in operation of EMU. The analysis is carried out following the literature on speculative attacks (Eichengreen, Rose and Wyplosz, 1995). ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The notions of “protection”, “homeland defense” and the “vulnerability of critical infrastructures” largely predate September 11, both in US military doctrine and in Europe, at least in France and the United Kingdom. The communication will discuss how pro ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]