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This paper analyzes U.S. policy toward China and Taiwan. I begin with an examination of Cold War foreign policy across the various presidential administrations. I then move to an examination of post-Cold War foreign policy concentrating on the Clinton and Bush presidencies. I focus on comparing various administration approaches to the Taiwan crisis and how and why policies varied within and between administrations. I discuss the numerous international and domestic factors that have contributed to U.S. policy toward Taiwan and China. Throughout, I attempt to capture the competing interests involved and how these actors and events have complicated both foreign policy processes and outcomes. I conclude with a discussion of policy implications for the present and future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we will examine U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. Much empirical evidence showed that the policy toward the Taiwan Strait slightly changed during Bush?s first term. After elaborating the subtle change of U.S. policy, we will attempt to interpret such change from the modified structuralism perspective. Different from neo-realist?s assumption of international anarchical status, we adopt neoliberalist?s view of international institutions existing in the international system. However, we don?t agree with the neoliberalist?s assumption that states seek their absolute interests. Instead, we accept neorealist?s survival prerequisite for states. Therefore, we identify the world as a hierarchical system and states seek their relative gains in this system. We further set the hierarchical system into two levels, the higher one and the lower one. According to Waltz?s structural theory, we claim only strong powers can have the capability to play on the higher level, while weak states are staying on the lower level of the international system. Any great power is gaming with other great powers on higher level and with weak states on lower level. Through such interactions on two levels, the great power can get interests from both. However, if the interests from the higher level are in conflict with those from the lower level, the great power, weighing its great power counterparts over the weak states, will discard the interests from the weak states. Our testing scenario centers the U.S. policy toward the Taiwan Strait under the Bush Administration. To fit this model, the U.S. and China are two powers staying on the higher level and Taiwan stays on the lower level. Previously, the U.S. were trying to get interests from both levels and keeping the ?double track? policy. However, two events change the balance among the three players: 9/11 attack and Taiwan?s independent referendum. These events lead to a conflict of the interests from China and Taiwan and the previous ?double track? policy does not work well. Thus, in order to keep interests from the higher-level partner -- China, the U.S. chooses the strategy to sacrifice its lower-level interests from Taiwan by stopping Taiwan?s willing of independence behind the referendum. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In alliances, the weaker more dependent ally should act according to a logic of deference and non-confrontation vis-à-vis its stronger ally due to power and material asymmetries. However, alliance theory is under-specified in why or when weaker players c ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]