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The leaders of both Japan and Turkey have recently made headlines with their refusal to acknowledge past atrocities committed by their states. In the case of Japan, the refusal centers on the Japanese state’s role in forcing Korean women into prostitution during WWII. In the case of Turkey the refusal is an outright denial of the Armenian genocide. It would be easy to dismiss these actions as the product of irrational nationalist bravado, put on for the benefit of a domestic audience. However, given the international character of these disputes, and their very serious consequences for the diplomatic credibility of the countries in question, international relations scholars have an obligation to explain why states act in ways which are contrary to their short-term self-interests. I argue that because of the social status hierarchy in the international system, admitting to past atrocities is more difficult for those states which are not naturally or inherently favored by the norms of the international system. In other words, it is not an accident that two Asian states with the highest aspirations to join the Western the world are also the states which have the most difficulty facing their past. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite of the fact that China and Japan are becoming the biggest trade partner with each other in recent years, political relations between both countries have deteriorated. Many people in China still concern over potential Japanese military resurgence, while more and more people in Japan worry about China?s military modernization and growing nationalism. The tension is unlikely to improve in the near future.The role of Taiwan in this China-Japan dispute is worth attention. While Taiwan has enjoyed de facto independence since 1949, it is still regarded by Chinese leaders as a renegade province, and the recovery of the island was considered in China as the sacred and ultimate goal. In recent years, Taiwan has increasingly attempted to act as a truly independent state, a development that could be attributed to political democratization on the island since the late 1980s. The question is whether the leaders in Taiwan will continue to push the envelope to a point short of de jure independence that will be intolerable to the leaders in Beijing. On the other hand, both Taiwan and Japan have shown strong intention in improving political relations between both sides. Creation of a Japan-Taiwan alliance is becoming a popular view in Taiwan?s strategic circle, and Japanese public have shown more sympathy to Taiwan?s international isolation. Japanese government even adjusted its policy toward the island state by including the Taiwan Strait into the sphere of concern in Japan-US Security Threty. These developments have been unthinkable in the past, because both China and Japan have committed to the ?One China? policy and because the Taiwan issue used to be excluded from China-Japan relations. This paper will examine the Taiwanese perspective of China-Japan relations. The author will outline the developments of Taiwan-Japan relations, identify the strategies Taiwanese government have utilized to strengthen the relations with Japan, and to assess the Taiwan factor in future Japan-China relations. In addition to analyses of secondary data, the author will also interview strategic scholars and even government officials to gain first hand information. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since 1980s, the notion of national identity and the nature of its relationship with foreign policy have been in the focus of constructivist and post-structuralist scholarship. In both theoretical approaches, the nature of the relationship is pre-determined. The constructivist scholars tend to treat the national identity as a cognitive lens through which national interests and related polices are defined and shaped. In a post-structuralist analysis, foreign policy is often perceived as a practice of difference that creates borders and enhances the national identity construction.The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between national identity discourse of the Japanese ?self? vis-à-vis the Russian ?other? and foreign policy without any pre-theorization regarding the relationship.In the first part this paper examines the structure of contemporary Japan?s national identity construction vis-à-vis Russia. It argues that Russia, because of her role as a traditional ?other? for the West, has played a special role in Japan?s attempt to construct herself as a member of the universal realm of ?modern nations.? The second part of the paper examines Japan?s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-communist Russia along three dimensions; economic, military and the territorial dispute related to the islands captured by the Soviet Union during the last days of the Pacific War. Identity does not matter in economy- business as usual with profits overriding other concerns related to territory and history. Identity is slightly visible in the security discourse as seen in the lack of long-term trust of Russia?s intentions among the members of the security community. In the context of the the territorial dispute, identity shapes and, at the same time, is shaped by the policy related to this dispute. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The year 2005 marked a new low in Sino-Japanese relations. A grassroots petition in China, South Korea and around the world gathered more than 30 million signatures in a matter of weeks. Violent demonstrations in China displayed Chinese people's deep resentment of Japan on a range of issues. Both Beijing and Tokyo have traded charges against each other while trying to control the situation from getting worse. This paper examines these developments, and focuses on how nationalism manifested itself in both China and Japan, what are behind the emotional outbursts of public sentiments, and why there is no single model that can explain the nationalistic behavior in either China or Japan. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I explore the ?rise? of China and Japan in the international political sphere through the theoretical lens of the English School. One of the most important insights provided by the English School approach of International Relations is its notion that ?Great Powers? hold special responsibilities in the Society of States. However, studies of ?great power responsibilities? have not sufficiently problematised or historicised what exactly these ?responsibilities? entail. Building on a recent study by Roland Paris which argues that international peacebuilding constitutes the modern ?mission civilisatrice?, I argue that the English School theoretical framework can offer us a fresh perspective in understanding the political ambitions of China and Japan to play a greater political role in International Society. Moving beyond conventional explanations which trace these movements to domestic nationalism, I explore through a comparative case study of Chinese and Japanese participation in international peacekeeping whether China or Japan?s recent actions for ?a greater international political role? is informed by both states? interaction with a international normative consensus of what constitutes a ?civilised? Great Power in twentieth and twenty first-century International Society. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]