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Despite evidence of “nationalist” influences on security policies in Japan and Korea, particularly in recent years, the term “nationalism” is conspicuous for its absence in Japanese security debates and for its replacement by the more popular “sovereignty ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When the interests of Tokugawa Japan and the Russian Empire clashed for the first time in the second half of the 18th century, Ainu, the native people of Hokkaido, Sakhalin and the Kurile islands, were in the center of the dispute. Furthermore, at least from the Japanese side, the notion of culture has defined the dispute. Namely, the potential Russian expansion of influence was seen as expansion of superior culture, conducted through enlightenment and amicable policies which could result in the voluntary embracement of the rule of the Russian empire by the Ainu (Akatsuki 1987.)In the last five decades the same border zone, namely the South Kurile islands (known as Northern Territories in Japan) have continued to occupy the central place in Japan's agenda vis-a -vis the Soviet Union and, after 1992, Russia. However, the existent scholarship has paid little attention to the role of culture and the Ainu in the contemporary dispute over control of the islands. This paper hopes to bridge this gap by bringing together the debate on the place of Ainu in Japanese society that emerged in early 1970s and the concurrent cultural construction of the Japan's "sef" vis-a -vis Russia.The first part of this paper provides a brief review of modern Japan's engagement with the Russian and the Ainu "other" in terms of national identity construction. The second part examines the contemporary dialogue between the two "others" within the broader context of identity politics of the 1970s and 1980s. It starts by analyzing the critical reevaluation of Japan's history of colonization of Ainu lands and the relocation of Ainu culture from the realm of the inferior assigned to it by the prewar discourse. This paper argues that this reconstruction presented a challenge not only to the conception of Japan as a homogenous nation but also undermined the validity of Japan's claim to the South Kurile islands as a quest for the return of inherent territory as it granted subjectivity to the Ainu "other" and allowed for the Ainu participate in the public discourse. The paper follows by introducing the cultural discourse on Russia and Japan that emerged almost simultaneously with the debates on Ainu. It argues that one of the functions of this construction of the national "self" was to suppress the challenges posed by the contemporary debates on Ainu by presenting a hierarchical construction between Japan's "self" and the Russian "other" and through this reaffirming Japan's belonging to the realm of the civilized and the normal. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There are unmistakable signs of rising nationalism in contemporary Japan. It has manifested itself in Prime Minister Koizumi's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, the rewriting of history textbooks, Prime Minister Abe'ss denial of the Japanese military's direct involvement in forced prostitution during the Second World War (the so-called "œcomfort women" issue), the recent revision of the basic education law designed to instill patriotism among the nation's youths, and the move to revise Article 9 and other parts of the constitution. Neither domestic opposition to nor foreign criticisms of these developments have had a marked impact on the shift to the right in the discourse on nationalism in Japan. On the contrary, against the backdrop of an increasingly assertive political leadership in Tokyo, the emergence of post-war generations of opinion makers and opinion leaders in Japan, and the growing uncertainty in the nation's security environment, the chorus of foreign critics may be having the opposite effect and strengthening the nationalists' cause. This paper explores this proposition through an examination of the way Japanese nationalists are using Japan's disputes with China, Korea, and Russia and these countries' criticisms of Japan to articulate their cause. The paper concludes that the Japanese nationalists make a selective use of ideas, events, and institutions from the past in reconstructing a post-postwar "Japan" in their image, anchor their arguments around Japan's bilateral disputes with the neighboring countries, and exploit foreign criticisms of Japan regarding those issues to advance their nationalist cause. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, relations between China and Japan have been stable yet contentious due to unresolved controversies concerning history textbooks, territorial disputes, military activity, market distortions, and environmental degradation. While by no means precluding the real possibility of reconciliation between China and Japan, such ends cannot be understood without explanations about cultural preferences amid materialist pursuits. As nearly 2,000 years in the history of Sino-Japanese relations thus demonstrates, unitary actors derive their general interests from specific identities such that the propensity for either apprehension or resolve need not always depend upon the effects caused by those structural factors (security dilemmas, imbalanced capabilities) which seem to be less conditional and more coincidental instead. For what has elsewhere been termed "civilizational realpolitik" continues to determine the conditions in constructing Sino-Japanese relations across time/space. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper critically examines the constructivist works on Japan’s security and shows empirically the inherent dangers in applying the constructivist framework to studies of national identity. It argues that the works discussed, besides not providing any new insights into Japan, suffer from reductionism and orientalism. In its second part the paper attempts to offer some modifications to the constructivist framework. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Recent summits have sought to redefine Japan-China ties as a "strategic relationship of mutual benefit" by "increasing political trust." Sino-Japanese trust is important because hedging in security affairs is expensive and can undermine stability. Lack of trust encourages worst-case assumptions about the other's motives, placing a ceiling on cooperation and making miscalculation and conflict more likely. Why is trust such a problem between Japan and China? Studies in international relations point to the power shift associated with China's rise and differences in regime type (democracy/authoritarianism). Research on contemporary Sino-Japanese ties often focuses on the significantly expanded and sometimes contentious trade relationship. Finding those explanations insufficient, this paper argues that trust problems are better understood as functions of national identity. The way that Japan and China perceive 'the other' in the context of their own national identities is the primary source of distrust. In Japanese perception, Japan tends to be seen as more developed and civilized than China and Chinese identity as obsessed with being at the center. In Chinese perception, China tends to be seen as morally and historically superior to Japan and Japanese identity as latently aggressive and disrespectful of natural order. These perceptions are traceable in Japanese views of China's human rights policies and regional diplomacy, and Chinese views of Japan's handling of history (including textbooks and Yasukuni Shrine) and military normalization. By explaining the link between identity conflicts and bilateral trust, this paper demonstrates why Sino-Japanese trust remains low and recent improvements in relations fragile. Peace and security in East Asia depend not only on how Tokyo and Beijing define and pursue their interests, but also on how they define and relate to each other. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]