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We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton's rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game between siblings.

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton's rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game between siblings.

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton's rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoner's dilemma game between siblings.

Quite often established migrants offer assistance and support that facilitate the arrival of new migrants. Why would migrants want other migrants to join them - so much so as to be willing to pay for them to come? We suggest a rationale. Our modeling framework is capable of explaining several stylized facts pertaining to transfers by migrants and the structure and dynamics of migration.

Quite often established migrants offer assistance and support that facilitate the arrival of new migrants. Why would migrants want other migrants to join them - so much so as to be willing to pay for them to come? We suggest a rationale. Our modeling framework is capable of explaining several stylized facts pertaining to transfers by migrants and the structure and dynamics of migration.

Quite often established migrants offer assistance and support that facilitate the arrival of new migrants. Why would migrants want other migrants to join them - so much so as to be willing to pay for them to come? We suggest a rationale. Our modeling framework is capable of explaining several stylized facts pertaining to transfers by migrants and the structure and dynamics of migration.