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While research suggests that telling lies can distort memory for the truth, the effects of receiving feedback about the believability about one's lies are not known. We hypothesised that participants who exaggerated the number of stolen items (vs. told the truth) in a mock insurance claim and then received feedback that their statement was believable (vs. not believable) would incorporate this lie into memory. In a two-phase between-subjects design, participants saw images of an office pre- and post-theft and were randomly assigned to report the number of stolen items accurately (truth-tellers) or exaggerate (liars). They were then randomly assigned to receive feedback that their statement was believable or not. Approximately two weeks later, participants' recall of the theft was measured. Liars and truth-tellers recalled a similar number of stolen items, but liars had less accurate recall for exactly which items were stolen. Liars (vs. truth-tellers) also made more omission errors. The majority of participants who fabricated additional stolen items (65.7%) incorporated one or more of these (false) items into their memory. Results suggest that source monitoring errors may lead fabricated details to be incorporated into memory. Although no effects of believability feedback were observed, recommendations for future researchers are discussed.

Instantaneous first impressions of facial trustworthiness influence the manner in which observers evaluate ensuing information about stranger targets [e.g. Porter, S., & ten Brinke, L. (2009). Dangerous decisions: A theoretical framework for understanding how judges assess credibility in the courtroom. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 14, 119–134. doi:10.1348/135532508X281520]. In two studies, we examined the association between perceptions of general trustworthiness and honesty assessments in an extremely high-stakes sample – individuals publicly pleading for the return of a missing relative, half of whom had killed the missing individual. In Study 1, observers (N = 131) provided trustworthiness ratings – either before or after viewing and evaluating the honesty of videotaped or audio-only pleas – for a still image that depicted a neutral expression on the face of each pleader. In Study 2, observers (N = 220) evaluated the sincerity of audio pleas paired either with an untrustworthy-looking t...

This study differentiated between the language of deceptive and genuine pleaders who were pleading for the return of a missing loved one during a televised press conference. The Wmatrix linguistic analysis tool was used to examine the language of 78 pleaders. Approximately half (n = 35) of these individuals were deceptive and were responsible for the disappearance. Transcripts of the pleas were analyzed for various linguistic cues, and a separate analysis was conducted across gender. Results revealed that deceptive pleaders used the word ‘they,’ singular indefinite pronouns (e.g., ‘anybody,’ ‘somebody’), and exclusivizers/particularizers (e.g., ‘just’) significantly more than genuine pleaders, while genuine pleaders used more temporal words (e.g., ‘days,’ ‘weeks’), and the word ‘we’ more frequently in their pleas. Specific gender differences were also revealed across credible and deceptive pleaders. Our analysis of linguistic differences across pleader veracity provides an enhanced understanding of the ve...

We examined the relation between emotion and susceptibility to misinformation using a novel paradigm, the ambiguous stimuli affective priming (ASAP) paradigm. Participants (N = 88) viewed ambiguous neutral images primed either at encoding or retrieval to be interpreted as either highly positive or negative (or neutral/not primed). After viewing the images, they either were asked misleading or non-leading questions. Following a delay, memory accuracy for the original images was assessed. Results indicated that any emotional priming at encoding led to a higher susceptibility to misinformation relative to priming at recall. In particular, inducing a negative interpretation of the image at encoding led to an increased susceptibility of false memories for major misinformation (an entire object not actually present in the scene). In contrast, this pattern was reversed when priming was used at recall; a negative reinterpretation of the image decreased memory distortion relative to unprimed images. These findings suggest that, with precise experimental control, the experience of emotion at event encoding, in particular, is implicated in false memory susceptibility.

According to the dangerous decisions theory (Porter, S., & ten Brinke, L. (2009). Dangerous decisions: A theoretical framework for understanding how judges assess credibility in the courtroom. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 14(1), 119–134), intuitive evaluations of facial trustworthiness influence the interpretation of evidence presented in courtroom settings. This study examined the role of individual differences in this process. Participants were presented with crime narratives, accompanied by a photograph of the supposed defendant that was previously rated as highly trustworthy or untrustworthy. Following presentation of the evidence in each case, participants rated the defendant's culpability and then completed questionnaires assessing potential biases. Participants endorsing justice–fairness were more likely to exonerate an untrustworthy-looking defendant, but less likely to exonerate a trustworthy-looking one. Individuals who held a strong racial bias, by contrast, were less likely to be influ...

Although the ability to detect deception is critical in many professional contexts, most observers (including professional lie-catchers) are able to identify deceivers at the level of chance only. Further, almost all studies of deception detection have used low-stakes deception scenarios in determining deceptive behavior and training effectiveness. We evaluated the effectiveness of a comprehensive, empirically based full-day training workshop in improving the ability of 42 legal and mental health professionals to detect extremely high-stakes emotional lies. Their ability to discriminate sincere and insincere pleaders was measured at baseline and post-training. Overall, accuracy increased significantly from M = 46.4 to 80.9%. We cautiously suggest that training professionals to apply empirically validated methods to deception detection can increase their ability to correctly discriminate between liars and truth-tellers. Strategies to facilitate the detection of deception via the development of training pro...

There is little support for the long-standing assumption that judges and jurors can accurately assess credibility. According to Dangerous Decisions Theory (DDT; Porter & ten Brinke, Legal and Crimi...

The discrimination of genuine and falsified emotional displays is critical in many contexts, including healthcare, forensic, and airport security settings. Previous research has demonstrated that comprehensive (two-day) empirically based deception detection training can lead to moderate gains in judgment accuracy. However, for many professional groups such extensive training is not feasible due to time and resource limitations. In the present study, we evaluated the effectiveness of brief (three-hour) training. N = 26 (13 females, 13 males) healthcare professionals with experience in evaluating the validity of medical claims participated in the training workshop. Their performance on two deception detection tasks was measured pre- and post-training; the participants attempted to discriminate: (1) videotaped truthful and fabricated stories concerning emotional events and (2) sincere and falsified emotional facial expressions. Results indicated that participants' overall accuracy on both tasks increased mod...

Despite a large body of false memory research, little has addressed the potential influence of an event's emotional content on susceptibility to false recollections. The Paradoxical Negative Emotion (PNE) hypothesis predicts that negative emotion generally facilitates memory but also heightens susceptibility to false memories. Participants were asked whether they could recall 20 "widely publicised" public events (half fictitious) ranging in emotional valence, with or without visual cues. Participants recalled a greater number of true negative events (M=3.31/5) than true positive (M=2.61/5) events. Nearly everyone (95%) came to recall at least one false event (M=2.15 false events recalled). Further, more than twice as many participants recalled any false negative (90%) compared to false positive (41.7%) events. Negative events, in general, were associated with more detailed memories and false negative event memories were more detailed than false positive event memories. Higher dissociation scores were associated with false recollections of negative events, specifically.

According to a long-standing clinical tradition, sexually traumatic experiences are processed and recalled differently from other experiences, often leading to memory impairment. In this study, we compared the characteristics of traumatic memories for sexual violence and two other types of emotional experiences. N=44 women recruited from a local sexual trauma agency were asked to recall and describe three autobiographical events: sexual abuse/assault, a non-sexual trauma, and a positive emotional event. The characteristics of the three memory types were compared on both subjective and objective measures. Further, the potential influences of level of traumatic impact and dissociation were assessed. Results indicated that memories for sexual trauma were not impaired or fragmented relative to other memories. Instead, memories for sexual trauma were associated with a remarkably high level of vividness, detail, and sensory components. Further, high levels of traumatic impact were not associated with memory impairment. Implications for the ongoing traumatic memory debate are discussed.