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These two books provide an analytical context for understanding the civil disorder which was rampant through major cities in the United States in the spring through winter of 2020. 1 The author of ...

Rising income inequality and the surge of civil disorder are two important socio-economic phenomena in contemporary China. This article empirically explores the relationship between inequality and ...

In March 1968, following a year of violent urban rebellions, the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders concluded that the United States was “moving toward two societies, one Black...

India possesses the world’s largest overseas population (31.2 million). This geographically dispersed overseas population contributes more to India financially every year than Foreign Direct Investment and Foreign Aid put together. India has come a long way from the Nehruvian era policy of active disassociation between the Indian State and overseas Indians. The need to protect or rescue Indians residing abroad may arise due to any number of scenarios ranging from natural disasters to civil disorder to terrorist action to full scale combat. This article examines whether it is possible for India to engage in the forcible protection/rescue of its nationals. It also examines the issue of whether India must limit itself to only protecting/rescuing its citizens or whether it can also protect/rescue its nationals.

President Lyndon Johnson's appointment of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder (Kerner Commission) followed a series of inner-city riots in the 1960s. The Commission's 1968 report, issued months before Martin Luther King, Jr.'s assassination, famously concluded that the United States was moving toward separate societies, one Black and one White. In recent years, another version of racialized violence has garnered public attention: systemic police brutality and repeated killings of unarmed Black and Brown men by police, spawning a new civil rights movement proclaiming Black Lives Matter. Condemnation of this violence and acknowledgment of its racial content by leading public officials is now standard fare, but criminal convictions and departmental discipline are scarce. This review essay brings attention back to the institutionalized racism called out by the Kerner Commission, arguing that occasional and even chronic police violence is an outcome rather than the core problem. A more fundamental issue is a routine function of policing-protecting mainstream United States from the perceived risk from its "ghetto" underbelly through spatial containment.

In Police Power and Race Riots: Urban Unrest in Paris and New York, Cathy Schneider explores the application of law enforcement policy and practice in response to civil disorders, and recounts nume...

Ferguson, Missouri became the center of the nation's attention when an unarmed African American teenager was killed by a Caucasian police officer. Civic unrest continued for weeks. The aim of this study was to learn how older adults experienced the social unrest. Ten focus groups were conducted with 73 participants. Eight themes were identified. Issues related to safety were most commonly discussed. Participants reported a breakdown in intergenerational communications and expressed a desire for more exchange. Findings are being discussed with relevant organizations to increase the involvement of older adults in on-going community development efforts and to provide opportunities for intergenerational dialogue.

Armed conflict and related violence, including terrorism and one-sided violence, has profound effects on people's health and lives. The purpose of this study was to determine the relationship between deaths due to terrorism, civil war and one-sided violence from 1994-2000 and disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) occurring in 2002 attributable to all causes and specific communicable and noncommunicable diseases. Deaths resulting from terrorism, war and one-sided violence were positively associated with all cause as well as a number of communicable and noncommunicable disease-specific DALYs across the majority of sex and age subgroups of the populace, controlling for an array of economic factors empirically shown to affect public health. Overall, a 1.0% increase in deaths due to terrorism, civil war and one-sided violence from 1994-2000 was associated with a 0.16% increase in DALYs lost to all causes in 2002 in the total world population. There was little variation in the magnitude of these associations between males and females and between communicable and noncommunicable diseases. The results of the present study can begin to guide post-conflict recovery by focusing on interventions targeting both noncommunicable as well as communicable diseases, thereby highlighting the full health costs of war and ultimately providing a strong rationale for promoting peace.

Although considerable scholarship has explored the riots of the 1960s as the culmination of tensions simmering throughout the tumultuous decade, this article examines Philadelphia's 1964 riot and the ways that local newspapers attempted to frame the violence. By urging Philadelphians to view the riot as the outcome of an ineffectual police department, which was ill-equipped to confront black "hoodlums, "journalists privileged frames of police paralysis and marginalization. The circulation of these two frames alone, however, cannot explain the eventual demise of the city's Police Advisory Board. This study argues that the imagery of police standing idly by while the streets of Philadelphia dissolved into chaos proved invaluable ammunition for opponents of the Board, who found in the news coverage further evidence of postwar liberalism's failure to protect the populace. On the evening of Friday, August 28, 1964, Philadelphia succumbed to the wave of urban riots that had been sweeping cities along the East Coast during a long and hot summer.1 Violence broke out at the corner of 22nd Street and Columbia Avenue in North Philadelphia after a black couple, Rush and Odessa Bradford, was confronted by two Philadelphia police officers, Patrolmen John Hoff and Robert Wells. Hoff, who was white, and Wells, who was black, had been called to the scene because the couple, allegedly engaged in a domestic dispute in their car, was blocking the flow of traffic at the busy intersection.2 Upon reaching the corner, the officers found Odessa Bradford holding her foot on the car's brake pedal. She proceeded to argue with Officer Wells, who pulled her out of the car by her wrists. Her removal should have been the end of the relatively minor disturbance, but as she was being put into the police wagon, a bystander emerged from the crowd and punched Hoff, causing passersby to enter the fray. After arresting Bradford and the bystander, who had punched his partner, Wells returned to the scene of the Bradfords' dispute to find a storm of flying botdes and bricks being aimed at police and their wagons. The ensuing violence and looting lasted the remainder of the weekend as rumors spread throughout the neighborhood that a black woman had been beaten and killed by a white police officer. Despite the rumors being untrue, they stirred greater anger toward police. When the violence Anally ended, two were dead, 350 were wounded, and commercial establishments lining the Columbia Avenue thoroughfare suffered approximately $4 million of damage.3 Home to the highest unemployment rates in the city, poorest housing, and lowest income and educational levels, North Philadelphia was more than simply an early example of the explosiveness of the urban crisis within the existing narrative of the 1960s.4 Commonly referred to as "the Jungle," the predominantly African-American neighborhood was the site of 19 percent of the city's crime and only 9 percent of its population. The phrase "the Jungle" was used by "many policemen, . . . much of the white community, [and] even . . . some juveniles who live in the area," according to the Philadelphia Evening Bulletin. Such usage signaled that in addition to being "a catalogue of social failure,"5 as die Bulletin reported, North Philadelphia also was discursively constructed in highly racialized, and racist, terms. The lexicon of descriptors conjured by a phrase such as "the Jungle" allowed for the demonization of the neighborhood and those who lived there. This casting of the neighborhood, set within the context of frequent charges of police brutality by community members, made North Philadelphia no stranger to strained relations with the Philadelphia Police Department.6 Urban League Executive Director Andrew Freeman dubbed North Philadelphia "a racial tinderbox" in early August 1964, waiting for a spark to ignite it.7 Only weeks later, the Bradfords' chance altercation provided the spark. Riots such as those which broke out in Philadelphia in 1964, in Watts in Los Angeles one year later, and in Newark and Detroit in 1 967 have been cited by historians as the catalysts compelling federal attention to longstanding issues of racism and inequality and resulting in President Lyndon Johnson forming the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders (Kerner Commission) in 1967. …

Television's Role in the Civil Disorders in the Summer of 1967 In the summer of 1967, America's cities exploded with riots in black neighborhoods, and many blamed televised news coverage for spreading the violence. The Kerner Commission investigated that issue and determined there was no direct connection between television and rioting. Yet there was data that was never revealed as part of the report that could have been used to come to a different conclusion. The commission hired a research firm, Simulmatics Inc., to do a content analysis of news media coverage of the riots, but data from the analysis was mentioned only briefly in the report. The data lends credence to the criticism that there was a connection between television and the riots. This article examines how the data fits into criticism of television violence in the 1960s and concludes there was a more direct connection than the commission reported. On July 27, 1967, four days after the start of Detroit's Twelfth Street riot, Congressman Durward G. Hall went to the podium in the House of Representatives. The House had spent the day debating its role in resolving the spate of urban violence that had spread from the Midwest to rhe South to the East Coast and back to the Midwest, and die toll was increasing. In June, one had died and sixty-three were injured in Cincinnati and then another sixteen were injured in Tampa. In July, twentyfive were killed and 725 were injured in Newark, and another was killed and fifty-five more were injured in Plainfield, New Jersey. The Detroit riot would eventually claim forty- three lives and injure 324. Major riots also were recorded in Buffalo, Milwaukee, and Minneapolis, and thirty-one other cities would experience serious rioting in poor, black neighborhoods diat summer. In total, die government estimated eighty-three people were killed and 1,897 were injured in the crisis.1 The nation was in turmoil, and the public was demanding that Washington take action to stem the tide of violence. Congress was trying to figure out why this was happening and who was responsible. The rioting had become the nations greatest domestic crisis since the Civil War, and there was plenty of blame to go around. Yet, Hall, a Republican from Missouri, had no equivocation about where the responsibility lay. He said it was television's fault: A sad but tragic fact is that our marvel of instant communications, with die potential to do so much good, mirrors the day-to-day events leading up to a riot in a fashion no less detestable than die worst days of yellow journalism. National commentators on television and radio decry what is happening today, but over many yesterdays they permitted their facilities to be used as an incitement to riot, and now they too are reaping what they have sowed.2 The nation's network and local television stations were already under fire in the summer of 1967. As riots spread from city to city, television news staffers dutifully reported on the events, often times at their own peril. They had the unenviable task of reporting what was happening in the black ghettos of American cities while trying to remain above the fray. Stories of television news reporters being harassed, beaten, and injured were legendary. Yet television news slogged forward reporting live from the scene of riots and informing the nation about why young blacks felt the need to trash their communities. But despite their heroic efforts, television news staffers found themselves being blamed for causing the rioting, not being praised for reporting on the crisis. Senator Hugh Scott, a Pennsylvania Republican, said at a news conference on July 31 that television news had "in many instances inadvertently contributed to the turmoil" and urged television to balance the statements made by violent extremists with the appeals for order by moderate black leaders. He wrote letters to the heads of ABC, CBS, and NBC, urging them to be more responsible in their riot coverage and to come up with a code of conduct on how they would report on rioting. …

In this article, we provide a synthetic review of how the Chinese government strategically guides public opinion when confronting increasing civic disorder. Specifically, under a framework of government-media-public relationship, the strategies are analyzed in terms of three dimensions: (1) how the government influences media coverage, involving information management and media management; (2) how the media coverage influences public attitudes, involving cooperative media framing; and (3) how the government communicates directly with the public, involving public consultation meeting and individualized thought work. These strategies consist of a triangle relationship, each element of which is examined in both theoretical frameworks and practical contexts in this article. We conclude with a discussion of implications of public opinion guidance for democratic governance in China.

This article uses the controversial November 2008 Belfast homecoming parade of local men and women in the British armed services as a case study to examine the mechanisms at work picking away at inter-communal trust, and the speed and persistence of their application, a defining characteristic of these mechanisms. The article conceptualises trust partially by reference to social capital, and closely examines how issues of post-conflict memory and contested space intersected and damaged nascent networks of inter-community trust. The article will also tentatively suggest means by which such cultural conflicts can be allowed to combust without ripping away grassroots trust and threatening civil disorder.

From the mid-1970s, seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa have experienced civil disorders and wars lasting for at least 10 years. In two Sierra Leone during 1991-2002, and Somalia from 1988 and continuing adult HIV prevalence remained below 1%. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, HIV prevalence appears to have stabilised during post-1991 civil disorder and war. Limited information from Angola (civil war 1975 -2002) and Liberia (civil disorder and war from 1989 and continuing) suggests low HIV prevalence. Mozambique's HIV prevalence was near 1% after its 1975 - 1992 civil war, but increased dramatically in the first post-war decade. Across African countries with long-term wars, HIV seems to have spread more slowly than in most neighbouring countries at peace.This evidence contributes to the ongoing debate about the factors that explain differential epidemic trajectories, a debate which is crucial to the design of HIV prevention programmes. One possible explanation for slow epidemic growth in wartime is that unsterile health care accounts for an important proportion of HIV transmission during peacetime, but much less when wars disrupt health services. However, other explanations are also possible.The roles of sex and blood exposures in HIV epidemics in war and peace await empirical determination. SAHARA-J (2004) 1(2): 87-98 Keywords: HIV, epidemiology, Africa, wars, risk factors. RÉSUMÉ A partir du milieu des années 1970, sept pays de l'Afrique sous-Sahara ont connu des désordres civils et des guerres qui ont duré au moins 10 ans. Dans deux pays la Sierra Léone entre 1991 et 2002 et la Somalie depuis 1988 jusque-là la prédominance du VIH chez des adultes est restée sous 1%. Dans la République Démocratique du Congo, la prédominance du VIH s'est stabilisée après le désordre civil et la guerre de 1991. L'information très limitée de l'Angola (guerre civile 1975 - 2002) et de Libéria (désordre et guerre civils depuis 1989) suggère une prédominance du VIH très basse. Au Mozambique, la prédominance du VIH était d'environ 1% après la guerre civile de 1975 à 1992. Cependant, il y a eu une augmentation importante au cours de la première décennie après la guerre. Dans tous les pays africains qui ont subit des guerres à longue durée, le VIH semble se propager plus doucement que dans des pays voisins qui sont en période de paix. Cette preuve contribue au débat actuel portant sur des facteurs responsables aux trajectoires différentielles de l'épidémie. Ce débat est important à la conception des programmes de prévention. Une explication possible de la dissémination lente de l'épidémie durant la guerre est que les soins non-stériles expliquent la proportion importante de transmission de VIH pendant la période de paix. Ce phénomène est encore plus réduit quand les services de santé sont interrompus par la guerre. Néanmoins, il y a d'autres explications possibles. Les rôles que jouent le sexe et la contamination par le sang sur l'épidémie du VIH pendant la guerre et durant la période de paix attendent une détermination empirique. . SAHARA-J (2004) 1(2): 87-98Mots clés: le VIH, I'épidémiologie, I'Afrique, les guerres, les facteurs de risque.

An under-researched, controversial and complex leisure event is examined in the light of orthodox research that documents the beneficial effects leisure has on the psyche. This involves drawing on contemporary theorizing in leisure studies while at the same time using grounded knowledge of a particular locality and synthesizing the material to identify areas for future theorizing and research. In Northern Ireland, the July summer holiday period was traditionally used to celebrate Protestant culture and religion and Unionist supporters marked these events by holding religious and political rallies. However, this celebration of Protestantism has not (recently) been shared with the Nationalist community and various skirmishes and civil disorder offences have been recorded over this holiday period during the last 5 years. The paper notes the change in emphasis from celebration to confrontation and considers the effects this has on individuals already living in an armed conflict situation. It is contended that...

(2002). The Construction of a Political and Media Presence. Journal of Homosexuality: Vol. 41, No. 3-4, pp. 249-264.

Greater market globalisation, ever-increasing competition, greater global interdependences and more pronounced shareholder activism in the USA and elsewhere pose demands for improved corporate governance in today's mature and emerging markets. The aim of such efforts is to deliver, through enhanced governance in the boardroom, a higher shareholder return. This paper evaluates South Africa's efforts to adhere to international best practice on corporate governance through the King II Report (Draft). It is argued that South Africa's unique socio-political context requires careful navigation and balance in order to avoid the civil disorder experienced by its neighbours.

During the past decade, vast changes have occurred in the geopolitical landscape and the nature of the types of conflicts in which technologically developed countries have been involved. While the threat of conventional war remains, forces have been more frequently deployed in situations that require great restraint. Adversaries are often likely to be elusive and commingled with noncombatants. There has been some shift in public opinion away from tolerance of collateral casualties. Therefore there is a need to be able to apply force while limiting casualties. Non-lethal weapons provide part of the solution. Among the changes that will influence the future have been studies by the US and NATO concerning the use of non-lethal weapons, coincidental with increased funding for their development and testing. New concepts and policies have recently been formalized. Surprisingly, the most strident objections to the implementation of non-lethal weapons have come from organizations that are ostensibly designed to protect non-combatants. These arguments are specious and, while technically and academically challenging, actually serve to foster an environment that will result in the deaths of many more innocent civilians. They misconstrue technology with human intent. The reasons for use of force will not abate. Alternatives to bombs, missiles, tanks and artillery must therefore be found. Non-lethal weapons are not a panacea but do offer the best hope of minimizing casualties while allowing nations or alliances the means to use force in protection of national or regional interests.

Welcome to issue 26(2) of Medicine, Conflict and Survival. The role of health professionals in relation to conflict has been an important theme of the journal since its inception and we return to i...

Mob sociology is a theory of crowd behavior that is found in U.S. police literature and that has been used to design and justify demonstration management practices. Mob sociology is derived from sociological theories about crowd behavior but ignores their originators’assertions that crowds occur within a larger social context. Mob sociology was diffused throughout the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s through a national civil disorder training program and a variety of police manuals and magazines. It is highly compatible with the escalated force style of protest policing and has lost much of its influence since the introduction of negotiated management practices. However, it is still present in police literature and training programs and should be replaced by contemporary social science research and theory.

Stone engages with his subject on two levels, the theoretical and the empirical. On the theoretical side, he argues for the meaningfulness of the term 'collective memory' by showing how the response to the Holocaust in Britain served certain communal needs. 'Collective memory' here is the way in which a group produces narratives of the past which enable it to perpetuate itself, to take account of the past without disturbing its own self-definition. On the empirical level, Stone shows that this response was one which domesticated the horror of what had occurred in order to make its narration bearable. The process was by no means a deliberate whitewashing of the murders; it demonstrates how, in the construction of collective memory, the most painful episodes are unconsciously written out or integrated into more uplifting stories. For example, the murder of the Jews of Europe was frequently tied into a narrative of catastrophe and redemption in which the Zionist cause signalled the Jews' ultimate triumph ove...

The World Food Programme's largest mission has evolved in the last decade from development to disaster relief. In particular, the rise of emergency food aid delivered in response to civil disorders has presented new challenges. This has led to substantial organizational challenges. Coordination with UN and NGO humanitarian agencies has grown, logistical capacity has adapted to difficult requirements, and strategies for working in an insecure environment have been developed. The reliance on emergency relief makes WFP operations and funding more dependent on unpredictable political events. Owing to this evolution and the variability of emergency needs, WFP's future direction and role in the UN system remain important issues.

Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), the greatest English political philosopher, famously argued that the solution to civil disorders lay in a sovereign authority backed with force. But force was insufficient unless people were also educated to obedience. The key was the re-education of teachers, including ministers of religion and lawyers, who would then instruct the masses. Hobbes attributed disorder, particularly in the English Civil War, to the doctrines taught in the universities which had encouraged students to question authority. He proposed to purge the universities and require lecturers to act as public servants teaching the true science of morals and politics which demonstrated the need for obedience. Hobbes claimed to have discovered this science and recommended it be taught in the universities. The article argues that education should be seen as at the centre of Hobbes's project.

This paper presents a personal view of some psychological aspects of the situation in former Yugoslavia.

This paper reappraises the role of the police in public order situations. In doing so, it suggests that the often mentioned, but just as frequently discarded, option of a ‘third force’ needs to be re‐examined against the costs of trying to maintain an incompatible range of police functions, and an increasingly unpopular public image.

The literature on 1960s civil disorders provides inconclusive evidence about their impact on city government policies. It is argued that the methodological weaknesses of existing studies account €or this. Focusing on urban centers of over 10,OOO population in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, this investigation uses annual expenditure data from 1962 to 1974 to evaluate the impact of rioting. Consequent upon rioting, city expenditures did not exhibit strong changes in direction. At best, there was weak, partial support for the argument that the primary city response was to enhance protective services and not to respond to rioters' grievances by increasing social-program commitments.

This article examines the role of commercial insurance for ethnic minority businesses located in the inner city. It is based on research in three major cities. Since 1981, insurance premiums have risen dramatically for many retailers, especially those operating in areas where civil disorders occurred. Some insurance companies have also refused insurance by operating ‘redlining’ policies. The negative impact of these strategies on ethnic business is examined and proposals advanced for ameliorating the position.

This critique of the relationship between media and social change reviews both the nature of the pseudo event as originally analyzed by American social historian Daniel Boorstin, and the relatively few systematic studies and essays on how news about such events may have affected social behavior, political power and history. Minority movements involving confrontation with police seeking to preserve established order are examined in the context of news communication, social and political causes and in some cases violence. This analysis casts considerable scepticism on the short-range impact of pseudo events, but offers a longer historical look at citizen participation in democracies, problems of substituting symbols for complex issues, and the clash of minorities and disorder with the resistance of the established majority. This article assembles both sporadic essays and commentaries along with more systematic studies, many of which were contemporary observations at the time when the events occurred. The in...

Around 1650 a Neapolitan named Laurent Tonti fled to France to escape civil disorders in his native land. Before long the Italian promoter's schemes to replenish the public treasury captured the ear and imagination of Louis XIV's powerful minister, Cardinal Mazarin. The monarchy, in fact, rewarded Tonti with an annual pension.1

Discrimination against women in education is discomfortingly familiar. In 1869 the climate was such that the decision of the Court of the University of Edinburgh to pass regulations permitting the admission of women undergraduates in medicine ultimately provoked civil disorder. Sachs and Wilson vividly describe the violence of reaction thus.

Students of civil disorder in the United States look to such events for signs of an incipient tradition in the growth of urban terrorism, but the relation between these two forms of collective violence remains unclear. By examining the evolution of civil violence in New York City for nearly three hundred years, one gains a better grasp of the historically conservative nature of collective violence in this country and the conditions under which it could change into a more threatening tradition of political terrorism.

Food riots were endemic in 18th-century England. Indeed, Professor George Rude has suggested that as many as two out of every three disturbances in that unruly century were over food. Many of these riots were short-lived local affairs. But frequently food riots swept across the country, smouldering and breaking out like brushwood fires from market to market and county to county to the alarm and dismay of the ruling classes. Such was the case in the years 1709–10, 1727–9, 1739–40, 1756–7, 1766–8, 1772–3, 1783, 1795–6 and 1799–1801. Among these ‘peaks’ of civil disorders, the food riots of 1766 stand out as among the most extensive, the most prolonged and the most difficult to assuage of the century. They came not in one wave but in three, breaking out in January-February, then again in early August, and finally culminating in September in a headlong rush of disturbances which convulsed central southern England, the Midlands and East Anglia. These riots stretched the resources of the forces of law a...

STUrmES OF ghetto violence, most notably the Report of the National Advisory Commission of Civil Disorders (1968), have documented Black exclusion from the opportunity structure in terms of high unemployment among Black ghetto youth, inadequate housing, and failing educational opportunities for low income Black ghetto residents. While riot studies have focused attention on the exclusion of Blacks from entry level jobs, only limited notice has been given to the extent of Black exclusion from positions of power in major institutional sectors. Community power studies also have provided relatively limited information on Black participation in community decision-making. It is the thesis of the present paper that Blacks are effectively excluded from the decision making process at the community level. A recent study of black powerlessness in Chicago examined the extent to which Blacks were excluded from positions of influence in major institutional sectors (Baron, et al., 1968). Their findings indicated that Negroes occupied only 2.6 percent or 285 of the 19,997 top policy-making positions in the Chicago area (Baron, 1968:28). Black representation in Chicago was greatest in the elected public sector, welfare and religious voluntary organizations, and industrial unions. In the words of the Chicago study

(1968). Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders: A Review Article. Journal of Economic Issues: Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 200-210.

The urban redevelopment problems of Tokyo presage those of the more successful metropolises in Asia. Its inner wards contribute to social and economic development by: 1. Producing and disseminating the popular innovations adopted by the pace-setting elites most active in the central wards 2. Supplying an environment for the acculturation of ambitious rural immigrants 3. Offering a convenient residential locale for diverse, opportunistic small businessmen 4. Providing sites and services for major cultural and educational institutions not able to crowd into the center 5. Generating capital to be invested in the suburbs or the center A procedure for comparing areas of an Asian metropolis made it possible to identify promising planning strategies. Local development consortiums should be exceedingly useful, but need a wider range of powers than at present. Highest priority must be given to the prevention of civil disorders.

An intensive multi-factor program designed to reduce negative racial attitudes among white first grade chil dren was implemented over a period of 30 school days. The experimental group consisted of twenty white children; the control group consisted of twenty-one white children. The preschool racial attitude measuring instrument showed a statistical significance of the mean change in the experimental group with a probability of less than .01. A REPORT on civil disorders from The Na tional Advisory Commission contends that there are patterns of tensions which produce fear, dis trust, guilt, and hate among members of all groups, and that they sometimes erupt into vio lent social disturbances (8). A reordering of re lations between black and white is inevitable if these patterns of tension are to disappear. Re search has indicated that early childhood is the place to begin this reordering. Studies have indicated that young children tend to associate the color black with negative objects or situations and the color white with positive ones (9, 10, 13, 15). Landreth and John son studied 3- to 5-year-old black children from upper socioeconomic status backgrounds and found that they tended to perceive skin color in cognitive terms while children from lower socio economic backgrounds perceived it in affective terms (4). They concluded that these patterns of responses to people with different skin color were present at the early age of 3 and became more prominent during the succeeding 2 years. It has been shown that white children displayed strong preferences for members of their own racial group (1, 3, 7). Morland postulated that contact between whites with members of other races was not necessarily the cause of negative racial atti tude development (7). He contended that prefer ence for being white came through indirect sources which involved subtle communications on the part of parents,, teachers, etc. It has been found that children who had a tend ency to associate the color white with positive words also associated the color black with nega tive words during preschool years when their at titudes were developing (9, 13, 15). These studies demonstrated that the colors black and white by themselves had connotative meanings which were substantially similar to the meanings commonly associated with racial membership. It was noted that this preschool period also coincided with the period of racial awareness development. It ap peared reasonable to speculate that these same word meanings could be generalized to groups of persons. Studies have also been conducted which i indicated that some of these same correlates ex isted between attitudes toward the colors black and white and children's attitudes toward them selves and others as related to racial member

A couple of years ago, when I was about ten years younger, Fred Mosteller asked me to give this speech. I said "yes" partly because I've known and admired Fred for many years, partly because I once taught statistics and have many friends in this Association, but mostly because I was flattered that someone thought I would last long enough to keep the engagement. My days and my energies are niow totally absorbed ill hlandling some of President Johnson's major domestic programs, anid I want to talk about some of the problems in our domestic effort, problems in the governinig of this free society in other words, problems facing the people. I cannot speak with assurance, only with concerni. I constantly marvel at the number of people outside the arenia of action who know precisely how to solve our problems, and the number of people in the heat of action who lack that superhuman clarity. I've often wondered why this is so. I want to talk about resources, expectatioiis, planniing, the public mood, institutional change and civil disorder. We have seen in the years since 1961 a growth of domestic social programs unrivalled in our history except for the period 1933-37. I'm not speaking solely of government programs-I'm speaking of activities in and out of government, in every corner of this land. It has been an extraordinary outburst of social conscience, marked first and foremost by a heightened awareness of social problems. There is no precedent for the scope of goals envisioned by the people in and out of government wlho concern tlhemselves with the social fields today. We lhave declared war on ignorance, disease, poverty, discrimination, mental or physical incapacity-in fact, on every condition that stunts human growth or diminishes human dignity. I am deeply committed to that effort and heartened by the progress we have made. But it is a struggle all the way, and there are grave problems ahead. Consider, for example, the coming crunch between expectations and resources. The expectations of the American people for social benefits are virtually limitless. In the past six years we have opened up innumerable areas of constructive governmental activity-in early childhood educationi, work with handicapped children, special education for the disadvantaged, health research, work oni artificial organs, programs for the aged. rural development efforts, conservatioin aind beautification activities, manpower training and so on. We have begun most of these programs oni a modest scale. The proponents of every social institution or group aided by these prograins believe passionately that support to their field Imiust be vastly enlarged in the near future. The colleges and uniiversities have ideas for future Federal support that would run to billions per year. And they ask little compared to the advocates of aid to elementary and secondary education. The aninual cost of a guaranteed incoimle would run -to scores of billions. Estimnates of the cost of adequate air and water pollutioni control and solid waste disposal run even higher. Es-timiiates of the cost of renovating our1 cities run to hundreds of billions. Today we attribute budget constraints to the Viet Nam war, but if the war ended tomorrow, in 12 monithls we'd again be bumpingt against the ceiliing of resource constraints. How do you make rational choices between goals when resources are limited and will always be limited relative to expectations? To those of you familiar with program budgeting, the question translates itself into several others: How cani we gather the data, accomplish the evaluation, anid do the planning that will make rational choices possible? Forced choices are of course nlot the only conisequence of a limit oIn resources. We can have our cake and eat at least some of it if we can get a higher yield from the dollars, talent and inistitutional strength available to us. But that raises questions of good management and unit cost that are painful to most people active in the social fields. Once in talking witlh a physician who was ministering to poor people I asked about unit costs of his government-supported clinic, and he said "I'm not an efficiency expert, I just want to heal sick people." What he was refusinig to face is that somewhere up the line hard decisions will necessarily be made, and a limit placed on resources available for delivery of health care. So if he is in fact functioning with high unit costs, the number of sick people hie can treat will be correspondingly few. Without knowing it he has made a decision oln resource allocation. Now let me mention onie more kind of probleiii that arises when demand is great and resources are limited. Any effort to plan amid rationalize the allocation of resources tenids to reduce pluralism, and to introduce new kinds of institutional controls. If we have less tliami enough to spend in constructing hospitals, then we must be sure that those constructed are properly located and * As delivered at a meeting of the American Statistical Association, Washington, D. C., Wednesday, December 27, 1967.