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In a recent monograph, Sandy Goldberg argues that epistemology should be renovated so as to accommodate the way in which human beings are dependent on others for what they know. He argues that the way to accomplish this is to consider the cognition of others to be part of the belief-forming process for the purposes of epistemic assessment when radical dependence on others is in evidence. In this paper, I argue that, contrary to what one may expect, a credit theory of knowledge is well positioned to make the sort of anti-individualistic move that Goldberg advocates. Furthermore, unlike Goldberg's extended process reliabilism, an extended credit theory has a theoretically motivated way of restricting the domain of epistemic evaluation to the cognitive. Finally, I argue that, although adopting the extended cognition hypothesis would help Goldberg's position, an extended credit theory would still have the advantage.

The Mine of Information Project attempts to provide a unified Web-accessible catalogue of archival, library and museum materials relating to the South Wales Coalfield. It faced difficulties in providing a comprehensive catalogue because: (a) we did not find ready-made software tools to handle varied formats, and (b) the development of cross-sectoral standards (such as Dublin Core) is far from complete.[Note: The views expressed in this article are those of the author writing in a private capacity and are not the official view of the Mine of Information project]