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Following a historical commitment to multilateralism, in the last decade the trade policy initiatives of many states in the Asia-Pacific have turned to bilateralism through the negotiation of free trade agreements (FTAs). The corresponding proliferation of regional FTAs has thus far been understood to result from three broad motivations: a desire to advance trade liberalization beyond World Trade Organization (WTO) disciplines; mercantilistic efforts to secure preferential access to key export markets; and/or attempts to use FTAs to secure non-economic political gains. This paper argues that since the middle of the decade a new motive has emerged – the use of FTAs to improve resource security – particularly by import-dependent resource consumers in Northeast Asia. As yet unexamined in the literature, this paper seeks to document and explain this trend. It analyses the recent emergence of resource security concerns as a new FTA motive; the corresponding shifts in the FTA strategies and initiatives...

This paper explores how Washington views the burgeoning across-theboard ties between Seoul and Beijing in the midst of the strained alliance relationship with the former. On the basis of poll and interview data, the paper demonstrates (1) average Americans' perceptual bias in favor of Europe and general lack of interest in Asian affairs at large, (2) Americans' (both public and elite) strong antipathy toward China and indifference to Korea, and (3) the potentially adverse impact of such perceptions on the future U.S.-Korea relations within the context of rapidly expanding Sino-Korean bilateralism. In the short run South Korea's strategic choice will be invariably to stick with the U.S.-centered alliance structure and, at the same time, to expand the burgeoning ties with China. South Korea's policy will increasingly resemble hedging. This approach will require much prudence. In the mid-term—by 2030—China's shadow over South Korea will perhaps have eclipsed that of the United States in Asia and, gi...

Published online: 06 May 2018 What are the consequences and implications of Brexit on the nature and character of Franco-German ‘embedded bilateralism’ in Europe, the relative influence of Berlin and Paris in EU policymaking, and the EU's future trajectory more generally? Brexit brings into sharper relief three basic future scenarios for the EU: (1) German hegemony; (2) the decline of the European project; and (3) a rejuvenated Franco-German tandem at the union's centre – what we call ‘back to the future’. Which of these scenarios prevails will depend on the interaction of Brexit with other developments, most notably (1) the overall strengthening of Germany's relative standing, and (2) France's ability to overcome its economic and societal stasis with serious reforms. Though each of the three scenarios is possible, this paper holds that ‘back to the future’ is the most likely and plausible. Brexit thus might even further accentuate the historically influential Franco-German relationship, not least in union-level policy domains, such as security and defense, in which Britain has hitherto played a significant role.

Japan's policy toward India since 2000 appears to be a sign of new directions in Japan's security policy since its decision to establish a strategic partnership with India is different from the previous policy of exclusive bilateralism centering on the US–Japan alliance. Nonetheless, Japan's recent security partnership with India is part of Japan's long-term effort to support the US-led liberal political and economic order in East Asia. This paper argues that Japan's policy toward India since 2000 has evolved toward becoming fully aligned with US policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. The critical shift in Tokyo's policy toward India came in spring 2005, when Japanese political leaders and policy elites came to recognize India as an important balancer against China as a result of the violent anti-Japanese demonstrations in China. They decided to support including India into the East Asian Summit and incorporated India into their new values diplomacy. This shift in Japan's policy toward India, alon...

In response to calls for developing an instrument to measure public diplomacy outcomes, this paper introduces the Relationship Assessment of Diplomatic Interaction Outcome (RADIO) scale. Developed based on the Organisation–Public Relationship Assessment (OPRA) scale in public relations, the RADIO scale measures relationship between a country and its foreign publics as public diplomacy outcome. It classifies relationships into two types: experiential (characterised by direct experiences with a country) and reputational (those without direct experiences). Two macro- dimensions (i.e. interactional bilateralism and power mutuality) and two micro-dimensions (i.e. trust and empathy) are proposed for both relationship types. Relational satisfaction and relational continuance are proposed as micro-dimensions for experiential relationships. Relational attentiveness and relational curiosity are proposed as micro-dimensions for reputational relationships. Implications of the RADIO scale also are discussed.

This paper looks at the TTIP from a trade policy perspective. It argues that while TTIP is an unprecedented bilateral agreement, it does not constitute a Polanyian moment. TTIP is unprecedented in both EU and international trade policy terms because it offers an alternative to WTO multilateralism. Never before has bilateralism offered such a 'best alternative to no agreement' (BATNA) to members of the core decision-making body of the WTO negotiating arm, making TTIP an unprecedented geopolitical game-changer. The anti-TTIP campaign, however, has not been driven either by geopolitical or trade liberalization concerns but by fears about EU bargaining power. By strategically focusing on the potential impact on public policy and safety standards, normative arguments promulgated by opponents to TTIP reflect concerns with perceived threats to the EU status quo, and a willingness to preserve the same. The US is presented (implicitly) as more powerful than the EU, and therefore perceived as able to impose its preferences which are considered too neo-liberal.

Australia–India relations continue to puzzle foreign policy analysts. The reasons for stronger ties seem obvious, yet each successive Australian government has proved unable to forge the links necessary for more fruitful collaboration. Prime minister John Howard made two visits to India. His second visit in 2006—when he expressed unqualified enthusiasm for India's fast-growing economy and for the development of a new centre of gravity for the world, the emerging ‘global middle class’ of China and India—promised to change the language of engagement from neglect to partnership. This paper examines the context of the changing relationship, looks at the role of leadership in the formulation of foreign policy, and asks whether the momentum developed from Howard's visit was deep and strong enough to sustain the shocks ahead—the 2009 attacks on Indian students and the reversal of the decision on the sale of uranium—and to maintain a position for Australia in India's growing global engagement.

A decade ago, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, numerous observers expected regional integration to take off in East Asia. What, meanwhile, has actually happened? This paper argues that while overall inter-state cooperation has certainly intensified in East Asia during this period, there has been no significant expansion of multilateral, as opposed to bi- or minilateral cooperation and less still any political integration. It explores the reasons for the emergence of this pattern of cooperation in the region, in particular the extent that it has been shaped by ASEAN, which, unwilling and unable as it is to sponsor any far-reaching projects for much closer, region-wide multilateral cooperation, provides no more than a ‘soft core’ of East Asian regionalism. The failure of political integration to take off is attributed to the antagonistic character of Sino-Japanese relations, the relative weakness of the mobilization of transnational business interests in favour of closer regional coo...

This paper examines economic regionalism in East Asia with a focus on the key issues in harmonizing bilateral free trade agreements. The ASEAN+1 free trade agreements with China, South Korea and Japan represent the first attempts to structure cooperation in trade across Southeast and Northeast Asia. It is therefore important to examine the coverage of these agreements and the extent to which they actually liberalize trade. This study focuses on major choices made in the negotiation of the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement and the ways in which these choices help or hinder the consolidation of economic regionalism. The results achieved in the ASEAN–Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement are limited at best. The agreement does establish some new areas of cooperation among the signatories but fails to address important issues for regionalism such as labor mobility. It also makes limited progress in harmonizing and liberalizing rules of origin. The ASEAN–Japan Compr...

This paper incorporates foreign direct investment (FDI) into the examination of trading bloc formation with endogenously determined coalition structures. In so doing, we build a three-country model, in which firms serve foreign markets either by exporting or undertaking FDI, and consider a coalition formation game with the Coalition Proof Nash Equilibrium as an equilibrium concept. We find that the equilibrium coalition structure varies upon firms characterization before and after the formation of a trading bloc. As in the literature, when all firms are exporters in the pre- and post-formation, bilateralism can be an equilibrium outcome. However, when trade barriers are not so high as to be trade-prohibitive and the environment is favorable to multinational activities in the pre- or post-formation, only global free trade will prevail as an equilibrium coalition structure.

This paper traces the formal and informal aspects of Japan's robust bilateralism on issues of external and internal security and discusses a variety of embryonic multilateral arrangements that have sprung up in the 1990s. Asian-Pacific multilateralism is not yet a strong and unquestioned collectively held norm in either Tokyo or any of the major capitals in the Asia-Pacific. What matters instead are political practices shaped by a strong tradition of bilateralism and, only very recently, by an incipient multilateralism.

William Watts, The United States and Japan: A Troubled Partnership, Ballinger, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1984. xiii, 118pp. Cloth: US$19.95. Endymion Wilkinson, Japan Versus Europe: A History of Misunderstanding, Penguin Books Australia, Ringwood, Victoria, 1983. 288pp. Paper: $7.95. Wolf Mendl, Western Europe and Japan Between the Superpowers, Croom Helm, London and Sydney and St. Martin's Press, New York, 1984. 181pp. Cloth: $31.95.