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Numerous routing protocols have been designed and subjected to model checking and simulations. However, model checking the design or testing the simulator-based prototype of a protocol does not guarantee that the implementation is free of bugs and vulnerabilities. Testing implementations beyond their basic functionality (also known as adversarial testing) can increase protocol robustness. We focus on automated adversarial testing of real-world implementations of wireless routing protocols. In our previous work we created Turret, a platform that uses a network emulator and virtualization to test unmodified binaries of general distributed systems. Based on Turret, we create Turret-W designed specifically for wireless routing protocols. Turret-W includes new functionalities such as differentiating routing messages from data messages to enable evaluation of attacks on the control plane and the data plane separately, support for several additional protocols (e.g., those that use homogeneous/heterogenous packet formats, those that run on geographic forwarding (not just IP), those that operate at the data link layer instead of the network layer), support for several additional attacks (e.g., replay attacks) and for establishment of adversarial side-channels that allow for collusion. Turret-W can test not only general routing attacks, but also wireless specific attacks such as wormhole. Using Turret-W on publicly available implementations of five representative routing protocols, we (re-)discovered 37 attacks and 3 bugs. All these bugs and 5 of the total attacks were not previously reported to the best of our knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Geosocial networks (GSNs) extend classic online social networks with the concept of location. Users can report their presence at venues through “check-ins” and, when certain check-in sequences are satisfied, users acquire special status in the form of “badges”. We first show that this innovative functionality is popular in Foursquare, a prominent GSN. Furthermore, we address the apparent tension between privacy and correctness, where users are unable to prove having satisfied badge conditions without revealing the corresponding time and location of their check-in sequences. To this end, we propose several privacy preserving protocols that enable users to prove having satisfied the conditions of several badge types. Specifically, we introduce (i) GeoBadge and T-Badge, solutions for acquiring location badges, (ii) FreqBadge, for mayorship badges, (iii) e-Badge, for proving various expertise levels and (iv) MPBadge, for accumulating multi-player badges. We show that a Google Nexus One smartphone is able to perform tens of badge proofs per minute while a provider can support hundreds of million of check-ins and badge verifications per day. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An accurate Internet topology graph is important in many areas of networking, from understanding ISP business relationships to diagnosing network anomalies. Most Internet mapping efforts have derived the network structure, at the level of interconnected autonomous systems (ASes), from a rather limited set of vantage points. In this paper, we argue that a promising approach to revealing the hidden areas of the Internet topology is through active measurement from an observation platform that scales with the growing Internet. By leveraging measurements performed by an extension to a popular P2P system, we show that this approach indeed exposes significant new topological information. Our study is based on traceroute measurements from more than 992,000 IPs in over 3,700 ASes distributed across the Internet hierarchy, many in regions of the Internet not covered by publicly available path information. To address this issue we develop heuristics that identify 23,914 new AS links not visible in the publicly-available BGP data—12.86 percent more customer-provider links and 40.99 percent more peering links, than previously reported. We validate our heuristics using data from a tier-1 ISP, and show that they successfully filter out all false links introduced by public IP-to-AS mapping. We analyze properties of the Internet graph that includes these new links and characterize why they are missing. Finally, we have made the identified set of links and their inferred relationships publicly available. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]