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Reverse auctions with multiple attributes have been extensively applied for centralized purchasing of large enterprises and governments. This paper focuses on the bid evaluation behaviors of referee experts and employs an evolutionary game approach to improve the fairness and reliability of bid evaluation. First, the bid evaluation process and existing problems in the mechanism are described. Second, a static game model is constructed to analyze the conditions that are necessary for achieving a long-term cooperative equilibrium between business and technical groups. Third, some evolutionary paths and factors influencing bid evaluation behaviors are analyzed, and then a simulation system is developed based on the evolution process and run several times on a MATLAB GUI platform. The simulation results explicitly make a wider gamut of decision-making parameters as well as start-up variants on initial conditions that determine further evolution. The methods and results presented in this paper can provide decision support for administrative departments in the bid evaluations of centralized purchasing. Those bodies can then choose from the best existing management policies to guide the referee experts’ behaviors into the desired channels and toward optimal outcomes. A more judicious bidding evaluations process may result. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the product-positioning problem for a monopolist developing of a new product. The majority of the literature on product positioning assumes that the consumer choice model and parameters are both precisely known. In reality, however, the marketer may be uncertain about the model structure or the parameters due to incomplete information, small sample data size, etc. In this paper, we investigate a robust product-positioning problem based on the multinomial logit model to account for parameter uncertainty. We first establish a nominal product-positioning model, in which valuation parameters are assumed to be known. Then, we investigate a static robust product-positioning problem with the multinomial logit model to obtain the maximin revenue. We also propose a two-period dynamic robust model. For each setting, we consider both homogeneous and heterogeneous customers' preferences. Finally, numerical experiments are presented to compare the nominal model with the static robust model, and to compare the static robust model with the dynamic robust model. The experiments show that when facing uncertain parameters, the robust model obtains more stable revenue than the nominal model; the dynamic robust model obtains higher revenue than the static robust model. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Reverse auctions with multiattributes are widely used for centralized procurements of large enterprises and government departments. The bid evaluation mechanism is a key factor for a fair auction and resource allocation. The current bid evaluation process is usually done by two groups, a business expert group and a technical expert group, separately. Taking bounded rationality as a precondition, we analyze the existence of antagonistic feelings between the two groups. The antagonistic feelings may grow as time goes by. To verify the discovered points, a multiagent-based approach is used to simulate the bid evaluation behaviors. The prototype system of a current bid evaluation mechanism is described by a multiagent model. In the model, the behaviors of both auctioneer and bidders are described by the attributes of each agent and decision rules. Their interactions are described by the collaboration and information exchange between different agents. The procedure of multiagent simulation is specifically presented. Then, the multiagent simulation system is developed and repeatedly runs on the platform of MATLAB GUI while adjusting relevant parameters. The results demonstrate that the behaviors of raising and repressing bid scores are increasingly severe with the passage of time. The result is that differences between the two groups increase with a decrease in the objectiveness of experts. The accumulation of antagonistic feelings can be obviously observed. The current mechanism is unfair to the bidders, as it may make the best bid lose the auction. To solve this problem, two modified bid evaluation mechanisms are suggested. The simulation comparison results show that the new bid evaluation mechanisms can efficiently weaken the antagonistic feelings of the two groups. Finally, three constructive suggestions are put forward to the organizer of tendering and bidding. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]