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This paper demonstrates that false data injection (FDI) attacks are extremely limited in their ability to cause physical consequences on $N-1$ reliable power systems operating with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) and security constrained economic dispatch (SCED). Prior work has shown that FDI attacks can be designed via an attacker-defender bi-level linear program (ADBLP) to cause physical overflows after re-dispatch using DCOPF. In this paper, it is shown that attacks designed using DCOPF fail to cause overflows on $N-1$ reliable systems because the system response modeled is inaccurate. An ADBLP that accurately models the system response is proposed to find the worst-case physical consequences, thereby modeling a strong attacker with system level knowledge. Simulation results on the synthetic Texas system with 2000 buses show that even with the new enhanced attacks, for systems operated conservatively due to $N-1$ constraints, the designed attacks only lead to post-contingency overflows. Moreover, the attacker must control a large portion of measurements and physically create a contingency in the system to cause consequences. Therefore, it is conceivable but requires an extremely sophisticated attacker to cause physical consequences on $N-1$ reliable power systems operated with RTCA and SCED. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Stochastic optimization can be used to model predictable but uncertain element failures, in an attempt to enhance system reliability in power system operation and planning. In practical applications, such as preventive operation during severe weather, the uncertainty set is often very large. This will lead to two challenges: (i) every possible scenario cannot be practically identified; and (ii) the computational demands of stochastic optimization with a large scenario set cannot be met. To address these challenges, this paper develops a multidimensional scenario selection method, which creates a rather small but representative set of scenarios. The developed method makes use of failure features as well as network features of the elements that may fail, to achieve a superior performance. The simulations studies on a synthetic large-scale Texas system, show the dominant performance of the method compared to existing algorithms in the literature, as well as common industry practices. Due to its effectiveness, the method presented in this paper enables computationally efficient implementation of stochastic power system operation and planning software tools. Such stochastic tools will improve system reliability and efficiency through enhanced use of the existing resources, without requiring any expensive system upgrade. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper proposes a data-driven algorithm for locating the source of forced oscillations and suggests a physical interpretation for the method. By leveraging the sparsity of forced oscillations along with the low-rank nature of synchrophasor data, the problem of source localization under resonance conditions is cast as computing the sparse and low-rank components using Robust Principal Component Analysis (RPCA), which can be efficiently solved by the exact Augmented Lagrange Multiplier method. Based on this problem formulation, an efficient and practically implementable algorithm is proposed to pinpoint the forced oscillation source during real-time operation. Furthermore, theoretical insights are provided for the efficacy of the proposed approach, by use of physical model-based analysis, specifically by highlighting the low-rank nature of the resonance component matrix. Without the availability of system topology information, the proposed method can achieve high localization accuracy in synthetic cases based on benchmark systems and real-world forced oscillations in the power grid of Texas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Ensuring reliable operation of large power systems subjected to multiple outages is a challenging task because of the combinatorial nature of the problem. Traditional approaches for security assessment are often limited by their scope and/or speed, resulting in missing of critical contingencies that could lead to cascading failures. This paper proposes a two-component methodology to enhance power system security. The first component combines an efficient algorithm to detect cut-set saturation (called the feasibility test (FT) algorithm) with real-time contingency analysis (RTCA) to create an integrated corrective action (iCA), whose goal is to secure the system against cut-set saturation as well as critical branch overloads. The second component only employs the results of the FT to create a relaxed corrective action (rCA) to secure the system against post-contingency cut-set saturation. The first component is more comprehensive, but the latter is computationally more efficient. The effectiveness of the two components is evaluated based upon the number of cascade triggering contingencies alleviated, and the computation time. The results obtained by analyzing different case-studies on the IEEE 118-bus and 2000-bus synthetic Texas systems indicate that the proposed two-component methodology successfully enhances the scope and speed of power system security assessment during multiple outages. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]