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Primary visual cortex (V1) and extrastriate V2 are necessary for the emergence of visual consciousness, but the effects of involvement of extrastriate V3 on visual consciousness is unclear. The objective of this study was to examine the causal role of V3 in visual consciousness in humans. We combined neuronavigated transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) with a computational model of the TMS-induced electric field to test whether or not the intact processing of visual input in V3, like in V1 and V2, is necessary for conscious visual perception. We targeted the stimulation both to V2 and to V3. If TMS of V3 blocks conscious visual perception of stimuli, then activation in V3 is a causally necessary prerequisite for conscious perception of stimuli. According to the alternative hypothesis, TMS of V3 will not block the conscious visual perception of stimuli, because the pathways from V1 to the higher cortical areas that go around V3 provide sufficient visual input for the emergence of conscious visual perception. The results showed that TMS interfered with conscious perception of features, detection of stimulus presence and the ability to discriminate the letter stimuli both when TMS was targeted either to V3 or to V2. For the conscious detection of stimulus presence, the effect was significantly stronger when V2 was stimulated than when V3 was stimulated. The results of the present study suggest that in addition to the primary visual cortex and V2, also V3 causally contributes to the generation of the most basic form of visual consciousness. Importantly, the results also indicate that V3 is necessary for visual perception in general, not only for visual consciousness.

The neural and perceptual mechanisms that support the efficient visual detection of snakes in humans are still not fully understood. According to the Snake Detection Theory, selection pressures posed by snakes on early primates have shaped the development of the visual system. Previous studies in humans have investigated early visual electrophysiological activity in response to snake images vs. various alternative dangerous or non-dangerous stimuli. These studies have shown that the Early Posterior Negativity (EPN) component is selectively elicited by snake or snake-like images. Recent findings yielded the complementary/alternative hypothesis that early humans (and possibly other primates) evolved an aversion especially for potentially harmful triangular shapes, such as teeth, claws or spikes. In the present study we investigated the effect of triangular and diamond-shaped patterns in snake skins on the ERP correlates of visual processing in humans. In the first experiment, we employed pictures of snakes displaying either triangular/diamond-shaped patterns or no particular pattern on their skins, and pictures of frogs as control. Participants observed a random visual presentation of these pictures. Consistent with previous studies, snakes elicited an enhanced negativity between 225 and 300 ms (EPN) compared to frogs. However, snakes featuring triangular/diamond-shaped patterns on their skin produced an enhanced EPN compared to the snakes that did not display such patterns. In a second experiment we used pictures displaying only skin patterns of snakes and frogs. Results from the second experiment confirmed the results of the first experiment, suggesting that triangular snake-skin patterns modulate the activity in human visual cortex. Taken together, our results constitute an important contribution to the snake detection theory.

Environmental psychology has provided evidence for psychologically favorable effects of exposure to natural settings, by means of controlled laboratory experiments as well as outdoor field studies. Most of these studies have employed subjective rating scales to assess processes and outcomes of exposure to nature, while only few of them have used physiological measures to assess the neural correlates of these benefits. The present study used electroencephalography (EEG) to explore how the brain engages in processing of images of natural vs. urban scenery. During EEG recording, the participants (n = 32) were presented with a series of photos depicting urban or natural scenery. Participants rated the sceneries for their subjective relaxing value. Images of natural scenery were rated as more relaxing compared to the images of urban scenery. Event related potentials suggested a lower attentional demand for images of natural scenery compared to urban ones. Signal spectral analyses revealed differences in brain activity level and cognitive demand between natural and urban scenery. Our data suggest that the visual perception of natural environments calls for less attentional and cognitive processing, compared with urban ones. © 2019 Elsevier Ltd

The snake detection hypothesis claims that predatory pressure from snakes has shaped the primate visual system, but we still know very little about how the brain processes evolutionarily important visual cues, and which factors are crucial for quick detection of snakes. We investigated how visual features modulate the electrophysiological markers of early attentional processes. In Experiment 1, we compared snake, rope, gun, and bird images to isolate the effects due to curvilinearity of the stimuli. The results showed that both snake and rope images elicited enhanced P1 and N1 event-related potential components as well as early posterior negativity (EPN). In Experiment 2, we studied whether nonthreatening curvilinear images (i.e., ropes) still elicit the enhanced electrophysiological responses when snake images are not presented as stimuli, and therefore the context does not provoke top-down attention to curvilinear shapes. Rope images still evoked an enhanced EPN, suggesting that curvilinear shapes are preferably captured by attentional processes. However, this effect was smaller than in Experiment 1, in which snake images were present. Thus, our results hint to the possibility that the perceptual context may interact with processing of shape information, drawing attention to curvilinear shapes when the presence of snakes is expectable. Furthermore, we observed that spatial frequency of the visual stimuli modulated especially the early electrophysiological responses, and decreased the differences between stimulus categories in EPN without completely eliminating them. The findings suggest that low-level and high-level mechanisms interact to give an attentional priority to potentially threatening stimuli.

The study of blindsight has revealed a seminal dissociation between conscious vision and visually guided behavior: some patients who are blind due to V1 lesions seem to be able to employ unconscious visual information in their behavior. The standard assumption is that these findings generalize to the neurologically healthy. We tested whether unconscious processing of motion is possible without the contribution of V1 in neurologically healthy participants by disturbing activity in V1 using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS). Unconscious processing was measured with redundant target effect (RTE), a phenomenon where participants respond faster to two stimuli than to one stimulus, when the task is just to respond as fast as possible when one stimulus or two simultaneous stimuli are presented. We measured the RTE caused by a motion stimulus. V1 activity was interfered with different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA) to test whether TMS delivered in a specific time window suppresses conscious perception (participant reports seeing only one of the two stimuli) but does not affect unconscious processing (RTE). We observed that at each SOA, when TMS suppressed conscious perception of the stimulus, the RTE was also eliminated. However, when visibility of the redundant target was suppressed with a visual mask, we found unconscious processing of motion. This suggests that unconscious processing of motion depends on V1 in neurologically healthy humans. We conclude that the neural mechanisms that enable motion processing in blindsight are modulated by neuroplastic changes in connectivity between subcortical areas and the visual cortex after the V1 lesion. Neurologically healthy observers cannot process motion unconsciously without functioning of V1.

Are synaesthetic experiences congenital and so hard-wired, or can a functional analogue be created? We induced an equivalent of form-colour synaesthesia using hypnotic suggestions in which symbols in an array (circles, crosses, squares) were suggested always to have a certain colour. In a Stroop type-naming task, three of the four highly hypnotizable participants showed a strong synaesthesia-type association between symbol and colour. This was verified both by their subjective reports and objective eye-movement behaviour. Two resembled a projector-and one an associator-type synaesthete. Participant interviews revealed that subjective experiences differed somewhat from typical (congenital) synaesthesia. Control participants who mimicked the task using cognitive strategies showed a very different response pattern. Overall, the results show that the targeted, preconsciously triggered associations and perceptual changes seen in association with congenital synaesthesia can rapidly be induced by hypnosis. They suggest that each participant's subjective experience of the task should be carefully evaluated, especially when studying hypnotic hallucinations. Studying such experiences can increase understanding of perception, automaticity, and awareness and open unique opportunities in cognitive neuroscience and consciousness research.

Are synaesthetic experiences congenital and so hard-wired, or can a functional analogue be created? We induced an equivalent of form-colour synaesthesia using hypnotic suggestions in which symbols in an array (circles, crosses, squares) were suggested always to have a certain colour. In a Stroop type-naming task, three of the four highly hypnotizable participants showed a strong synaesthesia-type association between symbol and colour. This was verified both by their subjective reports and objective eye-movement behaviour. Two resembled a projector-and one an associator-type synaesthete. Participant interviews revealed that subjective experiences differed somewhat from typical (congenital) synaesthesia. Control participants who mimicked the task using cognitive strategies showed a very different response pattern. Overall, the results show that the targeted, preconsciously triggered associations and perceptual changes seen in association with congenital synaesthesia can rapidly be induced by hypnosis. They suggest that each participant's subjective experience of the task should be carefully evaluated, especially when studying hypnotic hallucinations. Studying such experiences can increase understanding of perception, automaticity, and awareness and open unique opportunities in cognitive neuroscience and consciousness research.

Are synaesthetic experiences congenital and so hard-wired, or can a functional analogue be created? We induced an equivalent of form-colour synaesthesia using hypnotic suggestions in which symbols in an array (circles, crosses, squares) were suggested always to have a certain colour. In a Stroop type-naming task, three of the four highly hypnotizable participants showed a strong synaesthesia-type association between symbol and colour. This was verified both by their subjective reports and objective eye-movement behaviour. Two resembled a projector-and one an associator-type synaesthete. Participant interviews revealed that subjective experiences differed somewhat from typical (congenital) synaesthesia. Control participants who mimicked the task using cognitive strategies showed a very different response pattern. Overall, the results show that the targeted, preconsciously triggered associations and perceptual changes seen in association with congenital synaesthesia can rapidly be induced by hypnosis. They suggest that each participant's subjective experience of the task should be carefully evaluated, especially when studying hypnotic hallucinations. Studying such experiences can increase understanding of perception, automaticity, and awareness and open unique opportunities in cognitive neuroscience and consciousness research.

Are synaesthetic experiences congenital and so hard-wired, or can a functional analogue be created? We induced an equivalent of form-colour synaesthesia using hypnotic suggestions in which symbols in an array (circles, crosses, squares) were suggested always to have a certain colour. In a Stroop type-naming task, three of the four highly hypnotizable participants showed a strong synaesthesia-type association between symbol and colour. This was verified both by their subjective reports and objective eye-movement behaviour. Two resembled a projector-and one an associator-type synaesthete. Participant interviews revealed that subjective experiences differed somewhat from typical (congenital) synaesthesia. Control participants who mimicked the task using cognitive strategies showed a very different response pattern. Overall, the results show that the targeted, preconsciously triggered associations and perceptual changes seen in association with congenital synaesthesia can rapidly be induced by hypnosis. They suggest that each participant's subjective experience of the task should be carefully evaluated, especially when studying hypnotic hallucinations. Studying such experiences can increase understanding of perception, automaticity, and awareness and open unique opportunities in cognitive neuroscience and consciousness research.

Detecting the presence of an object is a different process than identifying the object as a particular object. This difference has not been taken into account in designing experiments on the neural correlates of consciousness. We compared the electrophysiological correlates of conscious detection and identification directly by measuring ERPs while participants performed either a task only requiring the conscious detection of the stimulus or a higher-level task requiring its conscious identification. Behavioral results showed that, even if the stimulus was consciously detected, it was not necessarily identified. A posterior electrophysiological signature 200-300 msec after stimulus onset was sensitive for conscious detection but not for conscious identification, which correlated with a later widespread activity. Thus, we found behavioral and neural evidence for elementary visual experiences, which are not yet enriched with higher-level knowledge. The search for the mechanisms of consciousness should focus on the early elementary phenomenal experiences to avoid the confounding effects of higher-level processes.

Clinical data and behavioral studies using transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) suggest right-hemisphere dominance for top-down modulation of visual processing in humans. We used concurrent TMS-EEG to directly test for hemispheric differences in causal influences of the right and left intraparietal cortex on visual event-related potentials (ERPs). We stimulated the left and right posterior part of intraparietal sulcus (IPS1) while the participants were viewing and rating the visibility of bilaterally presented Gabor patches. Subjective visibility ratings showed that TMS of right IPS shifted the visibility toward the right hemifield, while TMS of left IPS did not have any behavioral effect. TMS of right IPS, but not left one, reduced the amplitude of posterior N1 potential, 180–220 ms after stimulus-onset. The attenuation of N1 occurred bilaterally over the posterior areas of both hemispheres. Consistent with previous TMS-fMRI studies, this finding suggests that the right IPS has top-down control on the neural processing in visual cortex. As N1 most probably reflects reactivation of early visual areas, the current findings support the view that the posterior parietal cortex in the right hemisphere amplifies recurrent interactions in ventral visual areas during the time-window that is critical for conscious perception.

The neural mechanisms underlying conscious and unconscious visual processes remain controversial. Blindsight patients may process visual stimuli unconsciously despite their VI lesion, promoting anatomical models, which suggest that pathways bypassing the VI support unconscious vision. On the other hand, physiological models argue that the major geniculostriate pathway via VI is involved in both unconscious and conscious vision, but in different time windows and in different types of neural activity. According to physiological models, feedforward activity via VI to higher areas mediates unconscious processes whereas feedback loops of recurrent activity from higher areas back to VI support conscious vision. With transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) it is possible to study the causal role of a brain region during specific time points in neurologically healthy participants. In the present study, we measured unconscious processing with redundant target effect, a phenomenon where participants respond faster to two stimuli than one even when one of the stimuli is not consciously perceived. We tested the physiological feedforward-feedback model of vision by suppressing conscious vision by interfering selectively either with early or later VI activity with TMS. Our results show that early VI activity (60 ms) is necessary for both unconscious and conscious vision. During later processing stages (90 ms), VI contributes selectively to conscious vision. These findings support the feedforward-feedback-model of consciousness.

Are synaesthetic experiences congenital and so hard-wired, or can a functional analogue be created? We induced an equivalent of form-colour synaesthesia using hypnotic suggestions in which symbols in an array (circles, crosses, squares) were suggested always to have a certain colour. In a Stroop type-naming task, three of the four highly hypnotizable participants showed a strong synaesthesia-type association between symbol and colour. This was verified both by their subjective reports and objective eye-movement behaviour. Two resembled a projector-and one an associator-type synaesthete. Participant interviews revealed that subjective experiences differed somewhat from typical (congenital) synaesthesia. Control participants who mimicked the task using cognitive strategies showed a very different response pattern. Overall, the results show that the targeted, preconsciously triggered associations and perceptual changes seen in association with congenital synaesthesia can rapidly be induced by hypnosis. They suggest that each participant's subjective experience of the task should be carefully evaluated, especially when studying hypnotic hallucinations. Studying such experiences can increase understanding of perception, automaticity, and awareness and open unique opportunities in cognitive neuroscience and consciousness research.

Studies on the neural basis of visual awareness, the subjective experience of seeing, have found several potential neural corre- lates of visual awareness. Some of them may not directly correlate with awareness but with post-perceptual processes, such as reporting one’s awareness of the stimulus. We dissociated potential electrophysiological correlates of visual awareness from those occurring during response selection and thus co-occurring with post-perceptual processing. The participants performed two GO-NOGO conditions. In the aware-GO condition they responded with a key press when they were aware of the stimulus and withheld responding when they were unaware of it. In the unaware-GO condition they withheld responding when they were aware and responded when they were not aware of the stimulus. Thus, event-related potentials could be measured to aware and una- ware trials when responding was required and when not required. The results revealed that the N200 amplitude (180–280 ms) over the occipital and posterior temporal cortex was enhanced in aware trials as compared with trials without awareness. This effect (visual awareness negativity, VAN) did not depend on responding. The amplitude of P3 (350–450 ms) also was enhanced in aware trials as compared with unaware trials. In addition, the amplitudes in the P3 time window depended on responding: they were greater when awareness was mapped to GO-response than when not, suggesting that P3 reflects post-perceptual process- ing, that is, it occurs after awareness has emerged. These findings support theories of visual awareness that assume a relatively early onset of visual awareness before P3.

Some highly hypnotizable individuals have reported changes in objects' color with suggestions given in normal waking state. However, it is not clear whether this occurs only in their imagination. The authors show that, although subjects could imagine colors, a posthypnotic suggestion was necessary for seeing altered colors, even for a hypnotic virtuoso. She reported posthypnotic color alterations also selectively in response to specific target shapes in briefly presented object arrays. Surprisingly, another highly hypnotizable person showed a very different pattern of results. The control participants could not simulate virtuosos' results by applying cognitive strategies. The results imply that hypnosis can alter the functioning of automatic visual processes but only in some of the most hypnotizable individuals.

A fundamental unsettled dispute concerns how fast the brain generates subjective visual experiences. Both early visual cortical activation and later activity in fronto-parietal global neuronal workspace correlate with conscious vision, but resolving which of the correlates causally triggers conscious vision has proved a methodological impasse. We show that participants can report whether or not they consciously perceived a stimulus in just over 200 ms. These fast consciousness reports were extremely reliable, and did not include reflexive, unconscious responses. The neural events that causally generate conscious vision must have occurred before these behavioral reports. Analyses on single-trial neural correlates of consciousness revealed that the late cortical processing in fronto-parietal global neuronal workspace (∼300 ms) started after the fastest consciousness reports, ruling out the possibility that this late activity directly reflects the emergence of visual consciousness. The consciousness reports were preceded by a negative amplitude difference (∼160–220 ms) that spread from occipital to frontal cortex, suggesting that this correlate underlies the emergence of conscious vision.

Humans are rapid in categorizing natural scenes. Electrophysiological recordings reveal that scenes containing animals can be categorized within 150 msec, which has been interpreted to indicate that feedforward flow of information from V1 to higher visual areas is sufficient for visual categorization. However, recent studies suggest that recurrent interactions between higher and lower levels in the visual hierarchy may also be involved in categorization. To clarify the role of recurrent processing in scene categorization, we recorded EEG and manipulated recurrent processing with object substitution masking while the participants performed a go/no-go animal/nonanimal categorization task. The quality of visual awareness was measured with a perceptual awareness scale after each trial. Masking reduced the clarity of perceptual awareness, slowed down categorization speed for scenes that were not clearly perceived, and reduced the electrophysiological difference elicited by animal and nonanimal scenes after 150 msec. The results imply that recurrent processes enhance the resolution of conscious representations and thus support categorization of stimuli that are difficult to categorize on the basis of the coarse feedforward representations alone.

The authors studied whether a posthypnotic suggestion to see a brief, masked target as gray can change the color experience of a hypnotic virtuoso. The visibility of the target was manipulated by varying the delay between the target and the mask that followed it. The virtuoso's subjective reports indicated that her conscious color experience was altered already at short delays between the target and the subsequent mask. The virtuoso's objectively measured pattern of responding under posthypnotic suggestion could not be mimicked either by control participants nor the virtuoso herself. Due to posthypnotic amnesia, the virtuoso was unaware of suggestions given during hypnosis. Importantly, the virtuoso could not alter her color perception without a hypnotic suggestion. These results suggest that hypnosis can affect even a highly automatic process such as color perception.

Hypnotic suggestions may change the perceived color of objects. Given that chromatic stimulus information is processed rapidly and automatically by the visual system, how can hypnotic suggestions affect perceived colors in a seemingly immediate fashion? We studied the mechanisms of such color alterations by measuring electroencephalography in two highly suggestible participants as they perceived briefly presented visual shapes under posthypnotic color alternation suggestions such as "all the squares are blue''. One participant consistently reported seeing the suggested colors. Her reports correlated with enhanced evoked upper beta-band activity (22 Hz) 70-120 ms after stimulus in response to the shapes mentioned in the suggestion. This effect was not observed in a control condition where the participants merely tried to simulate the effects of the suggestion on behavior. The second participant neither reported color alterations nor showed the evoked beta activity, although her subjective experience and event-related potentials were changed by the suggestions. The results indicate a preconscious mechanism that first compares early visual input with a memory representation of the suggestion and consequently triggers the color alteration process in response to the objects specified by the suggestion. Conscious color experience is not purely the result of bottom-up processing but it can be modulated, at least in some individuals, by top-down factors such as hypnotic suggestions.

During prolonged viewing of ambiguous stimuli, such as Necker cubes, sudden perceptual reversals occur from one perceptual interpretation to another. The role of attention in such reversals is not clear. We tested whether perceptual reversals depend on attentional resources by manipulating perceptual load and recording event-related potentials (ERPs) during intermittent presentation of Necker stimuli. The results did not reveal any influence for perceptual load on the frequency of reversals. The ERPs showed that perceptual load influenced electrophysiological activity over parieto-central areas in the P1 time window (110–140 ms), but load did not modify the early enhancements of positivity (30–140 ms), which correlated with perceptual reversals at occipito-temporal sites. We conclude that disambiguation of ambiguous figures is based on early mechanisms that can work efficiently with only a minimal amount of attentional resources.

It has been suggested that unconscious visual processing of some stimulus features might occur without the contribution of early visual cortex (V1/V2). In the present study, the causal role of V1/V2 in unconscious processing of simple shapes in intact human brain was studied by applying transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) on early visual cortex or lateral occipital cortex (LO) while observers performed a metacontrast-masked response priming task with arrow figures as visual stimuli. Magnetic stimulation of V1/V2 impaired masked priming 3090 ms after the onset of the prime. Stimulation of LO reduced the magnitude of masked priming at 90120 ms, but this effect occurred only in the early parts of the priming experiment. A control task measuring the visibility of masked primes indicated that the orientation of masked primes could not be consciously discriminated and that TMS did not influence the conscious visibility of the primes indirectly by reducing the effectiveness of the mask in the critical time windows. We conclude that feedforward sweep of processing from V1/V2 (3090 ms) to LO (90 ms and above) is necessary for unconscious priming of shape, whereas conscious perception requires also the contribution of recurrent (feedback) processing.

The primary visual cortex (V1) has been shown to be critical for visual awareness, but the importance of other low-level visual areas has remained unclear. To clarify the role of human cortical area V2 in visual awareness, we applied transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) over V2 while participants were carrying out a visual discrimination task and rating their subjective awareness. Individual retinotopic maps and modelling of the TMS-induced electric field in V1, V2 and V3d ensured that the electric field was at or under the phosphene threshold level in V1 and V3d, whereas in V2 it was at the higher suppressive level. As earlier shown for the V1, our results imply that also V2 is necessary for conscious visual experience. Visual awareness of stimulus presence was completely suppressed when the TMS pulse was delivered 44-84 ms after the onset of visual stimulus. Visual discrimination and awareness of stimulus features was impaired when the TMS pulse was delivered 44-104 ms after the visual stimulus onset. These results suggest that visual awareness cannot be generated without an intact V2. (C) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Chromatic information is processed by the visual system both at an unconscious level and at a level that results in conscious perception of color. It remains unclear whether both conscious and unconscious processing of chromatic information depend on activity in the early visual cortex or whether unconscious chromatic processing can also rely on other neural mechanisms. In this study, the contribution of early visual cortex activity to conscious and unconscious chromatic processing was studied using single-pulse TMS in three time windows 40-100 msec after stimulus onset in three conditions: conscious color recognition, forced-choice discrimination of consciously invisible color, and unconscious color priming. We found that conscious perception and both measures of unconscious processing of chromatic information depended on activity in early visual cortex 70-100 msec after stimulus presentation. Unconscious forced-choice discrimination was above chance only when participants reported perceiving some stimulus features (but not color).

The primary visual cortex (V1) has been the target of stimulation in a number of transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) studies. In this study, we estimated the actual sites of stimulation by modeling the cortical location of the TMS-induced electric field when participants reported visual phosphenes or scotomas. First, individual retinotopic areas were identified by multifocal functional magnetic resonance imaging (mffMRI). Second, during the TMS stimulation, the cortical stimulation sites were derived from electric field modeling. When an external anatomical landmark for V1 was used (2 cm above inion), the cortical stimulation landed in various functional areas in different individuals, the dorsal V2 being the most affected area at the group level. When V1 was specifically targeted based on the individual mffMRI data, V1 could be selectively stimulated in half of the participants. In the rest, the selective stimulation of V1 was obstructed by the intermediate position of the dorsal V2. We conclude that the selective stimulation of V1 is possible only if V1 happens to be favorably located in the individual anatomy. Selective and successful targeting of TMS pulses to V1 requires MRI-navigated stimulation, selection of participants and coil positions based on detailed retinotopic maps of individual functional anatomy, and computational modeling of the TMS-induced electric field distribution in the visual cortex. It remains to be resolved whether even more selective stimulation of V1 could be achieved by adjusting the coil orientation according to sulcal orientation of the target site. Hum Brain Mapp, 2012. (C) 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.

Humans are able to categorize complex natural scenes very rapidly and effortlessly, which has led to an assumption that such ultra-rapid categorization is driven by feedforward activation of ventral brain areas. However, recent accounts of visual perception stress the role of recurrent interactions that start rapidly after the activation of V1. To study whether or not recurrent processes play a causal role in categorization, we applied fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation on early visual cortex (V1/V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) while the participants categorized natural images as containing animals or not. The results showed that V1/V2 contributed to categorization speed and to subjective perception during a long activity period before and after the contribution of LO had started. This pattern of results suggests that recurrent interactions in visual cortex between areas along the ventral stream and striate cortex play a causal role in categorization and perception of natural scenes.

Humans are able to categorize complex natural scenes very rapidly and effortlessly, which has led to an assumption that such ultra-rapid categorization is driven by feedforward activation of ventral brain areas. However, recent accounts of visual perception stress the role of recurrent interactions that start rapidly after the activation of V1. To study whether or not recurrent processes play a causal role in categorization, we applied fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation on early visual cortex (V1/V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) while the participants categorized natural images as containing animals or not. The results showed that V1/V2 contributed to categorization speed and to subjective perception during a long activity period before and after the contribution of LO had started. This pattern of results suggests that recurrent interactions in visual cortex between areas along the ventral stream and striate cortex play a causal role in categorization and perception of natural scenes.

Humans are able to categorize complex natural scenes very rapidly and effortlessly, which has led to an assumption that such ultra-rapid categorization is driven by feedforward activation of ventral brain areas. However, recent accounts of visual perception stress the role of recurrent interactions that start rapidly after the activation of V1. To study whether or not recurrent processes play a causal role in categorization, we applied fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation on early visual cortex (V1/V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) while the participants categorized natural images as containing animals or not. The results showed that V1/V2 contributed to categorization speed and to subjective perception during a long activity period before and after the contribution of LO had started. This pattern of results suggests that recurrent interactions in visual cortex between areas along the ventral stream and striate cortex play a causal role in categorization and perception of natural scenes.

Humans are able to categorize complex natural scenes very rapidly and effortlessly, which has led to an assumption that such ultra-rapid categorization is driven by feedforward activation of ventral brain areas. However, recent accounts of visual perception stress the role of recurrent interactions that start rapidly after the activation of V1. To study whether or not recurrent processes play a causal role in categorization, we applied fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation on early visual cortex (V1/V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) while the participants categorized natural images as containing animals or not. The results showed that V1/V2 contributed to categorization speed and to subjective perception during a long activity period before and after the contribution of LO had started. This pattern of results suggests that recurrent interactions in visual cortex between areas along the ventral stream and striate cortex play a causal role in categorization and perception of natural scenes.

Event-related potential (ERP) studies have attempted to discover the processes that underlie conscious visual perception by contrasting ERPs produced by stimuli that are consciously perceived with those that are not. Variability of the proposed ERP correlates of consciousness is considerable: the earliest proposed ERP correlate of consciousness (P1) coincides with sensory processes and the last one (P3) marks postperceptual processes. A negative difference wave called visual awareness negativity (VAN), typically observed around 200 ms after stimulus onset in occipitotemporal sites, gains strong support for eflecting the processes that correlate with, and possibly enable, aware visual perception. Research suggests that the early parts of conscious processing can proceed independently of top-down attention, although top-down attention may modulate visual processing even before consciousness. Evidence implies that the contents of consciousness are provided by interactions in the ventral stream, but indispensable contributions from dorsal regions influence already low level visual responses.

Humans are able to categorize complex natural scenes very rapidly and effortlessly, which has led to an assumption that such ultra-rapid categorization is driven by feedforward activation of ventral brain areas. However, recent accounts of visual perception stress the role of recurrent interactions that start rapidly after the activation of V1. To study whether or not recurrent processes play a causal role in categorization, we applied fMRI-guided transcranial magnetic stimulation on early visual cortex (V1/V2) and lateral occipital cortex (LO) while the participants categorized natural images as containing animals or not. The results showed that V1/V2 contributed to categorization speed and to subjective perception during a long activity period before and after the contribution of LO had started. This pattern of results suggests that recurrent interactions in visual cortex between areas along the ventral stream and striate cortex play a causal role in categorization and perception of natural scenes.